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Abstract 
This dissertation examines Canada’s copyright law reform in the information age. 
The overarching theme of my research underscores the importance of considering the 
purpose(s) of copyright law and the public interest while navigating the copyright law reform 
process. Additionally, I advocate that in regulating the influence of technology in the 
copyright system, the default approach should aim to objectively balance the interests of 
stakeholders to the extent possible. Ultimately, recognizing that stakeholders will continue to 
develop pragmatic responses to the changing landscape through private contracting and 
technological measures, I suggest that embracing regulatory pluralism is the most promising 
path towards achieving balanced copyright in the digital age. I develop these arguments over 
six chapters. 
In chapter one, I trace the contours of the origin and rationale of copyright 
protection, which culminated in the enactment of the first copyright law – the Statute of 
Anne of 1710. I examine the divergent views of copyright scholars on the specific 
reasons for enacting the Statute of Anne. Furthermore, I consider the purpose of copyright 
law in the Canadian context, and how it has evolved over the years, especially with 
judicial interpretations by the Supreme Court of Canada.  
In chapter two, I examine the advent and impact of digital technology on the 
traditional copyright system. The already tensed copyright industry now faces a paradigm 
shift created by digital technology, which disrupts the traditional copyright business model 
by facilitating copying and mass distribution, as well as presenting new and easier modes 
of creativity. The need to address the challenges that digital technology poses to the 
copyright system inevitably produces calls for copyright law reforms. The WIPO Internet 
Treaties, which sought to make member states reform their national copyright laws to 
address challenges presented by digital technology, are a perfect example. 
My focus in chapter three captures Canada’s intriguing copyright law reform process 
as prompted by the WIPO Internet Treaties. I examine the background and buildup to the 
WIPO Internet Treaties as well as Canada’s attempts to implement the Treaties. My 
analysis in this chapter raises concerns about whether copyright law reform in the 
technology age can adequately cope with the complex dynamics of the current copyright 
system. 
Next, I embark on a case study of what I label the “free culture” and the 
“content industry” stakeholders. First, in chapter four, I delve into a detailed examination 
of the free culture stakeholder group through the lens of the Creative Commons licensing 
movement. My analysis of the Creative Commons licensing scheme traces its origin, 
objectives, conceptual framework, licence categories and how they operate, and its 
ideological approach to copyright in the digital age. Chapter five follows with a critical 
examination of the content industry stakeholders using technological protection measures as 
a reference for analysis. I discuss the various forms of technological protection measures 
and how they operate. I also interrogate the underlying approach to copyright and arguments 
that support the use of technological protection measures and the push for their 
incorporation into copyright law in the digital technology landscape. 
The case studies in chapters four and five provide the context for chapter six. In 
this concluding chapter, I engage with the arguments that each set of stakeholders advance to 
justify their respective approaches to copyright and their use of these private ordering 
devices. Furthermore, in chapter six, I recommend embracing a regulatory pluralism 
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approach to understanding copyright policy in the information age. The regulatory pluralism 
recommendation is premised on the idea that the copyright system should be receptive to 
new and multi-stakeholder regulatory and private ordering initiatives, since reliance on 
copyright law alone is increasingly insufficient to regulate the activities of creators, 
consumers and the content industry. In addition to the challenges of implementing the 
WIPO Internet Treaties, a brief examination of the current Copyright Act review process 
underscores that copyright law reform alone is inadequate to deal with the challenges of 
copyright in the information era. This is not to say that legislative reform has no role to 
play. As an illustrative example, I recommend some salient reforms that are intended to 
balance the interests of users and copyright owners in relation to the current digital locks’ 
regime in Canada. 
Ultimately, I explain the importance of regulatory pluralism in the copyright 
context based on three main points: the need to 1) deemphasize over-reliance on copyright 
law reform; 2) encourage stakeholder-led regulatory practices; and 3) embrace innovative 
information and communications technology as an instrument to advance the purposes of 
copyright while serving as a platform for stakeholders to pursue their interests. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
This dissertation examines Canada’s copyright law reform in the digital landscape. 
Specifically, I focus on Canada’s copyright law reform journey towards the implementation of 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Internet Treaties (hereafter “WITs”) 
adopted by WIPO member states in 1996. Canada’s copyright law reform process, prompted by 
the implementation of the WIT, generated a lot of attention as well as intrigue. In a copyright 
system driven by digital technology and the internet, and with multiple and multi-faceted 
stakeholders, the copyright law reform process in Canada proved to be a lengthy and arduous 
task. The existence of different and conflicting conceptual approaches to copyright and its 
overarching purpose(s) exacerbated the challenges of reform. Consequently, in Canada’s 
implementation of the WITs, my research examines whether due consideration was given to the 
purpose(s) of copyright law and the balance of stakeholders’ interests, and whether digital 
technology was conceptualized as a threat or catalyst to the copyright system.  
For the purpose of my research, I focus on two copyright stakeholder groups, which I 
identify as the “free culture” and the “content industry” communities. The conceptual 
frameworks that underlie my research are what I describe as the “instrumentalist” and “intrinsic” 
approaches to copyright. These conceptual approaches underscore the free culture and the 
content industry’s competing perspectives on copyright law: while the free culture stakeholders’ 
ideology aligns with the intrinsic approach, the instrumentalist approach resonates with the 
content industry stakeholders. I analyze this further using the Creative Commons Licensing 
(hereafter “CCL”) and technological protection measures (hereafter “TPMs”) as case studies for 
the free culture and content industry stakeholders respectively. Both CCL and TPMs provided 
copyright owners with new tools for managing their copyright works and determining how they 
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could be accessed by the public. While CCL relied on existing copyright doctrine, TPMs were 
protected by new legal rules, which were the subject of the most controversial provisions in the 
1996 WITs.  
Unsurprisingly, Canada’s implementation of the TPM and anti-circumvention provisions 
was characterized by disagreements and controversies. Canada’s implementation of the WITs led 
to the enactment of the Copyright Modernization Act, 2012 (hereafter “CMA”). The CMA was 
enacted after three failed legislative attempts over a period of sixteen years since the adoption of 
the WITs in 1996. The delay in Canada’s implementation of the WITs is attributable to the 
dynamics of the legislative process, stakeholders’ interests and lobbying, and the task of 
achieving balance in the copyright system. In order to adequately unpack and examine the salient 
points that underpin this research, I discuss issues that help put my arguments in perspective. 
Assessing Canada’s copyright law reform in the era of digitized technology necessitated the 
study of the origin and purpose(s) of copyright law and how digital technology and the internet 
created a paradigm shift in the copyright. 
In chapter one, I therefore delve into the historical analysis of the origin, development 
and the rationale for the eventual enactment of the first copyright law – the Statute of Anne 
(1709). I discuss the interesting beginnings of copyright in seventeenth and eighteenth century 
Britain, including the relentless efforts of the Stationers’ Company to maintain a monopoly over 
printing, the significance of the enactment of the Statute of Anne, and its subsequent judicial 
interpretations.  I then briefly discuss the development and rationale for copyright law in Canada, 
showing how judicial interpretation plays a pivotal role in shaping the direction of copyright law 
in the modern age. I conclude that the challenges of copyright in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century still exist today, albeit in different forms.  
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The impact of technology on the copyright system is a cardinal focus of my research, 
therefore chapter two explores the paradigm shift created by digital technology and the internet 
in the sphere of copyright. Digital technology and the internet made the digitization of content 
possible; furthermore, it made content creation and dissemination significantly easy and 
inexpensive. While the emergence of technology simplifies creativity and enables the ubiquity of 
creative content, it raises some serious concerns about unauthorized access to and use of 
copyright-protected content. Consequently, I discuss the concept of digital information and 
communications technologies (ICT) and, in particular, whether they should be conceptualized as 
a threat to the copyright system, or an opportunity to advance its objectives. I examine this issue 
through the lenses of the free culture and content industry stakeholders and their respective 
approaches (intrinsic and instrumental) to copyright. 
Chapter three details Canada’s journey towards the implementation of the WITs and 
considers how well the implementation mirrors the purposes of copyright law and the goals of 
balance amongst copyright stakeholders. I set the context for this analysis by examining the 
origins, debates, controversies surrounding the TPMs provisions and the role the United States 
played both during the development of the WITs and their eventual implementation in Canada. 
Chapter four and five embody a comparative analysis of the free culture and the content 
industry stakeholders. I provide a detailed analysis and critique of both the free culture and the 
content industry stakeholders. On the one hand, in chapter four, I examine the free culture 
stakeholders using the CCL scheme, while on the other hand, chapter five is devoted to the study 
of the content industry with specific focus on TPMs.  
Chapter six assesses the critique of both the free culture (using CCL) and the content 
industry (using TPMs) against the backdrop of the purposes of copyright law, balance in the 
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copyright system in the digital context and the public interest. I then set out the context for my 
recommendations to address copyright challenges identified in this dissertation. First, I reiterate 
the challenges discussed in the dissertation, namely: 1) that the monopoly and control practices 
of the defunct Stationers’ Company still exists presently in the copyright system, 2) the difficulty 
of managing the impact of ICT on copyright and creativity, 3) the inadequacy of copyright law 
reform alone to deal with the dynamics of digital technology, and 4) the difficulty in reconciling 
the differences in copyright ideology between the free culture and the content industry 
stakeholders.  
Secondly, I make some recommendations by proposing a regulatory pluralism approach 
to understanding copyright law reform. This means embracing multi-stakeholder initiatives and 
ground-up regulatory practices that represent a shift from the sole reliance on copyright law 
reform to regulate copyright activities and its stakeholders as technologies change. Fittingly, I 
draw on Canada’s experience and the ongoing copyright law review process to show that law 
reform is time-consuming, complex, and susceptible to the influence of lobbyists, internal 
politics and international interests. Consequently, my regulatory pluralism approach hinges on 1) 
de-emphasizing the over-reliance on copyright law reform, 2) encouraging stakeholder-led 
regulatory practices, and 3) embracing ICT as a useful tool in the copyright system that fosters 
the realization of the purposes of copyright law and the attainment of balance among copyright 
stakeholders. This is not to say that legislative reform has no role to play in helping to 
maintain the copyright balance as technologies and practices evolve. B y way of illustration, 
following the incorporation of TPMs and their legal protection into copyright law in Canada, I 
conclude by making a case for some amendments to Canada’s copyright law that could 
potentially mitigate the harshness of the current TPM regime.       
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1. Theoretical Framework 
 
I conducted this research using a combination of two theoretical perspectives: the 
instrumental and the intrinsic conceptualizations of copyright. I will explain these two 
theoretical approaches, why I chose them and their usefulness to my research project.  
1.1 Instrumental Approach  
The instrumental perspective advocates for a copyright system where creativity is based 
on the promise of rewards; copyright protection is construed as a means to an end, with the end 
largely being financial benefit. This approach is based on the instrumental value of copyright as a 
means to an end,1 in the sense that the beneficial effects2 of copyright are strongly believed to be 
a necessary ingredient to encourage creativity. The instrumentalist conception of copyright 
therefore rests on a system of incentives, which ensures continuous innovation and creation of 
cultural works. This concept of copyright is not new and even pre-dates the Statute of Anne. In 
their rhetoric and campaign for the renewal of their exclusive right during the literary property 
debates, the Stationers’ Company used the instrumental approach to justify their cause. Gillian 
Davies observed: 
Parliament was regularly petitioned, therefore for a new Licensing 
Act. The booksellers argued that failure to continue the exclusive 
rights of printing had resulted in disincentives to writers. Without 
some form of protection to encourage authors, the public interest 
would be harmed by the decreased flow of works.3  
  
It is not unsurprising that the Stationers’ Company favoured this approached to copyright 
because their interest in the book trade was primary motivated by financial gain. The 
 
1 Lee Edwards et al, “Discourse, justification and critique: towards a legitimate copyright regime?” (2015)21 International 
Journal of Cultural Policy 60 at 61citing Drahos P, A philosophy of intellectual property (Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing, 
1996) 
2 Ibid.  
3 Gillian Davies, Copyright and the Public Interest (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) at 11; See also Lyman Patterson, 
Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968) at 142.  
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instrumental notion of copyright as a system of incentive is highly popular among the school of 
thought referred to as maximalists.4 Adherents to this school often favour the proposition that 
providing economic incentives through a system of intellectual property (copyright in this case) 
is crucial to progress, and without them there would be a dearth of creativity.5 They claim that 
any reduction in the level of protection would invariably lead to diminished creativity.6 They 
therefore condemn free-riding as undermining necessary incentives to create.7 A pertinent 
question that may be difficult for proponents of the incentive-based theory to answer is whether 
creativity would end if copyright law ceased to exist? Surely not, of course, and this proves that 
some creators are not motivated to create by financial rewards.  
In my view, the instrumental approach to copyright has three cardinal points: 1) strict 
copyright protection 2) a system of incentives and 3) continuous creativity, which is claimed to 
be enhanced by rewards/incentives. It is understandable why many supporters of the instrumental 
concept of copyright call for stricter copyright protection – it grants exclusive but limited 
monopoly rights, which in turn create artificial scarcity. Access to these protected works can then 
be granted for a fee, which is the reward or benefit to the creator to spur further creativity. Dr. 
Samuel Johnson’s view supports the incentive-based system of copyright: “no man but a 
blockhead ever wrote except for money.”8  
 
4 Deborah Halbert, The State Of Copyright - The Complex Relationships Of Cultural Creation In A Globalized World, 
(Abingdon, Routledge,2014) at 12. “By intellectual property maximalist I mean several things. Intellectual property maximalist 
do not believe that the current protective levels are sufficient, and thus advocate for longer terms, broader protection and 
enhanced punishment for violations.” For the purpose of my research, I will refrain from using the term “maximalist” except 
where I am directly quoting an author. The reason is that the so-called maximalists do not refer themselves as such but it is a term 
with which critics have labeled them. I prefer to use the term content industry instead.   
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Mark Lemley, “Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding” (2005) 83 Texas L.Rev. at 12 at online: < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=982977  > accessed September 14, 2019.  
8 Quoted by Davies, The Public Interest, supra note 3 at 15.  
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 Proponents of the instrumentalist discourse of copyright adduce several reasons to justify 
their approach to copyright. Karla O’Regan states that the incentive principle is the basis for the 
instrumentalist justification of copyright.9 Through this lens, the grant of protection encourages 
authors to create and disseminate their work; the absence of protection would therefore lead to 
less creativity and dissemination of works.10 Furthermore, the instrumentalist perspective claims 
to serve the public interest because copyright aids the establishment of an efficient market that 
creates benefits for consumers and the national economy.11 In a bid to defend their support for a 
copyright regime based on the incentive model, Lee Edwards et al report the submission of 
Warner Bros. as follows: 
Intellectual property rights are the cornerstone to facilitating, 
creating, distributing, and monetizing creative works. If one thinks 
of the media and entertainment industries as built upon creativity, 
then the industry looks at protection and growth of creativity as 
resting upon intellectual property protection.12      
 
The content industry stakeholders seek to legitimize their perspective on copyright on the 
ground that the creative works they produce give enjoyment and satisfaction to users, create 
employment, generate revenue through the export of creative works and contribute to national 
economy. The buy-in into the instrumentalist idea is widely embraced and popular among the 
content industry stakeholders and generally acclaimed to be a source of motivation for creative 
production. It forms the basis upon which most copyright legislation is drafted and rationalized. 
Davies notes that just reward for labour provides stimulus for creativity and both are inseparably 
 
9 Kala O’Regan, “Downloading Personhood: A Hegelian Theory of Copyright Law” (2010) 7 C.J.L.T. 1 at 13 at online: < 
https://ojs.library.dal.ca/CJLT/article/viewFile/5213/4709> accessed March 8, 2017. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Edwards, Discourse, Justification and Critique, supra note 1 at 69. 
12 Ibid.  
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linked.13 Though this claim could be contested, it is supported by the Statute of Anne 
(encouragement of learned men to compose and write useful books) and the United States 
Constitution (to promote the progress of science) both of which emphasize the importance of 
copyright protection as a stimulant for creativity.14 It is believed that the public interest is 
advanced when creators are encouraged (through the anticipation of rewards) to create and 
disseminate their works, which in turn inspire further creativity.  
As O’Regan explains,15 the economic or market efficiency justification of the 
instrumentalist theory of copyright is largely attributed to Ronald Coase16 who asserted that the 
creation and dissemination of property was attributable to the perceived efficiency of market 
transactions.17 The import of this claim seeks to justify the fact that property rights are able to 
function as a form of incentive18 to enhance an efficient copyright market. 
Despite its prevalence in the mainstream of copyright discourse, the instrumentalist 
theory of copyright is criticized for its strong emphasis on financial incentive as the sole reason 
for creativity. On this score, Edward et al comment on the instrumentalist notion of copyright 
that “the copyright regime is represented as being essential in order to support and facilitate 
cultural production, indeed, creativity tends to be conflated with the copyright regime, such that 
the only incentive for creativity is financial.”19 Similarly, Diane L. Zimmerman strongly 
challenges the incentive-based system of copyright as a precondition for creativity to occur.20 
 
13 Davies, The Public Interest, supra note 3 at 15. 
14 Ibid.  
15 O’Regan, Downloading Personhood, supra note 9 at 13. 
16 Ronald Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) 3 J.L & Econ. 1.  
17 Timothy J. Brennan, “Copyright, Property, and the Right to Deny” (1993) 68 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 675 at 691 cited in 
“O’Regan, Downloading Personhood, supra note 8 at 13” 
18 Ibid.  
19 Edward et al, Discourse, Justification and Critique, supra note 1 at 69 
20 Diane L. Zimmerman, “Copyright as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That? (2011) 12 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 28 at 31 at 
online: < http://www7.tau.ac.il/ojs/index.php/til/article/view/766/724 > accessed March 9, 2017.  
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The contrary view (which I subsequently discuss) is that empirical studies21 show that financial 
incentive is not the only—or even the primary—source of motivation for creativity,22 such that 
the copyright system should not be built on the foundation of financial incentives. 
Another reason the financial reward incentive rhetoric is suspect is that it arguably seems 
to benefit the content industry entities (corporation) more than the average artist or creator who 
can hardly make a living relying solely on the proceeds from her work. Zimmerman presents 
evidence of some empirical studies23 conducted in Britain,24 Canada25 and United States26 
indicating that most individual authors and artists cannot earn a living by solely relying on the 
proceeds from their work. Admittedly, these concerns about the instrumentalist approach are 
 
21 See generally Christopher Buccafusco, et al, “Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Threshold” (2014) 
92 Tex. L. Rev. 1922 at online: < http://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Buccafusco-92-7.pdf > accessed August 
28, 2019; Raymond Ku, et al, “Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empirical Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty” (2009) 
62 Vand. L. Rev. 1669 at online: < https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5aff/aa8dc9f6dc1868b4328ba989ff8716230c15.pdf 
 > accessed August 28, 2019.  
22 Elizabeth Rosenblatt, “A Theory of IP’s Negative Space” (2011) 34 Col. L. J. of Law & The Arts 317 at 321-2, 330-1 at 
online: < file:///Users/aliceogoroh/Downloads/SSRN-id1662661.pdf > accessed August 28, 2019. In analyzing the concept of 
negative space (a term coined by Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman define the term as encompassing any “substantial area 
of creativity” in which intellectual property laws do not penetrate or provide only very limited propertization. Put differently, the 
industries in IP’s negative space exist in a “low-IP equilibrium,” where intellectual property protection is absent, or largely so, 
but creation continues) Rosenblatt contends that the motivation for creativity is not limited to financial incentives alone. 
23 Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives, supra note 20 at 38. 
24 PR Newswire, “New Research Still Confirms UK Writers Struggle to Survive” March 8, 2007, at online: < 
http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/news-releases/new-research-confirms-uk-writers-still-struggle-to-survive-156139775.html > 
accessed March 13, 2017. Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society (ALCU) commissioned the Centre for Intellectual Property 
Policy and Management (CIPPM), Bournemouth University to conduct research into authors' earnings in the UK compared with 
those of German authors. The results are based on a survey of 25,000 authors in the two countries. Key findings of the study 
shows that only the top 10% of authors in UK reap real rewards, a typical author earns 33% less than the national average wage, 
60% of professional writers need another job to survive and only 20% of writers earn all their income from writing.   
25 Kelly Hill and Kathleen Capriotti, “A Statistical Profile of Artists in Canada Based on the 2006 Census” (2009) 7 Statistical 
Insights on the Arts 1 at 11 at online: < http://www.hillstrategies.com/content/statistical-profile-artists-canada > at 12 and 24. 
Accessed March 13, 2017. A typical visual artist earned about $8,000 from his or her work in 2005. The findings of the research 
reveal that the average earnings of authors and writers stood at $32,045 and those of visual artists was $13,976. The researched 
also presented data on the earnings of self-employed and paid authors and visual artists – self-employed authors and writers 
earned $10,125 and their counterpart in paid employment earned $14,375. Self-employed visual artists earned $11,035 and their 
counterparts in paid employment earned $6,000.    
26 Paul William Kingston & Jonathan R. Cole, “Economic and Social Aspects of the Literary Situation” (1983) 47 Pub. Opinion 
Q. 361, 366 “cited in Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives, supra note 20 at 38-9.” “A U.S. survey by Kingston and Cole, 
reported in 1983, concluded that “writing yields little economic return: the median writing-related income at the time was $4,775 
(which worked out to be a return of a little under $5.00 an hour). The researchers in that study found that 70 percent of those 
surveyed either held full time jobs or spent several hours each week on outside work to make ends meet. The support of spouses, 
they noted, is often necessary to allow individuals to devote significant blocks of time to the practice of their craft.” 
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genuine but the advocates of the approach also have some positive claim to justify their 
viewpoint.  
In applying the instrumentalist idea in my research, my intention is not to discredit the 
approach but to critique its pros and cons. Furthermore, it is pertinent to state here that there is a 
close connection between the instrumentalist perspective of copyright in the ICT age and the use 
of TPMs because they encourage authorized use, which may allow a fee to be charged to access 
content. TPMs are discussed in greater detail in chapter five.    
1.2 Intrinsic Approach 
The second analytical framework upon which I carry out my research is the intrinsic 
approach. This approach postulates that the motivation to engage in creativity is chiefly 
motivated by factors other than or solely monetary rewards; it further posits that creative works 
in themselves are valuable and that since the creators in this category are not primarily concerned 
with economic rewards, they are motivated to create by intrinsic desires such as the love for 
creativity, contribution to the public interest, increase access to cultural content for free etc. 
Consequently, creators on this spectrum may be more inclined towards making their works 
available and accessible to users for free. It is pertinent to note that writers have varying 
interpretations of the intrinsic approach to copyright. I will state these interpretations and clarify 
the aspect I will use for my research. Edward et al note that this perspective is based on the fact 
that “copyright may be justified intrinsically as a natural right that cultural producers have, either 
because (following Locke) their cultural works are born from their labour or because (following 
a German idealist tradition) they express their personality (Kretschmer and Kawohl 2004).”27 
Firstly, Edward et al explain the intrinsic approach using the natural right theory as developed by 
 
27 Edward et al, Discourse, Justification and Critique, supra note 1 at 61.  
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John Locke;28 but this is not the perspective upon which I intend to situate my analysis of the 
intrinsic approach. The reason is that it has the semblance of the instrumentalist theory because it 
promotes exclusive ownership of property as a means to gain financial reward. The second 
perspective on the intrinsic approach as articulated by Edward et al is that creative works 
emanates from and expresses the personality of the creator.29 This is the aspect I hope to develop 
using the intrinsic approach. I develop the view that cultural works are motivated fundamentally 
by an innate desire for creative expression and the value here is the manifestation of the 
expression (cultural works), and if this is the case, creativity then is not chiefly centered on 
financial incentives, which creates the possibility of making the work freely accessible for others 
to use without harming future creativity. O’Regan identifies the intrinsic value30 approach to 
copyright as an expression of the person but develops her scholarship on the relationship 
between personhood and property ownership.31 Again, I wish to clarify that this is not the 
approach I follow in developing the intrinsic approach to copyright.   
Zimmerman’s claim (supported with empirical evidence) challenges the instrumentalist 
notion of incentive as the basis for creativity and articulates intrinsic motivation as an alternative 
understanding of what prompts the desire to engage in creative expression.32 Before explaining 
Zimmerman’s position, it is apposite to clarify that she does not discredit the incentive approach 
to copyright, on the contrary, she acknowledges its importance;33 what she questions is the 
 
28 John Locke, Two Treatise of Government (England: Awnsham Churchill, 1689) at 116-18 at online: < 
http://www.yorku.ca/comninel/courses/3025pdf/Locke.pdf > Accessed August 28, 2019.  
29 Supra note 27.  
30 O’Regan, Downloading Personhood, supra note 9 at 17. 
31 Ibid. at 28-32. 
32 Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives, supra note 20 at 34. 
33 Ibid. at 57. “Maybe, too, understanding the true incentives for creativity might counsel investigating better ways to meet the 
needs of authors for a reliable income- possibly including greater investment in grants and fellowships-and perhaps better 
protection of the right of attribution. Having said that, there are going to be works that are created largely, or perhaps only, to 
earn money from public distribution. As noted earlier, lots of Hollywood productions seem to fall into the category, as do some 
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dominant narrative that the overarching motivation for creativity in the copyright system should 
be financial incentives.34 In addition to developing her narrative, which favours the approach to 
copyright from the intrinsic perspective, she challenges the seemingly established idea that the 
expectation of financial rewards fuels the desire for motivation. She further contends that the 
promise of monetary reward could in fact be counter-productive.     
Zimmerman supports the intrinsic understanding of copyright in the sense that creativity 
finds motivation from non-monetary incentives, and notes that researchers in psychology and 
human behavioural economics cast considerable doubt on the power of external inducement 
generally to actually motivate people and shape their activity in a particular way.35 On the 
contrary, these scholars posit that the expression of human creativity is primarily motivated by 
intrinsic rather than extrinsic factors.36 She argues that studies suggest that the promise of 
monetary rewards could actually diminish rather than enhance the motivation to produce high-
quality and new works.37 Under the intrinsic approach, creativity is motivated by reasons other 
than the expectation of financial benefit: the creator may be incentivised by the fact that her work 
is useful and valuable to others and contributes to the pool of creative knowledge, for example. 
 
other kinds of works that the public may indeed want but which might never appear if their creation depended on intrinsic 
motivation alone.” 
34 Ibid. “But the idea that for copyright to be any kind of useful incentives, it must offer the prospect of a larger and larger pot of 
gold through more control spread out over longer and longer times seems simply disconnected from what is really going on in the 
creative sphere.” 
35 Ibid. at 43. 
36 F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the 
Knowledge Society 3 Rochelle Dreyfuss, Diane L. Zimmerman & Harry First eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 
19. 
37 Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives, supra note 20 at 43. Zimmerman notes that although this growing body of literature is 
occasionally referenced in the scholarship on intellectual property (Roberta R. Kwall, “Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic 
Dimension of the Artistic Soul” (2006) 81 Notre Dame L.Rev. 1945; Bradford S. Simon, “Intellectual Property and Traditional 
Knowledge: A Psychological Approach to Conflicting Claims of Creativity in International Law, (2005) 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 
1613; Wendy J. Gordon, “Render Copyright unto Caesar: On taking Incentives Seriously” (2004) 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 75, 89), 
there has been little systematic attempt to review it or to ask what its insights might revel about the validity of the practices and 
assumptions of intellectual property. 
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This benefit to the public gives the creator a sense of satisfaction and fulfillment that is sufficient 
reward.  
Wikipedia could be cited as an example of creativity based on the intrinsic approach to 
copyright with authors devoting unpaid hours to produce works that are freely available to the 
public in the name of advancing knowledge.38 Further insight on the intrinsic approach to 
creativity can be found in the scholarship of Abraham Maslow39 who asserts that creativity is an 
aspect of self-actualization rather than a response elicited by motivations external to the 
individual (that is, extrinsic).40 Maslow argues that people create art because they have a built-in 
desire both to express themselves and to communicate their thoughts, impressions and ideas to 
others.41 Similarly, Everett Hagen speaks of creativity as motivated by an innate drive and that 
people are motivated to create by the pleasure they get from problem-solving skills and from an 
inner sense of duty to achieve.42    
In his study of innovative behaviour, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi remarks that: 
Creative persons differ from one another in a variety of ways, but 
in one respect they are unanimous: They all love what they do. It is 
not the hope of achieving fame or make money that drives them; 
rather, it is the opportunity to do the work that they enjoy doing.43  
 
In my view, Csikszenntmihalyi’s opinion above does not discount the need for copyright 
or the exploitation of creative works, but it supports the assertion that, on the spectrum of 
creators, there are those whose creativity is not fundamentally fueled by the desire to make 
 
38 Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives, supra note 20 at 37. 
39 Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1970) at 15-30. According to 
Zimmerman, Maslow claims that people are motivated first to satisfy their psychological and safety needs, then their needs for 
love, connectedness, and esteem, and finally by their need for self-actualization. “cited in Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives, 
supra note 20 at 46.” 
40 Ibid. at 142. 
41 Ibid. at 69-70. 
42 Everett E. Hagen, “On the Theory of Social Change: How economic Growth Begins” (Homewood, Dorsey Press:1962) at 93. 
43 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Innovation, (New York: Harper Perennial, 
1996) at 37. 
 14 
money from their works. The drive behind creativity under the intrinsic approach is attributable 
to a number of factors. Zimmerman notes that one of those factors is spiritual/religious stimulus 
and she cites in support the United Society of Believers in Christ’s Second Appearing (also 
known as Shakers) community who were extremely innovative.44 Students of the Shakers agree 
that the motivation for their innovation and creativity was marginally commercial and chiefly 
pragmatic and spiritual.45 Their desire to innovate and create would not have waned if there was 
no prospect of finding a market for their creations.46 Dismissing the possible contention that the 
Shakers are outliers on the motivational spectrum, Zimmerman cites Hagen to support her claim: 
The doctrine that the specific religious dogma of the Protestant 
Dissenters is peculiarly associated with innovational activity is 
obsolete, but a number of scholars observing economic growth in 
various societies have noted that innovators in the early stages of 
growth seem to be characterized by a common ethic which is 
appropriately termed religious in nature, whatever their religious 
dogma. They feel a personal responsibility to transform the world 
that far transcends the profit motive.47  
 
 Besides motivation that emanates from religious commitment, the sphere of open source 
movement provides the context to learn more about what motivates software developers to 
dedicate unpaid hours to works that will eventually be made free to the public. Josh Lerner and 
Jean Tirole admitted that, “to an economist, the behaviour of individual programmers and 
commercial companies engaged in open source processes is startling.”48 Lerner and Tirole 
concluded that the participants in the open source movement were motivated by the expectation 
 
44 Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives, supra note 20 at 35. According to Zimmerman, “Shakers belonged to a dissenting branch 
of Quakersism, founded in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain by Mother Ann Lee and brought to the United States 
by her just as the American Revolution was beginning. She settled in New York State, and her subsequent Shaker communities 
spread out from there through New England and south to Kentucky.” (For a brief history of the community visit 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shakers accessed March 21, 2017). 
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid at 36. 
47 Hagen, Theory of Social Change, supra note 42 at 93. 
48 Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, “Some Simple Economics of Open Source” (2002) 50 J. Indus. Econ 197 at 198. 
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of future extrinsic rewards49 such as enhancement of their reputation, which could increase 
visibility for greater career opportunities or status in the programming community.50 
Nevertheless, other scholars think differently; for example, Eric von Hippel and Georg von 
Krogh found that learning and enjoyment and a sense of ownership and control over the work 
products were fundamental prerequisite of who would participate.51 This suggests that the love 
and enjoyment of programming are arguably the impetus to be part of the open source 
programming community. In my opinion, Zimmerman’s acknowledgment that some 
programmers may be motivated by extrinsic reward does not invalidate the intrinsic perspective 
but shows that its claim cannot be absolute. There are creators on the intrinsic spectrum that may 
have some tendency or need to expect extrinsic benefits besides enjoying the engagement in their 
creative work.  
 Another form of intrinsic motivation arises out of a sense of obligation to give back52 to 
society in general or to immediate circle of friends or colleagues. This supports the notion that 
the intrinsic concept of copyright is aimed at achieving public good. Since the creations of 
cultural goods are motivated by non-extrinsic rewards, it should mean public access to these 
creative expressions would mostly be unrestricted. 
    The narrative on the intrinsic approach goes further to claim that potential harm may 
flow from tying creative and innovative activities too closely to the promise of monetary 
rewards.53 This claim relies on the product of empirical psychological studies on what motivates 
 
49 Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives, supra note 20 at 43. 
50 Supra note 48 at 218. 
51 Eric von Hippel & Georg von Krogh, “Open Source Software and the Private “Private-Collective” Innovation Model” 
(2003)14 Org. Sci. 209 at 211, 216. 
52 John Cahir, “The Information Commons” (2003) (unpublished) 32-33 at online: < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=428584 > accessed March 21, 2017 
53 Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives, supra note 20 at 45. 
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people to engage in creative and innovative thinking.54 This claim may be counterintuitive but 
empirical evidence abounds to support it; however, Zimmerman warns that this type of research 
is complex and researchers in this field do not always agree with one another on the 
interpretation of results.55 The results from this type of research are debatable56 and difficult to 
interpret;57 nonetheless, they present sufficient grounds to be taken seriously,58 especially by 
intellectual (copyright) property scholars.  
 By way of example, a series of experiments were conducted with residents in a rural town 
in India, and then with students at MIT and University of Chicago; the experiments tested their 
performance in various tasks involving memory, problem-solving and creativity.59 The findings 
indicate that in situations involving cognitive rather than physical effort,60 higher monetary 
incentives led to worse performance.61 A possible explanation for the detrimental effect the 
promise of rewards has on creativity can be found in what is called the self-determination 
theory.62 Zimmerman notes: 
Building on the insights of Maslow and others, researchers such as 
Edward Deci, Richard Ryan and Teresa Amabile have conducted 
empirical studies and interviews that have demonstrated a link 
between enhanced creativity and such internal factors as whether 
the subjects thinks of herself as free to follow her curiosity and 
structure her own approach to the task she chooses to undertake. If 
extrinsic tangible rewards are offered as motivators in a way that is 
 
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Zimmerman identifies scholarship contesting the findings that extrinsic rewards can be detrimental to creativity, see Judy 
Cameron & David W. Pierce, “Reinforcement, Reward and Intrinsic Motivation: A Meta-Analysis” (1994) 64 Rev. Edu. Res. 
363 (reanalyzing past research and concluding that monetary rewards are only harmful when not tied to measures of 
performance); Robert Eisenberger & Judy Cameron, “Detrimental Effects of Reward: Reality or Myth” (1996) 51 Am. 
Psychologist 1153 (rejecting the findings of harmful effects of rewards on creativity). 
57 For a review of the studies and various interpretations, see Beth A. Hennessey, “Self-Determination Theory and the Social 
Psychology of Creativity” (2000) 11 Psychol. Inq. 293, cited in “Zimmerman Copyright as Incentives, supra note 20 at 49.”   
58 Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives, supra note 20 at 49. 
59 Dan Ariely et al, “Large Stakes and Big Mistakes” (2008) 76 Rev. Econ. Stud. 451 “cited in Zimmerman, Copyright as 
Incentives, supra note 20 at 50. 
60 Ibid. at 464. 
61 Ibid. at 467. 
62 Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives, supra note 20 at 50. 
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perceived as controlling, the quality of the individual’s 
performance of a specified task seems to be diminished.63 
Interestingly, the disincentive effect of extrinsic motivators is 
strongest where the task at issue requires imagination and 
innovative approaches to problem-solving.64    
 
 Furthermore, in a study on the effect of external motivators (cash payment65 inclusive) on 
learning among students (elementary and college level), the students were presented with a set of 
materials and half of the subjects were informed they would assessed and graded on what they 
learned. The researchers discovered that those who did not expect to be tested showed greater 
understanding of the material than those who learned to be tested66 and they had longer memory 
retention of the material.67 The conclusion here is that intrinsic motivation engenders better 
conceptual understanding, greater creativity and improved problem-solving, relative to eternal 
controls.68 This study suggests that tying reward to creativity has the tendency to condition and 
control human motivation and impedes self-expression (self-determination), which is as an 
integral part of creativity.  
 In another study that aims to understand the connection or disconnection between 
extrinsic motivators and creativity, Amabile and her fellow researchers asked practising artists to 
randomly submit commissioned and non-commissioned works.69 A panel of experts who did not 
know which works were commissioned and non-commissioned were invited to evaluate the 
works; the experts judged the commissioned works as less creative than the non-commissioned 
 
63 Edward Deci & Richard M. Ryan, Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human Behaviour, (New York: Plenum 
Press, 1985) at 66, 149, 310, cited in “Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives, supra note 20 at 50.”  
64 Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives, supra note 20 at 50. 
65 For further reading on using money as reward, see Deci & Ryan, Intrinsic Motivation, supra note 63 at 44-49. 
66 Edward L. Deci & Richard Flaste, Why We Do What We Do: The Dynamics of Personal Autonomy (New York: Putnam’s 
Sons,1995) at 47-8. 
67 Ibid. at 48. 
68 Ibid. 51. 
69 Teresa Amabile, Creativity in Context: Update to the Social Psychology of Creativity (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996) at 
175. 
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ones.70 Furthermore, it was also found that the creativity of the commissioned works corresponds 
with the independent reports of the artists that they felt constrained or controlled by some 
commissions.71 Consequently, Amabile concludes that extrinsic motivators have negative effects 
because they seem to reduce the individual’s artistic involvement in the work, which results in a 
less creative product.72 Put differently, Deci and Ryan note that “rewards contingent on 
performance are a special and especially harmful distraction because the activity becomes a 
means to an end and rather than an end in itself.”73  
 The position that financial rewards have harmful effect on creativity is worth pondering, 
especially in the light of empirical evidence; however, to assume this position for all artists may 
not be appropriate given the varying motivating factors for artistic creation. Some artists are 
deeply in love with creativity as an end in itself and care little as to whether or not it generates 
financial rewards. These artists or creators likely do not rely directly on sales of their work as a 
means of livelihood. For those artists who love creativity for what it is and hope to obtain a just 
financial reward to make a living, however, it is hard to determine which takes preference, the 
money or the love for the art? And if the money their works generate is unable to sustain a living, 
they resort to other means of livelihood, which may or may not support or permit their continued 
creative endeavours.74 A third category of creators are those who are primarily motivated by 
extrinsic rewards and may care less about creativity; their continued creativity therefore depends 
on the expectation of extrinsic reward. Highlighting these categories of creators or authors serves 
to properly situate the argument that extrinsic rewards could potentially impede creativity. 
 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Deci & Ryan, Intrinsic Motivation, supra note 63 at 142. 
74 PR Newswire, UK Writers Struggle to Survive, supra note 24; Hill & Capriotti, Profile of Artists in Canada, supra note 25; 
Kingston & Cole, Aspects of the Literary Situation, supra note 26.  
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Commenting on Amabile’s work, Zimmerman admits that it also demonstrates that the 
relationship between the quality of performance on creative tasks and external rewards is not 
unitary;75 she further notes: 
Differences in reaction may also be dependent on differences in 
talent. Her research has found that where individuals with relatively 
low innate talent were told their work product would be evaluated 
upon completion, their performance actually improved; by contrast, 
among those whose skills were judged to be high at the outset of 
the experiment, performance deteriorated.76 Research also suggests 
that rewards per se do not have a negative impact on creativity. 
Thus, an unexpected bonus received at the completion of a task, 
although it will not incentivize performance, will not hurt either.77 
What seems to be problematic is a reward that is salient during the 
performance of the work.78   
    
 The narrative on the intrinsic understanding and approach to copyright presents a clear 
contrast with the instrumental approach; this could be one of the problems inherent in the 
intrinsic approach because less emphasis on financial rewards as a motivation for creativity may 
undermine the value of reward for creativity. Nevertheless, recognition of the intrinsic approach 
provides the analytical framework to develop my discussion on the free culture and creativity in 
the context of ICT using CCL as a case in point. The understanding of copyright through the 
lenses of the intrinsic standpoint aligns strongly with the free culture agenda. By way of contrast, 
I will evaluate the goals and interests of the content industry stakeholder community using the 
instrumental approach, which closely mirrors their viewpoint.  
 On the relationship between the instrumental and intrinsic theories of copyright, while 
there are marked differences between the two, as the analyses above have shown, I observe that 
 
75 Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives, supra note 20 at 53. 
76 Amabile, Creativity in Context, supra note 69 at 151. 
77 Edward L. Deci et al, “Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motivation in Education: Reconsidered Once Again” (2001) 71 Rev. 
Edu. Res. 1 at 7, 10. 
78 Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives, supra note 20 at 53. 
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some areas of intersection abound. Both perspectives claim to favour the interest of the public; 
instrumentalist notion posits that an incentivized copyright system encourages creativity 
resulting in more creative work products for the public to consume. The instrumentalist narrative 
also justifies their position on the ground that commercial activities in the copyright industry 
boost economic growth and creates jobs. On the other hand, the intrinsic approach advocates the 
recognition of the noble ideals that motivates creativity and that creativity is further encouraged 
by making works freely accessible by the public. Another intersection is that both perspectives 
expect to receive reward albeit in different forms. The reward in the intrinsic motivation to 
creativity is the satisfaction derived by the creator from her work; but the reward sought in the 
instrumental view is primarily monetary rewards. 
 My research applies these two conceptual frameworks to copyright to examine the 
perspectives of stakeholders (the content industry and the free culture community) to see how 
their interests align or conflict in a copyright system increasingly shaped by rapid developments 
in ICT. I have attempted to show in my analysis above that neither approach to copyright is 
perfect, and neither can their applicability claim to be absolute. To avoid any objection that these 
conceptual frameworks are too generalizing, it is pertinent to acknowledge here that, in between 
these two ends of the spectrum for interpreting creativity and copyright, artists and creators exist 
who do not fully confirm to either approach. For example, according to Lerner and Tirole some 
developers in the open source software community engage in creative coding activities with the 
expectation of future extrinsic rewards.79 Having said this, the focus of my research will chiefly 
consider the free culture and content industry community essentially as ideal types for analysis.
 
79 Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives, supra note 48. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
This chapter appraises the rationale for the existence of copyright law in Canada. I begin by 
discussing the origin and development of the Statute of Anne (the first copyright law) and the 
reason(s) for its enactment. I then proceed to examine the reasons for enacting copyright law in 
Canada. In my analysis of the purposes behind the Statute of Anne and those informing 
copyright law in Canada today, I examine the dialogic interaction between the parliament and the 
judiciary on the development of copyright law, and the role that this plays. The chapter seeks to 
identify and present the thematic and problematic issues surrounding the origin, evolution and 
perceived purpose(s) of copyright law generally, and with specific reference to Canada. 
 
1.0 Copyright Law: Origin and Development 
The origins of modern copyright law are traceable to the Statute of Anne,1 which is 
widely accepted as having laid the foundation of copyright law over three hundred years ago. It 
is incontrovertible—but worth emphasizing—that prior to the Statute of Anne, artistic works 
existed; the Statute of Anne introduced legal recognition of authors’ rights to control the making 
of copies and the grant of limited monopoly to exploit these rights. Salathiel Masterson suggests 
that although literary property probably did not exist in the ancient times, there is evidence that 
in ancient centres of learning such as Greece, authors secured compensation for their works.2 
There was, however, no formal law that granted rights to authors to control their works.3 Authors 
 
1 The Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Anne, c.19. 
2 Salathiel Masterson, “Copyright: History and Development” (1940) 28 California L. Rev. 620 at 620, 621. Instances of 
compensation to orators were not infrequent and orators were not in the habit of writing for free. Protagoras was the first lecturer 
to assume the title of Sophist and was said to be the first to received pay for his lessons.   
3 Ibid. at 620.  
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visited Rome from all parts of the civilized world to make their literary fortunes.4 Absent any 
positive law that recognized authors’ rights in their works and the power to sanction copying, 
authors’ complaints against plagiarism5 were no more than moral suasion. Thus, Martial writes 
to one Fidentinus: 
It is said, Fidentinus, that in reciting my verses you always speak of 
them as your own. If you are willing to credit them to me, I will 
send them to you gratis. If, however, you wish to have them called 
your verses, you had better buy them, when they will no longer 
belong to me.6  
 
Additionally, several centuries later but still prior to the Statute of Anne, records show a French 
court granting an order in recognition of an author’s right.7 There is plenty of evidence to suggest 
that, even before the formal recognition of authors’ rights by the first copyright law, authors 
were already benefiting from their intellectual works, and sometimes finding support from the 
state and third parties in their efforts to control the publication of copies. But even where authors 
could successfully command recognition of some rights or some kind of claim of ownership over 
the product of their intellect, there was a marked difference between this and copyright in its 
present form. The enactment of the Statute of Anne was the first law to award authors the 
exclusive right to copy. It was of course preceded by intriguing debates, which I now examine. 
  
 
4 Ibid. at 622. For example, Plautus, whose comedies date between 202 and 184 B.C., is reported to have been able to set himself 
up as a miller from the rewards of his plays; Cicero made a business out of the sale of his books by having publishing 
arrangements on a royalty basis.   
5 Masterson, Copyright History, supra note 2 at 622.  
6 Marcus Valerius Martialis, Epigrams (c. 80-104 AD), Book I, Epigram 29 at online: < https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Epigrams > 
accessed June 3, 2019. 
7 Daniel J. Gervais, “A Canadian Copyright Narrative” (2009)21 I.P.J. 269 at 279. Citing M. Rose (See M. Rose, Authors and 
Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993) 17-19), Gervais notes that the Statute (The Statute of Anne) was not the 
first right accorded to authors in Europe. The role of the author as a right-holder had emerged in France in the early days of the 
16th century. A French court granted the equivalent of an injunction to prevent an almanac from being sold without the consent of 
its author. 
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1.1 Prior to the Statute of Anne 
The build-up to the Statute of Anne played a significant role in shaping the statute and its 
subsequent interpretation.  Indeed, the nature of the debate could bear some similarities to the 
dynamics of the present-day copyright law reform debates. Though digital technology creates a 
marked difference in the substance of today’s debates, the clamour for more control over content 
by copyright owners and unfettered access to content by users remain largely the same. Tracing 
the contours of the pre-Statute of Anne period in the 16th century reveals a time riddled with 
schemes, lobbying and agitation for monopoly and control of the book trade; the Stationers’ 
Company8 was at the center of the monopolistic scheme to dominate the book trade. 
 
1.1.2 The Stationers’ Company and the Publishing Monopoly  
Before the Statute of Anne, book-publishing rights were regulated through printing 
patents9 and the London publishers’ guild (Stationers’ Company), and these were identified as 
publishers’ rather than authors’ rights.10  In England, in 1403, a guild of stationers was formed; 
by this time they did not have any control over printed books11 in the sense that they did not 
possess exclusive right or monopoly to publication or to sanction any publisher who published 
outside their guild. The stationers can be regarded as the forefathers of modern publishers. They 
 
8 Originally the term stationery referred to all products sold by a stationer, whose name indicated that his book shop was on a 
fixed spot, usually near a university, and permanent, while medieval trading was mainly carried on by itinerant peddlers 
(including chapmen, who sold books) and others (such as farmers and craftsmen) at markets and fairs, at online: < 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stationery#History_of_stationery > accessed June 3, 2019. 
9 Lyman Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968) at 78-113. 
10 Oren Bracha, “The Adventures of the Statute of Anne in the Land of Unlimited Possibilities: The life of a Legal Transplant” 
(2010)25 Berkeley T.L.J. 1427 at 1432. 
11 Masterson, Copyright History, supra note 2 at 625; Gervais, Copyright Narrative, supra note 7 at 274. 
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organized themselves into a guild and formed the Stationers’ Company,12 one of the primary 
aims of which was to vest its members with the exclusive right to publish books; unsurprisingly, 
the enforcement of this exclusive right was questioned by non-members.13 The Stationers’ 
Company’s move for exclusive book publishing right (to have monopoly over the publication of 
books), gained the support of Queen Mary when she granted a royal privilege in the form of a 
Charter in 1556.14 Subsequently, the Star Chamber Decree of 1586 codified the licensing 
framework for the Stationers’ Company.15 The licensing scheme required that any book printed 
in England had to be submitted to the Stationers’ Company for licensing and then recorded in the 
Company’s register.16  
Prior to the grant of the royal privilege, the level of influence wielded by the Stationers’ 
Company was uncertain. However, given that the guild had existed for more than a century 
before the royal charter, they must have been sufficiently significant to merit the royal 
privilege.17 According to Thomas Morris, who describes the rise and influence of the Stationers’ 
Company prior to its enjoyment of the privileges of the royal charter, the role of tradesmen of the 
guild (parchminers, lymners, and scriveners) became largely redundant due to printing 
 
12 Gervais, Copyright Narrative, supra note 7 at 274; Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, “The Untold Story of the First Copyright Suit 
Under the Statute of Anne in 1710” (2010) 25 Berkeley T.L.J 1247 at 1253. Gómez-Arostegui explains that the Company of 
Stationers was the guild governing printers, booksellers and others in the book trade. Thomas B. Morris offers further insight on 
how the different crafts’ guild in the book trade amalgamated into the Stationers’ Company stating that “Four different skilled 
craftsmen combined to produce each book- the parchminer supplied the parchment, the scrivener copied the text, the lymner 
illustrated the it, and the bookbinder tied the completed sheets together between cover…As early as 1357, these groups had their 
own crafts guild. Near the beginning of the fifteenth century, however, a decision was made to join together. A petition to this 
effect on July 12, 1403, was granted by the Mayor and Alderman of London, and the guild of the participants in the trade, later to 
become known as the Stationers’ Company, was born” Thomas Morris, “The Origins of the Statute of Anne” (1962) 12 
Copyright L. Symp. 222 at 231. 
13 Gervais, Copyright Narrative, supra note 7 at 274. The opposition by non-members of the Stationers’ Company not surprising 
because it adversely affected their interest in the sense that they could no longer publish books at liberty and therefore, suffer not 
just relegation, but denial of their authorial right.  
14 Ibid.; Masterson, Copyright History, supra note 2 at 625; Peter Baldwin, The Copyright Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 
2014) at 55 [Peter Baldwin, Copyright Wars]. 
15 Bracha, The Adventures of The Statute of Anne, supra note 10 at 1433. See also Patterson, Copyright, supra note 9 at 115-19.  
16 Ibid. at 1433-4; Gómez-Arostegui, First Copyright Suit, supra note 12,  
17 Masterson, Copyright History, supra note 2 at 625.  
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technology; and the only important group that remained were the booksellers or stationers.18 The 
booksellers and stationers (many of whom became printers), for mutual business interests, 
maintained close interactions in the book trade and presented a common front. Subsequently, the 
Stationers’ Company assumed a specific and important role in the book trade.19 The preclusion 
of authors from the benefits of the royal privilege, however, was detrimental to the interests of 
authors and did not encourage authorship. Authors who did not enjoy this privilege had to rely 
on the Stationers’ Company to publish their works and this did not give them much bargaining 
power. Naturally, this created an unhealthy rivalry between publishers and authors.   
The extent of the power granted to the Stationers’ Company by the British Monarch 
suggests that the Monarch saw the Stationers’ Company as a useful mechanism to protect 
political and religious interests. According to Masterson, the reason behind the grant of the royal 
charter was:  
…to prevent the propagation of the Protestant Reformation. After 
reciting that certain heretical books “both in rhymes and tracks” 
were daily printed, containing “great and detestable heresies 
against the Catholic doctrine of the Holy Mother Church,” it 
ordains that for the suppression of this evil ninety-seven named 
persons shall be incorporated as a society of the art of a stationer. 
No person is to practice the art of printing unless he be one of this 
society, and the master and warden are authorized to search for, 
seize and burn all prohibited books, and to imprison anyone that 
should exercise the art of printing contrary to their direction.20  
  
The privilege granted to the Stationers’ Company was a strategic move by the Crown to 
maintain control and silence publications perceived to be offensive and contrary to the interests 
of the state and the doctrines of the Catholic Church. The Crown found in the Stationers’ 
 
18 Morris, Statute of Anne, supra note 12 at 235. 
19 Ibid. at 234-235. 
20Masterson, Copyright History, supra note 2 at 628; Gervais, Copyright Narrative, supra note 7 at 275. In the quote, Masterson 
also cites “Drone, A Treatise on the Law of Property in Intellectual Productions in Great Britain and the United States (1879) 
56.”; Morris, Statute of Anne, supra note 12 at 239.  
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Company a willing ally or, at least, a useful institution, and bestowed immense powers upon it 
including quasi-judicial functions to command compliance and enforce sanctions. The 1556 
Charter represents a contrivance mutually beneficial to the Crown and Stationers’ Company in 
the sense that the former used it as a mechanism to censor the publication of offensive content 
against the monarchy and established religion, while the latter used it to gain the coveted control 
and monopoly in the book trade.21 Morris describes the alliance between the Crown and the 
Stationers thus: 
Eventually, and perhaps inevitably, the government looked to the 
Stationers’ Guild for assistance. Here was an established organization 
which could ferret out the source of heretical (or papistical, as the case 
may be) works as the Bishop or Mayor of London never could. They 
were printers and booksellers, they knew the locations of the presses and 
printers, they had developed their own machinery for the control of the 
trade and their register was a ready-made instrument for recording 
officially what works were printed. If all printers were forced to join the 
company, and all books were recorded on its register, and subject to its 
control, a centralized agency for censorship in the city of London would 
be established. This would mean that the limited membership of the 
Stationers’ Guild would enjoy a monopoly over all printed works, but the 
government would gladly exchange such monopoly for an effective 
system of accountability and control. The stationers, needless to say, 
were quite satisfied with the bargain, and so it was to be.22  
 
Morris asserts that the alliance between the government, the established Church and 
stationer both set the framework for the development, and perhaps also impeded, the 
development of copyright law for 150 years.23 It is important to note that any member of the 
Stationers’ Company who first entered a book in the register received the perpetual exclusive 
right to print that book.24 The Stationers’ copyright was perpetual in the sense that there was no 
 
21 Bracha, The Adventures of the Statute of Anne, supra note 10 at 1433; Gervais, Canadian Copyright, supra note 7 at 275.  
22 Morris, Statute of Anne, supra note 12 at 238-39. 
23 Ibid. at 240. 
24 Bracha, The Adventures of the Statute of Anne, supra note 10 at 1434.  
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provision for any work to ever fall into the public domain, as we understand the term today.25 
This arrangement, while it lasted, was supported by various instruments.26 This period marked 
the beginning of the Stationers’ Company’s influence and control in book publication, and 
created the desire for continued monopoly and control of creative works. 
 
1.1.3 The End of the Stationers’ Company’s Monopoly and the Quest for Revival 
Prominent authors such as John Locke, John Milton and Daniel Defoe, at that time in 
England, began to criticize and oppose the Stationers’ Company’s exclusive rights to book 
publication and called for an end to the monopoly. Perhaps their opposition to the Stationer 
Company’s monopoly rights influenced Parliament’s ultimate withdrawal of its support and 
refusal to renew the royal privileges. The Stationers’ privileges (the exclusive right to book 
publication) were renewable but allowed to lapse in 1679; they were revived by James II in 1685 
for seven years but the British Parliament eventually declined to renew them once again in 
1694.27 This was a clear indication that Parliament began to withdraw its support for the 
 
25 Gómez-Arostegui, First Copyright Suit, supra note 12 at 1255. In simple terms, works come under the public domain when 
their copyright term has expired or where the owner cannot be identified. It is a broad and complex area of intellectual property 
that has received scholarly analysis, see Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities 
(2003) 66 L. & Contemp. Probs. 147; Carys J. Craig, “The Canadian Public Domain: What, Where and to What End?” (2010)7 
Canadian J.L.T. 221 at 221. 
26 Ibid. “This form of copyright persisted under the auspices of various Star Chamber decrees from 1556 to 1641, parliamentary 
ordinances and statutes during the Civil War an Interregnum from 1643 to 1660, and then under the Printing Act of 1662 after the 
Restoration. The Printing Act lapsed between March 1678/9 and June 1685 and then expired on May 3, 1695. These lapses of 
protection (1679-1685 and 1695-1710) constituted statutory copyright interregnum –a time when copyright was not supported by 
statute…”  
27 Gervais, Canadian Copyright, supra note 7 at 275; Masterson, Copyright History, supra note 2 at 630; Morris, Statute of Anne, 
supra note 12 at 247-48. The refusal by Parliament to revive the Stationers’ monopoly in 1694 was the final blow that led to the 
decline of the Stationers’ Company; however, prior to this time, their fall came by installments. According to Morris, the Long 
Parliament on July 4, 1641, abolished the Star Chamber from which Decrees 1556, 1586, and 1637 were issued and the decrees 
fell with the Chamber and for the first time in eighty years, the Stationers’ authority rested on nothing but the original charter of 
1557. Though the Stationers later filled the void with an act of Parliament, the hiatus dealt a severe blow to the Stationers because 
in 1641, 240 titles were entered in the register but in 1642, only 76 were entered. Morris further reports that in 1649, an act was 
passed with reduced the powers of the Stationers by permitting two presses outside London to operate and all the limitations were 
removed from the number of master printers who could enter the trade. Again in 1653, another act was passed which reduced the 
Stationers’ powers by making a Council of State, not the Stationers’ Company, the final arbiter of exclusive rights to print literary 
works. The Stationers were relegated to the position of enforcement agency only.      
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monopoly enjoyed by the Stationers’ Company. The Stationers’ Company lobbied intensely for a 
new legislative scheme with the usual pattern of licensing privileges28 for the preservation of the 
publishing monopoly it had enjoyed for over a century. The Stationers’ Company made several 
abortive attempts29 to renew the Licensing Act.30 Over a period of fifteen years (1695 – 1710) 
the Stationers’ Company attempted to reclaim its monopoly over the book trade through petitions 
to Parliament.  Those of 1703, 1704, 1706 and 1707 failed. Their lobbying tactics even adopted a 
sentimental approach. Lord Camden subsequently described how “the Stationers came up to 
Parliament in the form of petitioners, with tears in their eyes, hopeless and forlorn; they brought 
their wives and children to excite passion, and induce Parliament to grant them a statutory 
security”31  
Unsurprisingly, as Oren Bracha recounts, the bills were opposed due to concerns over 
censorship, monopoly powers, and the interests of publishers to the detriment of authors, who 
arguably ought to be the legitimate beneficiaries.32 This period also opened up an opportunity to 
advocate for authors who hitherto did not have rights in their works. As described by Gervais, 
during the time after the Charter had elapsed in England, John Milton and John Locke33 
advocated for an end (non-renewal of the Charter) to the licensing regime (royal privileges) 
which they considered prepublication censorship.34 Similarly, Daniel Defoe argued that 
prepublication control was unnecessary and that “copy-right” should be granted to all authors.35 
 
28 Bracha, The Adventures of the Statute of Anne, supra note 10 at 1435. 
29 Patterson, Copyright, supra note 9 at 138-41 on the attempts to renew the Licensing Act. 
30 Licensing of The Press Act, of 1662. 
31 Karl Fogel, “The Surprising History of Copyright and The Promise of a Post-Copyright World” at online: < 
http://questioncopyright.org/promise > at 4, accessed February 23, 2017. 
32 Bracha, Adventures of The Statute of Anne, supra note 10 at 1435. 
33 Gervais, Canadian Copyright, supra note 7 at 275. John Milton and John Locke were instrumental in the fight to end the 
licensing regime. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid. at 280. 
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Furthermore, referring to a call for legislation to grant authors rights in their work, Ronan 
Deazley reports Defoe’s proposition thus: 
these things call for an Act of Parliament, and that so loud as I hope 
it will not be deny’d, that so Property of Copies may be secur’d to 
Laborious Students, to the Encouragement of Letters and all useful 
Studies.36  
 
As we will see below, Defoe’s proposition above captures the purpose of creating 
copyright law in much the same terms as it is articulated today. He canvasses for legislative 
protection for the rights of authors in their work as a means to achieve the encouragement of 
learning more broadly. Unlike the stationers and booksellers whose petition sought the 
preservation of their copies and trade, Defoe articulates a different justification for recognizing 
authors’ rights.37 As Ronan Deazley notes, Defoe’s proposal articulates a connection between 
publishing rights and the benefit to society as a whole, which comes from the encouragement of 
learning and the provision of statutory protection for books as a way of achieving this.38 Defoe’s 
rhetoric, it has been argued, influenced the Stationers’ change of strategy. As Mark Rose 
explains, “it was Defoe’s agitation on behalf of authorial rights that provided the London 
stationers with a new strategy for pursuing their own interest.”39 Similarly, Gervais notes: 
Focusing the attention on authors allowed booksellers to achieve their 
aims, while avoiding the problem of defending their unpopular trade. 
Authors did want rights they could enforce themselves, even though 
most of them were happy to work with publishers. There was, in other 
words, a timely convergence of interest. On the one hand, authors 
were basking in the sun of Enlightenment, stroked by the rays of 
individualism. On the other hand, the Stationers advocated in favour 
of a right for authors of which they would be assignees, through the 
then-prevailing patronage arrangement. They understood that they 
 
36 Ronan Deazley, The Statute of Anne, On the Origin of the Right to Copy, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) at 32.  
37Ibid.  
38 Ibid. 
39 M Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (London, Harvard University Press, 1993) at 35. “Cited by Ronan 
Deazley, The Right to Copy, supra note 36. 
 30 
need a justificatory theory other than greed or, indeed, their desire to 
survive to convince both Parliament and the public.40 
 
Although Gervais claims that most authors were happy to work with publishers, it 
appeared they did not have much of a choice. For more than a century, the publishers exercised 
great authority and had established dominance and monopoly in the book trade and they knew 
that, even if authors were granted rights in the copies of their books, they would still require the 
services of the booksellers or publishers to whom they would have to assign their rights. This 
age-long monopoly could have caused a less cordial relationship between authors and publishers. 
It was for their own interest that the stationers decided to change strategy and, on the pretext of 
advocating authors’ rights, fulfill this interest. This scheme was first manifested by the 
booksellers in a 1706 pamphlet titled “Reasons humbly Offer’d for a Bill for the Encouragement 
of Learning, and the Improvement of Printing.”41  
  Although the Stationers’ Company wielded so much power, which arguably could have 
advanced their cause, it appears that lobbying on their own behalf became unpopular and faced 
much opposition. Defoe’s eloquent articulations, for example, strongly supported authors’ rights 
to copies of their own work in the face of the publishers’ claims. Such authors (who were not 
within the publishing monopoly held by the Stationers’ Company) could not freely publish their 
works without scrutiny. Consequently, the Stationers’ Company’s lobbying rhetoric and tactics 
took a different tone. According to Deazley, thirteen influential Booksellers and Publishers in 
London and its environs supported authors’ interests when they petitioned the House of 
Commons seeking leave to present a bill:  
[M]any learned Men have spent much Time, and been at great 
Charges in composing Books, and who used to dispose of their Copies 
 
40 Gervais, Canadian Copyright, supra note 7 at 279. 
41 Ronan Deazley, The Right to Copy, supra note 36. 
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upon valuable Considerations, to be printed by the Purchasers…but of 
late Years such Properties have been much invaded by other Persons 
printing the same Books, either here in England, or beyond the 
Seas…to the great Discouragement of Persons from writing Matters, 
that might be of great Use to the Publick, and to the great Damage of 
the Proprietors; And praying, that Leave may be given to bring a Bill 
for the securing of Property in such Books, as have been, or shall be, 
purchased from or reserved to, the Authors thereof.42  
  
 The previous campaign strategy of the Stationers’ Company had been to attract sympathy 
by bemoaning the plight of their precarious livelihood; but now they emphasized the authors’ 
right and the public good.43 As Simon Stern notes, in order to restore the status quo, the 
booksellers presented publicly persuasive justifications that involved claims about the authors’ 
rights to speak to the public.44 The account of authors45 demonstrates how, in the fifteen-year 
quest for legislation for an exclusive right to print, booksellers moved from censorship-oriented 
justifications to arguments emphasizing authors’ interests.46  
Another possible explanation for the Stationers’ inclusion of the authors’ interest in their 
lobbying campaign is the relationship forged among prominent stakeholders. The success of the 
1709 petition, according to the account given by Morris,47 suggests that the Stationers’ change of 
approach and the drafting and eventual passage of the bill that heralded the Statute of Anne may 
 
42 Ibid. at 33. The signatories to this petition were as follows: Edward Brewster, Daniel Browne, Richard Chiswell, Robert 
Clavell, Freeman Collins, Timothy Goodwin, Charles Harper, Henry Mortlock, William Rogers, Samuel Roycroft, Jacob Tonson, 
Benjamin Tooke and John Walthoe. 
43 Ibid.; Bracha, Adventures of the Statute of Anne, supra note 10 at 1436. 
44 Simon Stern, “From Author’s Right to Property Right” (2012) 62 University of Toronto Law Journal 29 at 42. In this article, 
Stern’s approach to the history of copyright adopts what he calls author’s dignitary right, including communicative rights 
(bearing on who controls the public presentation of text), and reputational rights (bearing on the text’s appearance and its status 
as a reflection of the author).   
45 John Feather, “The Book Trade in Politics: The Making of The Copyright Act of 1710” 8 Publishing History 19; Mark Rose, 
Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992) 34-7. (Cited in Stern, 
Author’s Rights, supra note 44). 
46 Stern, Author’s Right, supra note 43. 
47 Morris, Statute of Anne, supra note 12 at 253. On the events of the 1709 petition and the passing of the Statute of Anne, Morris 
relies on the work of Ransom [Ransom, The First Copyright Statute 21 (1956)]. Morris admits that some of the account may 
involve speculations, but reasons abound for the justification of such speculation. 
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be attributable to the interlocking circle of relationships among Jacob Tonson,48 Joseph 
Addison,49 Richard Steele,50 Dr. Jonathan Swift51 and Edward Wotley.52 Morris believes that the 
web of interaction involving Tonson (the bookseller), Swift, Addison and Steele (authors) and 
Wotley (a legislator) could not have been unconnected to the drafting of the original bill leading 
to the enactment of the Statute of Anne.53 The involvement of prominent authors to align with 
booksellers could have been motivated by their concern that absent copyright, they would also 
suffer seriously from unauthorized reproduction.54 On this point, John Feather argues that the 
Stationers’ Company’s support for authors and the public good was a façade, and that their real 
motive was to secure publishing rights for their own benefit.55 
On December 12, 1709, the booksellers presented their petition after which permission 
was sought to present a draft bill for securing to them the property of books bought and obtained 
by them.56 The House of Commons responded to the petition by granting leave to Wortley to 
present a bill; the initial version presented on January 11th, 1710, was titled “A Bill for the 
Encouragement of Learning, and for Securing the Property of Copies of Books to the Rightful 
 
48 Ibid. at 253. Jacob Tonson was a powerful London bookseller in his time and had influential writers and parliamentarians as 
friends such as Joseph Addison, Richard Steele, Dr. Jonathan Swift and Edward Wotley. 
49Ibid. Joseph Addison was a writer and member of Parliament; he also served as Tonson’s literary agent before 1700. Together 
with Richard Steele, he published a popular periodical called The Tatler.  
50 Ibid. Richard Steele was Tonson’s friend, it is speculated that their friendship intensified because Steele was in a love 
relationship with Elizabeth (Tonson’s niece) who bore Steele a daughter.  
51 Ibid. Jonathan Swift was well acquainted with Tonson and in close relationship with Addison and Steele. He was a contributor 
to The Tatler.  
52 Ibid. According to Morris, Edward Wotley would appear one of the most over-looked figure in the development of the Statute 
of Anne. He was a member of Parliament and one of the three members of the Commons appointed to prepare the, and it was he 
who presented the draft to the House. Wotley met Addison in 1699 and they were close friends; it is speculated that it may have 
been through Addison that Wotley met Steele.  
53 Ibid. at 255-56. Morris further explains that it is usual for interested groups to prepare original drafts of bills presented to 
legislative bodies; he notes that Blagden [Cyprian Blagden, The Stationers’ Company: A History, 1403 – 1959 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1960)] has documented throughout his study the crucial role the stationers traditionally played in all 
legislations concerning their interest. They undoubtedly participated in every bill since 1695. When the 1707 attempt failed, they 
launched another bill.  
54 Ibid. at 256. The terms “unauthorized reproduction”, “unauthorized access”, and “illegal filesharing” are generally more 
acceptable in scholarly discourse as appear to be less controversial compared to the term “piracy”, which is controversial and 
one-sided. See generally Adrian Johns, Piracy: The Intellectual Property Wars from Gutenberg to Gates (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2010) 
55 John Feather, Publishing, Piracy and Politics: An Historical Study of Copyright in Britain (London: Mansell, 1994) at 56-7.  
56 Ibid.  
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Owners thereof.”57 Prior to this, as noted above, four petitions had already been rejected by 
Parliament, demonstrating its resistance to the booksellers’ efforts to regain monopoly over the 
book trade. However, this time, the Stationers’ support for authors’ interests and perhaps 
leveraging relationships with influential booksellers, authors and legislators for lobbying 
purposes may have made the difference. The bill was passed but it did not go through unscathed. 
The title of the bill was revised and according to Morris, the revision was significant and 
indicative of Parliament’s prejudice against booksellers; he notes that “Instead of ‘securing,’ the 
title now read ‘vesting,’ and instead of ‘owners’ it reads ‘authors or purchasers.’ This change 
from securing to vesting is significant, of course, because it suggests that the Act is creating a 
new right rather than recognizing and giving additional protection to an existing one.58 The bill 
presented did not contain any provision on limiting the term of copyright;59 therefore, an 
additional and significant blow the British Parliament dealt to the Stationers’ January 11, 1710 
bill was the creation of a limited term and so the title read “An Act for the Encouragement of 
Learning by Vesting the Copies of printed book in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, 
during the Times therein mentioned.”60 Eventually, then, the climax of the debate on the bill led 
to the enactment of the first copyright law by the British Parliament. The creation of a limited 
term in the Statute of Anne became the subject of continuing debate, however, and subsequent 
litigation. 
 
1.2 The Statute of Anne 
 
57 Stern, Author’s Right, supra note 44 at 45 citing “UK, Journal of the House of Commons, vol.16 (12 December 1710) at 240; 
Morris, Statute of Anne, supra note 12 at 258. 
58 Morris, Statute of Anne, supra note 12 at 258. 
59 Wikipedia, “Statute of Anne” at online: < https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statute_of_Anne> accessed June 10, 2019. 
60 Stern, Author’s Right, supra note 44 at 46. 
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On April 5th, 1710, the Statute of Anne 61 came into force.  As we have seen, it emerged 
from the attempts by the Stationers’ Company to renew their exclusive privileges and contained 
provisions that heralded a turning point in the ownership of copyrights. The discussions that 
follow examine the innovations brought by the Statute of Anne and the purpose(s) for its 
enactment. 
1.2.1 Copyright Under the Statute of Anne  
The Statute of Anne brought what is perceived as a landmark change by granting authors 
a twenty-one year copyright term for any book or books already printed; and a fourteen-year 
renewable copyright term for any book or books already composed and not yet printed and 
published.62 This provision brought a radical change by shifting the exclusive copyright 
ownership in books from the Stationers’ Company members to authors.63 Thus, the Stationers 
were stripped of their copyright ownership, exclusive publication rights and the power of 
censorship and enforcement64 that existed under the royal charter. The Statute of Anne made 
provisions for sanctions65 for the violation of authors’ copyright. However, as mentioned above, 
with regards to the fourteen-year term of copyright for new books, authors could assign their 
copyright under the Statute;66 this meant that an author was entitled to assign copyright in books 
to anyone. 
Two other provisions of the Statute of Anne which sought to  ensure access to knowledge 
were the publishers’ duty to fix fair prices, and to provide 9 free copies of their best publications 
 
61 Deazley, The Right to Copy, supra note 36 at 36-7. 
62 Statute of Anne, supra note 1, s.1. 
63 Patterson, Copyright, supra note 9 at 145. 
64 Masterson, Copyright History, supra note 17; Bracha, Adventures of the Statute of Anne, supra note 10 at 1437. 
65 Statute of Anne, supra note 1, s.1, anyone who prints or reprints books without the author’s written consent shall forfeit such 
books to the author who shall damask and make waste paper of them.   
66 Ibid. 
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to various institutions.67 The Statute provided that booksellers and printers should not sell books 
at a price adjudged to be high or unreasonable, and where this was found to be the case, the price 
was to be reduced.68 The Statute also imposed a duty on publishers to deliver 9 free copies of 
their best book publications for the use of the royal library, libraries of the universities of Oxford 
and Cambridge, the libraries of four universities in Scotland, the library of Sion College in 
London, and the library belonging to the faculty of advocates in Edinburgh.69 Failure to deliver 
the 9 free copies attracted a fine of £5 for every copy not delivered.70  The duty to fix a fair price 
was intended to check the exploitation of the public by publishers and the duty to deliver 9 free 
copies was aimed at ensuring unrestricted access to the knowledge without prejudice to the 
copyright granted to authors. However, the need to physically travel to the library to access these 
books may have been a practical constraint depending on the distance of travel; additionally, 
another possible restriction may have been whether access to these libraries was open to the 
general public. 
At face value, these historical changes introduced by the enactment of the Statute of 
Anne give the impression that the Statute was intended essentially for the benefit of authors and 
the public. However, there are divergent views on the subject; as Bracha notes, modern scholars 
disagree on the purposes and motivating forces behind the Statute of Anne.71 The divergent 
views of scholars on the exact purpose(s) for enacting the Statute of Anne is not due to paucity of 
information on plausible purpose(s) but the indeterminacy arising from the existence of more 
than one purpose.  
 
67 Ibid. at s.4 and 5. 
68 Ibid. at s.4. 
69 Ibid. at s.5 
70 Ibid. 
71 Bracha, Adventures of The Statute of Anne, supra note 10 at 1431  
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Before we get there, however, it is helpful to consider the effect of the statute on the 
Stationers’ claim to copyright under the common law, and the litigation that ensued. This 
analysis reveals the dialogic relationship between the judiciary and the Parliament in respect of 
the Statute of Anne. 
1.2.2 The Statute of Anne, Common Law Copyright and Early Copyright Cases 
The concept of English common law is multifaceted,72 but a simple and brief explanation 
will suffice for the purpose of this research. English common law system draws its origin from 
judge-made laws, judicial precedents, customs and traditions. In his analysis of the meaning and 
understanding of English common law concept, Morris Cohen considered various definitions of 
common law, one of which explained common law as: 
…the unwritten law, the law that receives its binding force from 
immemorial usage and universal reception, in distinction from the 
written or statute law. That body of rules, principles and customs 
which have been received from our ancestors, and by which courts 
have been governed in their judicial decisions. The evidence of this 
law is to be found in the reports of those decisions, and the records 
of the courts. Some of these rules may have originated in edicts or 
statutes which are now lost, or in the terms and conditions of 
particular grants or charters; but it is most probable that many of 
them originated in judicial decisions founded on natural justice and 
equity, or on local customs.73 
 
 This provides a succinct definition of the concept of English common law, which is 
predominantly unwritten but expressed in judicial decisions. For the purposes of the analysis to 
 
72Morris Cohen, “The Common Law in the American Legal System: The Challenge of Conceptual Research” (1989) 81 Law Lib. 
J. at 13. Cohon states that “since the concept of the common law is multifaceted, encompassing a variety of meanings, the 
literature that surrounds it reflects a wide range of approaches and themes. So diverse is this literature that one is often initially 
uncertain as to the thrust of a particular author's discussion of the common law. Research on a legal concept with such a long and 
diverse history similarly raises unique bibliographic problems. 
73 Ibid. at 15. 
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follow, it is worth noting in passing that Canada inherited the common law legal system from 
Britain (although the province of Quebec also inherited the French civil law system). 
The enactment of the Statute of Anne was not a complete victory for the Stationers’ 
Company, as we have seen. Although they secured copyright for books already published74 and 
new books (through assignment by authors),75 a limited term of twenty-one years (for books 
already published) and fourteen years (renewable) for new books, was attached to these rights. 
For about a century and half, the Stationers’ Company had had exclusive perpetual copyright in 
book publication; subjecting their copyright to a limited term was alien to them. In fact, 
according to Stern, it was considered illegitimate,76 perhaps because enjoying monopoly rights 
for over a century gave them a sense of entitlement. Unfortunately for the Stationers’ Company, 
the era of monopoly rights in book publishing ended with the enactment of the Statute of Anne. 
However, what remained to be determined for the Stationers’ Company was whether the Statute 
of Anne gave a specific limited term while the perpetual common law right continued to subsist, 
or whether it abolished common law perpetual copyright by replacing it with a limited statutory 
term.77 Any adjudication on this question would be deemed not ripe for consideration until at 
least the expiration of the twenty-one year term in 1731 and possibly, a third party publication 
attempt of a work for which the term had expired. However, a failed petition was made to 
Parliament in 1734 by the London booksellers to extend their statutory term.78 
 
74 Statute of Anne, supra note 1, s.1. 
75 Ibid. and s.11. 
76 Stern, Author’s Right, supra note 44 at 39. 
77 Masterson, Copyright History, supra note 2 at 630. 
78 Morris, Statute of Anne, supra note 12 at 224. The petition to extend the statutory copyright term arose in 1734 out of a 
challenge to the London booksellers copyright (or expired copyright). Three years after the works of Shakespeare, Milton, 
Dryden and other works expired and free to print (except common law right remained the Statute of Anne notwithstanding). One 
Walker began printing cheap editions of the works of Shakespeare. The London booksellers’ response was to seek extension of 
their limited statutory term. It is also important to note that Stern reports that “As De Grey LCJ noted in Donaldson, the London 
booksellers did not promote ‘the Idea of a Common Law Right in Perpetuity,…till after their Failure in procuring a new Statute’ 
for the extension of the copyright term in the 1730s. These failed attempts, De Grey explained, led the booksellers to reason that 
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Following the failed petition, the London publishers sought injunctive relief at Chancery 
albeit interlocutory (that is, not perpetual) orders. In June 1735, Sir Joseph Jekyll, M.R., granted 
Eyre (a bookseller) an injunction restraining the publication of an edition of The Whole Duty of 
Man.79 Injunctive relief became a safe harbour for the booksellers and they used it to their 
advantage to secure several injunctions. In 1736, Jekyll again granted Walthoe an injunction 
against Walker for a book which enjoyed the Statute of Anne’s protection till 1731.80 Jacob 
Tonson was granted an interlocutory injunction by Lord Hardwicke against Walker for Milton’s 
Paradise Lost.81 It appeared Walker was on a publication spree undeterred by previous 
restraining orders.  
The Chancery cases above suggest that the judges appeared implicitly to favour the 
concept of common law copyright even if its origin seemed controversial. According to De 
Grey,82 the London booksellers articulated the notion of common law right or perpetual 
copyright after their attempt to extend their statutory copyright term proved abortive.  They 
needed a justification for the continuous enjoyment of the exclusive right to publication even 
after the expiration of the limited term granted by the Statute of Anne. Since the Statute of Anne 
was silent on the common law right, it was necessary for the London booksellers to invoke the 
doctrine of common law right. Analyzing the concept of common law right, Morris notes that: 
No common law court had ever affirmed this right, but the Star 
Chamber, by supporting the validity of the stationers’ register and 
the decisions of the Stationers’ Court, had given governmental 
sanction to its existence. In addition, strong legal arguments could 
 
‘if…the Legislature will not do it for us, we will do it without their Assistance,’ and only then did anyone ‘begin to hear of this 
new Doctrine, the Common Law Right” Stern, Author’s Right, supra note 44 at 39 (footnote 28).  
79 Ibid. at 225 cites Eyre v. Walker, 2 Bro. P.C. 138, 1 Eng. Rep. 842 (Ch. 1735). 
80 Ibid. cites Walthoe v. Walker, 3 Swans. 676, 36 Eng. Rep.1019 (Ch. 1736); a similar case involving the same Walker for the 
same work but for a different edition was decided in a similar manner – Tonson v. Walker, 3 Swans. 672. 36 Eng. Rep. 1017 (Ch. 
1752). 
81 Ibid. cites Tonson v. Walker, 4 Burr. 2325, 98 Eng. Rep. 213 (Ch. 1736). 
82 Stern, Author’s Right, supra note 44 at 39 (footnote 28). 
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be made, based on traditional principles, for the existence of a 
common-law property right.83  
 
In my view, the Stationers’ Company did have exclusive publishing rights (without term 
limits) which rested on the various legal instruments84 the last of which lapsed in 1695; however, 
the question of whether this right could survive after the expiration of the limited term granted by 
the Statute of Anne became a highly debated and litigated issue. The enactment of a term limit to 
copyright could suggest that the Stationers’ Company’s exclusive right was extinguished upon 
the cessation of the statutory twenty-one year statutory right in existing publications. 
Consequently, it could be argued that printed or published books prior to the Statute of Anne, 
which had enjoyed perpetual common law right, no longer did so when the Statute of Anne came 
into force and limited their perpetual right to twenty-one years. 
The interlocutory injunction granted to the London booksellers even after their limited 
statutory term had elapsed85 was at best, a temporary haven for the booksellers because a 
substantive suit would need to be heard on the merits on whether common law rights survived 
the Statute of Anne and possibly litigated all the way to the House of Lords. The booksellers 
were determined to tenaciously hold onto the lifeline of injunctive relief to the extent of staging a 
case, as was discovered in Tonson v. Collins.86 Even though the decision was going to favour the 
plaintiff, the case was dismissed upon discovery that it was a collusion87 because Tonson was 
paying the defendant’s expenses.88 Masterson asserts that as a result of the ill-fated Tonson v. 
Collins, scepticism arose in Chancery, which led to the undoing of the booksellers because in 
 
83 Morris, Statute of Anne, supra note 12 at 251. 
84 Cp. Gómez-Arostegui, First Copyright Suit, supra note 12 at 1255. 
85 Morris, Statute of Anne, supra note 12 at 226; Masterson, Copyright History, supra note 2 at 630. 
86 Tonson v. Collins, 1 Black W. 301, 96 Eng. Rep. 169 (Ch. 1761) cited in Morris, Statute of Anne, supra note 12 at 225. 
87 Masterson, Copyright History, supra 2 at 631. Masterson notes that Tonson v. Collins was first brought before the King’s bench 
and the defendant was to answer for infringing on the rights of Tonson on The Spectator which was not within the protection of 
the Statute of Anne as the term had expired. The case was later adjourned to the Exchequer and despite all the judges favoring 
Tonson, it was dismissed based on discovery that it was a collusion. 
88 Morris, Statute of Anne, supra note 12 at 225. 
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subsequent cases (Millar v. Donaldson and Osborne v. Donaldson), injunctions were refused 
without any opinions given.89 
 Finally, the opportunity came for a pronouncement on whether the common law right 
survived the Statute of Anne in the landmark case of Millar v. Taylor.90 Millar instituted an 
action against Taylor for publishing the poem, The Seasons91 without his consent 
notwithstanding that the statutory copyright term in the work had expired under the Statute of 
Anne.92 Taylor contended that since the term had expired, the work was already in the public 
domain.93 Sir Thomas Sewell, M.R., referred the matter to the King’s Bench for determination.94 
Four judges sat on the case at the King’s Bench including Lord Mansfield, and judgment was 
given for the plaintiff by a vote of three to one.95 In his analysis of the judgment, Deazley notes: 
Despite each of the four having communicated their thought on the 
matter to each other, having “talked the Matter over several times”, 
and having equally endeavoured to persuade one another”, Yates J. 
nevertheless felt compelled to dissent from the opinion of the other 
three judges. Unanimity of thought upon this issue was not to be 
achieved. Given the question was “so important to the Literary 
World” Yates J. expressed his regret that “there should be any 
Disagreement upon this Bench.96 
 
Deazley further remarks that Lord Mansfield was undisturbed by the dissent of Yates, J.; 
on the contrary, Lord Mansfield claims it strengthened the conviction of the majority decision 
when he said: 
 
89 Masterson, Copyright History, supra note 2 at 631. In footnote 32, Masterson states that both cases were reported as one in 
(1765) 2 Ed., cited in Millar v. Taylor (1969) 4Burr. 2303 at 2327.  
90 Millar v. Taylor (1769) 4 Burr. 2303,98 Eng. Rep. 201. 
91 Masterson, Copyright History, supra note 85, Millar had purchased rights in The Seasons from the original author – James 
Thompson. 
92 Ibid.  
93 Stern, Author’s Right, supra note 44 at 72. 
94 Ibid.  
95 Masterson, Copyright History, supra note 85. 
96 Ronan Deazley, “Commentary on Millar v. Taylor (1769)” (2008) in Primary Sources on Copyright (1440 – 1900), eds L. 
Bentley & M. Krestschmer, at online:< 
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/commentary/uk_1769/uk_1769_com_972007181852.html >Accessed February 23, 2017, 
at 5. 
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I do not know whether it may not be very advantageous, that there 
has been a difference of opinion, for it has been the occasion of 
going into the whole of the question, and the whole of the 
arguments much more at large; and it is a general question that 
concerns a vast number of people, now and for the time to come, it 
concerns the whole kingdom: And therefore I think it is of publick 
advantage that we have different perceptions of this question, that 
has occasioned its being so minutely and so thoroughly gone into97  
  
Lord Mansfield favoured common law copyright and Yates, J. inclined to the contrary, 
perhaps because they both had previously expressed this position. Yates, J., as a counsel in 1762, 
had represented a defendant where he argued at length against the existence of common law 
right.98 On the other hand, Lord Mansfield (William Murray), appeared as counsel in Millar v. 
Kincaid (1749-1751) in favour of the London booksellers’ interest and argued in support of 
perpetual copyright in Tonson v. Walker (1752).99 It might been asked whether, in the interest of 
justice and fairness, both Lord Mansfield and Yates J. should have recused themselves from the 
case on the basis of their prior interest in the issues involved. However, the case did not reveal 
that either of them had personal interests in the case or were connected to any of the parties, as 
opposed to having merely framed arguments on behalf of their clients in their previous capacity 
as counsel. While their own views are evident in their decision, there is no reason to doubt their 
professional objectivity.  
In support of their ruling in favour of perpetual right, the majority examined the wording 
of the 1710 Act and found nothing contrary to the author’s right at common law.100 To justify his 
ruling, Lord Mansfield explains: 
 
97 Ibid.  
98 Ibid.  
99 Ibid.  
100 Ibid.  
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what is agreeable to natural principles is common-law; what is 
repugnant to natural principles is contrary to common-law, it is 
agreeable to natural principles that an author should have a copy of 
his own works before publication…Why?  ... Because it is just that an 
Author should reap the pecuniary Profits of his own Ingenuity and 
Labour. It is just, that Another should not use his Name, without his 
consent. It is fit, that He should judge when to publish, or whether he 
will ever publish. It is fit, he should not only choose the Time, but the 
Manner of Publication; how Many; what Volume; what Print. It is fit, 
that he should choose to Whose care he will Trust the Accuracy and 
Correctness of the Impression; in whose Honesty he will confide it, 
not to foist in Additions…I allow them sufficient to shew it is 
agreeable to the Principles of Right and Wrong, the Fitness of Things, 
Convenience, Policy, and therefore to the Common Law to protect 
before Publication…The 8th of Queen Ann is no Answer. We are 
considering the Common Law, upon Principles before and 
independent of that Act.101 
 
 The pivot for Lord Mansfield’s reasoning is based on common law, with which he 
equates natural law principles. Since the Statute of Anne does not expressly negate the common 
law right, he argues that the Statute of Anne, therefore, has no answer to the question at hand, 
and that recourse must be had to common law itself. He also makes a commendable argument in 
support of an author’s rights to earn rewards for his work as well as dignitary rights of the 
author.102 Lord Mansfield’s reasoning for authors’ right would have been meritorious save for 
the fact that the plaintiff in the case was a London bookseller and not an author (and of course he 
had previously defended the interest of London booksellers).103 Lord Mansfield’s argument that 
the Statute of Anne did not expressly negate the common law right can be countered by the 
provision that creates term limits. The statute expressly stated that books already printed or 
published (which previously had no term limit) were subject to a term limit of twenty-one years. 
 
101 Ibid. at 6. 
102 Stern, Author’s Right, supra note 44. 
103 Deazley, Commentary on Millar v. Taylor, supra note 96 at 5. 
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This provision notwithstanding, Lord Mansfield endorses common law right and its attendant 
implication of rights in perpetuity. 
It is the negative implications of a common law right for society that Yates J. develops in 
his compelling dissent. According to Deazley’s analysis, Yates J. could not reconcile the 
implications of perpetuity which the majority judges omitted from their reasoning.104 Yates J 
opined thus: 
Shall an Author’s Claim continue, without Bounds of Limitation; 
and for ever restrain all the Rest of Mankind from their natural 
right by an endless Monopoly? Yet such is the claim that is now 
made, a Claim to an exclusive Right of Publication, for ever: For, 
nothing less is demanded as a Reward and Fruit of the Author’s 
Labour, than an absolute Perpetuity.105  
 
As noted, Yates J. had previously argued against the existence of common law rights.106 
His strong dissent should not come as a surprise and considered on the merits, it is more of a 
public interest-oriented dissent. In my view, his dissent does not discount the value of authors’ 
rights to earn a living from their work, but he is more concerned about a right without bounds or 
limitation, which creates an endless monopoly. My inference is that Yates J. perceived that 
granting endless monopoly would be equal to going to back to the days of the Stationers’ 
Company’s monopoly, which was what the statute sought to end. The implication of this 
according to Yates J, would be to forever restrain the rest of mankind from accessing creative 
content. This statement might seem hyperbolic, but it raises genuine concern about locking out 
the public from accessing works to encourage the propagation of learning.107  
 
104 Ibid. at 6.  
105 Millar v. Taylor, supra note 90 at 232.   
106 Deazley, Commentary on Millar v. Taylor, supra note 96. 
107 Ibid. at 6. 
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Beyond the arguments and reasoning put forward by Lord Mansfield and Yates J, the 
main contention, in my view was the clash between English common law and the Statute of 
Anne. Common law tradition as I explained earlier, though largely unwritten is an age-long 
practice with a strong foundation. English judges take common law seriously and can be 
regarded as the primary custodians of English common law. Though common law is largely 
unwritten, this does not affect its consistency or make it unduly volatile. This explains why the 
majority favoured a common law approach in Millar v. Taylor. Copyright before the Statute of 
Anne, that is, under common law, was perpetual and the judges were convinced that that right 
should still subsist notwithstanding the enactment of the Statute of Anne and the limited term 
provision for books already printed or published. So, while the views and reasoning of Lord 
Mansfield seemed absolute, especially when it supported monopoly, it was born out of a 
common law perspective.  
Furthermore, the case may not have arisen had the Statute of Anne contained provisions 
that expressly stated whether the common law copyright had ended or not. While I argue that this 
was stated in the term limit provision, it was not sufficiently explicit to convince the majority in 
Millar v. Taylor. Perhaps it was deliberate that the Statute of Anne was silent on the issue, that is, 
not expressly mentioning that the term limit provisions applied specifically to common law. I 
strongly believe that in the course of considering the bill that was passed into law (Statute of 
Anne), it would have been contemplated that express provisions could be made to end the 
Stationers’ heretofore perpetual common law copyright; especially considering the fact that bill 
was an opportunity to rid the Stationers’ Company of their monopoly rights. My speculation is 
that they feared the consequences of tampering with the age-long tradition of common law. So, 
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at best, a term limit was included in the Statute of Anne, leaving the question of its interpretation 
to the courts.  
Notably, in their divergent views, both Lord Mansfield and Yates J tried to legitimize 
their opinion by referring to natural rights principles; Lord Mansfield notes that “what is 
agreeable to natural principles is common law”108 Yates J remarks “restrain all the rest of 
mankind from their natural rights.”109 The ruling in this case thus became a major victory for the 
London booksellers; but it did not last as long as they would have wished. 
The next landmark case of Donaldson v. Beckett110  can be regarded as a sequel to Millar 
v. Taylor.  The subject matter was the same collection of poems, The Seasons. Millar passed on 
in 1768 and his rights in The Seasons were purchased from Millar’s estate by Beckett.111 
However, Donaldson was selling cheaper editions of the same work.112 Beckett successfully 
obtained a restraining order in Chancery against Donaldson. Lord Chancellor Apsley followed 
the precedent of Millar v. Taylor and made the interlocutory injunction against Donaldson 
permanent.113 Donaldson appealed and the matter was referred to the House of Lords.114 Five 
questions were put before the judges whom the Lords summoned to give their opinion; the last 
two questions were essentially whether a common law right existed and, if so, whether the 
Statute of Anne removed this right.115 Eleven of the twelve judges116 had to give their opinion on 
 
108 Ibid.  
109 Ibid.  
110 4 Burr. 2408, 2 Bro. P.C 129, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1775), cited in “Morris, Statute of Anne, supra note 12 at 227.” 
111 Ibid.  
112 Ibid.  
113 Ronan Deazley, “Commentary on Donaldson v. Becket (1174)” (2008) in Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. 
Bently & M. Kretschmer, at online: < http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=commentary_uk_1774 
> Accessed February 23, 2017 at 2.  
114 Wikipedia, Donaldson v. Becket, at online: < https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donaldson_v_Beckett > Accessed February 23, 
2017 at 2. Note that seven months previously, in the case of Hinton v. Donaldson, the Scots Court of Session, had ruled that 
copyright did not exist in the common law of Scotland and that Alexander Donaldson (the defendant) could lawfully publish 
Thomas Stackhouse’s New History of the Holy Bible. 
115 Supra note 113 at 3. 
116 Ibid., Lord Mansfield abstained having given his opinion on the matter in Millar v. Taylor. 
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the matter: on the first question the judges ruled (7 to 4) in the affirmative; and on whether this 
right was taken away by the Statute of Anne, the judges ruled (6 to 5) in the affirmative.117 The 
House of Lords had the final say in the matter and of the five Lords, four (Lord Camden, Lord 
Chancellor Apsley, the Bishop of Carlisle, and the Earl of Effingham) spoke against the common 
law right and one (Lord Lyttleton) in favour; eventually, the perpetual injunction in favour of a 
common law right (Millar v. Taylor) was quashed.118 As Deazley notes, Lord Camden’s 
compelling rejection of the common law right dismisses the citations and precedents119 that had 
been relied on to support it as a “heterogeneous heap of rubbish, which is only calculated to 
confound your lordships, and mislead the argument.”120 Lord Camden further noted: 
The arguments attempted to be maintained on the side of the 
respondents, were founded on patents, privileges, Star Chamber 
decrees, and the bye-laws of the Stationers’ Company; all of them 
the effects of the grossest tyranny and usurpation; the very last 
places in which I should have dreamt of finding the least trace of 
the common law of this kingdom; and yet, by a variety of subtle 
reasoning and metaphysical refinements, have they endeavoured to 
squeeze out the spirit of the common law from these premises in 
which it could not possibly have existence.121 
 
 The judiciary in its landmark decision in Donaldson v. Beckett filled a lacuna in the 
Statute of Anne by dismissing the Stationers’ Company’s claim to perpetual right. This shows 
the dialogic interaction between the legislature and judiciary in shaping copyright law from the 
very early periods as it still continues to do to this day. It is fitting, therefore, that the next 
discussion underscores the dialogue between the legislature and judiciary in the wake of judicial 
decisions after the enactment of the Statute of Anne.  
 
117 Supra note 114. 
118 Deazley, Commentary on Donaldson v. Becket, supra note 113 at 3-4. 
119 Ibid. at 4. 
120 Ibid.  
121 Wikipedia, Donaldson v. Beckett, supra note 114 at 4. 
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 The enactment of the Statute of Anne ushered in a new era, though not one without 
challenges, and this led to some ground-breaking judicial opinions. We will return to examine 
the significance of Millar v Taylor and Donaldson v Beckett specifically in respect of this 
dialogic interaction between courts and the legislature, but first, there are a number of earlier 
cases that deserve to be brought into the picture.   
1.2.3 Copyright Cases: Dialogue between The Judiciary and Parliament 
Burnet v. Chetwood122 was the first case to be litigated after passing the Statute of Anne 
in 1710 involving the translation of work under its protection.123 The main issue for contention 
was whether the Statute of Anne prohibited the translation of works. In 1692, Thomas Burnet 
published Archaeologia Philosophica in Latin to express his views on geological history.124 
After Burnet’s death, William Chetwood and Richard Franklin sought to print an English 
translation of two works by Burnet, Archaeologia Philosophica and De Statu Mortuorum et 
Resurgentium.125 Burnet’s executor (his brother George) sought an injunction from Chancery on 
the basis that the book was written in Latin because it was only intended for the learned, and he 
also complained that the translation distorted the meaning of the book.126 In response, the 
defendants (Chetwood and Franklin) contended that their work was not the same book as 
Archaeologia Philosophica but a translation of the book into English.127 They further argued that 
the claimant based his claim on the Statute of Anne which does not prohibit translation of such 
books into another language and the printing and publishing of such translation; they also 
 
122 Burnet v. Chetwood (1921) 2 Mer. 441. 
123 Ronan Deazley, “Commentary on Burnet v. Chetwood (1921)”(2008) in Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. 
Bentley & M. Kretschmer, at online: < 
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=commentary_uk_1721 > Accessed February 23, 2017.  
124 Stern, Author’s Right, supra note 44 at 54. 
125 Ronan Deazley, Commentary on Burnet v. Chetwood, supra note 123 at 2. 
126 Stern, Author’s Right, supra note 44 at 55. 
127 Ronan Deazley, Commentary on Burnet v. Chetwood, supra note 123 at 2. 
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stressed the fact their translation work was not a mechanical art but some skill in language and 
equal to the encouragement of learning within the act.128 The Statute of Anne clearly was silent 
on translation of works into another language and the printing and publication of such works.  
Lord Chancellor Macclesfield agreed with the defendants that the translation of a work 
could be a different book because of the skill and care that was put into the new version of the 
work, and that such endeavours were not within the prohibition of the Act.129 Although 
sympathetic to the defendants’ arguments, the Lord Chancellor Macclesfield nonetheless 
awarded an injunction to prevent the translation and printing of both works and the forfeiture of 
all copies in defendants’ possession.130 Deazley explains the rationale for the Lord Chancellor’s 
decision as follows: 
…He continued, however, that this was a book that contained 
“strange notions” and as such should not be made available in the 
“vulgar” tongue (that is, in English). Rather, it should remain in 
Latin only, “in which language it could not do much hurt, the 
learned being better able to judge” the work… “[A]n injunction 
was granted,” and this based upon the Lord Chancellor’s opinion 
that the court has “a superintendency over all books, and might in a 
summary way restrain the printing or publishing any that contained 
reflections on religion or morality.”131  
 
It is apparent in this case that the 1710 Statute of Anne was silent on translation of works 
to another language and printing and publication of the same. However, the opinion of Lord 
Macclesfield manifests an engagement with the parliament to fill in the legislative gap in the 
Statute of Anne. Lord Macclesfield acknowledges that translation of a work to another language 
(which becomes a different work) was not within the prohibition of the Statute of Anne. The 
reason is that, if the law is silent on it, prohibition is unlikely to be enforced because it did not 
 
128 Ibid.  
129 Ibid.  
130 Ibid.  
131 Ibid. 
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constitute infringement.132 The court further recognizes an even more compelling argument that 
translation requires the investment of care and skill in language which contributes to the 
encouragement of learning as envisaged by the act. Ironically, in my view, it was for this same 
reason of encouragement of learning that the court decided against the defendants; that is, to 
prevent the distortion of knowledge. The court notes that the book was published in Latin to 
preserve the knowledge it contained and be judged by the learned; an attempt to translate it into a 
vulgar tongue (English) would defeat the interest for which the book was originally intended by 
the author.133 The court self-reports that its opinion to prohibit the translation of the work is 
based on its inherent authority of superintendency over all books. This could be interpreted to 
mean that the court has the responsibility to ensure that published books do not distort 
knowledge and spread error to the detriment of the public. 
Despite the jurisprudence behind that decision in Burnet v. Chetwood, it can be argued 
that to prohibit the translation of a work into another language absent any express prohibition by 
the act itself is not to interpret but to make law.  Additionally, the concept of a superintendency 
role of the courts over all books portrays the semblance of censorship as carried out by the 
Crown through the Stationers’ Company;134 however, at that time, English courts were wont to 
deny copyright enforcement where doing so, in their view, would prevent the circulation of 
obscenity that could potentially corrupt public morals. 
The arguments against the Burnet v. Chetwood decision present a reasonable view of the 
case at that time. However, my focus is the consideration of the dialogue between the judiciary 
and legislature. In every case that comes before the court, the court not only performs its 
 
132 Deazley, Commentary on Burnet v. Chetwood, supra note 123 at 3. 
133 Stern extensively discusses Burnet v. Chetwood from the perspective of dignitary rights of the author, see Stern, Author’s 
Right, supra note 44 at 54-9.  
134 Ibid. at 57. 
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adjudicatory functions, but also can be regarded through a modern lens as having been in 
discursive communication with the parliament. In Burnet v. Chetwood, the court demonstrates 
this dialogic interaction to make pronouncement on areas where the law is silent. This sends a 
message to parliament on areas that need future legislative attention and improvement. Lord 
Macclesfield’s determination that the translation of a work is not an infringement moots the fact 
that it could be included in the law. In modern copyright law,135 translations are regarded as 
derivative works within the scope of the author’s exclusive right.136 Although the observation of 
Lord Macclesfield may not have directly resulted in the right to control derivative works, it does 
form part of the rich contribution of the judiciary to the development of copyright law based on 
the relatively bare bones of the first copyright statute. Lord Macclesfield also foreshadows the 
standard of measuring originality when he states that “some skill in language is requisite and in 
the course of rewriting, the translator dresses [the original text] up and clothes the sense in his 
own style and expression.”137 Despite other interpretations that may be given to the Burnet v. 
Chetwood ruling, its examination reveals its contribution to the development of copyright law 
which was in its infancy at the time.  
The next copyright case to be considered as an example of dialogue between the judiciary 
and parliament is Pope v. Curll138 where the court had to consider whether unpublished letters 
fall within the protection of the Statute of Anne. In this case, Pope filed a complaint in Chancery 
under the Statute of Anne against Curll concerning the publication of a volume of 
 
135 David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patents and Trade-Marks 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at 55. See, 
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correspondence written by him and received from others, including Jonathan Swift.139 Pope 
obtained an injunction against Curll pending a response from Curll.140 According to Pope, 
between 1714 and 1738 he wrote series of letters to Swift but did not dispose of the copyright in 
the letters and therefore possessed the sole right to publish and sell them.141 During this same 
period, Pope stated that he received various letters from Swift and claimed that both the letter he 
wrote and those addressed to him by Swift should not be published without his consent.142 Pope 
asked for disclosure of all agreements made concerning the book and an accounting of all profits 
and paid to him.143 In response, Curll contended that the letters sent by Pope to Curll were 
considered as gifts to Curll and no longer Pope’s property.144 Pope argued that, while he was no 
longer the proprietor of the letters, he still remained their author and thus retained the ability to 
decide whether or not they should be published.145 
In his opinion on whether the unpublished letters fell within the protection of the Statute 
of Anne, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke ruled in the affirmative noting that “it would be extremely 
mischievous, to make a distinction between a book of letters, which comes into the world either 
by the permission of the writer, or the receiver of them, and any other learned work.”146 He 
further stated: 
It is certain that no works have done more service to mankind, than 
those which have appeared in this shape, upon familiar subjects, 
and which perhaps were never intended to be published; and it is 
this that makes them so valuable, for I must confess for my own 
part, that letters which are very elaborately written, and originally 
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intended for the press, are generally the most insignificant, and 
very little worth any person’s reading. (Atkyns, Pope)147 
  
On the issue of ownership and right to publication of the letters written by Pope and those 
addressed to him, Lord Hardwicke ruled thus: 
As to the first (letters written by Pope),148…I am of the opinion that 
it is only a special property in the receiver, possibly the property of 
the paper may belong to him; but this does not give a licence to any 
person whatsoever to publish them to the world, for at most the 
receiver has only a joint property…As for the letters in the volume 
written to Mr. Pope, I think that he cannot be heard to complain. 
They may possibly be published with the authority of the writers of 
them, and from copies taken from before they were sent to him.149  
 
Lord Hardwicke rejected Curll’s argument as to the letters written by Pope and, for the 
letters addressed to Pope, he ruled that Pope did not have the right to complain about their 
publication.   
Pope v. Curll demonstrates the dialogue on the Statute of Anne between the judiciary and 
the parliament. The issue before the court was whether unpublished works or manuscripts (in this 
case a collection of letters) came within the protection of the Statute of Anne which provided 
only for works upon publication. As Deazley rightly notes, “The issue was just one of a number 
of concepts that had been left unresolved by the Statute of Anne: who had the right to first 
publish any written manuscript? and, upon what foundation?”150 It is with this difficult question, 
for which the Statute of Anne made no provision, that Lord Hardwicke engaged in Pope v. Curll 
for the development and improvement of the copyright jurisprudence. Similar to Burnet v. 
Chetwood, the court resolves the question not based upon the face of the 1710 Act but its 
normative foundation. Lord Hardwicke’s decision was guided by the fact that the Statute of 
 
147 Ibid. at 208. 
148 Text in bracket added by the author of this dissertation. 
149 Deazley, Commentary on Pope v. Curll, supra note 139 at 2-3. 
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Anne was passed “for the encouragement of learning” and the continued “production of useful 
books.”151 Deazley explains that it would have been problematic to deny Pope any form of 
redress because epistolary exchanges at the time served a valuable instructional and educational 
function; indeed letter-writing in the eighteenth century was a practice in which all in society 
engaged.152 So while the Statute of Anne was silent as to unpublished letters, to deny the letter 
writer any protection might discourage writing.153 In sum, it would be counter-productive to 
deny the author of unpublished correspondence any right because such practice promotes the 
encouragement of learning in accordance with the Statute of Anne. A strict interpretation and 
enforcement of the Statute of Anne would have resulted in non-recognition of authorship and 
ownership of the letters written by Pope because they were not published by him and the Statute 
of Anne only protected published works, but this would have resulted in a misconception and 
conflicted with the prevalent notion of the instructional value of letter writing at that time. 
Instead, in the exercise of its adjudicatory function, the court effectively engaged in dialogue 
with parliament on the shortcomings of the Statute of Anne. The judgment could be criticized as 
the court overstepping its bounds and encroaching into the powers of parliament; but the court 
could equally be criticized for failing to uphold one of the stated objectives of enacting the 
Statute of Anne, which sought to encourage learning whether from letters or books.  
In his opinion, which granted authorship of the letters to Pope, Lord Hardwicke’s 
reasoning distinguished between physical possession of the letters and the creative expression of 
author. He notes that the receiver of the physical object embodying the work has at best, a 
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qualified interest.154 Deazley asserts that this reasoning “provided one of the earliest elaborations 
articulation on the problematic nature of copyright, and the relationship between the author, the 
reader, the book and the text.”155 Commenting on Hardwicke’s decision, Mark Rose describes 
the decision as “a transitional moment in the conception of authorship and a pivotal moment in 
the production of the concept of intellectual property”156 The illumination provided by Lord 
Hardwicke on this concept of copyright (authorship and the physical embodiment of the work 
and the user) can be regarded as one of the benefits of the courts engaging in a conversation with 
the parliament on shortcomings of the statutory provisions. 
The next two cardinal cases that shaped the early jurisprudence of copyright in the mid-
eighteenth century are Millar v. Taylor and Donaldson v. Beckett, discussed above. It is worth 
returning to examine these cases from the perspective of how the court dialogues with itself by 
re-evaluating previous decisions. Using Millar v. Taylor and Donaldson v. Beckett, I show that 
not only is there dialogic communication between or among arms of government, there is also 
the possibility of a dialogue within a single arm of government. These two cases exemplify this 
scenario; the court not only dialogues with the parliament, but also dialogues within itself 
through consenting and dissenting opinions of the judges.   
Recall that, in Millar v. Taylor, the issue for determination was whether perpetual 
common right existed in copyrighted works notwithstanding the limited term provision in the 
Statute of Anne. Here again, the Statute of Anne was silent on this, which is not surprising 
considering how parliament resisted the booksellers bid to revive their monopoly rights. The 
court had to engage with the parliament and fill in the lacuna. A second level of dialogue ensues 
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in the court when there is no unanimity in the opinions of all the judges. Even the court confirms 
this internal dialogue when it notes that despite “having talked the matter over, several times and 
having all equally endeavoured to persuade one another.”157 Arguably, the inability to achieve a 
unanimous decision was further heightened by the fact that Lord Mansfield and Yates J both had 
pre-conceived opinion already on the subject158 from their days as practicing counsel and this 
may have in no small way influenced their viewpoints on the issues. In a decision which 
favoured the existence of common law right, despite the copyright term limit provisions of the 
Statute of Anne, Lord Mansfield supports his opinion by explaining that the answer to the 
question before the court does not lie in the Statute of Anne but what is agreeable to natural 
principles which he believes is common law.159 On the contrary, Yates J cites public interest as 
the reason for his dissent asserting that an author’s right without limits would adversely affect 
the interest of the rest of mankind (public interest).160  
The majority decision in favour of common law right was a major victory for the 
booksellers and in effect weakened the public domain established by the Statute of Anne through 
the introduction of limited term. The booksellers got from the judiciary what they could not 
obtain from parliament. To the booksellers, it was a welcome decision, but to authors and 
possibly the reading public, it meant the revival of the 16th and 17th century monopoly. 
Millar v. Taylor demonstrates the uncertainty of judicial decisions and that the outcome 
may not always follow popular or expected views or, indeed, the assumed intentions of the 
legislature. The decision in Millar v. Taylor could be argued as right or wrong depending on 
whose interest is prioritized. My concern is the influence it had (though short-lived) in the 
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developmental phase of copyright law and its purposes. With Donaldson v. Beckett, the 
opportunity presented itself for the House of Lords to remedy, presumably, the wrong done in 
Millar v. Taylor. The earlier endorsement of perpetual copyright at common law was rejected on 
the ground that it could not be supported and that even if it existed, it was displaced by the 
Statute of Anne. The decision reveals that the dynamics in the conversation among the arms of 
government is an evolving and ongoing communication process. I mentioned earlier that the 
judiciary (and indeed any arm of government) can also look inward to interact and communicate 
with itself. This internal communication process can be in the form of a re-evaluation of an 
earlier adopted viewpoint and can effect a change where it is deemed necessary (subject to the 
court hierarchy system). This was exemplified by the Donaldson v. Beckett case; although the re-
evaluation of the matter was triggered by litigants, the court could have simply endorsed the 
earlier decision of the lower court on the matter and more so because the facts and subject matter 
were exactly the same. The House of Lords chose instead to dialogue with not just the 
parliament, but with the lower court and revisit an earlier decision. The outcome of the dialogue 
culminates in overruling the earlier decision and changing the course of copyright history. The 
1774 decision in Donaldson v. Beckett markedly shaped the future of copyright law and serves as 
a historical reference; but how much of this historical knowledge impacts the present-day 
copyright jurisprudence and policy formulation is another question.  
Reviewing the early copyright cases show the enormous contribution of the judiciary in 
moulding copyright law from the beginning. This role is still crucial today even as the copyright 
system has experienced immense transformation over the past three centuries and the legislative 
text has grown in depth and detail. The notion of dialogue helps to refine and improve 
knowledge and understanding on a particular subject. As the process is ongoing, it creates the 
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opportunity for continuous evaluation of previous positions for iterative improvement. In a 
subject like copyright, where numerous interests are involved and the context is always 
changing, the value of dialogue helps the arms of government to engage with the issues and to 
assist one another in cautiously addressing them. 
Having given a succinct account of the origin and development of copyright and the 
intrigues and interests involved, the question to which we now return is one that has been 
debated extensively by copyright scholars and other stakeholders: for what purpose or for whose 
interest was the Statute of Anne enacted?  
 
1.3 The Purpose of the Statute of Anne: To What End and for Whose Interest?       
For a fair analysis of the purposes of enacting the Statute of Anne, it is pertinent to 
flashback to the royal privileges granted to the Stationers’ Company and the debates that 
followed after it lapsed. My earlier discussion on the debates after the royal privileges ended and 
prior to the Statute of Anne reveals a period fraught with the intractable challenges of competing 
interests between authors and publishers and the public—not dissimilar to what exists today.  
In tracing the historical account of how the royal privileges started, the views of scholars 
on the purpose of granting the members of the Stationers’ Company monopoly rights in book 
publication seem to be fairly congruent. Bracha asserts that “the stationer’s copyright was rooted 
in an overlap between the guild’s commercial interests and the government’s political ones, the 
basic deal involved a facilitation of censorship in return for tight control of the trade and broad 
enforcement powers.”161 Similarly, Gervais states that the royal charter favoured both the 
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interests of the publishers and the Crown in maintaining control over new publications.162 
Masterson explicitly states that: 
It is not to be thought, however, that the sole, or even the chief, 
purpose of these privileges was to protect and encourage the printer or 
the author. The real reason behind the grants was to obtain for the 
Church and State an effective control and supervision over the press. 
Before a privilege could be obtained the work had to be submitted to 
censors and a favourable report secured…the first protection given to 
literary productions in what may be termed the growth of the present-
day legal systems was not in recognition of a private right of an 
individual, but was rather a concession to achieve a more effective 
administrative control of a trade, the dangers of which were early seen 
by the political and ecclesiastical authorities.163 
 
 It is apparent that the royal charter was devised primarily to serve the interest of the 
Crown and ecclesiastical authorities,164 and not for the interest of authors or for any individual. 
The benefit to the stationers followed as consequence of their role as a conduit to achieve 
political and religious objectives. In other words, if the Crown had other more convenient means 
of achieving its censorship objective, it may have dispensed with the stationers. However, the 
government’s choice in using the Stationers’ Company to do what I call its dirty job (pre-
publication censorship, which was criticized by both Locke and Milton)165 was very strategic 
because, prior to the grant of the royal charter, the Stationers’ Company had recognized the 
enviable benefits of exclusive rights in book publication and began scheming for it amidst 
questions from non-guild members.166 At this time, the members of the Stationers’ Company did 
not have any copyright or legal backing for the exclusive publication right they arrogated to 
themselves. However, their cause must have gathered momentum because, as Masterson argues, 
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though the influence exerted by the Stationers’ Company before the grant of the royal charter 
was uncertain, they must have been a body of some importance.167 Realizing that the ambition of 
the Stationers’ Company could work in its favour, the State was motivated to legitimize their 
exclusivity claim through the royal privileges that they enjoyed for more than a century.  
 The Stationers’ Company members were relentless in extending the privileges after their 
Charter ended, as we have seen. Consequently, it is important to ask how much of the royal 
privileges were transplanted into the Statute of Anne, and whether the Stationers’ Company got 
what they wanted. Analyzing the purposes for enacting the Statute of Anne generates different 
views depending on who is doing the analysis and the interests they represent or favour. 
Copyright scholars and academics may think differently from publishers and may approach the 
issues differently from publishers. An objective review of a mix of views will hopefully shed 
some light on the issue.  
 Bracha asserts that the new strategy168 adopted by the stationers eventually led to the 
enactment of the Statute of Anne, but that this did not imply they got everything they wanted.169  
Rather the Statute of Anne was a compromise: 
The Statute was a compromise that contained various elements 
reflecting the interests and concerns behind it: the interests of 
stationers in securing their economic rights, fears of the Company’s 
monopoly and of the power of its prominent members including by 
smaller booksellers, attempts to secure the public interests referred 
to as “the encouragement of learning,” and an emerging concern 
for authors. The basic features of the Statute reflected this amalgam 
of competing forces.170  
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  Bracha implies that everybody at least benefited to some extent from the statute; authors 
got copyright in their books,171 encouragement of learning secured the public interest,172 and the 
stationers had the opportunity to be assigned copyright by authors.173 Author Victor Bonham-
Carter associates the purpose of the Statute of Anne with recognizing the author’s position in 
copyright protection as well as giving them legal rights and the ability to bargain for better 
terms.174 Agreeably, for the first time, the statute vested copyright in the author; but the exercise 
of that right as Bonham-Carter notes, to negotiate better terms is questionable as the authors still 
had to rely on the structure of the theoretically defunct but practically active book trade business 
built by the stationers. 
Patterson thinks differently from Bonham-Carter and argues that the statute was primarily 
aimed at breaking the monopoly power of the Stationers’ Company and that the figure of the 
author was merely used as a pretext to achieve that purpose and regulate the book trade.175 
Patterson states that the Statute of Anne was more of a trade-regulation statute and that earlier 
English copyright laws were censorship laws176 and, as they functioned in censorship, so the 
Statute of Anne was meant to function in regulating the book trade.177 Expounding his argument 
further, Patterson argues that:  
Earlier English copyright acts, the Star Chamber Decrees of 1586 
and 1637, the Ordinances of 1643 and 1647, and Licensing Act of 
1662, were fundamentally censorship laws which may explain why 
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their relevance to the so-called first copyright act was ignored. 
Even so, the Statute of Anne descends directly from this earlier 
legislation, and just as these earlier laws functioned essentially in 
censorship, so the Statute of Anne was intended to function 
principally in regulating.178 
 
Mark Rose agrees with Patterson, noting that the Statute of Anne was not quite the 
landmark recognition of authors’ right as it has often been interpreted to be but favoured 
booksellers through the legislative continuation of the old trade regulation practices of the 
Stationers’ Company.179 
The historical account and the views of scholars examined above reveals factual details 
of the monopoly granted by the Crown to the Stationers’ Company; the reasonable conclusion to 
draw is that the grant of exclusive right to book publishing prior to the Statute of Anne arguably 
benefitted, firstly, the State (by controlling publication that sought to challenge its authority), and 
then secondly, the Stationers’ Company. This fact is crucial in trying to ascertain the motive or 
purpose behind the enactment of the Statute of Anne. There is a nexus between the monopoly 
regime and the new statutory copyright regime: the latter grew out of the demise of the former 
following the unflinching lobbying of the booksellers to revive their exclusivity. After the final 
lapse of the Stationers’ Company’s monopoly privileges in 1695,180 the lobbying and several 
bills181 sponsored by the booksellers did not have authors’ interests or public interests in mind 
and were met with resistance.182 Realizing that they needed an appealing justification more than 
censorship and exclusive publication, the interest of the author was projected and used as a 
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pretext to get the bill through parliament.183 Arguably, had any of these bills been successful, 
there may not have been any need or momentum to provide for the interest of author in the law—
and certainly not from the perspective of the booksellers. The resistance from parliament and the 
bid to dismantle the monopoly power of the cartel in the book publishing trade created the need 
to include authors’ interests in the bill. If, absent the strong lobbying by the booksellers, it is 
unlikely that parliament would have enacted a law primarily to provide for the interests of 
authors, then, from these historical facts, it can be argued that the protection of authors’ interests 
in the Statute of Anne was not the original or motivating intention. Patterson is right to conclude 
that the Statute of Anne was not intended primarily for the benefit of authors.184 The proposed 
bill required substantial review by parliament in 1709 in order to reshape it to serve the public 
interest—and so the Statute of Anne was born. The stationers had lobbied to regain their 
exclusive monopoly, but the legislative result was both more and less than they had anticipated. 
In my view, while the intention behind the lobbying efforts was primarily to favour the 
stationers and to push through a bill drafted under the influence of prominent publishers, authors 
and legislators,185 parliament did significantly thwart the intention of the stationers by revising 
the bill to include public interest provisions and vest copyright in authors. It would therefore be 
misguided to simply conclude that the making of the Statute of Anne did not consider the 
interests of authors or the public. Indeed, Deazley’s argument, at least, is that the Statute of Anne 
was fundamentally about the public interest. The idea that the statute was enacted solely for 
authors is also a misconception and Patterson cautions against this; while Patterson 
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acknowledges that the statute did give authors copyright, his ultimate argument points to the 
public interest benefit created by the statute:  
[T]he Statute of Anne is usually thought of as having vested the 
copyright of works in their authors; and superficially, the language 
of the statute conveys the idea that the act was especially intended 
to benefit authors. It did enable authors for the first time to acquire 
the copyright of their works, and to this extent, it was a benefit to 
them. The radical change in the statute, however, was not that it 
gave authors the right to acquire a copyright – a prerogative until 
then limited to members of the Stationers’ Company – but that it 
gave the right to all persons.186 
 
If the statute did not wholly favour authors, this implies that the stationers would have 
been best positioned to gain from it. Patterson doubts the practical efficacy of vesting copyright 
in the author and suggests that parliament was more concerned about breaking the stationers’ 
monopoly than the interest of the author: 
Emphasis on the author in the Statute of Anne implying that the 
statutory copyright was an author’s right was more a matter of form 
than substance. The monopolies at which the statute was aimed 
were too long established to be attacked without some basis for 
change. The most logical and natural basis for the change was the 
author. Although the author had never held copyright, his interest 
was always promoted by the stationers as a means to their end. 
Their arguments had been, essentially, that without order in the 
trade provided by copyright, publishers would not publish books, 
and therefore would not pay authors for their manuscripts. The 
draftsman of the Statute of Anne put these arguments to use, and 
the author was used primarily as a weapon against the monopoly.187   
 
Patterson seems to suggest that the author was caught in the crossfire between the 
stationers and Parliament. According to Patterson, parliament used the authors as an excuse to 
attack and dismantle the stationers’ monopoly. The setback experienced by the authors is that 
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despite their ownership of copyright, it did not place them in equal bargaining powers with the 
publishers. This is attributable to the longstanding and established monopoly held by the 
stationers; they owned the book trade market structure and distribution network, to which authors 
did not otherwise have access.  
My view is that, though, in theory, the monopoly in the book trade was dismantled, in 
practice, the publishers were still very much relevant due to their well-entrenched book printing 
and distribution network, giving them an advantage over authors. Even though Bonham-Carter 
argues that the Statute of Anne gave authors copyright in their works and impliedly, power to 
negotiate a better deal with publishers,188 it is doubtful if this was effective. With more than a 
century-long domination of the book publishing market, the stationers had become almost 
indispensable even after being stripped of their royal privilege of exclusive right to book 
publication. Their expectation was that the authors, though vested with copyright in their works, 
would need publishers and this gave the stationers power over authors and relevance in the 
scheme of things. The stationers’ position was further strengthened by the fact that they could 
still acquire and own copyright through assignment by authors189 including the renewal terms of 
such copyright. 
My position here is that, based on the previous examination of the schemes and economic 
interests of the Stationers’ Company and their tactical manoeuvre to include authors’ interest as a 
means to an end, their intention to continue to maintain economic power and to control book 
publishing, albeit through subtle means, was hardly diminished. It appeared the motive of the 
publishers to remain relevant was by design; other interests and purposes (vesting authors with 
copyright in their works and public interest of encouragement of learning), are equally important 
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reasons for the enactment of the statute and represent the effort by parliament to provide balance 
within and through the legislation.   
Rose190 and Patterson’s191 argument that the Statute of Anne was not primarily enacted to 
benefit authors is, I think, somewhat mischaracterized by Dennis Khong, who thinks that 
Patterson construes the Statute of Anne as a perpetuation of statutory form of publishers’ 
interest.192 Writing from a law and economics perspective on the Statute of Anne, Khong argues 
that, through anti-monopoly provisions, the statute sought to tackle monopoly in book 
publication.193 For example he cites section one which vests upon authors and their assigns the 
sole right of publication194 and by this, the exclusive monopoly of the publishers was weakened. 
The grant of copyright to authors by the act did not mean that the members of the Stationers’ 
Company could no longer publish, but that every other person or publisher could now publish, 
although of course only now with the consent of authors. This right had previously been 
exclusive to members of the Stationers’ Company and non-members were excluded from 
exercising this right. In effect, and from an economic perspective, the Statute of Anne functioned 
as a liberalization of the book trade, creating more competition. Khong also emphasizes that the 
introduction of a limited term was a departure from the stationers’ ancient practice of perpetual 
right.195 In fact, Khong notes that Wortley’s bill did not have term limits because the stationers’ 
were keen on maintaining their perpetual rights but the House of Commons introduced term 
limits.196 Another anti-monopoly provision of the Statute of Anne was section four, which 
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functioned, Khong notes, as price control;197 the section imposed a duty on publishers not to sell 
books at an unreasonable price as well as empowering any person to bring a complaint before 
specified authorities if they considered the price of a book to be unreasonable. Upon examination 
of the complaint, the adjudicator could review and set a new price, and failure of compliance by 
the printer or publisher would attract strict penalties.198 Although a laudable provision to check 
monopoly pricing, Khong notes that there is no historical evidence to show how effective this 
provision actually was in checking monopoly pricing, and speculates it may not have yielded 
much success.199 The arguments raised by Khong are genuine and should be taken into 
consideration as we evaluate parliament’s effort to balance the competing interest at play at the 
time. But Khong did not address the fact that the established position of the stationers as 
controllers of the distribution network and longstanding connections in the book trade meant 
they could still control a large share of the market. This is perhaps the point Patterson was 
addressing in his opinion: ultimately, the Statute of Anne benefitted the publishers more. 
The purpose of the Statute of Anne did not begin and end with the parliamentary 
enactment of the Act but was further refined by the judiciary through the early cases that tested 
the Act. It is fitting therefore to consider the purpose of the first copyright law from the 
perspective of judicial interpretation, which gave the judiciary opportunity to share its reflective 
and interpretative opinions on the subject. The discussion below draws one final time from the 
key cases already discussed, to which we now return with the aim of identifying the perceived 
purposes of copyright informing these important judicial decisions. 
 
197 Ibid; The Statute of Anne, supra note 1, s.4. 
198 The Statute of Anne, supra note 1, s.4. 
199 Khong, Law and Economics of Copyright, supra note 192 at 58. 
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At first, the judiciary was a haven for publishers when the courts favoured them with pre-
trial injunctions after the term in their published works ran out under the Statute of Anne. The 
court’s endorsement (the grant of interlocutory injunctions and the decision in Millar v. Taylor) 
of the subsistence of common law rights implied that it was unaffected by the limited term in the 
Statute of Anne. The courts granted inter-locutory injunctions to prohibit the republication of 
works whose term under the Statute of Anne had lapsed. This sent a message to the stationers’ 
that what they could not achieve through the parliament was coming through the courts. 
Furthermore, in the exercise of its interpretative role, the court gave an opinion (possibly 
influenced more by religion and morality than creativity, given the topics of the book) when it 
prohibited the translation of a work into another language despite admitting that there was no 
infringement of the original work. This once again emphasizes the impact of judicial 
interpretation in shaping the purpose of the Statute of Anne. The court envisions that the Statute 
of Anne was meant to encourage and promote new ideas and knowledge for the public interest.  
The court encouraged the productive consumption of existing works from which inspiration is 
derived and which, through the investment of care and skill leads, to the generation of a new 
work for more readers. While it could appear that the court went beyond its role, it does 
represent the court’s dialogic communication with the parliament to expound the meaning and 
purpose of the Statute of Anne, contributing to the development of a copyright system that was, 
at that time, still in its developmental stages). 
It is noteworthy that the interpretative role of the judiciary in shaping the purpose of the 
Statute of Anne did not follow a linear course, the courts having initially granted injunctions 
against republication of works whose term had expired under the Statute of Anne. As this 
demonstrates, dialogue within the judiciary on copyright issues does not always produce a 
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consensus opinion or a consistent position over time.  However, the court was able to detect foul 
play in the concocted case of Tonson v. Collins200 when the court realized the publishers were 
pulling the wool over its eyes because the plaintiff was paying for defendant’s expenses 
(suggesting, in other words, that the case was fabricated).  
Giving further clarity to the meaning and purpose of the first copyright statute, the court 
in Pope v. Curll expanded and interpreted the purpose of the Statute of Anne beyond what it 
expressly states to include what is implicit in the Act. The court explained that published letters 
(though not mentioned in the statute) have as much protection as do other published works and 
that to distinguish between the two would create hardship and impede the dissemination of 
knowledge. The Statute of Anne is hailed as a law that promotes authorship and learning; and 
these can manifest in different forms beyond the prescription of the statute. Consequently, for the 
purpose of the statute to be understood and achieved, the court reasoned that unnecessary 
restrictions or distinctions between different kinds of writings should be avoided. Additionally, 
the court’s opinion is lauded by Deazley201 and Rose202 as an important explication of a 
fundamental area of copyright. 
Finally, of course, both Millar v. Taylor203 and Donaldson v. Beckett,204 considered 
whether the Statute of Anne ended common law right. Amongst the purposes for enacting the 
Statute of Anne, the majority opinion in Millar found nothing that contradicted perpetual 
common law right. Yates J., meanwhile, rejected it as being detrimental to the rest of mankind, 
insisting on the limited term created by statute for the advancement of public interest and 
 
200 Supra note 81; Morris, Statute of Anne, supra note 12 at 225. As previously mentioned, it was discovered that plaintiff was 
paying for defendant’s expenses; Masterson, Copyright History, supra 2 at 631. The case was dismissed even if the outcome 
seemed like it was going to favour the plaintiff. 
201 Deazley, Commentary on Pope v. Curll, supra note 139 at 4. 
202 Rose, Authors and Owners, supra note 141 at 4. 
203 (1769) 4 Burr. 2303,98 Eng. Rep. 201. 
204 4 Burr. 2408, 2 Bro. P.C 129, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1775). 
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authorship.  In this case, although there was no consensus on the purpose of enacting the Statute 
of Anne emerged, the majority’s commitment to natural and perpetual rights prevailed. When 
Donaldson v. Beckett overruled Millar v. Taylor; Lord Camden expressed his disapproval for the 
endorsement of perpetual common law right. Deazley notes that Lord Camden expounded on 
two pertinent themes: 
The first turned on the sovereignty of Parliament, and the relationship 
between the legislature, the common law and the judiciary. He 
reminded the judiciary that their business is to tell the suitor how the 
law stands, and not how it ought to be; otherwise…each judge would 
have a distinct tribunal in his own breast and caprice, self-interest, and 
vanity would by turns hold the scale of justice while the law of 
property would be indeed most vague and arbitrary. His second 
concern was that of the bookseller…He reminded the peers that the 
common law right now claimed at your bar is the right of a private 
man to print his works for ever, independent of…all mankind. Should 
the Lords vote in favour of the perpetual right, he warned, all our 
learning will be locked up in the hands of the Tonsons and the Lintots 
of the age. Moreover, these booksellers, these engrossers, would then 
set upon books whatever price their avarice chuses to demand, till the 
public became as much as their slaves as their own hackney compilers 
are. Knowledge and science, he declared are not things to be bound in 
such cobweb chains.205 
 
 Lord Camden admonished that the judiciary has the responsibility to objectively interpret 
the enacted law to serve the interest of justice. Similar to the view expressed by Yates J in Millar 
v. Taylor, Lord Camden decried the notion of perpetual copyright and its negative impact on 
access to and dissemination of knowledge. The majority ruled against perpetual common law 
right and upheld the limited term in the Statute of Anne. The opinion in Donaldson v. Beckett not 
only overruled Millar v. Taylor, it set a historical definition of the purpose of copyright law 
which is to encourage authorship and ensure that knowledge is disseminated for the benefit of 
the public. In the exercise of its adjudicatory duties, the court in Donaldson v. Beckett dialogues 
 
205 Deazley, Commentary on Donaldson v. Beckett, supra note 113 at 4. 
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within itself to review a previous ruling which it found to be inappropriate and reversed the 
decision. The court also dialogues with the Parliament by giving meaning to the Statute of Anne 
and defining its purpose.  
 The role of the judiciary in defining the purpose of the Statute of Anne—and therefore 
providing the justificatory framework for the development of modern copyright law—should be 
acknowledged. My interpretation of the judiciary’s contribution to the definition of the purpose 
of the Statute of Anne is that (according to the decision in Donaldson v. Beckett), it favours the 
encouragement of learning and the dissemination of works for societal benefit (public interest). 
Although some courts did favour publishers, on closer examination, it was discovered that the 
publishers were exploitative; and as Lord Camden stated above, the booksellers have the 
tendency to set high prices for books because they are primarily concerned with commercial 
success and control of the market. The opinion of the judiciary in defining the purpose of the 
Statute of Anne, especially in Donaldson v. Beckett served as a check on the publishers who 
were already in a perpetual right business as usual mindset. 
 From the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that several divergent interests or purposes 
influenced the enactment and subsequent interpretation of the Statute of Anne. Determining the 
core principle underlying the Act is therefore problematic and inevitably subject to debate. There 
were numerous interests involved in the making of the first copyright system, including those of 
parliament, publishers, authors and the public. On the purpose of enacting the Statute of Anne, 
Myra Tawfik seems to suggest that publishers’ interests prevailed:  
Although its very title sets out the underlying purpose, tracing its 
contours has posed somewhat of a challenge to scholars. The 
traditional view of the law is that it was designed primarily with 
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publishers in mind - in other words, that it sought, first and 
foremost, to meet the needs of the book trade.206 
 
It can be inferred of Tawfik’s view above, and in particular her usage of the language “first and 
foremost,” that even if the statute was designed to favour the book trade, there may have been 
other purposes at play.207  
While I favour the opinion of Bracha above, that the Statute of Anne ultimately 
benefitted authors, the public interest (which by implication includes “users”) and the stationers, 
I am also of the opinion that among the competing purposes or forces, one set of interests would 
trump all other purposes or at least dominate the scene: that of the Stationers’ Company’s. Other 
purposes identified include advancing the public good through encouragement of learning, the 
encouragement of authorship by vesting copyright in authors, and the regulation of the book 
trade through the cessation of the Stationers’ Company’s monopoly. However, based on the 
Stationers’ Company’s domination of the book publishing market and distribution network and 
connections, it would appear that, although the Statute of Anne did not give them all they 
desired, what they got was sufficient to still place them at an advantage against others in the 
book publishing industry. Their expectation was that the authors, though vested with copyright in 
their works, would need publishers (and so transfer their rights to publishers), and this gave the 
Stationers’ Company power and continuing relevance in the scheme of things.   
The above narrative and discourse on the intriguing origin, development and purpose of 
the first copyright law lays the foundation for the copyright law model adopted by other 
countries such as the United States, which enacted copyright laws in the 18th century after the 
Statute of Anne. As this research is focused on examining copyright in the context of digital era 
 
206 Myra Tawfik, “History in the Balance: Copyright and Access to Knowledge” in Michael Geist, ed, From “Radical 
Extremism” to “Balanced Copyright”: Canadian Copyright and the Digital Agenda (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at 70. 
207 Bracha, Adventures of the Statute of Anne, supra note 10 at 1436. 
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technology in Canada, the analysis on the development of the first copyright law is helpful in 
discussing the origins and underlying purposes of copyright law in Canada.   
 
1.4 The Purpose(s) of Enacting Copyright Law – The Canadian Perspective  
Before examining the purpose(s) of copyright law in Canada, it is important to succinctly 
explain the history of copyright law in Canada. While Canada was under British colonial rule, its 
copyright law was subject to the imperial copyright system;208 the first copyright law209 in 
Canada was enacted in 1832 and was subject to British imperial copyright law. The local 
copyright laws (Canadian legislation) co-existed with British imperial copyright law, the former 
protected works in Canada while the latter protected works throughout the British Empire.210 
This obviously limited Canada’s copyright legislation in ways typical of a colony under imperial 
rule. In 1842, the British passed the imperial Copyright Act, which made Britain the sole legal 
supplier of British books, pamphlets, sheet music, maps, charts, and plans to British colonies by 
prohibiting the import of these into British dominions by anyone other than the copyright 
owners.211 
 Canada made several unsuccessful attempts (1889, 1890, 1891 and 1895) to enact its own 
copyright law but these attempts were denied passage into law by the British.212 However, in 
1911, the British enacted a new Copyright Act, which gave Canada the authority to enact its own 
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copyright law.213 The first domestic Copyright Act in Canada (which was not subject to British 
imperial copyright law) was passed by Parliament in 1921 but did not come into force until 
1924.214 By this time, although Canada was no longer a colony under the British rule, the 1921 
Copyright Act was closely based on the British Copyright Act of 1911 to align with the 
provisions of Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.215 
 Since its enactment in 1921, the Copyright Act, has been amended several times to 
regulate performing rights societies and to establish the Copyright Appeal Board.216 Around the 
early 1950s, influenced largely by the advent of technology such as computers, photocopiers, and 
recording devices, Canada carried out numerous studies on the need to update its copyright 
law.217These studies culminated in two major copyright revision processes implemented in two 
phases: phase I in 1988218 and phase II in 1997.219 In 2002, Industry Canada (now Innovation, 
Science, and Economic Development (ISED)) issued a report that identified 40 issues that 
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required legislative action in the short, medium and long term.220 After the report was examined 
and deliberated upon,221 it culminated in tabling Bill C-60 before Parliament in June 2005,222 
which was never passed into law. The focus of this project is on Canada’s copyright law reform 
commencing from Bill C-60, and so this is the point to which we shall return in Chapter Three.   
For now, my aim is to explore the purpose of copyright law from Canada’s perspective. 
Until recently, the attempt to define the intention behind the existence of copyright law in 
Canada proved difficult. In 2005, Teresa Scassa expressed the view that, not only were the policy 
considerations underlying Canadian copyright law unclear, but they were made murkier with 
competing and often contradictory accounts from policy makers and courts.223 Similarly, Daniel 
Gervais states that an attempt to identify the purpose of copyright law in Canada from 
government documents would provide no clear guidance.224 This lack of clarity or explicit 
purpose of Canadian copyright is surprising, especially considering the fact that the first 
Canadian colonial copyright law - An Act for the protection of Copy Rights 225 was passed by the 
Parliament of the Province of Lower Canada in 1832. By this time, the US constitution had 
already been written and ratified, expressly providing for the purpose of copyright law: to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.226 Unfortunately, this did not inspire a similarly 
clear provision on the purpose of Canadian copyright law, no doubt due at least in part to the fact 
that the Act was under British imperial copyright law. 
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Thus, the lack of clearly articulated policy objectives created a gap in the Canadian 
copyright law. In fact, Gervais noted that in 1956 it was stated that to engage in the discourse on 
the purpose of copyright was unnecessary and unproductive.227 In my view, the main challenge is 
that, in the absence of a statement similar to that found in the U.S. Constitution, policy 
considerations with regards to the purpose of passing copyright legislation in Canada were 
premised on the wrong idea. The Information Highway Advisory Council in a report on 
Copyright and the Information Highway noted: 
It must here be recalled that the U.S. law is founded on the principle 
that copyright is a tool ‘to promote the progress of science and useful 
arts.’ According to that principle, the goal of the copyright in the U.S. 
is to be an incentive for the disclosure and publication of works. The 
Canadian Act is based on very different principles: the recognition of 
the property of authors in their creation and the recognition of works 
as an extension of the personality of their authors.228  
 
 The statement above suggests that the perception, policy objective and purpose of passing 
copyright law in Canada tend towards individual property ownership, and this reflects the 
character of copyright reforms in Canada as putting the interest of individual authors and creators 
first as against the public interest.229 Additionally, the above quote embraces the moral right 
aspect of Canadian copyright law (due to its French and British colonial roots, Canada 
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recognizes both moral and economic rights),230 which is again a matter of the individual 
entitlement of authors. In my opinion, this focus represents an incomplete picture of copyright 
policy in Canada. However, this narrow conceptualization of the purpose of copyright in Canada 
remained the status quo until early in the twenty-first century, when a revolutionary shift in 
thinking was initiated.  
As Tawfik231 notes, copyright in the new millennium began to focus on the public’s 
interest in access to knowledge, likely given the growing influence of digital technology, which 
made accessing content considerably easier as a practical matter. This reorientation of the 
rationale for copyright protection had an enormous influence in the Canadian copyright system. 
The purpose of having copyright law in Canada received the attention of the judiciary, producing 
unprecedented pronouncements by the Supreme Court of Canada that have laid the foundation 
for the development of a clear articulation of the purpose for enacting copyright law in Canada. 
As Gervais has explained, and as we shall see in more detail below, the Supreme Court of 
Canada, through its opinions in three copyright cases, has finally articulated the rationale for 
enacting copyright law in Canada which had previously been lacking.232 
Additionally, some effort was made in the enactment of the Copyright Modernization 
Act233(CMA) of 2012 to fill the gap (that is, the absence of a clear definition of the purpose of 
copyright law in Canada), capturing much of the essence of the Supreme Courts’ earlier 
pronouncements. Part of the preamble to the Act provides:  
Whereas the Copyright Act is an important marketplace framework 
law and cultural policy instrument that, through clear, predictable and 
fair rules, supports creativity and innovation and affects many sectors 
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of the knowledge economy…Whereas the exclusive rights in the 
Copyright Act provide rights holders with recognition, remuneration 
and the ability to assert their rights, and some limitations on those 
rights exist to further enhance users’ access to copyright works or 
other subject-matter234 
 
The text quoted above suggests that the CMA was enacted to promote creativity, 
innovation and the development of a knowledge-based economy. Additionally, the CMA also 
provides for other purposes such as responding to the challenges and opportunities of digital 
technology, copyright protection based on international norms, to implement WIT including 
recognition of TPMs, foster competition, investment and promote research and education 
through technology.235 
While the articulation of these purposes in the CMA is a welcome development, it creates 
a problem of identifying the core purpose as numerous purposes were identified in the preamble 
to the CMA. This is indicative of the current dynamics of contemporary copyright in the digital 
age where the enactment of copyright law cannot be narrowed to a single purpose due to 
competing interests. In order determine the purpose of copyright law, or at least to untangle and 
reconcile the various purposes stated in the CMA, recourse must be had to relevant judicial 
opinions on the subject. The following analysis will focus on cases on appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Canada whose pronouncement on the purpose of copyright law is considered 
enlightening. As we have seen, the cases that followed the enactment of the Statute of Anne 
demonstrated the crucial role of the judiciary in contributing to the discourse and definition of 
the purpose of copyright law. The discussion below will consider how the judiciary, in its 
dialogic interaction with other arms of government in Canada, has contributed to enriching the 
 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid. 
 78 
discourse on the purpose of modern day copyright law in Canada, which had hitherto lacked a 
definitive explanation.  
 
1.5 The Supreme Court of Canada and the Purpose(s) of Copyright Law 
The case of Théberge v. Galerie d’art du Petit Champlain236 is a landmark opinion in which the 
Supreme Court of Canada articulated the purposes of copyright law. In Théberge, a renowned 
artist, Claude Théberge, assigned the right to reproduce some of his works to a publisher.237 An 
art gallery purchased art works (cards, photolithographs and posters) of Claude Théberge and 
then transferred the image onto a canvas through the process of lifting the ink that was used in 
printing a paper poster.238 This left the poster paper blank. The issue for determination was 
whether this process of transferring the image onto the canvass constituted reproduction under 
section 3 of the Act. 239 Thus, the challenge for the Supreme Court was to determine the extent to 
which an artist, utilizing the statutory rights and remedies provided by the Copyright Act R.S.C. 
1985, c. C-42, can control the eventual use or display of an authorized reproduction of his or her 
work in the hands of a third-party purchaser.240 Bennie J delivered the majority opinion which in 
summary declared: 
…the appellants did not thereby “copy” the respondent’s artistic 
works. They purchased lawfully reproduced posters of his paintings 
and used a chemical process that allowed them to lift the ink layer 
from the paper (leaving it blank) and to display it on canvass. They 
were within their rights to do so as owners of the physical posters 
(which lawfully incorporated the copyrighted expression). At the end 
of the day, no new reproductions of the respondent’s works were 
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brought into existence. Nor, in my view, was there production (or 
reproduction) or a new artistic work “in any material form within the 
meaning of s.3(1) of the Copyright Act. What began as a poster, 
authorized by the respondent, remained a poster.241  
 
 The court therefore allowed the appeal in favour of the appellant.242 In arriving at this 
decision, the Théberge court made a compelling explication on the purpose of copyright law in 
Canada. This articulation was responding to one of the sub-issues the court had to determine 
which hinged on reconciling the equipoise of economic interest of the author and the interest of 
the public. The court couched the issue as follows: if the plaintiff were to succeed, “the present 
balance between the economic interest of the copyright holder and the proprietary interest of the 
purchasing public would be significantly altered to the public’s detriment”.243 Explaining further, 
Binnie J elucidates on the purpose of copyright law in Canada as follows: 
The Copyright Act is usually presented as a balance between 
promoting the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination 
of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the 
creator (or, more accurately, to prevent someone other than the creator 
from appropriating whatever benefits may be generated) [...]The 
proper balance among these and other public policy objectives lies not 
only in recognizing the creator’s rights but in giving due weight to 
their limited nature. In crassly economic terms it would be as 
inefficient to over-compensate artists and authors for the right of 
reproduction as it would be self-defeating to undercompensate 
them…Once an authorized copy of a work is sold to a member of the 
public, it is generally for the purchaser, not the author, to determine 
what happens to it. Excessive control by holders of copyright and 
other forms of intellectual property may unduly limit the ability of the 
public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the 
long-term interest of society as a whole…244 
 
 The quote above has become famous in Canadian copyright jurisprudence, specifically, 
with reference to establishing the purpose of copyright law. The Supreme Court of Canada 
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refines the meaning and significance of the concept of balance within the copyright system, 
which is now understood to mean balancing, on the one hand, the public interest (which lies in  
the encouragement and dissemination of works of art and intellect), and on the other hand, 
obtaining a just reward for the author.245 With this, the Supreme Court of Canada brought a new 
perspective to the conception of balance and the policy objectives that underlie copyright law. A 
proper approach to balance, according to the Court, should not start and end only with the 
recognizing the creator’s right, but it should also encompass the limited nature of the creator’s 
right and the significance this has. In other words, the Supreme Court of Canada explains that the 
creator’s rights are not absolute and that the creator and the entire copyright system are under 
obligation to acknowledge the limited nature of the creator’s rights. It is the limited nature of the 
creator’s rights that enable the encouragement of learning and dissemination of works for the 
benefit of the public interest through the copyright system.  
The explication of balance by the court should not be interpreted to mean it favours the 
public interest over creators; on the contrary, the court impliedly means that both the public and 
the creator have legitimate claims to their interest in the copyright system. However, these 
competing stakeholder rights must be, as much as possible, fairly balanced, if copyright is to 
advance its purposes. The court agrees that creators are entitled to exploit their works for 
rewards, as a matter of justice or fairness, with its use of the term “just reward.” Based on the 
court’s reasoning, the meaning of just reward can be understood from two perspectives. First, 
just reward could mean either reward in monetary value or some other benefits. Secondly, the 
Supreme Court points out an implicit meaning of just reward, which means the right of the 
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2303, 98 E.R. 201, per Willes J., at p.218. “It is wise in any state, to encourage letters, and the painful researches of men. The 
easiest and most equal way of doing it, is, by securing to them the property of their own works…He who engages in a laborious 
work, (such for instance, as Johnson’s Dictionary,) which may employ his whole life, will do it with more spirit, if, besides his 
own glory, he thinks it may be a provision for family.”  
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creator to prevent anyone else other than himself from appropriating any benefits from his work. 
The obvious reason for vesting the creator with the right to prevent misappropriation of his work 
is to prevent any act that may be prejudicial to exclusive enjoyment of his just reward. 
The Supreme Court of Canada had thereby given an enlightening analysis on the concept 
of just reward, which is conceptually helpful but leaves some substantial gray areas. For one 
thing, the court does not explain what really constitutes just reward.246 The Court’s silence on 
defining the meaning of just reward is understandable, not least because it would be unable to 
assume a more specific prescriptive position that would account for the diverse interests of 
stakeholders in different situations; rather, my inference is that the Court has given a direction by 
which stakeholders should be guided on the purpose of copyright law and how it shapes their 
rights and obligations, which is not simply subject to the claims of authors. Also, the directive 
rather than prescriptive approach of the court can be deduced when it articulates that 
misappropriation is tantamount to impeding a creator’s just reward. What is “just” is a matter of 
context, and each case would have to be treated on its merits.   
 In my view, Canada’s top court at least made it clear that the purpose of copyright law 
does not hinge exclusively on propertization of copyright or exploitation of rights for economic 
rewards, but that the public interest, creative innovation and society’s interests as a whole should 
be the principles upon which the purpose of copyright is built. The exclusive rights granted to 
authors and creators is not only an end in itself but a means to an end; 247 equally important as an 
 
246 Perhaps the Supreme Court omitted to delve into this because, at least when it comes to the valuation of certain rewards, this 
is within the purview of Copyright Board of Canada. See Copyright Board of Canada, “Raison d’étre: Who We Are and What 
We Do”, “The Copyright Board of Canada (the “Board”) is an economic regulatory body empowered to establish, either 
mandatorily, or at the request of an interested party, the royalties to be paid for the use of a copyrighted work, when the 
administration of such copyright is entrusted to a collective-administration society. The Board also has the right to supervise 
agreement between users and licensing bodies and issues licenses when the copyright owner cannot be located.” At online: 
<https://cb-cda.gc.ca/about-apropos/role-role/raisons-etre-e.html> accessed June 19, 2019. 
247 Gervais, Purpose of Copyright Law, supra note 232 at 324.  
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ultimate objective of copyright is to benefit the interest of the public and society as a whole by 
encouraging production and dissemination of creative works to further inspire innovation and 
build a community of knowledge. The Supreme Court decries excessive control of creative 
works by copyright holders and that it limits enrichment of the public domain and creative 
innovation. Note that the Supreme Court does not disregard the exploitation of copyright for 
monetary gain as an aspect of copyright’s purpose; instead, it advocates for a balanced system 
where authors and creators are entitled to a just reward. It is fitting to emphasize here that such 
reward is limited by external considerations including the broader public interest.  
Despite some of the concerns I raised about the difficulty in applying the principles laid 
down, Théberge has contributed immensely to enriching copyright law in Canada by shedding 
light on its purpose. In the exercise of its adjudicatory functions, both in the majority and 
minority opinion (the latter also adding to the richness of the judicial elucidation), the Supreme 
Court communicates with other arms of government by defining the purpose of copyright law in 
Canada. 
Since Théberge in 2002, the Supreme Court of Canada has had the opportunity to 
consider other cases wherein it made pronouncements approving Théberge and expanding on its 
meaning. In 2004, CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada248 endorsed the 
explanation given by Théberge on the purpose of copyright law in Canada. At issue in that case 
was The Great Library at Osgoode Hall in Toronto operated by the Law Society of Upper 
Canada.249 The Great Library provides “a request-based” and “self-service” photocopying 
service for its members, the judiciary and other authorized researchers for the reproduction of 
 
248 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004 SCC 13 [CCH] at online: < 
http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2004/2004scc13/2004scc13.html > Accessed February 24, 2017. 
249 Ibid. at 2. 
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legal materials.250 Publisher CCH Canada Ltd. brought an infringement action against the Law 
Society of Upper Canada seeking a permanent injunction prohibiting it from reproducing any of 
its published materials in the library. The Supreme Court held that the Law Society does not 
violate copyright when a copy of a reported case, case summary, statute, regulation or limited 
selection of text from a treatise is made by the library in line with its access policy.251 
Additionally, the court held that the library is not liable for copyright infringement by 
maintaining a copier for reproducing materials especially having placed a caveat that it would 
not be responsible for copies made in infringement of copyright.252 In this case, the Supreme 
Court discussed the “purpose of the Copyright Act” and cited Théberge, which informed the 
Supreme Court’s ruling on every relevant issue.253 The Supreme Court in CCH notes that: 
Binnie J. recently in explained in Théberge…that the Copyright Act 
has dual objectives: The Copyright Act is usually presented as a 
balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement 
and dissemination of works of arts and intellect and obtaining a just 
reward for the creator…The proper balance among these and other 
public policy objectives lies not only in recognizing the creator’s 
rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature. In interpreting 
the Copyright Act, the courts should strive to maintain an appropriate 
balance between these two goals.254  
 
 I wish to emphasize two crucial points with regard to the CCH case. First, it adopts the 
guidance of the Théberge Court on the purpose of copyright law in Canada and secondly, it 
depicts an example of intra-dialogue where the judiciary not only dialogues with other arms of 
government, but also with itself. This is because the fact that McLachlin J delivered this 
 
250 Ibid.  
251 Ibid. at 3. The concept of access is discussed in detail in chapter four. In summary, it is the opportunity copyright users have to 
use and interact with content. Access could be authorized or unauthorized. See chapter four (explained under the heading 
“Critique of TPMs and their Legal Protection”). 
252 Ibid.  
253 Ibid. at 2, 8-9. 
254 Ibid. at 8-9. 
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judgment is significant given her more author-centred view previously expressed in the Supreme 
Court case of Bishop v Stevens.255  
In Bishop v Stevens, Bishop, a musician, composed a song and had a copy sent to a 
Performing Rights Society (PRS – an association that protects and enforces the copyright of its 
members) in Britain, and this association is also affiliated with Composers, Authors, and 
Publishers Association of Canada (CAPAC).256 Without Bishop’s consent or authorization, 
Stevens, a singer, recorded the song and arranged with Télé-Métropole (a television broadcasting 
organization) to broadcast the recording.257 The song was broadcast twice by Télé-Métropole 
using a pre-recorded tape in each case.258 Bishop instituted an action against Télé-Métropole 
claiming copyright infringement not for performance, which he had been paid for, but for 
making ephemeral copies.259The trial court found that Télé-Métropole infringed on Bishop’s 
copyright by pre-recording the song.260 Télé-Métropole’s appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal 
and Supreme was dismissed. At the Supreme Court, and according to McLachlin J (who 
delivered the judgment in this case), the opening paragraph in s.3(1) and the provisions of 
s.3(1)(d) of the Copyright Act,261 clearly distinguish between the right to “record” (which in this 
case is to make ephemeral recordings before broadcast) and the right to “perform” a work,262 and 
the right to perform does not include the right to record ephemeral copies for the purpose of 
 
255 Bishop v. Stevens [1990] 2 S.C.R 2 467 at online: < https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/640/1/document.do> 
accessed June 21, 2019. 
256 Ibid. at 470. 
257 Ibid. 
258 Ibid. at 470-1, “The appellant, though unaware that the song was written by the respondent and not by Stevens, gave due 
notification and paid the appropriate fees to CAPAC, and the payments for the broadcast performances were eventually forwarded 
through PRS to the respondent.   No specific arrangements, however, were made regarding the pre-recordings used in the broadcast.” 
259 Ibid. at 471. 
260 Ibid.  
261 Copyright Act, 1985, supra note 239. 
262 Bishop v. Stevens, supra note 255 at 484. 
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facilitating a broadcast.263 The ruling of the Supreme Court in the case favoured the author 
(Bishop); McLachlin J, in support of the author further endorsed an opinion stating that the 
singular purpose of copyright law is to benefit authors: 
 This distinction between the right to perform and the right to record a 
work is unsurprising in light of the object and purpose of the Act. As 
noted by Maugham J., in Performing Right Society, Ltd. v. Hammond's 
Bradford Brewery Co., [1934] 1 Ch. 121, at p. 127, "the Copyright Act, 
1911, was passed with a single object, namely, the benefit of authors of 
all kinds, whether the works were literary, dramatic or musical".    See 
also Article 1 of the Revised Berne Convention, cited above. A 
performance is by its very nature fleeting, transient, impermanent. When 
it is over, only the memory remains. A composer who authorizes 
performance of his work for a period of time has not irrevocably given 
up control over how the work is presented to the public.   He may 
choose at a future time to withdraw his authorization, and be the sole 
interpreter of his own work, or he may place conditions on his 
authorization.  
 
  The notion of judicial dialogue captures the idea that the law is not static but develops 
through a continuous conversation. The intra-dialogue of the Supreme Court is an opportunity to 
engage and re-evaluate its previous viewpoints and either confirm or contradict them. In this 
case, in a unanimous opinion penned by McLachlin C.J., the Supreme Court endorsed its 
previous explanation of the rationale for the enactment of copyright law in Canada as enunciated 
in the Théberge case, and applied it in a new context. This further strengthens and deepens the 
discourse on the purpose of copyright law in Canada. 
 A decade after the Théberge case, the Supreme Court in Entertainment Software 
Association v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada264 still validates 
the purpose of copyright law explanation in Théberge. The Entertainment Software Association 
(ESA) represents video game publishers and distributors who enable customers to download 
 
263 Ibid.  
264 [2012] 2 S.C.R 231. 
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video games from the internet: these copies are identical to those purchased in stores or shipped 
to customers by mail.265 The video games contain copyrighted musical works and the royalties 
for the musical works are negotiated before the games are sold to the public.266 SOCAN, which 
administers the rights to “communicate” to the public by telecommunication musical works on 
behalf of copyright owners, applied to the Copyright Board for a tariff covering downloads of 
musical works over the internet.267 The Copyright Board concluded that the download of a file 
containing musical works is a communication to the public under s.3(1)(f) of the Copyright Act, 
entitling SOCAN’s members to compensation in accordance with an approved tariff.268 The 
matter proceeded on judicial review to the Federal Court of Appeal where the decision of the 
Copyright Board269 was endorsed. The ESA appealed the matter to the Supreme Court, and the 
apex court reiterated that negotiations concerning rights in musical works incorporated in the 
video games are negotiated prior to sale of the video games.270 Upon conclusion of the 
negotiation of rights in the musical works, when the video games are sold, the owner of the 
copyright in the musical works has no further rights in respect of the sale.271 The issue for 
determination by the Supreme Court on this appeal was “whether the rights are nonetheless 
revived when the work is sold over the Internet instead of in a store,” which of course requires 
the work to be transmitted to the purchaser by telecommunication.272 In its response, the 
Supreme Court asserts that it makes little sense to distinguish between the two methods of selling 
the same work,273 contrary to the Copyright Board’s determination that sale of the video games 
 
265 Ibid. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Ibid. at 232. 
268 Ibid.  
269 Ibid. 
270 Ibid. at 238. 
271 Ibid. 
272 Ibid. 
273 Ibid. 
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over the internet triggers a new fee.274 The case implicates the important question of technology 
neutrality, with the court having to decide whether delivery of the same work over the internet 
should attract separate negotiations and an additional tariff. In arriving at its decision that no 
additional new tariff was triggered, the court took cognizance of the purpose of copyright law as 
discussed by Binnie J. in Théberge. The Supreme Court held that: 
The principle of technology neutrality is reflected in s. 3(1) of the Act, 
which describes right to produce or reproduce a work “in any material 
form whatsoever”. In our view, there is no practical difference 
between buying a durable copy of the work in a store, receiving a 
copy in the mail, or downloading an identical copy using the Internet. 
The Internet is simply a technological taxi that delivers a durable copy 
of the same work to the end user.275 
 
 Specifically, and to emphasize how the SOCAN case contributes to the enrichment of a 
clear and articulate understanding of the purpose of copyright law in Canada, an affirmative 
reference was made to Théberge, with the Court noting: “ESA’s argument is also consistent with 
the Court’s caution in Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 366, 
that the balance in copyright between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and 
dissemination of works and obtaining a just reward for the creator requires recognizing the 
“limited nature” of creators’ rights.”276 Absent a clear explanation by Parliament or the 
Executive, the guidance given in Théberge on defining the purpose of copyright law in Canada is 
now seen as a helpful reference point for the court in deciding copyright cases.  
Similarly, in the 2015 case of Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v. SODRAC 2003 Inc. 
and Society of Reproduction Rights of Authors, Composers and Publishers in Canada,277 the 
Supreme Court further gave its stamp of endorsement to the elucidation of the purpose of 
 
274 Ibid. at 12-13. 
275 Ibid. at 14-15. 
276 SOCAN, supra note 264 at 15. 
277 2015 SCC 57 at online: < https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2015/2015scc57/2015scc57.pdf > Accessed February 24, 2017 
[SODRAC]. 
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copyright law in Théberge.  The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) has its original 
programs and licensed programs from third parties and broadcasts these programs on television 
and the internet.278 The CBC is required to obtain licences in order to broadcast programs that 
contain copyright-protected musical works and SODRAC is the collective society that negotiates 
these rights with CBC on behalf of its members.279 In the production of a program, the CBC 
needs to make several kinds of copies: “synchronization copies” incorporate musical works into 
an audiovisual program;280 when the synchronization process is complete, the resultant final 
copy is called a “master copy;”281 CBC then loads the master copy into its digital content 
management and several copies (including the music) of the completed program are made for 
internal use.282 The collective society (SODRAC) began to distinguish between synchronization 
copies, and in 2006 SODRAC began asking CBC to pay for synchronization licences.283 This 
resulted in an impasse such that the CBC existing licence could not be renewed, and the 
collective society (SODRAC) asked the Copyright Board to set the terms of the licence.284 CBC 
contended that broadcast-incidental copies do not engage the reproduction rights, or, in the 
alternative, the synchronization licences impliedly covered the broadcast incidental copies if it 
was necessary.285 In 2012 the Copyright Board concluded that the CBC broadcast-incidental 
copies did engage reproduction rights and that a licence for such copies cannot be subsumed 
under the synchronization licences, therefore CBC required a separate licence to cover its 
broadcast-incidental copies, and the Copyright Board issued an interim licence.286 The Federal 
 
278 Ibid. at 616. 
279 Ibid. at 630. 
280 Ibid. at 616.  
281 Ibid. 
282 Ibid. 
283 Ibid. 617. 
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285 Ibid. 
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Appeal Court upheld the decision of the Copyright Board; but on appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Canada set aside the decision of the Copyright Board and remitted the matter back to the 
Copyright Board for reconsideration.287  
 In its analysis of the issues involved in SODRAC, the apex court expressly stated how the 
understanding of the purpose of copyright has evolved under its auspices through earlier 
decisions. The Supreme Court notes that: 
Though this Court’s subsequent decisions in Théberge v. Galarie 
d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., 2002 SCC 34, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, 
and Entertainment Software Association v. Society of Composers, 
Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC34, [2012] 2 
S.C.R. 231 (ESA), have refined our understanding of the purposes 
of copyright law […] To be sure, Théberge demonstrates how our 
understanding of the purpose of the Copyright Act has evolved 
since the pronouncement in Bishop288 that the “single object” of the 
Act was to benefit authors: Bishop, at pp. 478-79[…]Théberge 
observed that, when weighing competing policy interests under 
copyright, “[t]he proper balance[…]lies not only in recognizing the 
creator’s rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature.289 
 
 Dialogue between arms of government is clearly discernable in SODRAC as the Supreme 
Court, in the exercise of its adjudicatory functions, communicates with the parliament through its 
interpretation of the copyright law. This communication with Parliament necessitates an internal 
communication within itself, specifically through the review of its earlier decisions. Determining 
the purpose of copyright law is enriched in the process. In SODRAC, the Supreme Court, just 
like in CCH290 and SOCAN,291 affirmatively cites Théberge as laying down the fundamental 
principles to consider in determining the purposes of copyright law in Canada. Importantly, the 
SODRAC Court acknowledges that its understanding of the purposes of copyright law has 
 
287 Ibid.  
288 See footnotes 255 for the facts of Bishop v Stevens.  
289 SODRAC, supra note 277 at 629, 643. 
290 CCH, supra note 248. 
291 SOCAN, supra note 264. 
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evolved and experienced refinement through cases it had considered. This therefore means that 
the purpose(s) of copyright law as understood by the courts has changed and could continue to 
develop over time. This is not unusual: as Roscoe Pound states, “the law must be stable, but it 
must not remain static.”292 The realization of the Supreme Court of Canada of how its knowledge 
and understanding of the purpose of copyright law has evolved stems from the dialogue with 
itself and the parliament. 
 The above cases and other similar ones considered by the Supreme Court of Canada have 
provided robust guidance on the determining the purposes of having copyright law in Canada 
thereby attempting to fill in for the omission of parliament. These cases not only attempt to 
articulate the purpose of copyright law in Canada but show how and why it is important to know 
for what purpose copyright law exists. In the cases analyzed above, though the determination of 
the purpose of the dispute was not to primarily ascertain the purpose of copyright law in Canada, 
yet, the Supreme Court deemed it appropriate and necessary to identify the purpose of copyright 
law. In my view, the identification of the purpose of copyright law is pivotal to adjudication on 
copyright cases. This was confirmed most recently, in the Crown copyright case of Keatley 
Surveying Ltd. v. Teranet Inc., when Abella J. wrote for the majority: “This Court’s post-
Théberge jurisprudence has sought to calibrate the appropriate balance between creators’ rights 
and users’ rights. All provisions of the Copyright Act…must be interpreted with this balance in 
mind so that the Copyright Act continues to further the public interest.”293 
 A clear and well-defined purpose of copyright law is helpful in deciding between two 
competing copyright claims or interests among copyright stakeholders. While this may not be as 
 
292 The Free Dictionary, Legal Dictionary, “Roscoe Pound” at online: < http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Roscoe+Pound > Accessed February 24, 2017. 
293 2019 SCC 43, at paras. 44-46. 
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easy as it sounds, it does provide a foundation to build on. An examination of the purpose of 
copyright law in Canada shows (just like in the Statute of Anne) that not very much was said by 
Parliament about the purposes of enacting copyright law. However, examining relevant 
copyright opinions of the Supreme Court have enriched the dialogue through robust explanation 
on the purposes of copyright law in Canada. Additionally, and perhaps due to the influence of the 
pronouncements of the Supreme Court of Canada, Parliament is beginning to articulate the 
balance of rights between exclusive rights protected by copyright law and users’ rights to access 
and use these works under exceptions. The text in the preamble to the CMA stated earlier is 
instructive here.294 Incorporating such language in copyright legislation helps clarify its purpose 
and the rights and obligations of stakeholders.  
 The clarity given by the Supreme Court of Canada on the purpose of copyright law and 
other copyright issues has contributed immensely to the ongoing copyright discourse in Canada 
and has received the attention of copyright scholars295 in Canada. Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court is in communication with other arms of government who are also entitled to respond; the 
Supreme Court may not always have the final say because parliament has been known to 
subsequently enact new laws which had previously being declared invalid by the Supreme 
Court.296 In other words, as a fundamental feature of parliamentary supremacy, the Canadian 
Parliament can of course elect to enact or reform copyright laws in line with the decisions of the 
Supreme Canada or follow a different reasoning. In the dialogue among or between the arms of 
government on a particular issue(s), the possibility of conflict and disagreement is to be 
expected. The response of the executive or legislative arm of government could conflict with the 
 
294 Copyright Modernization Act, supra note 233. 
295 Gervais, Purpose of Copyright, supra note 232; Michael Geist ed, The Copyright Pentalogy, How the Supreme Court of 
Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law (Ottawa: Ottawa University Press, 2013). 
296 Peter Hogg, “Canadian Constitutional Law: Presentation to the Annual Conference of International Association of Law 
Libraries” (2013) 41.1 I.J. of Legal Information presentation 58 at 62-3. 
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direction of the Supreme Court on copyright issues in Canada—but it is unlikely to do so lightly 
or with disregard for the pronouncements of Canada’s top Court. For this chapter, it suffices to 
examine those judicial pronouncements on the purpose of copyright law in Canada, as we will 
return to discuss the responses of other arms of government Chapter Three, where I consider the 
activities of the executive and legislature on copyright law reform.  
 The articulation of the purposes of copyright law in Théberge is not akin to a statutory 
provision. In fact, it was noted in SODRAC that “the principles at work in Théberge … can 
inform the interpretation and application of the terms of the Act but cannot supplant them.”297 
The Supreme Court issues a note of caution to itself, which can be inferred to mean that its role 
is not to usurp the primary law-making duty of the legislative arm of government. 
 
1.6 Conclusion    
This chapter lays the foundation for understanding the purpose of copyright law in 
Canada – a theme that will recur throughout this dissertation because of its vital connection with 
other core aspects of my research. To properly understand the analysis of the purpose of enacting 
copyright law in Canada, I set the foundation by discussing the origin and purpose of the first 
copyright law. I offered historical account of the development of copyright law through the 
activities of the Stationers’ Company before the enactment of the Statute of Anne. This 
discussion underscored the controversial foundations on which copyright was built, which are 
arguably reflected in the dynamics of the contemporary and complex copyright system.  
Members of the Stationers’ Company who were empowered by the British Monarch 
through legal instruments that granted the Stationers’ Company exclusive and perpetual rights in 
 
297 SODRAC, supra note 277 at 643. 
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book publication first enjoyed the concept of exclusive rights in book publication. The State 
entrusted extensive powers to the members of the Stationers’ Company to superintend book 
publication and this privilege developed into a monopoly in the book trade. In return, and for the 
benefit of the British Monarch, members of the Stationers’ Guild provided a censorship 
mechanism against the publication of seditious materials against the State. This collaboration 
meant that individual authors who were not members of the Stationers’ Company could not 
publish books even if they intended to; this monopoly impacted negatively on authorship and 
continued for more than a century until a new political clime in Britain ended the monopoly. 
Though the monopoly ended, the members of the Stationers’ Company were unflinching in their 
efforts to regain their control and monopoly over book publication—a quest that ultimately 
culminated in the enactment of the Statute of Anne – the first copyright law.  
My investigation of origin and purposes for enacting the first copyright law indicates that, 
even after more than three centuries, it is still a debatable issue on which reasonable people may 
disagree—and they continue to do so to this day. My attempt to determine the purpose the 
Statute of Anne did not lead to a straightforward answer. The reason is that (as the historical 
analysis shows) the interplay of forces behind the statute could point in various directions. 
Historical facts and the views of copyright scholars indicate that protecting authors was not the 
primary motivating factor for the enactment of the Statute of Anne and that the publishers 
(stationers) benefitted more from the arrangement. Others argue that the Statute of Anne was a 
compromise to satisfy various interests or to advance the public interest more generally. 
I further explored the post-Statute of Anne era through judicial interpretation of the 
Statute of Anne. I examined how the judiciary interpreted the purposes of the Statute among 
competing stakeholders in early landmark cases. This investigation shows the effort of publishers 
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to exploit the judiciary and revive their otherwise defunct exclusive and perpetual right to book 
publication. In summary, the judiciary attempted to fill the gap left by the parliament as to the 
purpose of the statute and, therefore, the scope of the rights that it afforded.  
In summary, this chapter uncovers the uneasy history of copyright law, and its uncertain 
purpose, as well as the complex interests and tensions that inevitably underlie its enactment. In 
my view and from my research findings, while it may be difficult to identify a specific purpose 
underlying the Statute of Anne, the long title (An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by 
Vesting the Copies of printed book in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the 
Times therein mentioned) of the statute does provide a useful hint about the prevailing 
justificatory discourse. These words in the title (for the encouragement of learning) suggests that 
the core purpose intended by the statute—at least as presented to Parliament and the public—was 
to promote and encourage the creation and dissemination of knowledge; in other words, to serve 
the interest of the public. In order to achieve the encouragement of learning, the statute vests 
copyright in book to authors or purchasers for a limited time (by Vesting the Copies of printed 
book in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned). 
Therefore, this implies that encouragement of learning was the main purpose of the statute. 
Furthermore, the grant of copyright to authors was intended to incentivise them to create 
knowledge and encourage learning, by enabling them to enjoy the just reward for their creativity. 
Perhaps the intellectual property language in the United States constitution (To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries) was modeled to some degree after 
the long title of the Statute of Anne because of the evident similarities. Besides this core purpose 
of the Statute of Anne, other purposes included the abolition of the Stationers’ Company’s 
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monopoly rights to book publication, and regulation of the trade. It may seem that these other 
purposes were subordinate to the main purpose, but as I have argued, in practice the Stationer’s 
Company had an advantage that allowed them to remain at the top of the copyright food chain, 
so to speak, even if the core purpose of the statute was to benefit public interest.  
The review of the controversial origin and purposes for enacting the Statute of Anne 
provides the background against which to discuss the purpose of copyright law in Canada. Until 
the enactment of the CMA in 2012, which contains language on the purpose(s) of copyright law, 
Canadian legislation offered little help in articulating the purpose(s) of enacting copyright law. I 
examined relevant Supreme Court cases in Canada and the Court’s guidance on understanding 
the purposes of copyright law in Canada. My research shows the consistency of the Supreme 
Court on its position on the purposes of copyright law in Canada since 2002. Therefore, the 
purpose of copyright law in Canada is to promote the public interest in the encouragement of 
learning and dissemination of works of art and intellect, and to balance this public interest with 
the creator’s interest in obtaining a just reward. However, what this means in any particular case 
remains a matter of interpretation. Also, the Supreme Court may not always get the final word as 
the responses (legislation and policy formulation) from other arms of government may alter its 
pronouncements.  
With this chapter having provided the foundations for understanding copyright’s purpose, 
Chapter Two proceeds to discuss copyright in the context of digital technology, specifically, and 
the evolving views of the today’s active stakeholder groups on the impact of technology on the 
copyright system and its objectives. 
 96 
CHAPTER TWO 
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY  
AND THE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM 
 
This chapter shows how Information Communications Technology (ICT)1 gradually developed 
over the centuries and shaped the understanding and approach to copyright. It also discusses the 
key copyright stakeholders on which my research is focused and how they appear to 
conceptualize copyright in the context of ICT. In Part One of this chapter, I examine the 
copyright system in the context of ICT. I begin by tracing the evolution of technology and its 
impact on copyright. As a build-up to the present and sophisticated state of ICT, I discuss the 
evolution of early technologies and their impact on the copyright system. Such technologies 
include the printing press, reprography, sound and video recording. I proceed to review the 
contemporary copyright landscape in the era of digital technology and how this phenomenon 
accounts for a re-imagining of the copyright system and frequent calls for copyright law reform. 
In Part Two of the chapter, I offer a broad overview of copyright stakeholders, but proceed to 
focus specifically on the stakeholders that are cardinal to my research; I explore their 
perspectives on the intersection of copyright and ICT, and, in particular, on the opportunities and 
challenges presented by ICT.  
 
 
 
1 The term Information and Communications Technology is an extended term for information technology (IT) which stresses the 
role of unified communications (Murray James) and the integration of telecommunications (telephone lines and wireless signals), 
computers as well as necessary enterprise software, middleware, storage, and audio-visual systems, which enable users to access, 
store, transmit, and manipulate information. Wikipedia, Information and Communications Technology at online: < 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_and_communications_technology> Accessed October 19, 2016. My use of ICT in this 
dissertation proposal is to broadly cover the forms of ICT that impact the copyright industry. Though ICT is an internationally 
recognized term, the usage of “IT” is popular in Canada, even when referring to telecommunications.  
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PART I 
COPYRIGHT AND ICT 
2.0 Overview of Copyright in the ICT Landscape 
The debates on copyright law reform in the era of technology have tremendously 
heightened due to a paradigm shift in the entire copyright system created by fast-paced ICT 
advancement. The emergence and proliferation of ICT since the late 20th century have spawned 
controversial and challenging copyright issues. The manifestation of creative works has 
significantly metamorphosed from hard copies to soft or digital copies. Additionally, the means 
of creation, replication, and distribution of creative works are now technology-driven such that 
they can now be done easier and faster. The dissemination of creative works to thousands of 
recipients can be achieved with just a click of the button. Is this technology-aided phenomenon 
an opportunity to be nurtured or a threat to copyright that should be curtailed? The answer to this 
question has generated polarized views for decades now. To the advocates of free culture, the 
benefits of ICT are typically lauded as an opportunity because it makes content available and 
easily accessible, while to the content industry stakeholders, ICT is perhaps more commonly 
viewed as a challenge to the traditional copyright business model. That is, it aids unauthorized 
access to copyrighted materials, which they typically claim leads to loss of revenue. On a more 
beneficial note, ICT is perceived as an opportunity to achieve cost effective production and 
distribution of content, being a more efficient means of revenue generation through the 
digitization of content, as well as a means to restrict access to content through TPMs. For now, it 
suffices to say that TPM is a technological method aimed at encouraging authorized use of 
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digital content (or, at least, restricting its unauthorized use).2 They shall be examined in great 
detail in chapter five. 
The challenges that ICT poses to the copyright system did not occur overnight; it took 
centuries of technological evolution to achieve its present state and, of course, the evolution 
continues. To properly situate the present challenges, it is apposite to trace the development of 
specific technologies that have impacted on copyright over the centuries. 
 
2.1 Pre-ICT Era and Copyright  
Prior to the development of ICT to its current state, copyright faced challenges with the 
evolution of the printing press (which eventually triggered the literary property debates examined 
in Chapter 1), and later, of course, with the emergence of reprographic and sound recording 
technologies. On the printing press, Edward Samuel explains: 
…The movable type printing press was developed by Johann 
Gutenberg in Germany around 1440 and introduced to England by 
William Caxton in the last quarter of the fifteenth century. Prior to 
that time, it wasn’t all that important to think about the rights of 
authors in books because it was so expensive and time-consuming 
to produce books that few were in fact duplicated. With the 
printing press, however, it became possible to reproduce books in 
multiple copies, by the hundreds or even the thousands.3 
 
Before the computer age, the printing press technology was remarkably revolutionary 
because of its ability to produce numerous copies of books, which hitherto was laborious and 
cumbersome. It is regarded as the first copying technology.4 Prior to the printing press 
technology, the concept or appreciation of “authorship” was not well developed because it was 
 
2 Blayne Haggart, Copyfight: the global politics of digital copyright reform, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) at 30. 
3 Edward Samuel, The Illustrated Story of Copyright, at online:< http://www.edwardsamuels.com/illustratedstory/isc1.htm > 
Accessed March 21, 2016. 
4 Ibid. I replaced “copyright” with “copying” because copying is more appropriate and captures the concept of reproduction.  
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expensive and time-consuming to produce books.5 This is in sharp contrast to what it is today 
because authors now leverage the power of digital technology to create and disseminate content 
across the world with minimal cost.  The printing technology ignited and fueled authorship in the 
sense that its ability to easily produce copies of books incentivized authorship with the hope of 
earning some rewards as well as wide dissemination of their books. Besides encouraging 
authorship, the printing technology was essential to the flourishing of the book publishing 
business.  
Although the printing press technology was remarkable, its process was laborious in the 
sense that the printing process involved manual activity until relatively recent times; the 
development of reprographic technology proved to be far more efficient with the advent of the 
photocopying machine, invented by Chester F. Carlson in 1938.6 The photocopying machine 
enabled cheap and efficient reproduction of copies (including text and images) without the 
laborious printing press processes; however, by virtue of its copying efficiency it did pose a 
threat to the enforcement of copyright, which was, by then, well established.7 
In the music industry, the development of sound recording technologies was similarly 
revolutionary and equally disruptive. The phonograph was invented by Edison in 1877;8 the 
phonograph technology was crude and sound recording was completely mechanical because it 
did not use electricity.9 However, the capacity to record and replay musical performances raised 
 
5 Ibid.  
6 Samuel, Story of Copyright, supra note 3; It is important to note that centuries prior to the invention of the photocopying 
machine, several processes for making copies existed such as Ammonia and Blue Print, Pellet, Diazo, Paperographic, Edison 
Stencils processes etc, N.R. Jayaraman, “Reprographic process – Origin and development” (April, 2015), at online: < 
http://santhiprinting.blogspot.ca/2015/04/reprographic-processes-origin-and.html > Accessed October 24, 2016. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Daniel Von Recjlinghausen, “Electronic Home Music Reproduction Equipment” (1977) 25 at 759 at online: < 
http://www.aes.org/aeshc/docs/vonreck_electronic-home-music.pdf > accessed June 28, 2019. 
9 Supra note 3 at online: < http://www.edwardsamuels.com/illustratedstory/isc2.htm > Accessed February 12, 2018. 
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new but fundamental problems for copyright law, challenging traditional assumptions about the 
control over copies of musical works and their distribution. 
Although copyright infringement predates copyright in the ICT age, there are marked 
differences between infringement in the pre-ICT age and copying in the ICT era. Despite the 
ingenuity of the printing press, reprographic and sound recording technologies, and the copyright 
infringement concerns they presented, the nature of these challenges were not as sophisticated as 
they are today in the era of digital technology. Prior to digital technology, copyright owners 
chiefly controlled the production and distribution of copies of works of authorship, and copies 
were obtained through purchase or borrowing from a library or a friend.10 The effect of limited 
access to physical copies of creative works was that it created a physical scarcity to make sure 
losses through unauthorized access were minimized. This system favoured copyright owners 
more than users or consumers in the sense that copyright owners significantly controlled users’ 
access to content by controlling the making and dissemination of (physical) copies. 
Furthermore, technological advancement was less worrisome for content industries 
compared to the era of digitized content for a number of reasons. The previous copying 
technologies did not pose a significant threat to the content industry’s scarcity-based business 
model11 because, as noted by Ginsburg,12 copyright owners substantially controlled the 
production and distribution of creative works; through this business model, they retained the 
power to create scarcity and increase the demand for cultural goods and guaranteed commercial 
gain. Maintaining the status quo of their existing business model ensured market structure 
stability for the content industry.  
 
10 Jane C. Ginsburg, “Copyright and the Control over New Technologies of Dissemination” (2001) 101 Columbia L.Rev.1613 at 
1614. 
11 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 2 at 60. 
12 Ginsburg, Control over New Technologies, supra note 10.  
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Another reason the previous copying technologies could not so fundamentally alter the 
market place or threaten the business model of the content industries was that copies made in the 
non-ICT period were not exact replicas of the originals and were almost always poor quality 
replicas. Although photocopy generally means reproducing the exact copy, the quality of that 
copy is rarely equivalent to the original. Nor was photocopied or dubbed audiotape was exactly 
the same as the original work due to technological limitations.13  
 As Gillian Davies observes, it is “digital technology [that] has transformed the 
marketplace for copyright-protected works. It has opened up new ways of doing business…”14 
The previous technologies did not digitize content and so reproduction of copies at a commercial 
scale remained expensive,15 which rendered relatively insignificant any possible threat to 
copyright owners. Illegal reproduction did take place, and did influence copyright policy and 
practice; but it did not take place at a scale significant enough to threaten the content industry at 
an existential level. In other words, as Blayne Haggart states: 
Technological change has always influenced copyright law, but 
digital technology differs from previous technological advances in 
that it alters the very nature of the marketplace. Previous 
technological advances such as the invention of the record music and 
television were advances in degree, not in kind, over existing 
technologies.16 
  
In summary, the advances in technology and its impact on copying and copyright were, 
while influential in the development of copyright law, not significant enough to generate the 
controversial discourse on copyright reform on the scale and to the extent that we witness today. 
Let us turn then to examine copyright in the ICT age and its impact on the copyright system. 
 
13 Ginsburg, Control over New Technologies, supra note 10. 
14 Gillian Davies, Copyright and the Public Interest, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) 305. [Davies, Public Interest].  
15 Supra note 10. 
16 Supra note 11.  
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2.2 ICT Era and Copyright    
Advancement in copying technology took on a different dimension as technological 
evolution gradually transitioned to the age of ICT where many manual tasks were gradually (and 
in some cases rapidly) replaced with technology-driven automation, especially through the use of 
computer systems. With specific reference to the copyright industry, the ICT age introduced the 
ability to dematerialize creative content from its corporeal form to digitized form. The 
digitization of creative works (text, audio and video) made it possible to create perfect copies of 
the original. This altered the market structure in the copyright landscape and posed unending 
challenges for copyright enforcement. Before examining the impact of ICT on the copyright 
industry, it is pertinent to discuss the development and rise of the ICT age. The focus will be on 
the digital computer system, the world wide web, internet and social networking 
technologies/platforms. It is not within the scope of my research to delve into technical details or 
to give a comprehensive historical account of the emergence of ICT. Rather, my intention is to 
offer a brief introduction to these technologies in order to contextualize their impact on the 
copyright system. 
 
2.2.1 The Digital Computer System 
Computing technology has experienced phases of rapid advancement and development 
over time. Present digital technology seems to be an unprecedented phenomenon that has 
transformed, arguably, almost every facet of human endeavour. It seems inconceivable that the 
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humble beginnings of Charles Babbage’s computing invention17 and several other improvements 
thereafter in computing technology have transitioned us from the analogue system18 to digital 
computing.19 The change heralded the digital revolution,20 which has not ceased to impact the 
world and continues to beget further innovation. The adoption of personal computers grew 
rapidly and facilitated the processing of data – this became known as information technology. 
Digital technology in the information age facilitates enhanced data processing activities such as 
creation, editing, manipulation, storage/retrieval, transfer and reproduction at very high speed. A 
remarkable achievement by which digital technology dwarfed analogue and pre-ICT 
technologies was the ability of personal computers to make perfect and multiple copies of the 
original at very low cost; for an individual, such cost could include purchasing a computer, 
purchasing Microsoft Office application and internet subscription payment. Unlike the previous 
technologies, this became a serious concern because computer technology through digital means 
proved that copyrighted content could be duplicated perfectly, easily, and practically instantly. It 
 
17 Encyclopedia Britannica, “Digital Computer”, at online: < https://www.britannica.com/technology/digital-computer > accessed 
May 15, 2017. “Charles Babbage is credited with having first conceived the automatic digital computer. During the 1830s 
Babbage devised his so-called Analytical Engine, a mechanical device designed to combine basic arithmetic operations with 
decisions based on its own computations. Babbage’s plans embodied most of the fundamental elements of the modern digital 
computer. For example, they called for sequential control—i.e., program control that included branching, looping, and both 
arithmetic and storage units with automatic printout. Babbage’s device, however, was never completed and was forgotten until 
his writings were rediscovered over a century later.”  
18 Technopedia, “Analogue Computer”, at online: < https://www.techopedia.com/definition/5955/analog-computer > accessed 
May 15, 2017. “An analog computer is a computer which is used to process analog data. Analog computers store data in a 
continuous form of physical quantities and perform calculations with the help of measures. It is quite different from the digital 
computer, which makes use of symbolic numbers to represent results. Analog computers are excellent for situations which 
require data to be measured directly without converting into numerals or codes. Analog computers, although available and used 
in industrial and scientific applications like control systems and aircraft, have been largely replaced by digital computers due to 
the wide range of complexities involved.” 
19 Supra note 17 “Digital computer, any of a class of devices capable of solving problems by processing information in discrete 
form. It operates on data, including magnitudes, letters, and symbols, that are expressed in binary code—i.e., using only the two 
digits 0 and 1. By counting, comparing, and manipulating these digits or their combinations according to a set of instructions held 
in its memory, a digital computer can perform such tasks as to control industrial processes and regulate the operations of 
machines; analyze and organize vast amounts of business data; and simulate the behaviour of dynamic systems (e.g., global 
weather patterns and chemical reactions) in scientific research. 
20 Wikipedia, “Digital Revolution”, at online: < https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_Revolution > accessed May 15, 2017. “The 
Digital Revolution is the change from mechanical and analogue electronic technology to digital electronics which began 
anywhere from the late 1950s to the late 1970s with the adoption and proliferation of digital computers and digital record keeping 
that continues to the present day. Implicitly, the term also refers to the sweeping changes brought about by digital computing and 
communication technology during (and after) the latter half of the 20th century. Analogous to the Agricultural Revolution and 
Industrial Revolution, the Digital Revolution marked the beginning of the Information Age.” 
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meant that users could dispense with the original if a functionally equivalent and identical copy 
was made. Additionally, of course, the information age brought another phenomenon: the 
internet and worldwide web.         
 
2.2.2 Internet and World Wide Web 
The internet and the world wide web (hereinafter referred to as “the web”) can be categorized as 
information transmission technologies. They were developed around the same budding period as 
digital computing technology. The internet is a global communication network that connects 
computers around the world;21 it was created in 1969 as ARPANet (Advanced Research Projects 
Agency network) for the U.S. Department of Defense.22 In his account of the purpose for 
creating the internet and the early stages of its development, Samuel explains: 
The network was designed to break information into separate 
packets and send the packets over various routes from computer to 
computer, rerouting the information as necessary to circumvent the 
breakdown or failure of parts of the system. In the first year, there 
were four host computers connecting Stanford, UCLA, UC-Santa 
Barbara, and the University of Utah. In 1981, several academic 
institutions formed BITNET, a wide-area network to serve the 
academic community. In 1990, after ARPANet and various other 
networks had connected over 300,000 host computers, ARPANet 
was decommissioned as a project of the Department of Defense 
and allowed to develop as a civilian enterprise…By 1992, the 
number of host computers connected to the Internet surpassed 1 
million; by 1998, there were nearly 50 million Internet users in the 
United States; and by 2000, Internet users were estimated at over 
133 million in North America, and 228 million in the rest of the 
world.23  
 
 
21 Samuel, Story of Copyright, supra note 3 at online: < http://www.edwardsamuels.com/illustratedstory/isc5.htm > accessed May 
16, 2017. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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 As the take-up of the internet progressed, the web was created; it is an information space 
where documents and other web resources are identified by Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), 
interlinked by hypertext links, which can be accessed via the Internet.24 The web  was developed 
by Tim Berners-Lee in 1989;25 as a scientist employed at CERN (European Organization for 
Nuclear Research) in 1989, Tim Berners-Lee came up with an idea to let users (especially 
scientists) browse each other’s papers on the internet.26 He wrote the Hypertext Markup 
Language (HTML) and a protocol called the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) that could be 
implemented on any computer.27 Additionally, he created the Universal Resource Locator (URL) 
system for naming, locating and retrieving content on the internet.28 In 1991, using the system he 
had developed, the World Wide Web was launched,29 quickly becoming central to the 
development of the information age and the primary tool used by many millions—now 
billions—to connect on the internet.30 
 Put simply in the words of Samuel, the value of the web is that using straightforward 
HTML language, “just about anybody with a computer and a place to store the information could 
create a Web page, or series of interrelated pages, that could be accessed by anybody else on the 
Internet.”31 The launch of the mosaic web browser is a significant milestone achievement to 
mention in the early days of internet usage. The mosaic web browser was created by the National 
Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) at the University of Illinois-Urbana 
Champaign in 1992 and was launched in 1993.32 The mosaic browser was the first web browser 
 
24 Wikipedia, “World Wide Web”, at online: < https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Wide_Web > accessed May 16, 2017. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Samuel, Story of Copyright, supra note 19. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid.  
30 Supra note 24. 
31 Supra note 26. 
32 Wikipedia, “Mosaic Web Browser” at online: < https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mosaic_(web_browser) > accessed July 8, 2019. 
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to display graphical images,33 and the impact on internet usage by the public was huge because it 
so enhanced the average user experience, allowing the internet to become what it is today.   
The internet and the web are two separate creations34 but work together to make a 
tremendous difference in the ease of sharing and accessing cultural works in the digital age. The 
timing and creation of the internet and the web were apposite; an amalgam of digital computing 
on the one hand, and the internet and the web on the other hand facilitated an exponential growth 
in digital technology that created what can only be described as a paradigm shift. This has 
become the springboard and inspiration for further innovation, resulting in the creation of 
innumerable communication platforms and systems, from electronic mail (email), instant 
messaging (IM) and chat rooms to voice over internet protocols (VoIP), video-conferencing, and 
social networking. 
2.2.3 Social Networking Platforms 
The emergence of social networking platforms is attributable to the rise of the ICT age 
under the auspices of the internet and the web. Access to the internet is the foundation on which 
social networking thrives; the proliferation of digital computing and advances in mobile 
telephony empower ordinary individuals to be active participants in the ICT age. For ordinary 
users of the internet, the mobile phone is the most commonly used means to access the internet 
and social networks. Around the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the new 
millennium, mobile telephony evolved from voice and text messages services into a mini-
 
33 Ibid.  
34 The “Internet” and “WWW” are two terms used frequently in the digital age and may sometimes be confused as one system 
even if they are separate creations. Samuel attempts to explain the difference thus “The Internet is the infrastructure that connects 
various local area networks of computers (at universities, companies, and government agencies) to each other to form a global 
network of networks. It’s not connected by any particular type of transmission lines, but consists of all ways in which computers 
are connected to other computers—including telephone lines, cable, fiber optics, microwave dishes, and satellite links.   
The World Wide Web is a subset of the Internet, but it doesn’t exist in any particular location on the Internet. Rather, the World 
Wide Web is simply a protocol for exchanging information, and a system for identifying the location of particular items of 
information on any of the computers linked by the Internet. To view the http code for any Web site, simply click on view page 
source, or view source in your browser.” Samuel, Story of Copyright, supra 26. 
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computer with the ability to accomplish almost everything a personal computer could achieve. In 
digital technology parlance, mobile phones are built with such enhanced features to be regarded 
as smartphones because of the functions they are designed to accomplish through installable 
apps compared to a non-smartphone, allowing users to access the internet, instant messaging and 
multimedia services, and any number of other apps for every conceivable purpose. Smartphone 
technology contributes to the deepening of the social networking phenomenon, with the world’s 
leading social networking platforms, such as Facebook, Qzone (in China), LinkedIn, Google+, 
WhatsApp, YouTube, Twitter, Snapchat and so forth, providing the means for users all over the 
world to connect and share ideas and content and disseminate information.  
Daily, billions of social media users engage in communicating, creating, sharing and 
accessing information over these networking platforms. Knowledge and cultural flows are freed 
of traditional barriers to access. Social media is used by many as a means of political, economic 
and spiritual empowerment, social mobilization and creative self-expression. A vast volume of 
creative content is shared free of charge for all to access, use and find inspiration in, enabling 
them to further practice and share their creative abilities. Furthermore, on the political scene, 
social media has proved to be a useful instrument in mobilizing citizens’ protests against 
oppressive governments. An example is the critical role social media played in the protests that 
occurred in the Middle East and North Africa popularly known as Arab Spring, which involved 
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.35 Even in the more immediate context of Canadian copyright reform, 
the political power of social networking has been aptly demonstrated by Michael Geist’s use of 
 
35 Habibul Haque Khondker, “The Role of the New Media in the Arab Spring” (2011) 8 Globalizations 676-679 at online: < 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2011.621287 > Accessed February 12, 2018.  
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Facebook as a means to mobilize the Fair Copyright for Canada campaign,36 speaking out 
against the legal protection for TPMs. 
Of course, these technologies (digital computers, internet, the web and social networking 
applications) are much more technologically complex and sociologically significant that I can 
capture here. For our purposes, however, the point is that their influence on the copyright system 
has been enormous and far reaching, and continues to present pressing policy issues for 
discussion. Their impact is perhaps best explained by showing the sharp contrast between the 
pre-ICT and the ICT era. 
 
2.3 Differences between the Pre-ICT and ICT Periods 
The categorization of the copyright system into non-ICT and ICT periods reveals marked 
differences. My analysis of the impact of ICT on the copyright system will rely chiefly on the 
identification of these distinguishing features, which I have categorized under three themes, 
discussed below. 
2.3.1 Loss of Control over Access 
… until the advent of the photocopier, copyright owners substantially 
controlled the production and dissemination of copies of works of 
authorship, as the public could not obtain the work without 
purchasing a copy, or borrowing one from a library or a friend. 
Before mass-market audio and video recording equipment, copyright 
owners also controlled access to works made publicly available 
through performances and transmission, because the public could not 
see or hear the work without attending a licensed live performance, or 
viewing or listening to it through licensed media. With the arrival of 
these technologies, the de facto, and often the de jure, balance 
substantially shifted to users.37   
 
36 Michael Geist, Wikileaks Confirms Public Pressured Forced Delay of Canadian Copyright Bill in 2008, at online: < 
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2011/04/wikileaks-cable-copyright-delay/> accessed May 17, 2017. 
37 Ginsburg, Copyright and Control, supra note 10. 
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The emergence of digital technology altered the equation in the copyright industry; 
copyright owners gradually lost the reins of power to control access to creative works to a new 
copyright world in the digital age. As content became digitized and ubiquitous, the accessibility 
of information goods flourished, empowering users to share and distribute. ICT equips users not 
just to passively consume creative works, however, but also to interact with and manipulate 
them. ICT currently aids creativity and the development of new works as well as disseminating 
them worldwide. As the subject-matter of copyright is, by definition, expression, the greater 
power to convey this message to the world, to educate and communication ideas, is a welcome 
development for the user community. While copyright law has never granted exclusive rights 
over access as such, this change to the medium presented a phenomenal change from the realities 
of the pre-ICT copyright period. Nevertheless, the degree of accessibility to creative works 
continues to change with technology, as content owners use encryption technology to restrict 
access to digitized content. 
2.3.2 Emergence of Digital Creative Communities 
In the pre-ICT regime, creativity could only take place in the real world where physical 
copies of works were created and the means of distributing and accessing these works were also 
physical. The advent and influence of ICT and the internet creates a paradigm shift, which 
enables digital creativity and distribution of content easily. This gradually led to the creation of 
digital creative communities offering content creators the opportunity to create and share content 
without being constrained by time, space and distance. There are innumerable platforms and sites 
that exemplify this digital creative community, but perhaps none more so than YouTube, on 
which millions of users each day are inspired to create and share content. Today, YouTube has 
become a reservoir of video content on virtually any subject. This digital creative community did 
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not displace the traditional copyright system or the printing press, of course, as we still have 
book publishers publishing books in hard copies. The digital creative community, however, 
fostered cohesion, motivation and empowerment among like-minded creators. Additionally, as 
the YouTube example powerfully illustrates, creative works are easily accessible by the user 
community, bringing knowledge and entertainment through the communicative exchange of 
ideas in the digital space. The power of the digital creative community also enhanced the cultural 
behaviour of sharing—sharing knowledge and information thereby promoting innovation and 
creativity. The rise of social media plays a significant role in encouraging digital creative 
communities in terms of disseminating content that emanate from digital creative communities, 
thereby establishing audiences and receiving feedback on platforms such as Facebook, Google+, 
WhatsApp, Instagram, and Twitter.  
My reference to digital creative community, it should be stressed, does not encompass or 
pretend to unify all communities in the digital space or social media. There are diverse 
communities in the digital space who are drawn together for different interests other than 
creativity per se. For the sake of my research, my reference to digital creative communities mean 
platforms in the digital space that bring content creators together for the purpose of creative 
expression. The emergence of digital creative communities nurtures the culture of content 
sharing at an exponential rate that could not have been possible in the pre-ICT era. To illustrate 
the power and benefits of this digital creative communities and sharing culture, the following 
statistics as at April 2017 give an indication of monthly active users of leading social networking 
platforms: Facebook, 1.94 billion;38 WhatsApp, 1.2 billion;39 YouTube, 1 billion;40 Twitter, 319 
 
38Statista, “Most famous social network sites worldwide as of April 2017, ranked by number of active users (in millions)” at 
online: < http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/> accessed May 17, 
2017. 
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million;41 Instagram, 600 million;42 Qzone, 595 million;43 and LinkedIn, 106 million. The 
exchange of content that occurs on a daily basis within and across these platforms from 
individual users and digital creative communities worldwide thus contributes to the 
dissemination of knowledge and inspires creativity. 
 
2.3.3 Free Culture 
The concept of free culture,44 is discussed in detail subsequently in this chapter; to avoid 
repetition, it would suffice here to give a general explanation and how it benefits the copyright 
system under the aegis of ICT. The concept of free culture in the context of this research 
connotes the liberty of creators to share their works or make it accessible for others to use. 
Contrary to a common misconception, free culture does not necessarily mean the absence of 
price or money. Even if it inheres in the free culture philosophy that creators allow their works to 
be accessed without paying, the underpinning objective is not absence of money but the freedom 
to share and access content. 
Free culture therefore leverages the benefits of ICT to encourage the dissemination of 
creative works. Arguably, in the pre-ICT period, content creators may have practised free culture 
by permitting their works to be shared, but it is markedly different in the ICT age due to the scale 
at which it happens and how easily it can be achieved. The digitization of content makes it 
possible to easily replicate content and following the free culture philosophy, to distribute it 
 
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid.  
44 Free culture, in copyright parlance has been subject to different interpretations. The concept of free culture arguably originated 
from Richard Stallman’s free software idea in the early 1980s. In subsequent explanation, I will discuss the concept free culture 
(liberty to share) that Stallman articulates and the four attributes it must have. Furthermore, I distinguish Stallman’s free software 
concept from Open Source Software (OSS) and show how they differ ideologically. I also explain Creative Commons Licensing 
in relation to free culture in the context of Stallman’s four pillars of freedom. 
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freely and make it accessible for users. The benefit that free culture brings in the copyright 
digital landscape is that knowledge and creative works are now more available and accessible for 
consumptive use, enlightenment and inspiration to continue the circle of creativity. The free 
exchange of creative works happens online by the second on a daily basis and the benefits can 
hardly be quantified. Free culture fosters the sharing of creative content across the globe through 
ICT, which undeniably fuels the development of new ideas and creative works. It also provides a 
means to communicate artistic expression with extraordinary potential;45 this should be 
embraced as one of the unique opportunities that ICT brings in the creative industry. Today, it is 
estimated that there are over 3 billion internet users in a world of over 7 billion 
persons.46Majority of content shared by daily internet users is made possible through the free 
culture philosophy.  
The combination of the culture of sharing and free culture concepts in the digital age 
have significantly advanced the dissemination of knowledge and learning in the copyright system 
in the digital period.  
The relative loss of control over access to copyright works, the emergence of digital 
creative communities, and the emergence of a free culture ideal represent significant differences 
between the before- and after-ICT copyright systems. These are, for our purposes, the major 
relevant differences between the copyright in the ICT era and copyright in the non-ICT period, 
although this list is by no means exhaustive. 
 
2.4 Impact of ICT on the Copyright System 
 
45 Lawrence Lessig, “Free(ing) Culture for Remix”, (2004) Utah L. Rev. 961 at 965. 
46 Internet World Statistics, “Internet Users in the World by Regions – March 25, 2017” at online: < 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm > accessed May 17, 2017.  
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The impact of ICT on copyright has generated unending controversy, which of course is 
not surprising given the different stakeholders in the copyright system and their differing 
normative approaches to legitimizing their goals. Various stakeholders justify their viewpoints 
on the impact of ICT to suit the pursuit of their interests and goals. My aim here is to examine 
the views and present, as much as possible, an objective analysis.  
The discourse on the influence of ICT on copyright is of great concern to a whole range of 
copyright stakeholders. A discussion on stakeholders’ analysis will follow subsequently but 
suffice it to say here that copyright stakeholders broadly encompass the following: creators, 
authors, users, libraries, governments, legislators, judiciary, collective societies (these are 
organizations that act on behalf of its members to license copyrighted works, collect royalties 
and assist members with copyright enforcement), academics, copyright lawyers, media and 
entertainment corporations, and other corporate intermediaries (tech and telecom companies, 
digital platforms, etc.). Following the rise of digital technology, data have become a precious and 
invaluable commodity. There is now a shift towards a data-based economy where access to and 
control of data is deemed to be competitive advantage over others in information-driven 
businesses. Debora Halbert observes that, “…information, access to it, and its control are the 
foundations of the new wealth made possible by the information age.”47 A publication in The 
Economist referred to data as the oil of the digital era;48 it also states that, “…there is cause for 
concern. Internet companies’ control of data gives them enormous power.”49 It is undeniable that 
since the acquisition, control and distribution of data in the ICT era has become a lucrative 
 
47 Debora J. Halbert, The State of Copyright: The Complex Relationships of Cultural Creation in a Globalized World (New York: 
Routledge, 2014) 3. 
48 The Economist, “The World’s Most Valuable Resource is no longer Oil, but Data” at online: < 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21721656-data-economy-demands-new-approach-antitrust-rules-worlds-most-valuable-
resource?fsrc=scn/fb/te/bl/ed/regulatingtheinternetgiantsthedataeconomydemandsanewapproachtoantitrust > accessed May 23, 
2017.  
49 Ibid.  
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business, capitalists (some of whom are profit-making corporate entities in the cultural industry) 
have greater incentive to maintain control of creative works for commercial gain. Furthermore, 
for stakeholders (free culture advocates), who seemingly do not seek financial rewards but 
promote the ideology of free access to information also in a non-monetary way, gain some form 
of empowerment in the copyright system in the technology era. The access to creative content 
and information is a means of social enlightenment and empowers the masses, politically and 
socially, to challenge any move to inhibit their access to information. As noted earlier, a perfect 
example of this is the Fair Copyright for Canada campaign.50 
As we have seen, in the pre-ICT age, control of creative works was not a major issue for 
concern because creative content was more readily under the control of copyright owners.51 As 
ICT has substantially altered the status quo, enabling users to access and share content, so too 
has it changed the market structure or copyright business model. Commenting on the impact of 
ICT on the copyright system and its disruption of the market structure, Haggart states: 
Because of the economies of scale related to commercial 
reproduction and distribution, the content industries fulfilled an 
important social and economic function of making works 
accessible to the general public. But with technology (computers) 
and a distribution system (the Internet) that renders copying and 
distribution trivially easy, the content industries are in danger of 
losing their raison d’etre. Unlike the hierarchical nature of the 
previous market, a digitized, networked economy involves 
“decentralized peer production”52 and has less need for large 
corporate structures to coordinate creative production and 
distribution, particularly when one considers the degree to which 
digitization reduces the cost of copying and even shifts it almost 
completely to the consumer.53  
  
 
50 Geist, Canadian Copyright Bill, supra note 35. 
51 Ginsburg, Control over New Technologies, supra note 10. 
52 Jeremy de Beer, “Copyright and Innovation in the Networked Information Economy” (Working Paper) 2009, p.4 at online: < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1410158 > accessed May 23, 2017. 
53 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 11.  
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Haggart’s view nicely summarizes the power shift in the creation and transmission of data 
from the content industry to users and the attendant effect this has on the market structure. He 
conveys the impression that the content industry is at a loss since the traditional model upon 
which their copyright business is built has suffered severe disruption. While I agree, I would add 
that the content industry also benefits in the sense that the digitization of content now provides a 
new means to generate revenue. I examine this subsequently when I discuss copyright 
stakeholders. 
Similarly, commenting on the influence of ICT on the copyright system, but with an added 
concern about unauthorized access, Davies notes: 
Digital technology has transformed the marketplace for copyright-
protected works. It has opened up new ways of doing business and 
given right owners access to new on-line markets via digital 
networks. Text, music and images are reduced to digital data, 
which can be transmitted in digital form at high speed throughout 
the world to everybody with a connection to the internet. This is 
posing new challenges in relation to enforcement of rights, since 
the internet also increases the ease with which intellectual property 
rights in works in digital form can be infringed. This means that 
two perennial problems for right owners, commercial piracy and 
copying for private use, have become ever more difficult to 
control. At the same time, digital technology offers the promise of 
enabling right owners to control the use of their protected material 
and access thereto by technical means.54  
 
          Davies expresses views similar to those of Haggart on the effect of ICT on copyright but 
goes further to highlight the challenges that digital technology presents to copyright owners. 
Inherent in the views of Haggart and Davies are a number of salient points at the core of the 
impact of ICT on copyright. The invention of digital computing technology made it possible for 
creative works to be created and expressed in digital form by anyone who had access to a digital 
 
54 Davies, Public Interest, supra note 14 at 305-6. 
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computer. It simplified the process of idea expression and artistic creation, manipulation and 
reproduction of perfect copies of the original. After the creation of an artistic work, the next goal 
of most creators is to put their work out for others to see, use, appreciate, be inspired by, criticize 
and evaluate. In the pre-ICT period, the dissemination of works was limited in the number of 
people it could reach; however, with the web and the internet, works can be made available to 
millions of people instantaneously. Thus, the dissemination of cultural works can be done at no 
or very low cost. For copyright owners, it reduces the cost of production and dissemination while 
for users, it enables easy access to information for consumptive use. For individuals who engage 
in the sale of unauthorized copies of creative works, it makes infringement easier, which is a 
raises genuine concerns for the copyright owner. Sheldon Halpern aptly captures this thus: 
…the World Wide Web provides a framework for vast access to an 
array of information, from favourite family recipes and newspaper 
articles to scholarly treatise and music, all available at the click of 
a mouse. Yet the same technology that provides vastly enhanced 
access also raise difficult fundamental issues concerning 
intellectual property, because the technology that makes access so 
easy also greatly aids copying – both legal and illegal…55 
     
Furthermore, Halpern expresses his views on the economics of copyright market structure 
in the ICT age and the dilemma it poses: 
Information in digital form has radically changed the economics 
and ease of reproduction. Reproduction costs are much lower for 
both rights holders (content owners) and infringers alike. Digital 
copies are also perfect replicas, each a seed for further perfect 
copies. One consequence is an erosion of what were once natural 
barriers to infringement, such as the expense of reproduction and 
the decreasing quality of successive copies in analog 
media…Computer networks have radically changed the economies 
of distribution. With transmission speed approaching a billion 
characters per second, networks enable sending information 
products worldwide, cheaply and almost instantaneously. As a 
 
55 Sheldon Halpern, “The Digital Threat to the Normative Role of Copyright Law” (2001) 62 Ohio State L.J. 569. 
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consequence, it is easier and less expensive both for a rights holder 
to distribute a work and for individuals or pirates to make and 
distribute unauthorized copies.56     
 
 The impact of ICT bestows undeniable benefits to both copyright owner and user, and at 
the same time, the challenges that accompany the benefits must be acknowledged. For the 
copyright owner, ICT reduces the cost of production and transmission of copyright content and 
opens up a new platform to generate revenue. The downside of ICT for the copyright owner 
arises when her exclusive right under the copyright law is compromised by unauthorized use and 
copyright infringement. It is pertinent here to clarify that not all copying is illegal as the rhetoric 
and clampdown on piracy often suggests. Davies recognizes this distinction and she uses the 
words, “…commercial piracy and copying for private use…”57 when highlighting the challenges 
copyright owners face in the digitized copyright system. Copyright law prohibits the sale of 
illegal copies,58 but this should be distinguished from copying for private use, which is often 
permissible under the law as an exception to the bundle of exclusive rights under copyright law. 
It is important to mention that the term “private use” used by Davies should be interpreted 
cautiously because permissible use does not necessarily have to be private use (nor vice versa). 
For example, under Canadian copyright law, news reporting, which is not private use, qualifies 
as an exception under fair dealing.59 Unfortunately, the distinction between unlawful copying 
and lawful copying such as fair dealing is hardly given due regard in copyright piracy discourse. 
Also, as Davies notes, despite the challenges that ICT poses to the copyright owner, it presents 
 
56 Ibid. at 571. 
57 Davies, Public Interest, supra note 14 at 305. The term “piracy” has become a loaded term in copyright parlance, to avoid 
ambiguity and confusion, I prefer to use the legal or illegal copying instead. 
58 Copyright Act, 1985, R.S.C., c. C-42 s.27. 
59 Ibid. at s.29(2).  
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new opportunities to use technological60 means to prevent unauthorized access, whether for 
lawful or unlawful uses.   
 For some specific kind of users who mostly seek free access to content, the benefit of ICT 
removes barriers to access information and creative works. It fosters access to and dissemination 
of content, creative expression and interaction with a digital community of creativity. 
Admittedly, ICT enables the user community to access creative works online; however, a 
possible challenge this poses to copyright enforcement is that the empowerment and access to 
creative works could be used (by some members of the user community but not all) to perpetrate 
commercial piracy. Therefore, in a bid to check unauthorized access, the user community may be 
branded as illegal copiers, and may in some cases be denied access to permissible use of content.  
 The impact of digital technology on copyright therefore comes with opportunities and 
challenges. While the free culture community welcomes ICT as an enabling tool to disseminate 
information and promote learning, the content industry welcomes ICT as a means to reduce cost 
and generate revenue, except in areas where it is prejudicial to their control over content. 
Ironically, technology also becomes the tool employed by the content industry to control (by 
means of encryption technology) access to content. The conflict of views among copyright 
stakeholders in the digitized era has remained largely unresolved; meanwhile, the development 
of ICT continues, seemingly oblivious to the tension it generates among stakeholders. This 
complex situation puts further strain on copyright law to balance the rights of stakeholders. On 
this note, Neil Netanel remarks: 
Copyright law strikes a precarious balance. To encourage authors 
to create and disseminate original expression, it accords them a 
bundle of proprietary rights in their works. But to promote public 
education and creative exchange, it invites audiences and the 
 
60 This refers to technological protection measures and I discuss it in detail in chapter five. 
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subsequent authors to use existing works in every conceivable one 
that fall outside the province of the copyright owner’s exclusive 
rights. Copyright law’s perennial dilemma is to determine where 
exclusive rights should end, and unrestrained public access should 
begin.61  
  
 This dilemma is further complicated with the advent of technology that gives the public 
easy access to copyrighted materials and at the same time offers copyright owners the means to 
control/restrict access to content. This conjures up an image of conflict of interest between 
copyright stakeholders–where each copyright stakeholder is primarily concerned with the 
achievement of their interests and goals by maximizing beneficial uses of technology.62  
 In 1994 John Perry Barlow’s reflections on the influence of ICT on copyright and its 
seemingly unsolvable challenges prefigures the present challenge: 
Throughout the time I’ve been groping around cyberspace, an 
immense, unsolved conundrum has remained at the root of nearly 
every legal, ethical, governmental, and social vexation to be found 
in the Virtual World. I refer to the problem of digitized property. 
The enigma is this: If our property can be infinitely reproduced and 
instantaneously distributed all over the planet without cost, without 
our knowledge, without its even leaving our possession, how can 
we protect it? How are we going to get paid for the work we do 
with our minds? And, if we can’t get paid, what will assure the 
continued creation and distribution of such work? Since we don’t 
have a solution to what is a profoundly new kind of challenge, and 
are apparently unable to delay the galloping digitization of 
everything not obstinately physical, we are sailing into the future 
on a sinking ship. This vessel, the accumulated canon of copyright 
and patent law, was developed to convey forms and methods of 
expression entirely different from the vaporous cargo it is now 
being asked to carry. It is leaking as much from within as from 
without. Legal efforts to keep the old boat floating are taking three 
forms: a frenzy of deck chair rearrangement, stern warnings to the 
passengers that if she goes down, they will face harsh criminal 
 
61 Neil Netanel, “Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society” (1996) 106 Yale L.J. 283 at 285, cited in “Halpern, “The Digital 
Threat, supra note 50 at 573.  
62 The stakeholders my research focuses on are the content industry, which represent commercial interests, and the free culture 
stakeholders, who represent the user community. These will be discussed in detail in chapters four and five.  
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penalties, and serene, glassy-eyed denial.63 
 
  
Barlow’s position captures the dilemma and challenges of copyright in a digitized work. 
The attempt to address these challenges culminated in the World Intellectual Property 
Organization’s (WIPO) Copyright Treaty (WCT)64 and Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
(WPPT),65 collectively referred to as the WIPO Internet Treaties. Both treaties deal with the 
protection of works in the digital environment and strive to balance the interest of parties.66 
Having discussed the general impact of ICT on copyright, it is fitting now to examine the subject 
from the perspectives of copyright stakeholders.  
 
PART II 
COPYRIGHT: STAKES AND STAKEHOLDERS 
2.5 General Overview of Copyright Stakeholders 
The copyright system generally has different stakeholders who influence activities in the 
cultural industry. As noted earlier, stakeholders in the copyright system in a general sense could 
include authors, creators, producers, publishers/distributors, legislators, the judiciary, 
government, and users and so forth. As the copyright stakeholders vary, so do their interests and 
goals. Their goals may align or conflict. Differences in goals mostly dominate the scene, 
 
63 John Perry Barlow, “The Economy of Ideas” (1994) WIRED, at online: < https://www.wired.com/1994/03/economy-ideas/ > 
accessed May 25, 2017. 
64 World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Copyright Treaty, December 20, 1996, at online: 
<http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=295157> Accessed October 6, 2015. The WCT entered into force on 
March 6, 2002 [WCT]. 
65 World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, December 20, 1996 at online:  
<http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=295477> Accessed October 6, 2015. The WPPT entered into force on 
March 6, 2002 [WPPT]. 
66 WCT, supra note 59 at 1; WPPT, supra note 60 at 1. The treaties are designed to serve as an international legal framework for 
WIPO member countries to implement in their national copyright laws. The implementation of the WIPO treaties in Canada 
dragged on for several years amidst pressure from the United States for Canada to reform its copyright law in the face of 
technological advancement. The initiative behind the development of the WIPO Internet Treaties and its implementation in 
Canada are discussed in detail in chapter 4 of this dissertation.   
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culminating in conflicts, debates, and the call for copyright law reforms. The lines of distinction 
drawn among copyright stakeholders may appear blurred sometimes; for example, one person 
can be both a creator and user. For example, if someone reads a book, she is a user; but if she 
reads the book for the purpose of writing a review of it, she has engaged in creative use to 
produce a new work, so she ceases to be merely a user, she becomes both a user and a creator. 
Similarly, a research student developing a thesis is not just a user, but both a user and author 
simultaneously because she is consuming the works, which feed into the development of her own 
thesis. In a broader sense, given that no one creates out of nothing, every author is a user. 
 For some creators/authors at a given time, the value derived may be the inspiration of ideas 
and follow-on creativity they get from the works of others; at other times, the value they seek 
may be monetary rewards for their works. To consumers/users, their interest could be the 
enlightenment and knowledge that creative works offer as well as their enjoyment and 
interaction with the works. In the copyright ecosystem, there is the tendency to hold the narrow 
view that users/consumers engage merely in consumptive use of content without giving anything 
back. On the face of it, this may be so; but not completely. To reduce users’ role in the copyright 
system to mere consumption demeans the crucial position they occupy, even in their capacity as 
users. It is arguable that a good number of authors/creators, apart from fulfilling their 
motivation67 to create or write, take users’ preferences and desires into consideration as they 
create their work. In fact, in the area of product/service development and design, the Japanese 
 
67 This motivation could be for monetary rewards or an innate desire of artistic expression. Deborah Halbert, The State of 
Copyright - The complex relationships of cultural creation in a globalized world, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014) at 12; Everett E. 
Hagen, “On the Theory of Social Change: How economic Growth Begins” (1962) 93 “cited in Diane L. Zimmerman, “Copyright 
as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That? (2011) 12 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 28 at footnotes 25 and 72 at online: < 
http://www7.tau.ac.il/ojs/index.php/til/article/view/766/724 > accessed June 26, 2017”.  
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developed a technique known as kansei engineering68 to incorporate users’ preferences in the 
design of products and services. Some copyright owners and content providers rely on the 
critique and feedback of users to develop and enhance their work for business advantage (for 
those interested in monetary rewards) and greater acceptability. In my view, creativity has a 
cycle, and this is not complete until the user (who is part of the creativity cycle) uses and 
interacts with it. Users complete the final phase or link in the creativity cycle. Julie Cohen 
underscores the important role of the user as follows: 
The situated user appropriates cultural goods found within her 
immediate environment for four primary purposes: consumption, 
communication, self-development and creative play. The cumulative 
result of this behaviour by situated users, and of both planned and 
fortuitous interactions among them, produces what the copyright 
system names, and values, as “progress.”69 
 
 One important value of users to the copyright system and society is that they help to foster 
public interest which could be seen as playing a social engineering function, as articulated by 
Mtima and Jamar.70  To business-minded corporations and individuals, while the value they 
seek may be pecuniary reward, they also place a huge importance on producing high quality 
works and building reputation through their product. For academics and scholars, the value they 
seek in their works may mostly be wide readership and critical engagement with their 
scholarship; although it could be a combination of a wide readership and some monetary 
rewards. Another dimension of the value of scholarly works by academics is how they impact 
 
68 Yu Chen, “Research on optimized Design of Kansei Engineering-based Web Interface” (2013) Computational and Information 
Sciences 1709 at online: < http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6643365/?reload=true > accessed June 26, 2017. The concept of 
Kansei Engineering was developed by Mitsuo Nagamachi in 1970 and was first known as emotional engineering. Kansei 
engineering is an approach to product development that involves the statistical deductions of design elements that provide 
satisfaction to end users at a psychological level, and the conversion of such elements into design parameters. Simply put, KE 
aims to build consumers’ affective perceptions, needs and emotions into products and services.  
69 Julie Cohen, “The Place of the User in Copyright Law” (2005) 74 Fordham L. Rev. 348 at 370.  
70 Lateef Mtima & Steven D. Jamar, “Fulfilling the Copyright Social Justice Promise: Digitizing Textual Information” (2010) 55 
NY Law School L. Rev. 78 at 79, 80, 81. My interpretation of the social engineering value of copyright is its capability to 
enlighten and educate members of the public through their use and interaction with cultural goods. This is further enhanced by 
ICT which provides a platform makes access to and sharing of information easy. 
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and influence public policy and law reform; academic scholarship also drive innovation in 
science, technology and other fields and these have proved very valuable.  
 According to Haggart, the creator-user distinction may be misleading because creators and 
publishers (e.g., movie studios) use existing works in order to create new works.71 Even though 
the dynamics of copyright stakeholders’ analysis admits that one category of stakeholders could 
easily switch to the other or appear to be a creator and user simultaneously,72 the attempt is still 
made to draw a line of distinction. 
 The government as a copyright stakeholder can be categorized into three sub-units: the 
legislature, executive and judiciary; though these are arms of one unified government, their 
interests in copyright can hardly be said to be unified.73 Even within these three government 
stakeholders, there exist varied approaches and viewpoints to copyright. For example, different 
legislators could have different viewpoints on a proposed copyright issue, the executive could 
have different department with varied approaches to copyright, while in the judiciary, you may 
not always get a unanimous decision on a particular copyright issue, with some judges 
expressing dissenting views. These government stakeholders’ complexities also manifest in other 
stakeholders beyond the government structure.  With different stakeholders playing varying roles 
and seeking different values, interests and goals all in one copyright system, it is hardly possible 
to satisfy the interests of all the stakeholders. While this challenge may not be unique to 
 
71 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 11 at 63. 
72 An example of this is an academic who authors a scholarly work of her own, but in the process of doing so, she uses other 
existing scholarly works. 
73 This is discussed in chapter three of this dissertation where I review Canadian copyright law reform. I analyze the roles and 
interests (whether they align or conflict) of the arms of government in Canada. I also apply the theory of dialogue to examine 
how these arms of government communicate with each other in the context of copyright law reform. A bill for copyright law 
reform could emanate from the legislative arm of government, or be sponsored by the executive arm of government if it develops 
or identifies a policy objective upon which a proposed copyright law reform is based. The executive subsequently sponsors a bill 
to be passed into law by the legislature; here the bill goes through the conventional but arduous process of lawmaking. Non-
contentious bills usually scale through the lawmaking stages without much ado. However, in the case of copyright law reform in 
the ICT age in Canada, the process (from the policy formulation in executive to the lawmaking process in the parliament) has 
been characterized by contentious debates, unresolved stakeholders’ differences, lobbying, international influence etc. The 
judiciary in Canada also plays it role and this will be examined as well in chapter 4. 
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copyright policy-making and law reform, it is certainly a perennial problem that leaves the 
copyright system in a quandary in Canada and other jurisdictions. 
   Various writers have given different interpretations on the key copyright stakeholders. 
Giuseppina D’Agostino identifies creators, owners, users, and the general public as copyright 
stakeholders.74 In developing a stakeholder-focused framework for research on business models 
for information products and open content, Chitu Okoli identifies creators, consumers, 
distributors and others as stakeholders in information products (which he notes includes 
copyrightable works and much more).75 Uma Suthersanen identifies three categories of copyright 
stakeholders – authors/creators, producers, and the consumers.76 Haggart discusses copyright 
stakeholders in Canada by classifying them into Protection Groups and Dissemination Groups.77 
He identifies the Content Industries78 and Creator’s Groups79 as part of the Protection Groups. 
According to Haggart, the Dissemination Groups consist of Traditional User Groups,80 Internet 
Service Providers81 and The Public Interests.82 
 
74 Giuseppina D’Agostino, Copyright, Contracts, Creators: New Media, New Rules (UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2010) at 
8. 
75 Chitu Okoli, “A Stakeholder-Focused Framework for Research on Business Models for Information Products and Open 
Content” (April 28, 2015) at online: < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2600341 > Accessed May 30, 2017. 
76 Uma Suthersanen, “Copyright Law: A Stakeholders’ Palimpsest” in F. Macmillian ed, New Directions for Copyright Law 
(2007) 5 Edward Elgar at 119.  
77 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 11 at 166, 169. 
78 Ibid. at 166-7. Haggart explains that content industries refer to multinational corporations that lobby for strong copyright laws 
which is the foundation of their business models and they spend huge resources lobbying to influence government copyright 
decisions. Haggart identifies the Canadian Recording Industry Association (CRIA), Canadian Motion Picture Distributor’s 
Association (CMPDA), Canadian Publishers’ Association and Entertainment Software Association of Canada (ESAC) as 
associations through with the content industries advance their agenda.   
79 Ibid. at 168.Haggart explain that creator groups are creators who actively lobby for greater rights in their work 
80 Ibid. at 169. According to Haggart, these are large institutional users such as Association of Universities and Colleges 
(AUCC), Canadian Library Association, Canadian Association of University Teachers and the Council of Ministers of Education, 
Canada; they have tended to represent the interest of users in the copyright policy debate in Canada and are against strong 
protection of TPMs which they believe interferes with ease of use, lending of, and access to books and other materials for 
educators.  
81 Ibid. ISPs in Canada are dominated by three major providers – Bell Canada (Phone), TELUS Corp. (Phone) and Rogers 
Communications Inc. (Cable) and are primarily concerned with limiting their liability for infringement actions committed by 
subscribers and avoid a system that requires them to police the actions of their users.  
82 Ibid. at 170. According to Haggart, these are individual/consumer/public interest groups. They advocate for access to content 
and oppose strong copyright protection (added).  
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 In line with the focus of my research, I have chosen to identify the free culture and the 
content industry stakeholder groups as the focal point for my analysis. It should be stressed that 
each category of stakeholder, thus defined, will include both creators and users in some capacity. 
My examination of these two stakeholder groups necessarily includes consideration of how the 
actions of the executive, parliament (legislature) and the judiciary83 influence the copyright 
system.  
2.6 The Free Culture: Origin and Concept 
 In copyright parlance, the concept of free culture is arguably attributable to the work of 
software developer Richard Stallman, who initiated the legacy idea of free sharing of software.84 
Stallman’s idea sought to build a community of developers with the liberty to share software 
amongst themselves; he commenced the software-sharing project in January 1984 known as the 
GNU Project.85 The GNU Project used a method called copyleft to accomplish its goals; 
according to Stallman, copyleft applies copyright but flips it over to serve the opposite objective, 
that is, instead of creating proprietary rights in software, it becomes free.86 As he progressed in 
the development of his software initiative, Stallman established the Free Software Foundation, a 
non-profit to serve as the corporate platform to help achieve the goals of the free software 
community.  
Today, the free culture mantra has expanded beyond the software community into the 
copyright system generally and the meaning ascribed to it today may not be what Stallman 
 
83 This has been discussed in chapter one; it would also be examined in chapter three with focus on the Canadian perspective, and 
how the activities of executive, parliament and judiciary have shaped the contours of copyright in Canada.  
84 Richard Stallman’s concept of free culture originally started with free sharing of software among software developers, but 
today, the concept has expanded to include other content such as text and multimedia. However, in my opinion, the concept of 
free can be traced back to the Statute of Anne of 1710, which provides in s.4 & 5 that free copies of published works are to be 
made available for free. The rationale for this is to enable public access to content for the encouragement of learning.  
85 Free Software Foundation, “Free Software, Free Society: Selected Essays of Richard M. Stallman” (2002) Joshua Gay, ed., 
p.20 at online: < https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/fsfs/rms-essays.pdf > accessed June 5, 2017.  
86 Ibid. at 22. 
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originally intended. According to Stallman, his philosophy of free refers to a particular kind of 
“free”: 
The term “free software” is sometimes misunderstood—it has 
nothing to do with price. It is about freedom. Here, therefore, is the 
definition of free software: a program is free software, for you, a 
particular user, if: you have the freedom to run the program, for 
any purpose, you have the freedom to modify the program to suit 
your needs. (To make this freedom effective in practice, you must 
have access to the source code, since making changes in a program 
without having the source code is exceedingly difficult.), you have 
the freedom to redistribute copies, either gratis or for a fee, you 
have the freedom to distribute modified versions of the program, 
so that the community can benefit from your improvements. Since 
“free” refers to freedom, not to price, there is no contradiction 
between selling copies and free software. In fact, the freedom to 
sell copies is crucial: collections of free software sold on CD-
ROMs are important for the community and selling them is an 
important way to raise funds for free software development. 
Therefore, a program that people are not free to include on these 
collections is not free software.87  
 From the above, Stallman’s ideology of the concept of free is much broader than the 
literal interpretation of absence of price or money. It is the creation of liberty (among software 
developers), to share their software for others to build on and re-distribute for further use, 
modification and distribution – this, to me, means contributing to the progress of knowledge and 
dissemination of the same in the sphere of software development. Stallman’s emphasis on the 
“freedom” to run, modify, and redistribute means that one must have been authorized to do so by 
the software owner, who has copyright88 in the software but chooses to adopt a copyleft 
approach. He further clarifies this by remarking that a program that cannot be added to the 
collection does not qualify as free software. In other words, Stallman’s ideology does not 
 
87 Ibid. 20. 
88 The basis of the exercise of copyleft must rest on copyright, this is because for content (in this case, software codes) to be 
shared, it must be created, and once created (that is, expressed in a tangible or fixed form) copyright applies by default, but the 
copyright owner elects not to exploit her proprietary rights in the software code but to freely grant other developers access to it to 
improve on it and disseminate their improvements. 
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encourage unauthorized distribution. If the owner of the copyright in a software is interested in 
exploiting her proprietary rights for monetary gains, this precludes the software from being 
shared as free software and Stallman does not condemn this; in fact, he encourages the freedom 
to sell copies to generate funds to promote the free software development. He does not condemn 
the desire to seek monetary rewards because, in his words, “there is no contradiction between 
selling copies and free software.”89 Here, Stallman underscores the fact that the desire to seek 
monetary reward and the choice not to can co-exist.90  
          Stallman’s concept of free software therefore rests on rests on freedom four pillars:91 1) 
freedom to run the program as you wish for any purpose 2) freedom to study the source code of 
the program and change it to do what you wish 3) freedom to make copies and share with others 
when you wish, and 4) freedom to distribute or publish modified versions. According to 
Stallman, any purported claim to free software must have all of these four attributes and if any 
one of these freedoms is substantially missing or insufficiently available, then it is not free 
software but proprietary software.92 
The idea of free software is more than a practical licensing scheme; it is also a 
philosophical concept. Stallman explains that “Free software” is a matter of liberty, not price. 
To understand the concept, you should think of “free” as in “free speech,” not as in “free 
beer.”93 Inherent in the concept of free culture is the outcome or consequence that users will 
definitely get the software or information product without paying, which Stallman admits  when 
 
89 Free Software Foundation, Free Software, supra note 80. 
90 This echoes my line of thinking (that I develop later in this dissertation) that copyright stakeholders could explore ICT as an 
instrument to promote the possibility of peaceful co-existence despite their different interests. 
91 Free Software Foundation Europe, “The Free Software Movement and the Future of Freedom” lecture by Richard Stallman at 
Zagreb, 2006 at online: < https://fsfe.org/freesoftware/transcripts/rms-fs-2006-03-09.en.html#q6> accessed July 10, 2019. 
92 Ibid.  
93 Supra note 89 at 43. 
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he refers  to the redistribution of copies gratis.94 In my view, what is important to Stallman is not 
for users to obtain software without paying (which inevitably happens), but that software 
developers have the authority or liberty to share without barrier and encourage the improvement 
of knowledge in the software code development. Despite his effort to give clarity to the meaning 
of his usage of the word “free,” Stallman laments the ambiguity95 in the word and its 
susceptibility to different meanings. For the purpose of my research, it is important to note the 
foundational meaning of free culture as Stallman enunciates and the meanings that have been 
ascribed to it in the copyright industry by various stakeholders. 
Besides Stallman’s free software initiative, it is apposite to mention the existence of Open 
Source Software (OSS) and how it compares to Stallman’s free software concept and its four 
freedoms. The OSS is defined as a computer software where the author releases the source code 
of the program for users to study, modify and distribute the software for any purpose.96 While 
this may appear similar to free software, the underlying ideological motive for OSS differs from 
free software. The concept of OSS originated from the work of Eric Raymond, and he thought 
that Stallman’s free software social activism was not appealing to the commercial software 
industry.97 Therefore, Raymond and his team chose to rebrand the free software concept to 
project the commercial potential of sharing and collaborating on software source code and the 
term “open source” was adopted.98 So while both free software and OSS are similar in the sense 
that both believe in the sharing software source code, they are markedly different. The 
 
94 Ibid. at 20. 
95 Ibid. “Because of the ambiguity of “free,” people have long looked for alternatives, but no one has found a suitable alternative. 
The English Language has more words and nuances than any other, but it lacks a simple, unambiguous word that means “free,” 
as in freedom—“unfettered” being the word that comes closest in meaning. Such alternatives as “liberated,” “freedom,” and 
“open” have either the wrong meaning or some other disadvantage. 
96 Wikipedia, “Open-source software” at online: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software> accessed July 11, 2019. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
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fundamental and ideological difference is that while free software’s objective is to benefit users, 
OSS emphasizes benefits for not only users, but also software developers and vendors, which 
includes corporate entities. Therefore, despite what they have in common, that is, sharing 
software code and allowing it to be used, modified, and distributed, their underlying values are 
fundamentally different. With these differences in mind, even though the term free culture 
movement may include OSS, they may not subscribe fully to the entire free culture philosophy 
especially as the term “free” may connote gratis. 
The concept of free culture gradually developed and expanded in its area of application 
beyond Stallman’s original idea, which is the software domain into other areas of creative 
content. Lawrence Lessig used Stallman’s free culture concept (with some differences) to 
promote his idea of making creative works digitally available and easily accessible by everyone.  
Lessig established the Creative Commons (CC) Organization99 through which he promotes 
Creative Commons Licensing (CCL). Lessig is a proponent of Stallman’s free culture agenda 
and has expressly stated this;100 his establishment of the CC was undoubtedly influenced by 
Stallman’s ideological stance. Lessig’s idea of CCL was modelled after Stallman’s free culture 
concept but not all the licenses under CCL scheme fully align with Stallman’s four freedoms. 
Though Lessig generally supports Stallman’s notion of free culture (which includes the four 
freedoms), four of the six licenses under CCL scheme do not align with the four freedoms of free 
 
99 Creative Commons, “About CC” at online: < https://creativecommons.org/category/about-cc/ > accessed June 6, 2017. A 
detailed analysis of Creative Commons Organization and Creative Commons Licensing is given in chapter four. 
100 Free Software Foundation, Free Software, supra note 85 at 11, commenting on Stallman’s idea, Lessig states “Through his 
works and his words, he has pushed us to see the importance of keeping code “free.” Not free in the sense that code writers don’t 
get paid, but free in the sense that the control coders build be transparent to all, and that anyone have the right to take that control, 
and modify it as he or she sees fit. This is “free software”; “free software” is one answer to a world built in code. “Free.” 
Stallman laments the ambiguity in his own term. There’s nothing to lament. Puzzles force people to think, and this term “free” 
does this puzzling work quite well. To modern American ears, “free software” sounds utopian, impossible. Nothing, not even 
lunch, is free. How could the most important words running the most critical machines running the world be “free.” How could a 
sane society aspire to such an ideal? Yet the odd clink of the word “free” is a function of us, not of the term. “Free” has different 
senses, only one of which refers to “price.” A much more fundamental sense of “free” is the “free,” Stallman says, in the term 
“free speech,” or perhaps better in the term “free labor.” Not free as in costless, but free as in limited in its control by others.”  
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software. The CCL scheme is discussed in detail in chapter four, but it is important to mention 
here that four licenses (CC-BY-NC, CC-BY-ND, CC-BY-NC-SA and CC-BY-NC-ND)101 
prohibit creating derivative works and commercial use. In contrast, Stallman’s four pillars of free 
software do not have such restrictions, and according to Stallman, if one of the four freedoms is 
missing or insufficiently available, the software (which in this case is creative works other than 
software) is not free software. The two licences under the CCL scheme that conform to 
Stallman’s free software tenets are CC-BY and CC-BY-SA because they require only that one 
gives attribution to the original author and shares the content under the same licence condition; 
neither of these two conditions contradicts the four freedoms of free culture. 
In fact, Lessig’s nuanced approach to free culture was clearly stated by Stallman in 2012: 
Creative Commons publishes six principal licences. Two are 
free/libre licences: the Sharealike licence CC-BY-SA is a free/libre 
licence with copyleft, and the Attribution licence (CC-BY) is a 
free/libre licence without copyleft. The other four are nonfree, 
either because they don't allow modification (ND, Noderivs) or 
because they don't allow commercial use (NC, Nocommercial).102 
The foregoing clarifies the extent to which CCL scheme conform to Stallman’s free 
culture philosophy and its four freedoms: while the CC organization broadly supports the free 
culture idea, only two of its licences confirm to Stallman’s free software precepts. For the 
purpose of my research, it is important to highlight the different approaches and conceptions to 
free culture as conceived by Stallman (free software), OSS supporters, and the CC organization.   
In his writings, Lessig advocates free culture in the digital era and his works offer 
compelling critiques of the copyright system; he also provides an initiative for owner and user 
 
101 Licence code meaning: BY (attribution), SA (ShareAlike), NC (Non-commercial), ND (Non-derivative work). 
102 Richard Stallman, “On-line education is using a flawed Creative Commons licence” at online: 
<https://stallman.org/articles/online-education.html > accessed July 12, 2019. 
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practices to co-exist under the mechanism of the CCL, which enables the freedom to disseminate 
content encourage and inspire learning. Like Stallman, Lessig is not against seeking monetary 
rewards, but he articulates a system of control to give artists sufficient incentive to produce while 
leaving free, as much as possible, for others to build upon and create.103 This suggests the notion 
of striking a balance, which is usually difficult in practice. 
Lessig’s expresses his idea of free culture when he asserts: 
A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not a culture 
in which artists don’t get paid. A culture without property, or in 
which creators can’t get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is 
not what I advance here. Instead, the free culture that I defend in 
this book is a balance between anarchy and control.104 
 
 The import of Lessig’s conceptualization of free culture as stated above does not mean 
creators should not get paid or earn financial reward for their creativity. Stallman expresses a 
similar view when he articulates states his support for selling CD-ROMs of free software.105 This 
is worth emphasizing to correct the common but erroneous thinking that free culture means 
absence or price or free of monetary charge. Lessig agrees that the free culture idea does not 
preclude, neither is it against, authors or creators seeking incentives in the form of monetary 
reward or otherwise. The fundamental idea of the free culture advocacy emphasizes the freedom 
to make content available and easily accessible, so others can draw inspiration from it, improve 
on it, and further disseminate their improvement to keep the circle of knowledge and creativity 
ongoing. Lessig stresses the importance of ownership but decries absolute control.  
2.6.1 Free Culture Stakeholders and the Intrinsic Approach to Copyright   
 
103 Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas, The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World, (Toronto; New York: Random 
House, 2001) at 249. 
104 Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture, How big Media uses Technology and the Law to lock down Culture and Control Creativity 
(New York: The Penguin Press, 2004) at xvi. 
105 Free Software Foundation, Free Software, supra note 85 at 20. 
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The concept of free culture has become volatile and although it fits within the intrinsic 
approach to copyright, traces of an instrumental approach arguably abound within it. The 
conceptual analysis of free culture given above suggests that even within the free culture 
community, there is no unified understanding or approach to the concept of free culture. Within 
the broad spectrum of free culture, there are stakeholders who may disagree on the meaning of 
free culture or have different motives for identifying with free culture. As noted above, Stallman 
and Lessig’s perspective on free culture broadly articulate the freedom to share content to 
encourage its dissemination and the promotion of learning, but marked differences exist; they 
both construct the concept of free culture on the foundation of copyright but offer creators the 
opportunity to exercise their rights differently by not exploiting the proprietary interest. The 
implementation of this idea contemplates that content will be shared gratis even though this is 
not the fundamental reason for the free culture agenda. Consequently, some stakeholders’ 
understanding of free culture mean no fee is paid to access content. This is only permissible to 
the extent that the copyright holder authorizes it, and anything contrary to the terms of the 
licence may amount to copyright infringement. Additionally, the notion that content should be 
accessed without a fee negates the idea of free culture as envisaged by Stallman and Lessig 
because they both agree that it is permissible to create proprietary interests in creative content 
and earn a reward from it106 in exchange for access to the content. Therefore, free culture 
stakeholders who posit that content ought to be free of monetary charge represents a different 
perspective and a more absolute approach to free culture, which ultimately means the abolition 
of copyright law.107 
 
106 Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 96; Free Software Foundation, Free Software, supra note 85 at 22. 
107 See Joost Smiers, “The Abolition of Copyright: Better for Artists, Third World Countries and The Public Domain” (2000) 62 
Gazette, 379-406 at online: < http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0016549200062005003 > accessed June 27, 2017; 
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The view that calls for content to be necessarily free of monetary charge is not the only 
challenge among the free culture stakeholders. Even among those who subscribe to Stallman and 
Lessig’s idea of free culture (freedom to share), evidence abounds to show that motives for doing 
so differ. Reflecting on why software developers would spend valuable time to develop code 
they would eventually share for free, Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole admitted that this is startling;108 
but they also argue that they act on the expectation of future extrinsic rewards109 such as the 
enhancement of their reputation, which could increase visibility for greater career opportunities 
or status in the programming community;110 this position aligns with OSS principles described 
above. Also, in CCL, evidence shows that some artists and creators who share their works at no 
cost attain commercial success through it. In fact, this has been published as part of CC success 
stories.111 There is nothing wrong with embracing free culture and benefitting financially from it. 
In fact, from the examples given above, free culture itself arguably becomes a business model, 
which business-minded free culture stakeholders and even the content industry can exploit, 
directly or indirectly. My concern here is that the financial/business motive may erode the free 
 
Newswise, “Economist Say Copyright and Patent Laws are Killing Innovation; Hurting Economy” (2009) at online: < 
http://www.newswise.com/articles/view/549822/?sc=dwhn > accessed June 27, 2017, “Abolishing patent and copyright law 
sounds radical, but two economists at Washington University in St. Louis say it's an idea whose time has come. Michele Boldrin 
and David K. Levine see innovation as a key to reviving the economy. They believe the current patent/copyright system 
discourages and prevents inventions from entering the marketplace. The two professors have published their views in a new 
book, Against Intellectual Monopoly, from Cambridge University Press.” 
108 Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, “Some Simple Economics of Open Source” (2002) 50 J. Indus. Econ 197,198.  
109 Diane L. Zimmerman, “Copyright as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That? (2011) 12 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 28 at 43, 
online: < http://www7.tau.ac.il/ojs/index.php/til/article/view/766/724 > accessed June 27, 2017. 
110 Supra note 108 at 218. 
111 The Power of Open, Bloomsbury Academic: Publishing Openly, at online < 
http://thepowerofopen.org/assets/pdfs/tpoo_eng.pdf > Accessed October, 26, 2016. This publication chronicles success stories of 
Creative Commons Licensing. Some examples are: Bloomsbury Academic - a publisher of academic journals distribute free 
online versions of its research publications under the non-commercial Creative Commons licence while still continuing to sell 
hard copies; British photographer Jonathan Worth met science-fiction writer Cory Doctorow, who was giving his book away and 
making money from it. Worth photographed him once and asked him what the deal was and Cory proposed an experiment. Worth 
signed on. They put a Creative Commons BY licence on the image and shared high-resolution copies for free online while selling 
signed prints at various prices and levels of exclusivity. “The most expensive sold first. No one had ever heard of me, but they 
were paying good money for my prints. Doctorow had given Worth a lesson on the new digital world and people’s digital habits. 
Now I can understand how to leverage the forces of people using my images for free, says Worth. It’s like putting a message in a 
bottle and the tides can take it anywhere under its own steam and you can take advantage of those forces; see also Mihaly Ficsor, 
“How did we arrive here? The Evolution of Copyright Legislation” at 13 online: 
<http://www.ebu.ch/CMSimages/en/B.1%20M.%20Ficsor_tcm6-43830.pdf> accessed December 6, 2014.  
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culture philosophy if it becomes a means to an end rather than an end in itself. With success 
story reports that CCL promises future financial rewards, it is not surprising that businesses that 
offer online content have evolved a “freemium” business model —i.e., offering users some part 
of their content for free with the expectation of converting them into paying customers later.  
The discourse on free culture reveals that stakeholders who embrace the concept do not 
share unity of understanding and purpose. There are variants within the free culture fold and this 
divide is based on their perception of the concept and underlying motive.  For the purpose of 
clarity, my reference to free culture as implemented by CC under its licensing scheme partly 
embraces the position of Stallman. It gives copyright owners the liberty to share their works for 
users to access and use as they please, and at the same time accommodates content owners who 
desire to make content available under certain conditions and even for a fee. In other words, free 
culture envisions a copyright system where there is liberty to share creative content to promote 
innovation and further creativity. A possible explanation for having diverse perspectives in the 
free culture community is due to stakeholders’ perception and approach to copyright. In the 
theoretical framework section of this dissertation I examine the concepts that underpin different 
stakeholder approaches to copyright while contrasting the instrumental and intrinsic approach to 
copyright.  
 There appears to be a connection between intrinsic approach to copyright and free culture 
stakeholders. To summarize, the intrinsic approach postulates that creative production is chiefly 
motivated by factors other than solely for monetary rewards; it further posits that creative works 
in themselves are valuable and ought to be accessible for use by others. This perspective of 
copyright aligns with the position of Stallman and Lessig, and consequently, their approach to 
copyright resonates with the intrinsic approach. The instrumentalist approach, on the other hand, 
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advocates for a copyright system that operates on the assumption that creativity is based on 
rewards; copyright protection is construed as a means to an end, with the end largely being 
financial benefit, which incentivizes creativity. 
In my examination of the intrinsic school of thought on copyright, I did argue that one of 
the problems it may have is that de-emphasizing extrinsic rewards may undermine the value of 
reward for creativity. There is the possibility of having some free culture faithfuls who are not 
absolute in their support for free culture and exhibit some traits of seeking financial rewards. 
Others claim to be free culture stakeholders but with an instrumentalist mindset; they use free 
culture as a means to an end – that is, they use free culture platform principally as a means to 
gain financial rewards for their creative works. The CCL success story highlighted above is 
instructive here. 
The instrumental and intrinsic justification for copyright explains why the free culture 
concept can hardly be absolute as different stakeholders in the free culture community have 
different understandings of, and divergent approaches, to copyright and its role.   
2.6.2 Free Culture Perspectives on ICT in the Copyright System 
It is fitting at this stage to consider the impact of ICT on the copyright system from the free 
culture point of view. It is not debatable that the various shades of free culture agenda would 
embrace ICT, welcoming it as having a positive impact on the operation of the copyright system, 
albeit for different reasons. Despite their nuances, there is a confluence of interest in the sense 
that, in general terms, free culture advocates in the copyright system support the dissemination 
of, and free access to, information and cultural works.112 The free culture perspective on ICT in 
 
112 Despite this common ground, their motives differ as I have explained. To each of them, the ICT plays a positive role to 
achieve their purpose. For example, to promote the sharing of cultural works, ICT is needed for dissemination. To the free culture 
stakeholder who expects to get content free, digital technology is arguably the means to get access content. The incentive-
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the copyright system is premised on its catalytic role in fostering free sharing and access to 
information. 
In my analysis of the free culture advocates’ perspective on ICT in the copyright system, 
the focus will be on social networking and CCL. In the last decade, digital technology and the 
internet have aided the proliferation and massive uptake of social networking.  Social networking 
platforms undoubtedly foster the encouragement of learning and innovation. For instance, 
YouTube, as discussed above, is a unique social networking platform with a rich and rapidly 
growing repository of videos and video sharing features; a significant social benefit of YouTube 
is advancing access to ideas, knowledge and inspiration on an almost infinitely diverse array on 
subjects. People freely upload their creative content for others to watch, learn from, and be 
enriched by. The take-up of such content sharing platforms has increased rapidly, and they attract 
massive user traffic daily. The enormous scale of creation and sharing of creative works on these 
digital platforms by millions of users inspire ever more ideas in the creativity cycle, and this, in 
turn, leads to further creativity, and greater dissemination of knowledge. This aligns with the 
objectives of free culture stakeholders.  
In the pre-ICT copyright regime, the sharing and access to cultural works could not have 
been envisaged at this magnitude: it exemplifies the opportunity that ICT and the internet bring 
to the copyright system. In addition to connecting people socially, ICT facilitates the purpose of 
copyright law through the advancement and dissemination of knowledge and learning. ICT 
presents the opportunity for stakeholders to advance their goals and interests in the copyright 
system. This is precisely the argument I make to support the claim that ICT presents immense 
opportunities for stakeholders in the copyright system. Copyright stakeholders are already taking 
 
oriented upcoming artiste and free culture advocate, ICT is a means to reach millions of users hoping to create awareness about 
her content and consequently financial reward.  
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advantage of this ICT-driven opportunity; for example, as we shall see, free culture stakeholders 
are using ICT to promote their objectives. The exponential growth in the free sharing of content 
under the aegis of ICT is a strong indication that free culture stakeholders welcome the impact of 
ICT in the copyright industry. 
The same could be said of the CCL scheme, which is the next basis for reviewing free 
culture stakeholders’ view on the impact of ICT on copyright. The CCL is discussed extensively 
in chapter four, but a brief explanation will serve our purposes here. The CCL is a scheme that 
empowers authors and creators to exercise their rights (exclusive rights granted by copyright 
law) differently by making it possible for users to freely access and make certain uses of their 
works,113 which may inspire transformative use leading to follow-on creativity and innovation. 
The terms of the ShareAlike licence in the CCL scheme is similar to Stallman’s copyleft114 idea, 
although there are some differences.115  
CCL taps directly into the huge benefits of ubiquity of the internet to promote its idea. 
Content owners who subscribe to the CCL scheme provide their works in digital form online; 
users who agree to abide by the conditions of use access the creative works online. Since its 
inception in 2001, the CCL has attracted large numbers of owners and users who have keyed into 
the concept. In 2016, 1.2 billion116 CC licensed-works were found on the internet. The number of 
licensed-works under the CCL scheme indicates that stakeholders of free culture embrace ICT as 
 
113 The works are licensed using various licence categories, which provide some restrictions on the use of the content. This is 
discussed in detail in chapter four.  
114 Free Software Foundation, Free Software, supra note 85 at 22. 
115 The Open Source Software specifically deals with the sharing of software codes while CCL deals with creative works 
generally, which could be text, audio, images, videos and multimedia creations. For more on the differences between Open 
Sources Licences and CCL, see Yi-Hsuan Lin et al, “Open Source Licences and the Creative Commons Framework: Licence 
Selection and Comparison” (2006) 22 Journal of Information Science and Engineering, 1-17 at online: < 
https://www.iis.sinica.edu.tw/page/jise/2006/200601_01.pdf > accessed June 27, 2017. 
116 Creative Commons, “State of the Commons” at online: < 
https://stateof.creativecommons.org/?utm_campaign=2014fund&utm_source=carousel&utm_medium=web > accessed June 15, 
2017. 
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an opportunity to advance their interests in the copyright system. The objective of sharing and 
use of copyright works under CCL promotes a digital community of limitless knowledge 
creation and artistic expression; it utilizes the capabilities of ICT to further promote access to and 
use of creative works for the public interest. From the free culture stakeholders’ perspective, ICT 
in the copyright system is seen as a positive impact as it aligns with their interest.  
From the perspective of social networking platforms and CCL, ICT has offered great and 
undeniable opportunities to promote free culture interests and the dissemination of knowledge 
and creativity in the copyright system. However, it must be noted that despite these 
opportunities, social networking and CCL have raised some concerns. The emergence of a digital 
community has created a seemingly different world (online world) from the real world. This has 
beneficial uses as I have articulated above, unfortunately, it comes with negative consequences. 
Social networking platforms have been used as instruments to perpetrate child pornography, 
cyber-bullying, pedophilia and terrorism propaganda, etc. Taking advantage of the global reach 
of the internet and the anonymity it offers, perpetrators of heinous crimes, under masked 
identities, prey on the vulnerable and gullible. The harm that this has caused is undeniable; 
however, I argue that such activities pre-date digital technology and the internet and while 
technology may amplify and distort these activities, the root cause lies with the individuals that 
engage in these unlawful acts through whatever technological means are available to them. This 
field however is outside the scope of my research and is best left to experts for analysis.  
Another concern associated with social network and the internet is the general obsession 
with it specifically among teenagers. Marion K. Underwood117 and Robert W. Faris118 in 
 
117 Marion K. Underwood is a professor of Behavioural and Brain Sciences at the University of Texas in Dallas. 
<https://www.purdue.edu/hhs/about/meet-the-dean.php > accessed October 25, 2019. 
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collaboration with CNN’s Anderson Cooper 360 carried out a research project involving a 
survey conducted among 200 13-year-olds to identify what they are doing online.119 The research 
reveals the overarching influence of ICT on teenagers and often negative definitions of self. 
Teenagers’ reliance on social network for affection, affirmation and approval could be the 
consequences of broken societal values and relationships. The findings120 of the research are 
quite disturbing and prompt the rhetorical question - are we using technology or is technology 
using us? Again, this subject is not within the purview of my research project, although it is a 
general societal problem: the lockdown of digital technology (assuming it were possible) or 
labeling it “a threat” is not however a decisive way of dealing with the challenge. 
Another concern (which is mostly from the content industry) is nicely articulated by 
Davies’ comment when she says:  
…two perennial problems for right owners, commercial piracy and 
copying for private use, have become ever more difficult to control. 
At the same time, digital technology offers the promise of enabling 
right owners to control the use of their protected material and access 
thereto by technical means.121  
 
While maintaining the distinction between sale of illegal copies of works and copying for private 
use,122 digital technology makes it easy to indulge in sale of illegal copies by some individuals or 
entities. To keep this in check, copyright owners use encryption technology to restrict 
 
118 Robert W. Faris is a professor of Sociology at the University of California at Davis. < 
http://sociology.ucdavis.edu/people/rwfaris > accessed October 25, 2019. 
119 Marion K. Underwood & Robert W. Faris, “Being 13: Perils of lurking on social media” at online: < 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/05/opinions/underwood-faris-being-thirteen-lurking-social-media/index.html > Accessed April 9, 
2016.  
120 Ibid. Part of the findings of the survey show that youth who are less socially secure, who might be vulnerable to feeling lonely 
or sad or socially anxious, likely face several perils of lurking online. First, the more time they spend lurking, the more likely 
they are to observe friends having a wonderful time without them. In our study, nearly half said they had felt excluded by seeing 
social media posts about friends doing things together without them, and more disturbingly, over a third said they themselves had 
posted on social media in ways that made others feel excluded. 
121 Davies, Public Interest, supra note 14 at 305-6.  
122 Commercial piracy is unauthorized access to and reproduction of copyright-protected content and exploiting them for 
commercial gain– this is prejudicial to the exclusive rights of the copyright owner and by law it is deemed to be copyright 
infringement, see Copyright Act, 1985, R.S.C., c. C-42 s.27; copyright for private use is not copyright infringement as it fall 
within the exception to copyright, see s.29, Copyright Act, 1985. 
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unauthorized access. However, on the one hand, while it can be argued that the use of encryption 
hardly makes a distinction between sale of illegal copies and permissible use, on the other hand, 
a counter argument could be that the use of encryption by copyright owners ensures that only 
authorized users access their content thereby distinguishing between legal and illegal access. 
Insofar as the internet and digital technology provide novel means to restrict access to content, 
free culture stakeholders will perceive this as an inhibition on their continued access and use. For 
now, it is important to keep this in mind; more discussion specifically addressing the harms of 
TPMs will follow in Chapter Five. 
Regarding CCL, some scholars and free culture stakeholders have also expressed concerns 
about the arrangement, raising issues about confusion around its purpose and conceptualization, 
including, unsurprisingly, critical comments from Stallman.123 Additionally, as noted above, 
some concerns have been raised about how CCL is being used as a business model for financial 
rewards, which, to an extent, contradicts the spirit of CCL and arguably distorts the free culture 
ideology. 
The concerns notwithstanding, it does appear, however, that the free culture community 
may incline more towards the view that ICT presents, broadly speaking, more of an opportunity 
than a threat in the copyright industry. However, it should be acknowledged that some free 
culture stakeholders, particularly those whose interests and access to content may be 
significantly affected by technical controls, will not regard the rise of ICT as purely positive for 
the copyright system.   
 
2.7 Content Industry Stakeholders: Origin and Concept 
 
123 Richard Stallman, “Fireworks in Montreal (2005-07-01 to 2005-07-05)” (2010) at online: < 
https://www.fsf.org/blogs/rms/entry-20050920.html > accessed February 20, 2018. 
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The content industry stakeholders’ ideology is that copyright owners are entitled to 
financial reward for the content they create; this, in turn, incentivizes them to produce more 
creative works for the progress of knowledge and creativity, which ultimately serves the public 
interest. Sandra Aistars et al, while citing Justice Reed in the United States case of Mazer v. 
Stein,124 note that although copyright seems to grant authors exclusive rights for personal gain, 
the progress of science is achieved through the proliferation of knowledge to the public.125 
Aistars et al further note that in ensuring the protection of authors’ rights, the focus of copyright 
law has properly been first on authors, but the ultimate effect is a benefit to society at large.126 
This position arguably relies on the provision of the United States Constitution, which states that: 
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.127 
Furthermore, a more controversial perspective of content industry stakeholders in the ICT 
age is captured by Halbert’s view: “…information, access to it, and its control are the 
foundations of the new wealth made possible by the information age.”128 The motive to acquire 
content and control access to it (create artificial scarcity) for financial gain predates the ICT age 
and perhaps the concept of copyright itself. In chapter one, I explained that prior to the existence 
of a formal system recognized by copyright law through the enactment of the Statute of Anne in 
 
124 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), “the economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyright is 
the conviction that the encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the 
talents of authors and inventors in Science and useful Arts. Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve reward 
commensurate with the services rendered.” With due respect to Justice Reed, I disagree with his opinion that incentivizing 
individual authors is the best way to achieve public welfare or public interest. I acknowledge that, as at that time (1954), this may 
be the prevalent view, it cannot be said to be the best way now, certainly not in the era of digital technology. It could be one of 
the ways, but certainly not the best way.  
125 Sandra Aistars et al, “Copyright Principles and Priorities to Foster a Creative Digital Marketplace” (2016) 23 Geo. Mason L. 
Rev. 769 at 771. 
126 Ibid. at 771-2; see Terry Hart, “Copyright Is for the Author First and the Nation Second”, Copyhype, (2012) at online: < 
http://www.copyhype.com/2012/10/copyright-is-for-the-author-first-and-the-nation-second/ > accessed June 19, 2017.  
127 United States Constitution, Art. 1, §8, cl.8, 1789. 
128 Halbert, The State of Copyright, supra note 47. 
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1710, authors did manage to secure some remuneration for the content they created. Salathiel 
Masterson’s view suggests that there is evidence that in ancient centers of learning, authors 
secured compensation for their works129 in Greece. Although there was no copyright law, the 
author or creators’ ownership of the work and value in it was appreciated to the extent that it 
attracted financial rewards. 
Additionally, in chapter one, I gave a detailed analysis of the origin and rise of the 
Stationers’ Company, which, according to Daniel Gervais, can be regarded as the forefather of 
the present-day publishers,130 in other words, content industry advocates. The exploits of the 
Stationers’ Company in the 16th century to monopolize and control the book trade precedes the 
control of access to content, as the content industry stakeholders advocate. In fact, it can be 
argued that the recognition of a proprietary interest in creative works started with the Stationers’ 
Company which had the approval and support of the monarch through the royal charter to 
achieve their business-oriented interest in creative content, then mostly book publishing. As we 
saw, even after the abolition of the monopoly rights of the Stationers’ Company and the 
enactment of the Statute of Anne, the Stationers desperately wanted to revive their monopoly by 
invoking common law rights through litigation. 
Arguably, the origin of the content industry is therefore traceable to the Stationers’ 
Company’s advocacy and activities both before131 and after132 the enactment of the Statute of 
Anne; their aims and those of the modern-day content industry stakeholders remain largely the 
same. The similarities include an incentive-based system (financial reward), creation of artificial 
 
129 Salathiel Masterson, “Copyright: History and Development” (1940) 28 California L. Rev. 620 at 620, 621. Instances of 
compensation to orators were not infrequent and orators were not in the habit of writing for free.   
130 Daniel J. Gervais, “A Canadian Copyright Narrative” (2009)21 I.P.J. 269 at 274. 
131 Lyman Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968) at 28-41 and 43-77. 
132 Ibid. at 143-179. 
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scarcity through controlled access to content, support for strict copyright law and longer terms of 
protection, and the power and influence of such industries.133 
Just like the free culture community, the content industry stakeholders’ approach to 
copyright is largely influenced by their underlying ideology (instrumental approach) and 
understanding of copyright. 
2.7.1 Content Industry Stakeholders and the Instrumental Approach to Copyright  
 The term content industry is rather encompassing and broad. According to Haggart’s 
classification of copyright stakeholders in Canada, the category (Protection Groups134) is made 
up of content industry and creator groups. As noted, multinational corporations dominate the 
content industry with links to the United States and a shared tendency to advocate for stronger 
copyright laws.135 Creator groups, as the name implies, are those who actually create the content, 
and according to Haggart: 
Traditionally, actual creators have served two purposes in the 
copyright debate. On the one hand, creators were used to legitimize 
industry demands for greater copyright protection to copyright 
owners, even though this protection does not necessarily translate 
into money revenues for the artists. On the other hand, creator groups 
have actively lobbied for greater rights in their own work. Industry 
and creator groups have in the past formed temporary coalitions, such 
as the Copyright Coalition of Creators and Producers136 in the run-up 
to the 2005 copyright bill.137  
   
The content industry stakeholders (the powerful multinational corporations) have lobbied 
their cause leveraging their relationship with creators and authors as a means to achieve their aim 
without much benefit going to the authors or creators themselves. This comes as no surprise 
 
133 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 78. 
134 Ibid. at 72. 
135 Ibid. at 73. 
136 Simon Doyle, Prey to Thievery: The Canadian Recording Industry Association and the Canadian Copyright Lobby, 1997 to 
2005, (Master of Journalism, Carleton University, 2006) [unpublished].  
137 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 133 at 168. 
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because these same tactics was employed centuries ago. The content industry stakeholders’ 
subtlety in legitimizing their interests can be traced back to the lobbying tactics used by the 
Stationers’ Company when, after several lobbying efforts failed, they put forward authors’ 
interests to justify their demands.138 Although, according to Haggart, the content industry and 
creators or authors forged a coalition in the past, such an alliance may not always last as their 
interests differ in some areas. For example, while content industry stakeholders favour greater 
copyright and the use of TPMs to restrict access, creators tend to support strong protection for 
performers but not necessarily TPMs.139 In Canada, the preferences of creator groups tend to 
diverge depending on linguistic and geographical interest: 
…Creator groups tend to divide along linguistic and provincial 
groups, with Quebec-based creators and performers forming their 
own associations. Both traditional English-and French-French-
Canadian creator groups, however generally support WIPO 
implementation (because, besides other provisions, the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty contain provisions that enable content creators 
and/or owners use TPMs to restrict access to content) …while 
primarily domestically focused creator groups also maintain loose 
affiliations with foreign and international groups.140 
 
For the purpose of my research, I will focus on the content industry (thinking, in particular, 
of national and multinational corporations); however, individual creators and authors may also 
be referenced if the need arises, at least to show a different perspective of the broad Protection 
Group category. The common interest that content industry and creators/authors share is that 
 
138 I noted in chapter one that “Defoe’s rhetoric, it has been argued, influenced the Stationers change of strategy; quoting Mark 
Rose, Ronan Deazley states “...it was Defoe’s agitation on behalf of authorial rights that provided the London stationers with a 
new strategy for pursuing their own interest, M Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (London, Harvard 
University Press, 1993) at 35. “Cited by Ronan Deazley, The Statute of Anne, On the Origin of the Right to Copy, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2004) at 32. 
139 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 137. 
140 Ibid. “The Alliance of Canadian Cinema, Television and Radio Artists (ACTRA), for example, works internationally through 
the International Federation of Actors, and was deeply involved through the FIA in the negotiations that led to the WPPT” (Garry 
Neil, policy adviser, ACTRA, interview by Haggart, Toronto, 19 May, 2008). 
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both generally approve of the rewards system of copyright, based on their underlying perception 
of copyright. 
The basis of the content industry stakeholders’ copyright approached is rooted in the 
instrumental approach to copyright discussed in the introduction of this dissertation. The crux of 
this approach embraces the proposition that providing an economic incentive through a system of 
intellectual property is crucial to progress without which there would be less motivation to 
create.141 The content industry stakeholders position is that any reduction in the level of 
protection would invariably lead to diminished creativity.142 This explains why the content 
industry stakeholders make financial rewards an integral objective of their approach to copyright. 
The content industries claim that the ultimate aim of their approach to copyright is to serve the 
public interest in the sense that incentivizing creativity leads to more creative works being made 
available to the public143 to inspire follow-on creativity.   
Based on their interest in financial rewards, content industry stakeholders are therefore 
business-minded copyright stakeholders who use various strategies to achieve their business 
goals. It would not be correct to make an absolute claim that all content industry and individual 
creators/authors are business-focused (that is, always expect financial reward), but neither would 
this category of “content industry stakeholders” qualify as free culture advocates. However, there 
is proof that they do exhibit some traits of free culture while the motive for doing so could 
speculatively be expectation of financial rewards. As alluded to in the discussion of free culture 
stakeholders, there is a trend for content industry and creators/authors to use the free culture 
 
141 Deborah Halbert, The State of Copyright, supra note 128 at 12. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Sandra Aistars et al, Copyright Principles, supra note 125. 
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concept presumably for the benefit of their business motives144 among other reasons. Some 
content industry and individual creators have used the CCL (free culture platform) as a business 
model to gain financial rewards. While the dynamics of copyright stakeholders could possibly 
allow for stakeholders who genuinely are partly free culture and partly rewards-inclined, there 
are clearly those who are fully rewards-inclined but use the CCL as a stepping stone to financial 
reward.145 This creates an instrumentalist overlap between free culture stakeholders and content 
industry. It also provides proof that, in the digital era, the categorization of copyright 
stakeholders may not be absolute due to varying and shifting motives, which continues to evolve. 
Perhaps this blurred distinction between the free culture and the content industry stakeholders 
could prove positive in the sense that it could help prevent or reduce extremities on both 
spectrums.  
This analysis shows that despite the content industry’s adherence to the instrumentalist 
approach to copyright, they may, at some point, identify (genuinely or as a means to an end) with 
the intrinsic approach (free culture) to copyright. 
 
2.7.2 Content Industry Perspective on ICT in the Copyright System  
One of the most compelling impacts of ICT in the copyright system is that it enables the 
ubiquity of content through digitization. This can be referred to as the democratization of 
content: making content available to as many people as possible. This trend distorts the existing 
 
144 The Power of Open, Bloomsbury Academic, supra note 111. 
145 This trend raises several issues. First, it may be a demonstration of the misuse of CCL as different from what was originally 
intended by Lessig. Just like Stallman’s free culture idea was/is misunderstood to mean absence of price. Secondly, it could be 
that the promoters of CCL themselves are responsible for this misconception because of the way they have promoted the licences. 
From the publication (supra note 111), showcasing the success of CCL in the form of financial rewards gives the impression that 
it can be used as business model for creators and authors to make money. Third, it may be proof that the proposal I make in this 
dissertation can actually work. That is, in the age of digital technology, copyright stakeholders can use ICT to achieve their 
different interests without much friction. Clearly, free culture advocates are benefitting from CCL as well as rewards-inclined 
users who subscribe to the licences. 
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business model for the content industry146 and consequently can be perceived by it as 
undermining the model. Another reason why the content industry frowns at the impact of ICT on 
the copyright system is that it enables unauthorized sale of illegal copies of works.147 This 
emergence of ICT and its impact on the copyright system has prompted three different 
perspectives or responses from the content industry. 
The first response captures the industry’s embrace of the beneficial aspect of ICT, which is 
exploiting online-based business models to generate revenue. Second, is the usage of a tactic that 
William Patry148 calls moral panic to create propaganda that ICT poses a threat to copyright and 
should be checked. The third response is that the content industry is using technology to restrict 
access to content in a bid to restore their scarcity-based business model through the use of TPMs.  
The first response can be regarded as the primary response of the content industry to ICT, 
which leverages the immense opportunities that ICT offers to make their content ubiquitous, and 
easily accessible to millions of users around the world and increase their revenue generation. 
While digital technology may have contributed to toppling the content industry’s traditional 
business model, paradoxically, the same digital technology provides immense opportunities for 
financial gain. Digital technology provides online-based business models that enable the content 
industry to reach millions of users with low production and distribution costs while generating 
revenue. In the music industry, iTunes and Amazon are selling online music, in the film industry, 
Netflix, Amazon Prime, Microsoft Xbox, HBO Go, Xfinity and Hulu Plus are providing online 
 
146 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 137 at 60; Davies, Public Interest, supra note 121; Halpern, The Digital Threat, supra note 56. 
147 Halpern, The Digital Threat, supra note 55.  
148 See generally William Patry, Moral Panic and the Copyright Wars (Oxford University Press, New York, 2009).  
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video services, and in book publishing, the advent of Apple’s iBooks, Amazon’s Kindle149 are 
examples of business models that digital technology made possible.  
On the one hand, while the emergence of ICT serves as a boost to the content industry’s 
business opportunities, a major challenge it presents is that it also enables unauthorized access to 
and sale of content. Naturally, the content’s industry’s response would be to devise means to 
check illegal downloading, which is justifiable as it poses a threat to their financial interests and 
investment. Unfortunately, this has led to branding ICT as a threat to copyright enforcement. I 
examine a classical example to illustrate this point. As previously discussed, centuries before the 
emergence of digital technology, reprographic and sound recording technologies threatened the 
interest of copyright owners.150 Similarly, and not too far in history, branding technology as a 
threat to the content industry was seen in the 1984 United States case of Sony Corp. v. Universal 
City Studios.151 Sony had developed a technology (videotape recorders) that enabled viewers at 
home to record programs for later viewing (i.e. time-shifting). Universal Studios resisted this 
technology on the ground that recording programs for which it owned copyright amounted to 
copyright infringement. The case was litigated all the way to the Supreme Court. In a bid to stifle 
this technology and prior to the decision of the Supreme Court, Jack Valenti152 on April 12, 
1982, testified before the US Congress on the alleged dangers posed to the motion picture 
industry by the videotape recorders and called it a troubling assault.153   
 
149 Stephen A. Merrill & William J. Raduchel eds., Copyright in the Digital Era: Building Evidence for Policy at online: < 
http://www.nap.edu/download/14686> (Washington DC: National Academies Press: 2013) at 23, 25 and 26 accessed June 26, 
2017. 
150 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 133 at 60. 
151 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios 464 U.S. 416 (1984) at online: < https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/464/417/> 
accessed June 24, 2017. 
152Jack Valenti was a longtime president of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). During his 38-year tenure in the 
MPAA, he created the MPAA film rating system, and he was generally regarded as one of the most influential pro-copyright 
lobbyist in the world. Wikipedia, “Jack Valenti” at online: < https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack_Valenti> accessed June 24, 2017. 
153 William Patry, Moral Panic, supra note 148 at 144. 
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Jack Valenti, with clever rhetoric and the use of moral panic, attempted to influence 
Congress to silence the technology; fortunately, the apex court ruled that the recording of the 
programs did not constitute copyright infringement but fair use.154 The Supreme Court also held 
that the manufacturer of the videotape recorder was not liable for infringement.155 Contrary to 
the fear that the videotape recorder was a threat to the movie industry, the popularity of the 
technology significantly benefited the industry through the sale of pre-recorded movies.156 This 
suggests that the purported claim of labeling digital technology as a bane to the copyright 
industry is somewhat short-sighted. Pamela Samuelson notes that the advocacy to silence 
technology by some publishers is intended to control not only public and commercial use of their 
copyright materials, but also all private uses as well.157 They claim this would better fulfill the 
constitutional purpose of copyright on the basis that the more financial benefit to them, the 
greater their incentive to make works.158 Although Samuelson notes that the Sony Betamax 
thwarted the effort to silence technology,159 it did not entirely extinguish the claim that 
technology poses a threat to the copyright industry.  
There are clearly genuine concerns about unauthorized access to content on the internet but 
a generalization that the internet and ICT threaten the business of copyright corporations may not 
represent an objective analysis of the dynamics of digital technology. I believe such a one-sided 
argument stem from the concern that copyright may no longer have relevance if ICT is not 
checked. Lessig may have alluded to this when he commented that the concern is that cyberspace 
 
154 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, supra note 151. 
155 Ibid.  
156 Wikipedia, “Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios Inc.”, at online: < 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_Corp._of_America_v._Universal_City_Studios,_Inc.> accessed June 24, 2017. 
157 Pamela Samuelson, “The Copyright Grab” online: < 
http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper.html?pg=1&topic=> at 1, accessed June 24, 2017.  
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will become the arena where copyright can be defeated.160 He further buttresses his point by 
asserting that using MP3 technology, for instance, a CD recording can be significantly 
compressed and in seconds emailed to one hundred friends worldwide.161  
 It is important to acknowledge as well that technological applications come with 
inevitable concerns relating to new modes of infringement.162 It is undeniable that ICT and the 
internet have been used to perpetrate illegal activities. On this point, Peter Yu, quotes excerpts 
from a report published by MarkMonitor (a company that specializes in helping companies 
protect their brand online) in January 2011, which states that: 
...traffic to sites suspected of offering pirated digital content 
or counterfeit goods amounted to more than 146 million 
visits per day and 53 billion visits per year. According to the 
report, the top-three websites classified as “digital piracy”- 
rapidshare.com, megavideo.com, and megaupload.com- 
collectively generate more than 21 billion visits per year.163 
 
The statistics presented here appears quite alarming and raises cause for concern from the 
perspective of copyright owners. However, while not asserting that the statistics could be false, 
the possibility of bias in the reporting could exist and some comments on it is necessary. My 
examination of the reporting is to consider the objectivity of the reporting since some of 
MarkMonitor’s clients are members of the content industry. Firstly, MarkMonitor is a corporate 
organization and one of its service offerings to corporate organizations and owners of copyright 
works is to police their copyright protected content online and identify illegal downloading.164 
Their reporting on file sharing could be geared towards corporate interest. Secondly, the figures 
they quoted refer only to visits and is not disaggregated into actual downloads or quantified in 
 
160 Lawrence Lessig, Code and other laws of cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999) at 49. 
161 Ibid.  
162 Mtima & Jamar, Copyright Social Justice, supra note 70 at 79.  
163 Peter K. Yu, “Trade Agreement Cats and the Digital Technology Mouse” in Bryan Mercurio & Ni Kuei-Jung, eds. Science 
And Technology In International Economic Law: Balancing Competing Interests (New York: Routledge, 2014) at 7.” 
164 MarkMonitor, Better Brand Protection, at online: < https://www.markmonitor.com/ > accessed February 20, 2018.   
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terms of revenue losses to copyright owners. While there are genuine cases of copyright 
infringement, caution must be applied in the interpretation of the data. On this subject of using 
technology to perpetrate infringement, Lateef Mtima and Steven Jamar rightly noted that such 
concerns are legitimate but must be evaluated from a broader perspective165 to avoid 
exaggerating the issue.   
The issue of unauthorized use of copyright content is a sensitive issue in the copyright 
system generating divergent viewpoints, as we have seen. Caution must be taken to properly 
contextualize the issue and not to brand every internet user as a potential copyright infringer and 
so to discount the benefits that ICT brings. Copyright owners claim that unauthorized access to 
creative works dampens their motivation and incentive to create more works and leads to loss of 
revenue. This claim has been challenged by a 2010 survey on File-Sharing and Copyright, which 
reports that: 
As our survey indicates, the empirical evidence on the sales 
displacement is mixed. While some studies find evidence of a 
substitution effect, other findings, in particular, the papers using 
actual file-sharing data, suggest that piracy and music sales are 
largely unrelated. In contrast, there is clear evidence that income 
from complements has risen over the years. For example, concert 
sales have increased more than music sales have fallen...Looking 
at the aggregate output - the number of recordings, books, and 
movies produced every year - we see no evidence that file sharing 
has discouraged the production of artistic works. However, as with 
income from complementary goods, aggregate statistics needs to 
be interpreted with some care. For example, digital formats not 
only encouraged file sharing; digital technology also lowered cost 
of producing movies and music and they allowed artists to reach 
 
165 Mtima & Jamar, Copyright Social Justice, supra note 162. The authors argue that there is a social justice (access to 
information and knowledge by the public) value in digitizing textual works. They argue that the Google Books Library Project is 
a means to foster this objective. Wikipedia, “The Google Books Library Project” at online: 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Books_Library_Project explain google book project > Accessed March 22, 2016. “The 
Google Books Library Project is an effort by Google to scan and make searchable the collections of several major research 
libraries. The project, along with Google's Partner Program, comprise Google Books (formerly Google Book Search). Along with 
bibliographic information, snippets of text from a book are often viewable. If a book is out of copyright and in the public domain, 
the book is fully available to read or to download.”  
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their audience in novel ways...As this essay has made clear, we do 
not yet have a full understanding of the mechanisms by which file 
sharing may have altered the incentives to produce entertainment. 
However, in the industry with the largest impact - music - 
consumer access to recordings has vastly improved since the 
advent of file sharing. Since 2000, the number of recordings 
produced has more than doubled. In our view, this makes it 
difficult to argue that weaker copyright protection has had a 
negative impact on artists’ incentives to be creative.166    
 
    The findings presented by Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Koleman Strumpf show that the 
effect of file sharing on revenue is mixed,167 which I interpret to mean that the results are 
inconclusive. They further state that music piracy can explain as much as one-fifth of the recent 
decline industry sales;168 but this decline in sales has been judged to be insufficient to weaken 
authors’ incentive to create new works.169 
While the findings of the survey seem to present empirical evidence and do not speculate 
or exaggerate any point, neither do they make any absolute claim; careful scrutiny must therefore 
be applied before arriving at a conclusion based on empirical evidence. The recent case of Re 
exp. British Academy of Songwriters, Composers, and Authors v. Secretary of State for Business, 
Innovation And Skills170 is instructive; in this case, the court held that Secretary of State’s 
reliance on empirical evidence to arrive at a decision cannot be justified because the evidence 
was inadequate/manifestly inadequate. 
 
166 Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, “File-Sharing and Copyright” in Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., in Innovation 
Policy and the Economy online: < http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11764.pdf> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010) at 
49-50.  
167 Ibid. at 21. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid. 
170 [2015] EWHC 1723 at 83 para. 232. The case was an application for judicial review of the decision of the Secretary of State 
which sought to introduce a new section (“Section 28B”) into the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (“CDPA 1988”) 
which has the effect of creating an exception to copyright based upon personal private use. Henceforward, any person who 
legitimately acquires content (music, film, books) can copy that work for his or her own private use without infringing copyright. 
It can be copied onto other formats or stored in the cloud provided it is for private, non-commercial use. It can now be 
reproduced without even the theoretical risk of that person being pursued as an infringer of copyright. That purchaser cannot, 
however, under the exception, copy that content and give it to a family member, friend or colleague and cannot copy it for any 
commercial use. 
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 The conception that ICT is a threat to the copyright system or the content industry 
stakeholders raises genuine issues, which I have highlighted. At the same time, this claim often 
arises from a skewed understanding of the purpose of enacting copyright law itself. Digital 
technology is not simply perceived as a threat to the copyright because it allegedly leads to loss 
of revenue, but more because it challenges the content industry’s position on copyright, which is 
based on the propertization ideology and economic rationalization of the purpose of copyright 
law.171  
One of the consequences of the perceived threat of ICT to copyright enforcement is the use 
of TPMs by the content industries.  (My treatment of TPMs here will be succinct, more details 
will be provided in chapter five.) TPMs mean any encryption system designed to prevent 
unauthorized access to digital content. The content industry, aware of the ease with which ICT 
enables access to and copying (both legal and illegal) of cultural works, responded by using 
technology itself to restrict access to content. This perspective of the content industry’s response 
to ICT in copyright has generated much debate in Canadian copyright law reform, as in other 
jurisdictions such as the United States. A major criticism against the use of TPMs is that they 
tend to undermine users’ right to access creative works for fair use172 by not distinguishing 
between the right to fair use and unauthorized use or sale of illegal copies of creative content. 
The validity of this criticism would rest on whether it is technologically and practically possible 
for TPMs to distinguish copying for private use from illegal copying for commercial sale. 
Additionally, it is important to consider the justification to access TPM-protected works since 
there is, as I have previously emphasized, no exclusive right to access in copyright law. We will 
 
171 See generally my discussion on the purpose of copyright law in chapter one. 
172 Copyright Act, 1985, R.S.C., c. C-42 s.29 (1) & (2). In Canada, it is called fair dealing. 
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return to these issues in Chapter Five when I examine the use of TPMs from the perspective of 
both the content industries and its critics.  
The discourse on the impact of ICT on the copyright system should be assessed 
dispassionately. There is the tendency for copyright stakeholders to express a one-sided view to 
fulfill their interests. For example, free culture advocates, while strongly emphasizing the need 
for free sharing of content, may not adequately acknowledge the fact that content industry 
stakeholders also have a legitimate claim of entitlement to rewards. Similarly, the exploitation of 
copyrighted works by the content industry stakeholders ought to be sensitive to copyright 
exceptions. In my view, if this trend continues, the controversy amongst copyright stakeholders 
will remain a vicious circle with no sign of abating. 
 
2.8 Conclusion  
In this second chapter, I have attempted to examine ICT in the copyright system and 
through the lens of copyright stakeholders. ICT and has become a highly contentious issue in 
the copyright landscape in Canada and other jurisdictions. I examined the early evolution of 
technology to its present digital and ever-evolving state. With the advent of digital technology 
and the internet came unprecedented feat of expressing content in digitized form. This gave 
individuals enormous ability to create, edit, access and distribute creative content across the 
world. 
On the one hand, while digital technology and the internet are hailed as tremendous 
opportunities for creativity to thrive, its effect on the business model for reward-seeking 
copyright businesses appeared to be unwelcome. By making content readily available to users, 
ICT challenged the scarcity-based business model of business entities that provided content for 
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a fee. This impact of ICT in the creative industry has been a source of unsettled debates among 
copyright stakeholders. To properly situate the ICT-copyright discourse, I broadly discussed 
stakeholders in the copyright industry; then, for the purpose of my research, I narrow my 
analysis of stakeholders to free culture and content industry stakeholders. I connect the 
stakeholders’ interest in copyright to their underlying justification and approach to copyright. 
Here, I show the intersection between my discussions in the theoretical framework section of 
this dissertation and the stakeholders’ interest and the reason for their different inclinations and 
perspectives on copyright. The desire for both the free culture and the content industry 
stakeholders to achieve their interests in a copyright system influenced by digital technology 
seemingly creates a problem as their interests tend to differ. 
From my analysis above, it would help if both free culture and content industry would 
embrace ICT as bringing both opportunities and challenges instead of simply as a challenge or 
threat to their interests. Digital technology and the internet have brought challenges to both the 
free culture and the content industry; it has also created immense opportunities to optimize their 
legitimate interests. It is debatable to evaluate who suffers more ICT-driven challenges between 
the free culture and the content industry stakeholders; what could be helpful is for copyright 
stakeholders to adapt to the use of ICT in a non-competitive manner to achieve their goals in the 
copyright system. Frankly, both free culture and content industry stakeholders do explore 
opportunities in ICT as a means to achieve their goals and interests; however, the influence of 
technology created a paradigm shift in the traditional copyright business model. The ease of 
access to and dissemination of content in the digital space has significantly weakened content 
industry’s market structure. The creation of scarcity is seriously compromised, and the content 
industries argue that this is a negative trend as it discourages further creativity and leads to loss 
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of revenue. As the free culture community, aided by ICT, grows strong in empowering users to 
access content, the content industries perhaps see this as a threat and apply all their resources to 
control this trend – this becomes a source of friction for both stakeholders. However, this 
reveals that ICT can play a role in regulating the activities in the copyright system besides 
copyright law. In fact, copyright law is fast becoming inadequate in the regulation of copyright 
in the digital context. Consequently, one of the suggestions I make in chapter six is to 
accommodate regulatory pluralism, that is to allow the private ordering and multistakeholder 
initiatives to drive activities in the copyright system.  
The issues discussed in this chapter show how the emergence of digital technology creates 
new opportunities for both the content industry and the free culture stakeholders in the copyright 
but not without their attendant challenges. These analyses are fundamental for what follows in 
the next chapter (chapter three) in which I examine the impact of ICT on copyright law reform 
both globally and, specifically, in Canada. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
CANADA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WIPO INTERNET TREATIES 
 
 
Chapter three examines Canada’s copyright law reform in the ICT era. The specific focus is the 
copyright law reforms orchestrated by the WIPO Internet Treaties, which sought to set the legal 
framework to address the challenges and opportunities for copyright in the digital landscape. 
This chapter has two parts. Part I explores the genesis and development of the WIPO Internet 
Treaties, what interest(s) it sought to serve and the intriguing debates surrounding its provisions, 
especially the controversial TPM and anti-circumvention provisions and their implementation 
approach. Part II analyzes Canada’s various failed attempts to implement the WIPO Internet 
Treaties until it finally passed the Copyright Modernization Act (CMA) of 2012. An examination 
of the reforms made by the CMA aims to ascertain whether it creates the much needed balance in 
the copyright system. I further analyze whether the CMA reforms favour the content industry or 
the free culture community or both; and how well they prioritize the purposes of copyright, the 
public interest and balance within the copyright system.   
 
PART I 
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WIPO INTERNET TREATIES 
 
3.0 Background to The WIPO Internet Treaties 
The WIPO Copyright Treat (WCT)1 and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
(WPPT)2 generally referred to as WIPO Internet Treaties (hereinafter “WITs”) were adopted in 
 
1 World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Copyright Treaty, December 20, 1996, at online: < 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=295157 > Accessed May 25, 2018. The WCT entered into force on 
March 6, 2002. [WCT]. 
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Geneva on December 20, 1996. Ideally, since WIPO membership consists of member states, it is 
expected that input from these countries would be required in the drafting of treaties such as the 
WITs that have the potential to shape the international regulation of copyright. Although several 
countries made contributions to the process, the United States’ input dominated and largely 
shaped the contents of the WITs. Background activities by the United States government 
revealed its scheme to push its national copyright agenda at the international level, which later 
manifested in the WITs and served as the basis for the enactment of Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998 in the United States. The United States’ influence in the WITs is 
relevant to my research, first, because it ties into subsequent analysis of the United States’ 
influence over Canada’s implementation of the WITs. Additionally, internally in the United 
States, there were conflict of interests between the content industry and the free culture 
stakeholders; the free culture stakeholders opposed the content industry’s approach to copyright 
reform in the ICT era.  
Besides the United States being at the vanguard of championing the reform of copyright 
in the digital milieu in the early 1990s, WIPO was similarly motivated. According to Mihaly 
Ficsor, by the time the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights3 (TRIPS) 
Agreement was signed in 1994, the internet had already begun disrupting activities in the 
traditional copyright setting.4 Ficsor further notes that: 
The international copyright community was unable to celebrate the 
TRIPS Agreement and sit idle for a long period of time. The 
 
2 World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, December 20, 1996 at online:  
< http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=295477 > Accessed May 25, 2018. The WPPT entered into force on 
March 6, 2002 [WPPT]. 
3 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Singed Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C. TRIPS is an international agreement between member nations of the World Trade 
Organization. It stipulates the minimum standard and framework for the regulation of intellectual property by member nations. 
4 Mihaly Ficsor, “The WIPO “Internet Treaties:” The United States as the Driver: The United States as the Main Source of 
Obstruction – As seen by Anti-Revolutionary Central European” (2006) 17 Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop.L.16 at 19 at online: < 
https://repository.jmls.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1113&context=ripl > accessed May 25, 2018.  
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phenomena of digital technology and the Internet raised important 
new questions that required urgent responses. It was impossible to 
reopen the TRIPS negotiations to address these new questions raised 
by digital technology and the Internet.5 
 
WIPO had made attempts to deal with the issues raised by the new technologies with 
regards to copyright by establishing two committees charged with the responsibility of dealing 
with copyright and rights of performers and producers of phonograms.6 However, according to 
Ficsor, these committees could not make much progress for several years as it was thought their 
work may interfere with TRIPS negotiations,7 which was ongoing at that time. After the adoption 
of TRIPS, the WIPO committees accelerated their assignment.8 
It was obvious that despite TRIPS, a vacuum was opening up in the area of copyright due 
to the emergence of digital technology and the internet. WIPO’s foresight in establishing a 
regulatory framework for copyright in the digital landscape is evinced in the committee of 
experts it set up to address the issue. The committees of experts were set up as early as 1985; in 
fact, Ficsor reports that in February 1985, WIPO and UNESCO organized a joint meeting with 
the Group of Experts on the Copyright Aspects of the Protection of Computer Software.9 The 
background work initiated by WIPO in preparation for what later became the WITs was at best 
rudimentary; the contributions of the United States according to Blayne Haggart, were therefore 
able to shape, but not determine completely, the negotiations’ outcome.10   
3.1 The United States and Pre-WIPO Internet Treaties  
 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ficsor, The WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 4. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. at 17, footnote 8.  
10 Blayne Haggart, Copyfight: the global politics of digital copyright reform (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) at 93 
[Haggart, Copyfight]. 
 160 
The activities and interests of the United States in copyright regulation were largely 
domestic in the sense that as at that time, its copyright industry did not expand internationally but 
mainly operated within the United States. However this changed when the United States joined 
the global copyright community by acceding to the Berne Convention11 in 1988 and it entered 
into force in the United States on March 1, 1989;12 the United States went from being isolated to 
an international influencer in copyright.13 The United States’ involvement in facilitating the 
creation of international norms to regulate activities in the face of ICT originally started out as a 
move to create a national legislation in the United States. In 1993, the Bill Clinton-led United 
States government created the Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF) with the core 
mandate of regulating the “Information Superhighway.”14 Additionally, the IITF included a 
Working Group on intellectual property and it had the responsibility of formulating copyright 
policy in the digital landscape in the United States.15 The Working Group was chaired by Bruce 
Lehman16 and in July 1994 the IITF published a Green Paper,17 which was supposed to focus on 
industrial property rights;18 but of the 141 page Green Paper, only twelve covered patents, 
 
11 Berne Convention for the Protection for Literary and Artistic Works was adopted in 1886. According to WIPO the Berne 
Convention “provides creators such as authors, musicians, poets, painters etc. with the means to control how their works are used, 
by whom, and on what terms. It is based on three basic principles and contains a series of provisions determining the minimum 
protection to be granted, as well as special provisions available to developing countries that want to make use of them” at online: 
< https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/ > accessed April 22, 2019. 
12 Supra note 7 at 18. 
13 Ibid. at 16. 
14 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 10 at 110. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. Haggart reports that at that time, Bruce Lehman was the undersecretary of commerce for intellectual property, director of 
the Patent and Trademark Office, and a former representative of the computer software industry on copyright issues. He was also 
the main US representative to WIPO. A forceful personality described by one of Haggart’s interviewee as a “pretty tyrant,” he 
also knew more copyright than anyone else in government. Haggart’s short but telling description of Bruce Lehman’s 
background seems to suggest that it would not be wrong to call him a copyright maximalist and content industry supporter. The 
relevance of pointing this out is that his ideology and approach to copyright would influence his copyright policy ideas.  
17 Bruce Lehman, “Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure – Preliminary Draft of the Working Group 
on Intellectual Property Rights”(1994) at online: < http://cool.conservation-us.org/bytopic/intprop/ipwg/ > accessed May 29, 
2018. 
18Ficsor, The WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 7 at 21.  
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trademarks and trade secrets.19 The rest of the pages were devoted impact of digital technology 
on copyright and the possibility of using technological measures and rights management 
information to protect copyright owners’ interests in the digital landscape.20  
As early as 1993, the Green Paper, being the first strategy document produced by the 
Working Group under the auspices of Lehman, already articulated the idea of introducing 
restriction of access to and use of digitized content. Specifically, the Green Paper stated that 
unauthorized access to copyrighted works can be denied through technologically restricting 
access to the source of the work and by limiting the manipulation of the electronic file 
embodying the work.21The Green Paper further elucidated on specific ways to restrict access to 
and use of digital content thus:  
[…] control over protected works can be exerted through control 
measures tied to the electronic file containing the work. One type 
of restriction can be implemented through "rendering" or "viewing" 
software. Such systems require (1) a proprietary or unique file 
format that can only be read by certain software and that is 
developed or controlled by the information provider and (2) 
software that incorporates both a "control" measure to prevent 
viewing or use of a work without authorization from the 
information provider and "manipulation" functions to permit the 
user to view or use the work. Rendering or viewing software can be 
written to deny access if the user enters unauthorized identification 
or an improper password […] Another type of restriction is 
encryption. In its most basic form, encryption amounts to a 
"scrambling" of data using mathematical principles that can be 
followed in reverse to "unscramble" the data. Encryption 
technologies can be used to deny access to the work in a usable 
form. File encryption simply converts a file from a manipulatable 
file format (e.g., a word processor document or a picture file that 
can be opened or viewed by appropriate general purpose software 
packages) to a scrambled format. Authorization in the form of 
 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Lehnam, Intellectual Property, supra note 17 at < http://cool.conservation-us.org/bytopic/intprop/ipwg/tech.html#id4a > 
accessed September 3, 2019. 
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possession of an appropriate password or "key" is required to 
"decrypt" the file and restore it to its manipulatable format.22 
 
 It is important to emphasize here that the original intent for the proposals above was to 
form the basis for copyright policy formulation23in the United States with the hope that it would 
eventually metamorphose into legislation to address the challenges posed by digital technology 
in the copyright sector. The wording of the quote above as contained in the Green Paper could 
arguably be regarded as more content industry-friendly: the priority is clearly the protection of 
owners’ content from users in the digital environment. This comes as no surprise since Lehman 
and his team24 shared the content industry ideology. 
According to Ficsor, following the publication of the Green Paper, the Working Group 
conducted hearings and received testimonies and written proposals by interested organizations 
and were taken into account in the publication of a White Paper,25 a sequel to the Green Paper 
published in September 1995.26Ficsor notes that:27 
The White Paper followed the same structure as the Green Paper. 
However, at the end, it did not present "preliminary findings and 
recommendations," as in the Green Paper. Instead, it presented 
concrete, final recommendations and appendices with the text of 
the proposed legislation, and with a statutory mark-up of the 
suggested modifications. In the draft provisions, several elements 
appeared, which would later become part of the two WIPO Treaties 
and then the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
("DMCA"). 
 
 
22 Ibid. 
23 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 14. 
24 Ibid. at 110-11, According to Haggart, “Lehman made copyright a primary concern of the PTO, building up its staff of 
copyright lawyers. Keith Kupferschmid, senior vice-president for intellectual property policy and enforcement at the Software 
and Information Industry Association, who worked with Lehman at the PTO and helped negotiate the WIPO Internet treaties…” 
25 Bruce Lehman, “Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure – The Report of the Working Group on 
Intellectual Property Rights” (1995) at online: < https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015040596903;view=1up;seq=10 >  
accessed May 29, 2018. 
26 Mihaly Ficsor, The WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 7 at 21.  
27 Ibid. 
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Ficsor presents the contents of the Working Group’s Green and White Papers as 
generally acceptable and supported by interested organizations that made written and oral 
submissions to the Green Paper leading to the White Paper. In his analysis, Ficsor did not 
specifically mention the names of the interest groups that supported the proposal, but it is likely 
they were pro-content industry stakeholders. This is not surprising, as Ficsor himself seems to 
subscribe to a maximalist approach to copyright. Ficsor was the WIPO representative who served 
as the secretary to the Diplomatic Conference in the WIT negotiation and was a supporter of 
inflexible implementation, subscribing to the view that the treaty must prohibit circumvention of 
access controls generally, and must extend to trafficking in devices.28 This suggests that right 
from the early stages, the WITs enjoyed the support of the content industry lobbyists.  
There were, of course, opposing views on the Green and White Papers developed by the 
Working Group, which may be helpful for us to consider.  
In her critique of the White Paper published by the Working Group, Pamela Samuelson, 
for example, expressed strong criticisms against it and the legislation it proposed.29 Samuelson’s 
argument revealed the potential harm that would be done if the contents of the White Paper were 
to be enacted into law; she noted that traditional user rights and freedoms to browse, share, or 
make non-commercial copies of copyrighted works would be denied.30 Furthermore, she argued 
that online service providers would be coerced to monitor users’ activities online to identify 
unauthorized access to digital content.31 This could potentially lead to invasion of users’ privacy 
 
28 Michael Geist, “The Case for Flexibility in Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties: An Examination of the Anti-
Circumvention Requirements” in Michael Geist, ed. From “Radical Extremism” to “Balanced Copyright”, Canadian Copyright 
and the Digital Agenda (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at 212. 
29 Pamela Samuelson, “The Copyright Grab” at online: < 
http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper.html?pg=1&topic=> at 1, accessed May 30, 2018 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid.  
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online. Samuelson insisted that the rationale behind the proposed reform of copyright law in the 
digital era was politically motivated: 
Why would the Clinton administration want to transform the 
emerging information superhighway into a publisher-dominated toll 
road? The most plausible explanation is a simple one: campaign 
contributions. The administration wants to please the copyright 
industry, especially members of the Hollywood community, who are 
vital to the president's re-election bid. And what this copyright 
industry wants in return is more legal control than ever before over 
the products they distribute.32 
 
Samuelson’s argument clearly portrays Lehman as favouring a maximalist-oriented 
agenda33 in the reform of copyright at that time, which she regarded as favouring the content 
industry over users and the public.  Jessica Litman echoes many of the same views as Samuelson 
regarding the dangers and consequences of the proposed legislation to regulate the activities of 
copyright in the face of advancement in ICT. She opined: 
Most of the current proposals for interpreting or amending copyright 
law to apply to digital technology have come from copyright holders 
or their defenders. They appear to contemplate that the law will 
henceforth govern all activities of anyone who uses digital media in 
any capacity. The suggested application of copyright law to digital 
media potentially affects, indeed prohibits, most common everyday 
ways one can use a computer or other digital device to read, view, 
hear or otherwise experience copyrighted works.34  
  
The views of Samuelson and Litman suggest that the Lehman’s Working Group proposal 
intended to establish a strong regulatory regime in copyright that would potentially have made 
every noninfringing and non-commercial access to and use of digital content an infringement. It 
is clear that the proposed reform was content industry-driven with little or no consideration for 
the user community and the public interest. This shows the extent to which, at that time, ICT was 
 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. at 2. 
34 Jessica Litman, “Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age” (1996) 75 Or. L. Rev. 19 at 24. 
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perceived as a threat to copyright holders’ interests; and that users’ right to access and use 
content was perceived as less significant. On this score, Haggart rightly notes that that Lehman’s 
idea of copyright law reform in the ICT age was heavily biased toward the content industries.35 
He further reports that: 
Lehman’s working group was extensively criticized for being too favourable 
to the content industries. His senior staff, which included former copyright 
lobbyists for the computer and music and recording industries, controlled the 
process, maintaining extensive informal communications with private-sector 
copyright lobbyists.36 The working group’s membership, which came from 
across the government and the executive branch, complained that they were 
effectively shut out of the process: “All decisions were made and all 
documents drafted by the commissioner and his senior staff without any 
consultation.37 The 1995 paper reflected these biases. Despite some 
conciliatory language, it betrays an overwhelming emphasis on protecting the 
rights of copyright owners and reflected a vision of creative “works” as 
tradable products. Users’ rights were treated as residual. It proposed that 
copyright owners be “given control over every use of copyrighted works in 
digital form by interpreting existing law as being violated whenever users 
make even temporary reproductions of works in the random access memories 
of their computers,” and that online service providers become “copyright 
police,” enforcing copyright law.38 
   
 While the consideration of the views for and against the Lehman’s proposals may simply 
be interpreted to mean differences in opinion on the face of it, it is much more than that. It 
encapsulates the bigger picture, representing different approaches and ideologies imbibed by 
different copyright stakeholders as they navigated the copyright space, which was at that time 
experiencing a paradigm shift precipitated by ICT. Lehman and his supporters represent one 
particular vision of copyright, which undoubtedly mirrors a system based on commercial gain for 
owners; additionally, this approach thrives under the power of control over content and strict 
enforcement – characteristics which were replete in the Working Group’s copyright reform 
 
35 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 14 at 111. 
36 Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright, (New York: Prometheus Books, 2001) at 90.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 35 at 111-12. 
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proposal. Ficsor, by his viewpoints, can be seen to support this approach. The desire to protect 
control over content and to sustain monopolies in the copyright industry, as manifested by 
Lehman in the 1990s, can be said to have emanated from the Stationers’ Company bloodline and 
remains active to date. 
Samuelson, Litman and others who expressed similar views represent the broader public 
interest and free culture community, and this user-centric advocacy has helped to neutralize and 
push back on some of the copyright proposal that sideline the place of the user and their basic 
right to access and use content. This sort of opposition was manifested in the United States when 
the proposed bill to reform copyright law – the National Information Infrastructure Copyright 
Protection Act of 1995 was introduced in Congress in December 1995.39 The introduction of this 
bill was the ultimate aim of the Lehman-led working group but it met with stiff opposition by 
those who were sidelined, as well as their representatives.40 According to Haggart, those who 
had been excluded from the process such as “library groups, online service providers, consumer 
organizations, computer hardware manufacturers, Internet civil liberties group, telephone 
companies, educators, consumer electronics manufacturers, and law professors mounted a fierce 
opposition to the bill.”41 Consequently, the bill did not survive beyond the House Judiciary 
Committee.42 The opposition took shape under the aegis of Digital Future Coalition (DFC), 
which was convened by Professor Peter Jaszi.43 
Though the proposed bill was halted by the efforts of the DFC, another strategy was 
developed by Lehman to achieve the mandate given to the working group by the Clinton 
 
39 Ibid. at 112. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Litman, Digital Copyright, supra note 36 at 122; Pamela Samuelson, The US Digital Agenda at WIPO” (1996) 37 Va. J. Int’l L 
369 at online: < https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1881&context=facpubs> accessed April 29, 
2019. 
43 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 38. 
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administration. Originally, the plan was to pass the legislation in the United States, which would 
then serve as a basis for negotiation at the WIPO Committee of Experts’ meeting in February or 
May 1996;44 however, faced with domestic opposition, Lehman dealt with the problem in 
reverse.45 Referring to how Lehman overcame opposition to the bill, Haggart explains: 
As head also of the US delegation to the WIPO Committee of Experts 
charged with creating the draft treaties, he did not shift the US 
negotiating position on the WIPO treaties. Bruce Lehman went to 
Geneva and got [his digital agenda] included in the treaty there and 
then he came back and said, Oh, we need to implement the treaty.46 
 
 This explains why the United States was at the vanguard of the WITs negotiation and 
contributed significantly to the content of the treaties; it was obvious that the United States was 
driven by both national and international interest. National interests, that is, in the sense that it 
needed an international treaty47 obligation to make it easier to implement its digital copyright 
policy at home, while the international agenda was to influence other countries (as it did Canada, 
discuss below) to provide the same legal framework for the protection of digital content. This 
therefore made the United States intensify its effort at the international level during the WITs 
negotiations.  
 
3.2 WIPO’s Motivation as an Institution for The Internet Treaties  
 It could have easily been taken for granted that WIPO’s motivation to initiate the 
negotiations for the WITs was born simply as a result of its role of providing international 
leadership and regulatory framework in intellectual property. While this is rightly so, the 
underlying motivation was perhaps WIPO’s bid to stay relevant as an institution in the scheme of 
 
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid. at 114. 
46 Jonathan Band, intellectual property lawyer, interviewed by Haggart, digital recording on June 20, 2008. 
47 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 44.  
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international intellectual property regulation.48 As the longstanding international regulatory 
institution for intellectual property, WIPO was at the risk of being sidelined following the 
negotiation of TRIPS agreement under the auspices of World Trade Organization (WTO).49  
WIPO did not lead on intellectual property issues on TRIPS but was relegated to providing 
technical support to WTO;50 therefore, WIPO’s successful negotiation of the WITs would 
amplify its position, reinstating it as the cardinal organization in charge of intellectual property. 
Furthermore, it would be a plus for WIPO to negotiate the WITs successfully because the TRIPS 
agreement had a lacuna – it did not address internet-related issues partly because, at the time of 
its negotiation the internet and digital technology was yet to create such phenomenal change.51  
 The above is relevant not just for information, but because it may have played a role in 
the speed with which the WITs were negotiated and adopted. So, with a United States hoping to 
use the WITs to lobby for a national legislation and a WIPO seeking to prove and maintain its 
relevance in international intellectual property scene, both parties had different but non-
conflicting motives to work together and accelerate the WITs negotiation process. 
 
3.3 WIPO’s Objective for Initiating the Internet Treaties 
Besides these underlying motives for WIPO’s interest in initiating talks for international 
treaties relating to technological developments, the projected objective articulated for initiating 
the discussions on the proposed treaties can be found in the preamble to the treaties: 
 
48 Ibid. at 115. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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Desiring to develop and maintain the protection of the rights of 
authors in their literary and artistic works in a manner as effective and 
uniform as possible, 
Recognizing the need to introduce new international rules and clarify 
the interpretation of certain existing rules in order to provide adequate 
solutions to the questions raised by new economic, social, cultural and 
technological developments, 
Recognizing the profound impact of the development and 
convergence of information and communication technologies on the 
creation and use of literary and artistic works, 
Emphasizing the outstanding significance of copyright protection as 
an incentive for literary and artistic creation, 
Recognizing the need to maintain a balance between the rights of 
authors and the larger public interest, particularly education, research 
and access to information, as reflected in the Berne Convention,52 
Similarly, the preamble to the WPPT states: 
Desiring to develop and maintain the protection of the rights of 
performers and producers of phonograms in a manner as effective and 
uniform as possible, 
Recognizing the need to introduce new international rules in order to 
provide adequate solutions to the questions raised by economic, 
social, cultural and technological developments, 
Recognizing the profound impact of the development and 
convergence of information and communication technologies on the 
production and use of performances and phonograms, 
Recognizing the need to maintain a balance between the rights of 
performers and producers of phonograms and the larger public 
interest, particularly education, research and access to information.53 
The above objectives summarize the ostensible rationale for the introduction of the WITs. 
However, amongst the objectives stated, the issue of addressing the impact of ICT on copyright 
 
52 WIPO, WCT, supra note 1 at 1-2. 
53 WIPO, WPPT, supra note 2 at 2. 
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proved to be the most controversial. Additionally, as Haggart notes, for the first time the term 
“balance”54 was articulated in the preambles to an intellectual property treaty – a welcome and 
laudable development. However, how well the concept of “balance” and “public interest” 
impacts the copyright system through implementation in national legislation is a different issue 
entirely, as we will see in the case of Canada’s implementation.  
 
3.4 WIPO Preparatory Meetings 
As noted,55 WIPO had already started brainstorming how to provide international 
leadership in the regulation of copyright in the face of advancement in ICT. Digital technology 
and the internet were already signaling that they could potentially disrupt the status quo in the 
copyright industry as cultural works became more digitized. Although these activities were 
preparatory, they can be said to mark the beginning of the debates and policy-thinking around 
these issues.   
Prior to the Diplomatic Conference in December 1996, several preparatory meetings took 
place. Geist documents the deliberations of these meeting in what he calls “The WIPO Internet 
Treaty Legislative History;”56 according to Geist, meaningful debates on the inclusion of TPM-
related provisions started in the fourth session of the Committee of Experts in December 1994.57 
In this meeting, the United States delegation stated that, given how easy it was to copy digitized 
content, it was necessary to devise technological means to protect digitized content as well as 
outlaw any attempt to circumvent any such technological means of protection.58 Geist reports 
that some representatives of non-governmental organizations present at the meeting as 
 
54 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 47 at 117. 
55 Ficsor, The WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 4. 
56 Geist, Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 28 at 212. 
57 Ibid. at 213. 
58 Ibid. 
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“observers” were of the opinion that it would be necessary to impose limits and exceptions on 
the new norm to in order to guarantee freedom for use.59 The observers did not fight against the 
implementation of the proposed TPMs as well as their legal protection, which is an indication 
that they did acknowledge the genuine concern copyright owners had about unauthorized use. 
However, pursuant to achieving balance, the observers apparently expressed concern over how it 
would be implemented and its impact on users’ rights to legitimate use. The matter was not 
resolved conclusively, but the summary prefigured the final outcome – to declare circumvention 
unlawful and then leave it at the discretion of each Contracting party to determine its 
implementation approach.60 
The fifth session took place in September 1995 and discussions on the TPMs and 
proposed anti-circumvention provisions continued. The United States insisted that it was 
imperative to have a proposed schedule in readiness for the full Diplomatic Conference in the 
second half of 1996.61 The proposition to recognize the use of TPMs under copyright law as well 
as provide legal protection to prevent its circumvention seemed too overreaching and did not sit 
well with other representatives. On the United States strong proposal, Geist reports that:  
Other delegations expressed some reservation about the issue. For 
example, the Korean delegation emphasized that it only supported 
the protection of TPMs “provided that such measure did not 
prevent normal exploitation of the protected subject-matter.”62 The 
European Commission delegation pointed to Article 7(1) (c) of its 
computer programs directive as a model. This provision applied to 
distribution or possession of for commercial purposes, and only 
where the device had the sole intended purpose of facilitating the 
unauthorized removal or circumvention of a TPM protecting a 
computer program.63 Moreover, non-governmental organizations 
 
59 ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid.  
62 WIPO, Report of the Fifth Session of the Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention (Geneva, 4 to 
8 and 12 September 1995 “cited in Geist, Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 56 at 214. 
63 Ibid.  
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had their own concerns, with Japan Electronic Industry 
Development Association stressing the importance of protecting 
exceptions for fair use and “safeguards for innocent infringers.64  
 
At this stage, then, there was clearly an indication of the potential harm that TPMs and anti-
circumvention provision could do to users’ rights. 
At the sixth session, which took place in February 1996, written proposals were presented 
by the United States, Argentina and Brazil;65 the United States proposal targeted trafficking in 
circumvention devices or the provision of such services but not the act of circumvention66 itself. 
The submission by Argentina and Brazil, unlike the United States, covered acts of circumvention 
besides trafficking in circumvention devices;67 however, Geist observed that the major difference 
between the United States’ submission and that of Argentina and Brazil was that the proposal 
made by the former were limited to copy controls, with no reference to access controls.68 With 
divergent views on TPMs and whether or not to include protection for TPMs, naturally, there 
was no conclusion on the matter, but this inconclusiveness notwithstanding, the Diplomatic 
Conference was scheduled for December 1996 to conclude the treaties.69 
A final (seventh) session took place in May 1996, at which the European Union presented 
a written proposal that supported anti-circumvention measures with specific reference to 
trafficking in circumvention devices or provision of services but not targeting acts of 
circumvention.70Again, several country representatives expressly rejected any anti-
circumvention provisions. The Canadian delegation explicitly stated that it was unable to support 
 
64 Ibid. 
65 Geist, Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 56 at 214. 
66 Ibid.  
67 Ibid. 
68 WIPO, Comparative Table of Proposals and Comments Received by the International Bureau, Geneva 1 to 9 February,1996, 
“cited in Geist, Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 65 at 215. 
69 Geist, Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 56 at 216. 
70 WIPO, Proposal of the European Community and its Member States, Geneva, 22 to 24 May,1996, “cited in Geist, 
Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties, ibid. 
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any of the proposals due to ongoing domestic studies and was concerned about the impact of the 
proposals on lawful uses.71 Other country delegates expressed their concerns about the European 
Union proposal.72 
From accounts of the WIPO preparatory meetings, the debates and views expressed by 
the different country delegations make some important facts obvious. First, the United States 
expressly supported the implementation of TPMs and its protection. Reactions from other 
country representatives to the United States’ proposal were twofold: while representatives of 
many states were prepared to accept a case for the use of TPMs, they were not comfortable with 
a blanket application which did not distinguish between copy control and access control; and 
most country delegations had less tolerance for the proposed legal protection for TPMs because 
of the perceived harm it could do to users’ rights to access digital content.  
The second point to note from the deliberations at the preparatory meetings was that there 
was no consensus on the controversial issue of legal protection for TPMs, and yet the provisions 
eventually became part of the treaties. This is indicative of the fact that the United States, WIPO 
and other supporters of the controversial provisions must have persuaded the countries that were 
not in support of the provisions to compromise on the issue. Of course, in copyright law reform, 
and indeed legislative processes generally, it is difficult to get all stakeholders to agree 
 
71 WIPO, Report of the Seventh Session on the Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention, 22 to 24 
May, 1996, cited in Geist, Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 69 at 216. 
72 Ibid. Geist summarized the concerns expressed by the various country delegates as follows: Singapore felt that the proposal 
would interfere with legitimate uses, harm industry, create a barrier to innovation, and capture both licit and illicit uses; Thailand 
delegation viewed the proposal as too vague, and would lead to confusion; Korean delegation felt protection of TPMs would do 
harm to the public interest, and inappropriately impose liability on manufacturers of lawful products for the illicit acts of others; 
the Chinese delegation thought the entire issue might not fit within the sphere of copyright; the Ghanaian delegation thought that 
protection of TPMs could be oppressive to developing countries and called for a reconsideration; the Brazilian delegation stated 
that the rationale for protecting TPMs needed more clarification; the Moroccan delegation stated that it did not fully support the 
European Union proposal; the South African delegation was concerned about the ambiguity in language of the European Union 
proposal  and raised questions of allocation of liability; the Nigerian delegation, speaking on behalf of the African Group, 
expressed concerns about vagueness of language, impact on access to knowledge, and economic and social impact, and called for 
a reassessment with due consideration for developing countries; the delegation from Guinea supported the views of the Nigerian 
delegation, and the Egyptian delegation supported the views that called for further clarification.    
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unanimously on problematic issues; such controversies are sometimes resolved through trade-
offs within and across treaties. In this case, however, it seems to have been more of “an 
imposition” of the provisions than a trade-off.    
 
3.5 WIPO’s Diplomatic Conference: Negotiating the Internet Treaties 
The deliberations and submissions for the proposed treaties commenced in earnest during 
the WIPO Diplomatic Conference in December 1996, which eventually led to the agreement on 
the treaties.73 The duration of the WIPO Diplomatic Conference happened over the course of 
three weeks, which was impressive for agreeing on two international treaties74 on a complex and 
controversial topic. This could be attributable to the keen interest of the United States and WIPO 
to get the treaties adopted. The United States came prepared with robust draft submissions for the 
treaty negotiations. Representatives from 127 countries attended the Diplomatic Conference, the 
United States had 30 representatives and Canada had 7.75 The proposal submitted by the United 
States at the Diplomatic Conference was derived largely from its White Paper76 and was 
arguably the most significant contribution to the process that culminated in the WITs.77  
It is surprising to note that just about seven months prior to the Diplomatic Conference, 
there was no consensus on anti-circumvention legislation and country representatives raised 
significant concerns on the subject. It hardly seems possible that all of these could have been 
satisfactorily resolved during the three weeks of the Diplomatic Conference. Indeed, as a matter 
of fact, it seems the WITs were adopted amidst significant opposition. The same issues raised at 
 
73 Geist, Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 69 at 212. 
74 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note at 54 at 117. 
75 Ibid.  
76 ibid. at 118; Ficsor, The WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 55 at 22. 
77 Ian Brown, “The Evolution of Anti-Circumvention Laws” (2006) 20 Int’l Rev. Law and Comp. 239 at 241 at online: < 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13600860600852119?needAccess=true> accessed April 29, 2019. 
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the preparatory meetings were also echoed at the Diplomatic Conference.78 As Ficsor 
acknowledged: 
Certain groups have never ceased to criticize the new provisions, in 
particular, the provisions regarding the protection of technological 
protection. These groups both at the 1996 Diplomatic Conference, and 
during the preparatory work for the DMCA, strongly oppose these 
provisions, and when their arguments were not accepted, they 
continued their fight in other forms and in the media. These groups 
mainly work in the United States, and when they appear at the 
international level, their U.S dominance is also conspicuous. […] 
these groups are in favour of (i) a more liberal, sometimes 
“ultraliberal,” copyright policy, (ii) the preservation of as much total 
freedom in the cyberspace as possible, (iii) the restriction of the scope 
of protection, and (iv) the broadening of exceptions and limitations in 
the digital networked environment.79 
    
  While Ficsor recognizes and articulates the free culture views opposed to the 
controversial anti-circumvention provision, he does not seem to acknowledge their relevance and 
ultimate contribution to the WITs. It is understandable that Ficsor has sympathies for the content 
industry, and there is nothing wrong with this; in fact, I have previously explained in chapter two 
that approach to copyright can be influenced by different ideological perspectives. However, 
with respect, there are two instances in which I sense that he contradicts himself. First, Ficsor 
notes that, “The Diplomatic Conference adopted two well-balanced and sufficiently flexible 
Treaties: the WCT and the WPPT.” The contradiction here is that in the making of such 
international copyright treaties, in order for them to be “well-balanced,” there ought to be 
significant input from various copyright stakeholders, and after making compromises and trade-
offs, the stakeholders ought to reach a compromise. Ficsor, in the quote above appears to 
undermine the input of the free culture community, which surely makes a serious dent on this 
 
78 Geist, Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 73 at 219-21. To avoid repetition, the critical comments here are 
largely the same as stated in footnote 68. 
79 Ficsor, The WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 55 at 28. 
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purported “balance.” Similarly, at the Diplomatic Conference in 1996, Ficsor was dismissive of 
the views of a coalition80 and noted that:81 
First, although for different reasons, they all opposed multiple aspects 
of the proposed updating of the international copyright norms. 
Second, they were “newcomers” at WIPO; their level of copyright 
knowledge was still relatively low, which resulted in certain 
misgivings that were not truly justified.82 
 
 Ficsor did not specifically mention the reasons members of this coalition were opposed to 
the treaties, but from the composition of the coalition,83 the library and educational association 
would typically be concerned about access to content being trumped; the other technology and 
business-focused members of the coalition would be concerned about TPMs, anti-circumvention 
provision, ISP liability, and circumvention devices. I construe Ficsor’s condescension as 
representative of the views of the institution he represents – WIPO. This suggests that although 
WIPO’s objectives for updating copyright norms at the international level articulated balance and 
the public interest, it is doubtful if this is reflected in the treaty-making process, wherein 
expressing a different viewpoint was dismissed as ignorance in international copyright 
lawmaking. The use of “balancing” rhetoric is not sufficient to effectuate actual balance.  
 The second contradiction noticeable in Ficsor’s views is that he claims the treaties did not 
add any new level of protection: “the two Internet Treaties have led to neither a larger scope of 
copyright protection and related rights, nor a higher, more demanding level of protection. The 
treaties take into account all of the various legitimate interests, but they have done nothing 
 
80 Ibid. at 22, according to Ficsor, at the Diplomatic Conference, besides country delegations and owners’ rights representatives, 
there existed a coalition – this consisted of educational and library association, as well as representatives of certain industries, 
some of which are financially stronger than the copyright industries. The industrial members of the coalition included 
telecommunications organizations, Internet service providers, other information technology industries, entertainment equipment, 
and recording material manufacturers. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
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more.”84  He then makes a seemingly contradictory statement: “[…] the new Treaties clarified 
the application of the existing norms in the digital environment, and, in particular, on the 
Internet, adapted the existing norms for the purpose, and introduced new norms where they were 
indispensable to maintain an appropriate level of protection for copyright and related rights and 
to effectuate public policy considerations.”85 In my view, Ficsor’s usage of the term “new 
norms” acknowledges that a new law was introduced, which resulted in a new kind of additional 
protection, even if the rationalizing logic was merely maintaining the existing level of protection. 
The new norms referred to here are provisions that introduced the protection of TPMs, which had 
never previously been protected through copyright law. Haggart offers a corroborative statement 
when referring to legal protection for TPMs: 
This article introduced something new to international copyright laws 
and treaties: “While the other provisions of the Treaty consist more or 
less of interpretation and certain adaptations of the existing 
international copyright norms at the Berne-plus-TRIPS level, Article 
11, along with Article 12 [on rights management information], 
includes wholly new provisions.”86These provision, “for the first time, 
provide protection for copyright owners outside the usual framework 
of a law of authors’ rights […].87 
  
 In chapter five, I will discuss the levels of protection available to copyright and how 
TPMs, DRM and their legal protection have further expanded that protection; the resultant 
implication of this development is therefore the constriction of users’ rights to access content, 
which in turn undermines the public interest. My purpose in highlighting these facts is to show 
the circumstances under which the WITs were adopted and these developments occurred and 
how it impacts on the overall purpose of copyright.  
 
84 ibid. at 24. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Mihaly Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the Internet: The 1996 WIPO Treaties, Their Interpretation and Implementation, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 544. 
87 Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: Berne Convention and Beyond, 2d. ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 152. 
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Despite these criticisms against the WITs, it should be noted that the negotiation of the 
treaties did permit some degree of flexibility—and potentially some degree of balance—by 
deferring to the discretion of WIPO Member States on their implementation approach. 
Furthermore, significant balance actually came from a revised version of the original draft 
proposed by the United States through its White Paper. As Carys Craig notes, the final text 
adopted reflects a dilution of the anti-circumvention provisions originally proposed by the United 
States.88  
 
3.6 Controversial Provisions of the WIPO Internet Treaties 
The WCT has 25 Articles and the WPPT consists of 33 Articles; amongst the provisions 
of these treaties, the most controversial are the legal protection against circumvention of TPM 
and removal of DRM.89 Article 11 of the WCT provides for obligations concerning technological 
measures as follows: 
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and 
effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective 
technological measures that are used by authors in connection with 
the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention 
and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are not 
authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law.90 
Furthermore, Article 12(1) & (2), provides for obligations concerning rights management 
information as follows: 
(1) Contracting Parties shall provide adequate and effective legal 
remedies against any person knowingly performing any of the 
 
88 Carys Craig, “Digital Locks and the Fate of Fair Dealing in Canada: In Pursuit of Prescriptive Parallelism” (2010) 13 JWIPL 
503 at 506 at online: < https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1747-1796.2009.00394.x > accessed April 25, 2019. 
89  WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1 Arts. 11 & 12; WIPO Performances & Phonograms Treaty, supra note 2 Arts. 18 & 19. 
90 Ibid. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Art. 11. 
 179 
following acts knowing, or with respect to civil remedies having 
reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce, enable, facilitate or 
conceal an infringement of any right covered by this Treaty or the 
Berne Convention: 
(i) to remove or alter any electronic rights management information 
without authority; 
(ii) to distribute, import for distribution, broadcast or communicate to 
the public, without authority, works or copies of works knowing that 
electronic rights management information has been removed or 
altered without authority. 
(2) As used in this Article, “rights management information” means 
information which identifies the work, the author of the work, the 
owner of any right in the work, or information about the terms and 
conditions of use of the work, and any numbers or codes that 
represent such information, when any of these items of information is 
attached to a copy of a work or appears in connection with the 
communication of a work to the public.91 
Similarly, WPPT contain analogous provisions as Articles 11 and 12 of WCT; Article 18 
of WPPT provides for obligations concerning technological measures as follows: 
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and 
effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective 
technological measures that are used by performers or producers of 
phonograms in connection with the exercise of their rights under this 
Treaty and that restrict acts, in respect of their performances or 
phonograms, which are not authorized by the performers or the 
producers of phonograms concerned or permitted by law.92 
 
The rights management provision under WPPT states as follows: 
(1) Contracting Parties shall provide adequate and effective legal 
remedies against any person knowingly performing any of the 
following acts knowing, or with respect to civil remedies having 
reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce, enable, facilitate or 
conceal an infringement of any right covered by this Treaty: 
 
91 Ibid. Art. 12(1) & (2) 
92 WIPO Performances & Phonograms Treaty, supra note 2 Art. 18. 
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(i) to remove or alter any electronic rights management information 
without authority; 
(ii) to distribute, import for distribution, broadcast, communicate or 
make available to the public, without authority, performances, copies 
of fixed performances or phonograms knowing that electronic rights 
management information has been removed or altered without 
authority. 
(2) As used in this Article, “rights management information” means 
information which identifies the performer, the performance of the 
performer, the producer of the phonogram, the phonogram, the owner 
of any right in the performance or phonogram, or information about 
the terms and conditions of use of the performance or phonogram, and 
any numbers or codes that represent such information, when any of 
these items of information is attached to a copy of a fixed 
performance or a phonogram or appears in connection with the 
communication or making available of a fixed performance or a 
phonogram to the public.93 
 
 Unsurprisingly, the implementation of WITs by WIPO Member States proved 
problematic, including in Canada, as I discuss in Part II below. 
  
3.7 Implementation of the WIPO Internet Treaties 
While the WITs did favour rights owners, it left room for efforts to create a fair balance 
between the free culture and the content industry stakeholder communities; and this was by 
virtue of the implementation approaches available to WIPO Member States when incorporating 
the provisions into its national copyright laws. WIPO Member States could take advantage of the 
manner in which the controversial provisions of the WITs were expressed. The provisions are 
more advisory than prescriptive, which leaves the WIPO Member States with some margin of 
discretion in their implementation process. In other words, the WITs recommend how these 
provisions are to be implemented but do not coerce WIPO Member States to do so in a particular 
 
93 Ibid. at Art. 19(1) & (2). 
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way. A close examination of the WITs language corroborates this argument. For instance, Article 
11 of WCT states that, “Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective 
legal remedies.”94 The key terms here are adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies. 
In my opinion, adding this language, which gives each Member State implementation discretion, 
was perhaps a possible way to reach a compromise. While it is hardly possible for each WIPO 
Member State to arrive at the same interpretation or meaning for adequate legal protection and 
effective legal remedies, it is possible that some countries may be influenced by others in their 
implementation model. WIPO deliberately inserted this provision to give Member States the 
leeway to implement the provisions as they see fit. Recall that in making of the WITs, several 
countries opposed a blanket approach to the implementation of legal protection for 
circumvention of TPMs. This perhaps explains why the final language refrained from being 
overly prescriptive or specific, thereby creating the liberty for WIPO Member States to 
implement as they deem fit, within the broad scope of the treaty language. 
However, a downside of this discretion is the absence of uniformity in the 
implementation of the WITs by WIPO Member States. Commenting on this, Geist notes that: 
In view of the broad range of interpretations open to the anti-
circumvention provisions in the WIPO Internet treaties, it should 
come as little surprise to find that there is a wide divergence among 
ratifying countries in the way they have implemented their anti-
circumvention obligations into national law.95 
   
Geist undertakes a brief review of how some countries have implemented the provision 
into national law; it is fitting here to highlight some examples such as the United States, 
Switzerland and New Zealand.   
 
94 WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 89 Arts. 11; similar provision in WIPO Performances & Phonograms Treaty, supra note 89 
Art. 18. 
95 Geist, Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 78 at 222. 
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3.7.1 The United States’ Implementation Approach 
The United States was one of the first countries to implement the WITs and it did not 
happen without opposition. Senator John Ashcroft introduced a bill called the Digital Copyright 
and Technology Education Act of 1997;96 also, Rick Boucher and Tom Campbell tabled a similar 
bill in the House of Representatives as the Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act of 1997.97 
Surprisingly, neither bill had provisions on anti-circumvention devices, which the United States 
clamoured for during the making of the WITs. Howard Coble introduced what later became the 
DMCA but triggered serious concerns in that it went beyond what was required by the WITs.98 
Even Lehman, during his congressional testimony admitted that the provisions (especially the 
prohibiting trading in circumvention devices) went above the requirements of the WITs. Lehman’s 
justification for this was that approval of the law and ratification of the WITs would serve as a 
motivation for other countries to accede to the treaties, which are of significant benefit to United 
States copyright interests.99 Furthermore, the then United States registrar of copyright, Marybeth 
Peters opined that:  
Some have argued that the legislation does not address the 
provision of products or services, but focus solely on acts of 
circumvention. They state that the treaties do not require such 
coverage, and argue that devices themselves are neutral, and can be 
used for either legitimate or illegitimate purposes. It is true that the 
treaties do not specifically refer to the provision of products or 
services, but merely require adequate protection and effective 
remedies against circumvention. As discussed above, however, the 
treaty language gives leeway to member countries to determine 
what protection is appropriate, with the question being whether it is 
adequate and effective.100 
 
 
96 Ibid. at 223. 
97 Ibid. at 224. 
98 Ibid.  
99 Ibid. at 225. 
100 Marybeth Peters, Registrar of Copyrights, Statement Before the House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, 
1997, cited in “Geist, Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 95 at 226.” 
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Peters’ statement above explains that including more than what the WITs required was 
within the contemplation of the WITs because the treaties only provide for minimum 
requirements. Furthermore, giving leeway to states meant that their implementation could go 
beyond the minimalist provisions of the treaty. The WITs were framed to give countries liberty 
to include more provisions in their implementation. The United States’ implementation of the 
WITs included more provisions in its implementation approach than was required. The United 
States DMCA in s.1201 provides for prohibition against circumvention;101 on circumvention 
devices, it prohibits the manufacture, import, offering to the public, provision, or otherwise 
trafficking in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof that primarily 
circumvents TPMs.102  These provisions constrict access to content and expand the copyright 
owner’s control. 
Pamela Samuelson, in her critique of the DMCA asserts that the initial prohibition of 
circumvention was simpler and more consistent,103 and even if it did contain anti-circumvention 
provisions, it was less harmful to growth of the digital economy.104 The United States 
government, at that time admitted that the DMCA went over what the WITs required, but argued 
 
101 DMCA s.1201 (1)(A), “The provision states: “No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls 
access to a work protected under this title.”  
102 ibid. S.1201(2) significantly impairs access in the sense that besides prohibiting circumvention, it outlaws various activities 
that could aid circumvention: ‘‘(2) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any 
technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that— ‘‘(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose 
of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title; ‘‘(B) has only 
limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access 
to a work protected under this title; or‘‘(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that 
person’s knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under 
this title.” 
103 Pamela Samuelson, “Intellectual Property and The Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be 
Revised” (1999) Berkeley Tech. L.J.14 1 at 18 at online: < http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~pam/papers/Samuelson.pdf> 
Accessed April 25, 2019. 
104 Ibid. at 19. 
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it was necessary so that such standards could be used to influence other countries to pass similar 
strong law.105 
The DMCA provides opportunity, every three years,106 to review cases of users who may 
have been adversely affected by the harshness of the ban on circumvention and consider granting 
an exception to such users. While this creates the possibility of granting users exceptions, it 
should not be triennial because it gives the impression that the DMCA favours the content 
industry over the user community. Instead of a triennial review to consider the possibility of 
granting exception, a better option would have been an administrative process available 
immediately to consider such cases and make decisions. One of the primary purposes of enacting 
a law is to prevent harm and injustice; in the DMCA, the default appears to be the reverse: it 
allows the user to suffer harm before being considered for an exception for non-infringing 
activities. Admittedly, the rationale for the three-year review in the DMCA is deserving of 
commendation because it seeks to incorporate the possibility of new exceptions without a 
lengthy law review process, potentially supporting the cause of balance and the user community. 
3.7.2 The Switzerland and New Zealand Implementation Approach 
In my view, the Switzerland implementation exemplifies a liberal and more balanced 
approach. The Swiss Copyright Act in Article 39a(1) states that effective TPMs may not be 
circumvented;107 Article 39a(2) defines effective TPM as, “technologies and devices such as 
access control, copy control, encryption, scrambling and other modification mechanisms that are 
intended and suitable for preventing or limiting the unauthorized use of works and other subject-
 
105 Ibid. 
106 DMCA s.1201(B) & (C). 
107 Switzerland Federal Act on Copyright and Related Rights, 1992 as Amended in 2017 at online: < 
https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19920251/201701010000/231.1.pdf 
 > accessed April 29, 2019.  
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matter.”108 Article 39a(3)(a)-(c) proscribes the manufacture, import, offer for sale or use of 
devices that facilitate the circumvention of TPMs.109 These provisions are similar to those of the 
United States, but the Swiss provision adds in Article 39a(4) that, “the ban on circumvention 
may not be enforced against those persons who undertake the circumvention exclusively for 
legally permitted uses.”110 Article 34a(4) in the Swiss Copyright Act makes a fundamental 
difference by creating an exception to the ban on circumvention to mirror exceptions and 
limitations in existing copyright protection; this exception attempts to create a balance among 
copyright stakeholders. The Swiss approach to the implementation of the WITs depicts 
flexibility; it exercises its discretion to address the genuine concern of unauthorized access to 
content, while at the same time guaranteeing that user’s right to legally permitted use is not 
trumped. 
 At this juncture, it is pertinent to highlight the New Zealand WITs implementation 
approach, which goes further than the Swiss approach in mitigating the possible harms of TPM 
protections. The New Zealand law also prohibits distribution of circumvention devices,111 but 
this is not an absolute bar. The New Zealand law expressly allows circumvention for permitted 
 
108 Ibid. at Art. 39a (2). 
109 Ibid. at Art. 39a (3)(a)-(c). 
110 Ibid. at Art. 39a (4). 
111 New Zealand, Copyright (New Technologies) Amendment Act, 2008, s. 226A (1)A person (A) must not make, import, sell, 
distribute, let for hire, offer or expose for sale or hire, or advertise for sale or hire, a TPM circumvention device that applies to 
a technological protection measure if A knows or has reason to believe that it will, or is likely to, be used to 
infringe copyright in a TPM work.“(2)A person (A) must not provide a service to another person (B) if— 
“(a)A intends the service to enable or assist B to circumvent a technological protection measure; and “(b)A knows or has 
reason to believe that the service will, or is likely to, be used to infringe copyright in a TPM work. “(3)A person (A) must not 
publish information enabling or assisting another person to circumvent a technological protection measure if A intends that 
the information will be used to infringe copyright in a TPM work. 
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purposes.112 Furthermore, if a user is prevented from engaging in such permitted purposes by a 
TPM, he or she has an administrative route to submit a petition in order to be granted access.113  
In terms of implementing the WITs, compared to the US DMCA, the New Zealand and 
Swiss models seem to be more liberal, creating limits and exceptions to TPM protection, as well 
as ensuring that users are actually able to enjoy them in practice.     
3.8 WIPO Internet Treaties: Justifying Different Implementation Approaches 
The varying viewpoints and approaches to the implementation of WIT do not come as a 
surprise given that they pertain to a subject as controversial as copyright and involve several 
countries. The differences in implementation approaches are obviously not just a function of the 
 
112 Ibid. at s.226D, this provision lists the permitted purposes and those who enjoy such rights: (1) The rights that the issuer of 
a TPM work has under section 226B do not prevent or restrict the exercise of a permitted act. 
(2) The rights that the issuer of a TPM work has under section 226B do not prevent or restrict the making, importation, sale, 
or letting for hire of a TPM circumvention device to enable— 
(a) a qualified person to exercise a permitted act under Part 3 using a TPM circumvention device on behalf of the user of a 
TPM work; or 
(b) a person referred to in section 226E (3) to undertake encryption research. 
(3) In this section and in section 226E, qualified person means— 
(a) the librarian of a prescribed library; or 
(b) the archivist of an archive; or 
(c) an educational establishment; or 
(d) any other person specified by the Governor-General by Order in Council on the recommendation of the Minister. 
(4) A qualified person must not be supplied with a TPM circumvention device on behalf of a user unless the qualified person 
has first made a declaration to the supplier in the prescribed form. 
(5) In this section — 
archive has the same meaning as in section 50(1) 
archivist includes a person acting on behalf of the archivist 
encryption technology means the scrambling and descrambling of information using mathematical formulae or algorithms 
librarian includes a person acting on behalf of the librarian 
prescribed library has the same meaning as in section 50(1). 
(6) In this section and in section 226E, encryption research means identifying and analysing flaws and vulnerabilities of 
encryption technology. 
113 Ibid. at s.226E states that: (1) Nothing in this Act prevents any person from using a TPM circumvention device to exercise 
a permitted act under Part 3. 
“(2) The user of a TPM work who wishes to exercise a permitted act under Part 3 but cannot practically do so because of a 
TPM may do either or both of the following: 
(a) apply to the copyright owner or the exclusive licensee for assistance enabling the user to exercise the permitted act: 
(b) engage a qualified person (see section 226D (3)) to exercise the permitted act on the user’s behalf using a TPM 
circumvention device, but only if the copyright owner or the exclusive licensee has refused the user’s request for assistance or 
has failed to respond to it within a reasonable time. 
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existence of different copyright stakeholders who adhere to different ideologies from different 
jurisdictions, but also the interplay of power and bargaining influence motivated by economic, 
cultural and political interests. The content industry stakeholders are more likely to incline 
towards an implementation model that enables them to achieve their interests and goals 
(economic gains) guarantees their proprietary interests, while free culture advocates would 
embrace an approach that benefits the user community to the extent possible. An implementation 
model that caters for and balances the interests of both stakeholders is preferable though, of 
course, difficult to attain. 
The existence of different approaches to implementation is to be expected when the legal 
framework of the anti-circumvention provisions defers to WIPO Member States the power to 
exercise discretion in their implementation approaches. While the deference to WIPO Member 
States may prima facie seem like a benefit to the various states by giving the liberty to decide the 
implementation details, in actual fact, it was tactical effort at compromise to get countries to buy-
in to the WITs. 
 There is no consensus among copyright scholars as to which approach should be adopted in 
the implementation of the WITs; however, as Geist notes: 
[…] scholars from around the world have concluded that there is 
considerable flexibility in the implementation of the anti-
circumvention provisions that do not necessitate the inclusion of 
provisions barring the distribution of circumvention tools nor unduly 
limit adding exceptions to the anti-circumvention rules.114  
 
114 Geist, Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 95 at 236. To properly understand Ficsor’s pro-content industry 
position, at the time of writing Geist explained that Ficsor “serves as a consultant to International Intellectual Property Alliance 
(IIPA), a private sector coalition of seven US trade associations that include Motion Picture Association of America and the 
Business Software Alliance.” 
 188 
 In defining what is deemed “a flexible implementation of TPMs and its legal protection” 
as stated in the quote above, it is crucial to recall that TPMs seek to add a new layer of protection 
in addition to what already exists in copyright law and allow for its unregulated use/abuse. The 
United States’ approach highly favours TPMs and legal protection against their circumvention 
and Ficsor supports this approach. Geist describes him as “the unquestioned leader of those 
arguing for an inflexible implementation, complete with limited exceptions and strong anti-
device provisions.”115 According to Ficsor: 
Contracting Parties may only fulfill their obligation under Article 11 
if they provide protection and remedies: against preparatory acts 
(manufacture, importation and distribution of tools and offering of 
services); against circumvention of access controls and copy controls 
(and any other control of exercise rights); against dual-or multi-use 
devices which are “primarily designed” for circumvention, have only 
limited commercial use other than circumvention, or are marketed for 
use for circumvention; and against individual components of such a 
device.116 
Silke von Lewinski and Jorg Reinbothe seem to concur with Ficsor’s idea of 
implementing the WITs and they articulate that: 
By its nature, Article 11 WCT provides for minimum protection, 
which Contracting Parties are free to go beyond in their domestic law. 
The question arises, whether this minimum protection only covers 
acts of circumvention. It seems that limiting the protection to such 
acts would not correspond to the objective of the provision. 
…Accordingly, the obligation to provide for “adequate protection” 
under Article 11 WCT would seem to require that rightsholders enjoy 
protection also against preparatory acts of circumvention 
themselves.117 
 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ficsor, The Law of Copyright, supra note 86 at 562. 
117 Jorg Reinbothe and Silke von Lewinski, The WIPO Treaties 1996: The WIPO Copyright Treaty and The WIPO Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty: Commentary and Legal Analysis (London: Butterworths, 2002) at 142.  
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Lewinski and Reinbothe were members of the European Union delegation at the 1996 
Diplomatic Conference118 and are strongly in favour of creating extra protections beyond what 
the WITs requires without any limitation or permitted exceptions to accommodate access to 
works. Notwithstanding that the views of Ficsor, Lewinski and Reinbothe are cited as authority 
for inflexible implementation of the WITs, other experts think differently.119 
With regards to implementation of the WITs in Canada, in 2000, Mark Hayes, a Toronto-
based copyright lawyer was retained by Industry Canada to advise on their implementation.120 
Hayes concluded that access controls were beyond the requirements of the treaties121 and he 
opined: 
In order to constitute “adequate legal protection” under the WCT and 
WPPT, one does not have to go so far as to provide a right to prevent 
the circumvention of effective technological measures protecting 
access to a work. Nevertheless, in order for the right granted to be 
truly adequate, some measure of prohibition or limitation of certain 
devices may be necessary.122 
Similarly, in Canada, Ian Kerr, in his extensive analysis of TPMs posited that: 
[…] any newly introduced access-control right must be counter-
balanced by a newly introduced access-to-a-work right. Under this 
approach, copyright owners would have a positive obligation to 
provide access-to-a-work when persons or institutions fall within an 
exception or limitation set out in the Copyright Act. Such an 
obligation might entail the positive obligation to allow access-to-
works in the public domain, or to provide unfettered access-to work to 
 
118 Geist, Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 114 at 237. 
119 Ibid. at 237-8. 
120 ibid.  
121 ibid. 
122 Industry Canada, Memorandum Concerning the Implementation in Canada of Articles 12 and 18 of the WIPO Treaties 
Regarding the Unauthorized Circumvention of Technological Measures Used in Connection with the Exercise of a Copyright 
Right by Mark Hayes (Ottawa: Ogilvy Renault, 2000. Cited in Geist, Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 108. 
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educational institutions and other organizations that are currently 
exempted from a number of the provisions in the Copyright Act.123 
The import of Kerr’s opinion is that copyright owners’ right to implement anti-circumvention 
measures, which could include prohibition of circumvention and the manufacture, importation, 
distribution and sale of circumvention devices, must be balanced with the rights of users to 
access works, which are (at least) equally deserving of recognition and enforceability.  
The different views expressed above on how the provisions of the WITs should be 
implemented is indicative of the challenges inherent in implementing the treaties into domestic 
laws. In my view, the liberal approach seems to be more appropriate because it does not entirely 
oppose anti-circumvention provisions and the ban on the use of circumvention devices but 
suggests that exceptions should be created and processes established to accommodate 
permissible uses traditionally beyond the scope of the copyright owner’s control. This represents 
a more balanced approach compared to an approach that seemingly advocates for an absolute ban 
on circumvention and other related activities and/or devices that aid circumvention. Proponents 
of the inflexible approach appear not to consider accommodating users’ right to access even in a 
limited way; and this violates user rights by depriving users of the benefits of exceptions 
recognized in the national copyright laws of most countries.  It is pertinent to mention here that, 
while I may have a bias for free culture, my intention is not demonize content industry 
stakeholders but when their motive is to deny users their right to access in the name of 
implementing WITs, such attempt is detrimental to the public interest and the purpose of 
copyright law as discussed in this research.  
 
123Ian Kerr, “Technological Protection Measures: Part II – the Legal Protection of TPMs, Department of Canadian Heritage, 
Copyright Policy Branch,” at online: < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=705081 > accessed September 15, 
2019, at 66-7. 
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The WITs implementation quagmire is what WIPO member states, including Canada, 
have had to deal with to incorporate the treaties into their national copyright law. Considering the 
subjective nature of the controversial TPMs and anti-circumvention provisions, one country’s 
implementation inevitably influenced another’s. Presumably, being one of the early 
implementers of the WITs, the United States’ implementation model, which culminated in the 
DMCA, influenced other countries in their implementation by effectively setting the default 
model. It is in the context of this dilemma that Canada struggled to shape the contours of its 
copyright law reform to bring it in line with the WITs.     
Besides influencing other countries by its implementation example, the United States 
exerts pressure using an even more powerful tool – international trade agreements. Since IP is 
now a key area of focus in international trade, foreign trade agreement (FTA) between or among 
countries usually include IP provisions. Consequently, it is expected that the IP regime in these 
countries should align. Usually, the country with strong international economic and trade 
influence, such as the United States, calls the shot. A typical example is United States-Australia 
FTA.  Australia initially implemented the WITs under the Digital Agenda Act, 2000,124following 
a flexible approach, but was pressured by the United States to a adopt a less flexible approach 
through the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) of 2004. AUSFTA 
 
124 Australia Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act, 2000, at online: < 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2004C01235> Accessed April 26, 2019. This amended the Copyright Act of 1968. 
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required Australia to implement a TPM regime modeled after the United States DMCA.125 
Australia had to adopt stricter measures in terms of TPMs and a ban on circumvention devices.126 
Having assessed the implementation of the WITs by certain countries, we can turn now, 
in Part II of this Chapter, to consider in greater detail Canada’s implementation of the Treaties. 
 
PART II 
CANADA’S COPYRIGHT LAW REFORM IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
3.9 Background to Canada’s Implementation of WIPO Internet Treaties 
Canada’s implementation of the WITs did not happen as swiftly as it did in the United 
States. Indeed, the WITs was not implemented in Canada until 2012, after passing through a 
laborious process that was influenced by several factors. Canadian copyright law reform can be 
classified as one of the highly controversial subjects that have come before the Parliament of 
Canada.127 The delay/implementation is attributable to a combination of different factors such as 
copyright policy formulation, competing stakeholders’ interests, lack of robust articulation of the 
purpose of copyright law in Canada, international obligation as a signatory to WIPO, and inter-
departmental rivalry between Canadian Heritage and Industry Canada. Some of these factors 
have been discussed extensively in previous chapters (such as the competing interests of 
stakeholders; competing understandings of the purpose(s) of copyright law in Canada; and the 
international divergence of approaches to implementing controversial provisions within the 
 
125 Matthew Rimmer, “Robbery under arms: Copyright Law and Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement” (2006) 11 First 
Monday at online: < https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1316/1236#r3 > Accessed April 26, 2019. 
126 For extensive discussion on this, see Robert Burrell and Kimberlee Weatherall, “Exporting Controversy? Reactions to the 
Copyright Provisions of The U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement: Lessons for U.S. Trade Policy” (2008) 2 JLTP 259-319 at 
online: < http://illinoisjltp.com/journal/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/WeatherallBurrel.pdf > Accessed April 26, 2019. 
127 Sara Bannerman, “Copyright: Characteristics of Canadian Reform” in Michael Geist, ed, From “Radical Extremism” to 
“Balanced Copyright”: Canadian Copyright and the Digital Agenda (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at 17. 
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WITs). Here, my focus will be on the United States’ influence and the challenges of copyright 
policy formulation in relation, in particular, to the apparent conflict between Canadian Heritage 
and Industry Canada. Canada’s delayed implementation of the WITs was perhaps partly due to a 
commitment to achieve a copyright reform that reflects a balanced approach. Arguably, the fact 
that the implementation was not hastily passed like that of the United States could be a sign of 
the checks and balances at play.  
 
3.10 United States’ Influence in Canada’s Implementation of the WIPO Internet Treaties 
 The discussions below show the United States’ influenced on Canada’s implementation 
of the WITs. However, this should not be interpreted to mean that the United States controlled 
the reform process; in fact, Canada demonstrated its resistance to the United States’ influence in 
the implementation of the WITs, as we shall see.  
Besides pressure on Canada arising from its international commitment, as a WIPO 
member state and signatory to implement the WITs, the United States, to some degree, did 
influence how Canada implemented the WITs. The United States is the world leader and net 
exporter of cultural goods, and to maintain this dominant position, it seeks to align as closely as 
possible, the copyright laws of the rest of the world with its copyright law.128 The obvious 
rationale for this is to ensure that works of United States origin enjoy the same level of 
protection in a foreign jurisdiction. Being its next-door neighbor, Canada provides a strategic 
 
128 The self-interest of the United States is overly overbearing and runs contrary to norms in international IP lawmaking as 
advocated by IP scholars. For example, the draft IP provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership have been criticized for its lack of 
balance and potential harm to developing countries, Jeremy de Beer, “Applying Best Practice Principles to International 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking”, (2013) 44 Int. Rev of Intell. Prop. & Comp. Law, 884-901 at online: < 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-013-0133-3> Accessed April 26, 2019. For more analysis on international IP 
lawmaking see generally: Kimberlee Weatherall, “ACTA as a New Kind of International IP Lawmaking”, (2010) PIJIP, Research 
Paper No. 12, at online: < https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=research> 
Accessed April 26, 2019; Graeme Dinwoodie, “The International Intellectual Property System: Treaties, Norms, National Courts, 
and Private Ordering” in Daniel Gervais, ed., Intellectual Property, Trade, and Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic 
Development in a TRIPS PLUS Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 61-114.     
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market for the United States’ copyright industry.129 The United States capitalizes on its 
diplomatic and trade relations with Canada to influence Canada’s implementation of the WITs. 
The United States government utilizes its diplomatic tools to influence the Canadian 
government;130 for example, the United States used the Security and Prosperity Partnership of 
North America meeting platform to ask about Canada’s lack of WITs implementation thus:131 
Then-US ambassador to Canada Davis Wilkins also met with 
Canadian officials on several occasions during his tenure from 2005 
to 2009 and was not shy about expressing the American pro-content-
industry position. At an April 2008 Public Policy Forum conference 
on intellectual property, Wilkins remarked: “The USTR continues to 
have concern about Canada’s failure to ratify and implement the two 
WIPO Internet treaties.”132 Michael Shapiro, attorney-adviser from 
the Office of Intellectual Property Policy and Enforcement of the US 
Patent and Trademark Office, elaborated on the US position, arguing 
for Canadian DMCA-type legislation. He posited that that difficult 
nature of copyright policy “should not be a reason for further delay in 
ratifying and fully implementing the WIPO Internet treaties.”133 The 
United States has also placed Canada on its Special 301 Watch List 
every year save one (1993). In 2009, it “upgraded” Canada to the 
Priority Watch List where Canada remained until 2013, when it was 
downgraded back to the Watch List.134 Since 2004, Canada’s lack of 
movement on the Internet treaties figured prominently in its 
placement of these lists.135 
 
 
129 This could also be advantageous for Canadian content creators as well to try and explore the United States market for their 
content. 
130 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 74 at 164. 
131 Michele Austin, former chief of staff, Industry Minister Maxime Bernier, interviewed by Haggart on April 30, 2008. 
132 David Wilkins, speech at Public Policy Forum, Intellectual Property Reform: Innovation and the Economy, April 28, 2008 
“Cited in Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 130 at 165. 
133 Michael Shapiro, speech at Public Policy Forum, Intellectual Property Reform: Innovation and the Economy, April 28, 2008 
“Cited in Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 130 at 165. 
134 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2013 Special 301 Report, May 2013, at 59, Cited in Haggart, Copyfight, 
supra note 130 at 165. Haggart states that the downgrade was partly a response to the passage of the 2012 Copyright 
Modernization Act; Wikipedia, “Special 301 Report,” “The Special 301 Report is prepared annually by the Office of the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR) that identifies trade barriers to United States companies and products due to the intellectual 
property laws, such as copyright, patents and trademarks, in other countries. By April 30 of each year, the USTR must identify 
countries which do not provide "adequate and effective" protection of intellectual property rights” at online: < 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_301_Report > accessed July 17, 2019. 
135 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 130 at 165. 
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In response, Canada discounts the United States’ Special 301 Watch List contending it is 
“deeply flawed and inappropriate… It’s reflective of industry views”136 and that Canada does not 
recognize the 301 Watch List process because it is unreliable and lacks objective analysis.137 
Despite Canada’s rejection of the United States’ monitoring process, the United States’ influence 
on Canada cannot just be brushed aside. The presence of American content industry corporations 
in Canada and Canada’s dependence on the United States creates caution in dealing with the 
United States on copyright reform issues.138 So even without the United States’ influence, in my 
view, the United States’ copyright market is important to Canada and is worth exploring. 
Therefore, there has to be some form of alignment in the copyright laws of both countries. The 
crucial question is what degree of copyright law alignment is possible given that both countries 
may have differing viewpoints on some areas of copyright as well as different pressures from 
domestic stakeholders. Managing the influence of the United States proved very challenging for 
Canada in its implementation of the WITs. 
It is worth mentioning here that the power dynamics and the relationship between United 
States and Canada were recently demonstrated once again in the renegotiation of NAFTA, which 
has now culminated in the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) being signed 
(although not yet ratified at the time of writing) on November 30, 2018 after a long period of 
back and forth. Although CUSMA is a trade deal, and so broader in its coverage than intellectual 
property, as shown above in the AUSFTA, the negotiation of such trade deals offers a robust 
opportunity for the United States to pressure Canada on the intellectual property portfolio, 
especially where Canada’s export interests for industries like auto, lumber and diary are at stake. 
 
136 Yannick Mondy, first secretary, trade policy, Embassy of Canada in the United States, interviewed by Haggart on August 6, 
2008. 
137 Nancy Segal, Testimony (edited) before Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, House of Commons, 1st 
Session 39th Parliament. Interviewed by Haggart on August 6, 2007. 
138 Supra note 117. 
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Specifically, on IP, for example, Canada has committed through CUSMA to a copyright term 
extension by twenty years, which means an increase from fifty to seventy years.139 The 
implication for this is that it would take twenty more years for works to enter the public domain, 
and, until then, more money will be spent on accessing copyright content. In fact, the cost 
implications for Canada could run into tens of millions, which would mostly go to the United 
States copyright market.140  
 
3.11 Inter-Departmental Conflict: Canadian Heritage and Industry Canada 
When it comes to copyright policy-making in Canada, the involvement of different 
government departments makes it problematic to identify whose forte it is to superintend over 
copyright policy formulation. In fact, one of the determinant factors to identify which 
government department would be involved depends on whether it is strictly intellectual property, 
or intellectual property imbedded in trade policy.  
Haggart141 identifies three government departments in Canada that have some 
responsibility in dealing with copyright-related issues: Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and 
Development (DFATD)142 (formerly Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
[DFAIT]), Industry Canada143 and Canadian Heritage.144 The Department of Foreign Affairs, 
Trade and Development assumes the primary role in copyright policy during international trade 
 
139 Jesse Hirsh,  “How Will the Digital Economy Fare Under the USMCA?” 2018 at online: < 
https://www.cigionline.org/articles/how-will-digital-economy-fare-under-usmca> Accessed April 26, 2019. 
140 Jeremy de Beer, “Intellectual Property Chapter of USMCA Proves Canada’s Pragmatism” 2018 at online: < 
https://www.cigionline.org/articles/how-will-digital-economy-fare-under-usmca> Accessed April 26, 2019.  
141 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 117 at 157. 
142 Government of Canada, About the New Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, at online: 
<http://www.international.gc.ca/protocol-protocole/policies-politiques/circular-note_note-circulaire_ftrn-001.aspx?lang=eng> 
accessed April 29, 2019. 
143 Ibid. Innovation, Science and Economic Development, at online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/icgc.nsf/eng/h_00007.html> 
accessed April 29, 2019. 
144 Ibid. Canadian Heritage, at online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage.html> accessed April 29, 2019. 
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negotiations that have intellectual property components.145 In other words, in the absence of 
international trade negotiations and when such negotiations are focused chiefly on intellectual 
property, DFATD would not assume primary role. Industry Canada, now Innovation, Science 
and Economic Development (ISED), has the mandate to foster and grow a competitive 
knowledge-based economy in Canada;146 intellectual property, which includes copyright, plays a 
key role in building a knowledge-based economy. 
According to the Canadian Heritage website: 
Canadian Heritage and its portfolio organizations play a vital role in 
the cultural, civic and economic life of Canadians. Arts, culture and 
heritage represent $53.8 billion in the Canadian economy and more 
than 650,000 jobs in sectors such as film and video, broadcasting, 
music, publishing, archives, performing arts, heritage institutions, 
festivals and celebrations.147 
 
 It is apparent that the mandate given to Canadian Heritage also includes significant 
responsibility to build and promote cultural works and artistic expression, which involves 
copyright. It is evident that these three government departments in Canada have some copyright 
policy-making role, and that this overlapping mandate could cause some friction in the exercise 
of their functions. For DFATD, deference may be given to its role in copyright when the 
negotiations involve international trade agreements, a good example here are negotiations related 
to the TRIPS Agreement and fittingly under the auspices of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). For chiefly intellectual property related negotiations, for instance, in the WIPO Internet 
treaties, ISED and Canadian Heritage led the Canadian delegation, while the DFAIT (now 
 
145 supra note 141. 
146 Ibid. ISED Mandate, at online: <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/icgc.nsf/eng/h_00018.html.> accessed April 29, 2019. Though 
Industry Canada has now been subsumed under ISED, all references to Industry Canada in this research are valid as they refer to 
its activities prior to the reorganization by the Trudeau government.  
147 Government Canadian, Heritage, supra note 144. 
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DFATD) played a coordinating role.148 The role of DFAIT here was more diplomatic than actual 
copyright policy-making. In the implementation of the WITs, DFAIT played a supporting role, 
acting as a link to convey Canada’s position to United States and communicating the United 
States’ position to Canada.149 Admittedly, while there is always an element of international trade 
in intellectual property, WTO’s mandate deal fundamentally with trade, which encompasses 
intellectual property and much more. This is why DFATD would be the appropriate department 
to lead on trade issues involving intellectual property. On the other hand, WIPO’s mandate is 
chiefly intellectual property-related, which may involve some aspects of international trade and 
the appropriate Canadian departments to lead on intellectual property issues with WIPO would 
be ISED and Canadian Heritage.  
The main challenge is the determination of how Industry Canada and Canadian Heritage 
manage and share responsibility in copyright policy issues in Canada. In examining this issue, 
Haggart reports: 
Canada is unusual in that the responsibility for copyright is shared 
between two departments.150 The Copyright Act gives formal 
responsibility for copyright to the minister of industry. In practice, 
however, Industry Canada and Canadian Heritage share the copyright 
file.151 While Industry Canada is involved by statute, Canadian 
Heritage owes its involvement to its responsibility for the Canadian 
Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), and 
aspects of the broadcasting industry, as well as its “broad heritage and 
cultural mandate that includes citizenship and Canadian identity, 
cultural development and heritage, and national politics.152 Although 
the Canadian Heritage’s responsibility is not enshrined in the 
 
148 Denis Gratton, former manager, copyright policy, Department of Canadian Heritage, interviewed by Haggart on February 7, 
2008. 
149 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 141 at 158. 
150 Simon Doyle, Prey to Thievery, (Ottawa: Simon Doyle, 2006) at 146-7, cited in “Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 149 at 158.” 
151 Ibid.  
152 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 149 at 158. Haggart further states that “Before 1993, the predecessor to industry Canada, the 
Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs handled the file. The Department of Canadian Heritage is treated as a joint 
partner; in practice, the two departments must negotiate in order to bring forth copyright legislation.” 
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Copyright Act, copyright has assumed a greater relative importance 
for Canadian Heritage than Industry Canada.153 
   
Copyright is challenging enough for one government department; sharing the 
responsibility between two or more government departments is unlikely to make the job easier; if 
anything, it has the potential to make it more difficult as each department may be loyal to its 
mandate, interests, and copyright stakeholders who influence a particular agenda. In this case, if 
conflict arises, ISED may assert its authority originating from the statute to claim the power to 
make the final decision; on the other hand, Canadian Heritage could seek to establish its 
authority and mandate, which is designed to preserve and promote equally important sectors in 
Canada such as media and broadcasting, culture, artistic expression and the richness of Canadian 
culture. In practice, the power sharing formula between these two government departments is not 
easy to delineate. 
The challenges are further heightened as the departments are sometimes seen to be 
divided along the lines of their approach to copyright: albeit a generalization (and while it might 
seem counter-intuitive at first glance) Industry Canada appears to lean towards a free culture 
position, while Canadian Heritage more typically favours a content industry perspective. This 
controversial relationship is corroborated in an interview with a close aide to Maxime Bernier 
(former minister of Industry Canada). Haggart reports his findings thus: 
The departments’ opposing mandate institutionalize copyright’s user-
creator, or protection-dissemination, dichotomy and complicate any 
efforts to pass copyright legislation. As Michele Austin, chief of staff 
to Maxime Bernier while he was the Conservative industry minister, 
from February 2006 to August 2007, told the author, were copyright 
policy to be made the purview of only one department, “life would be 
a thousand times easier.154 
  
 
153 Ibid. at 159. 
154 Austin, Interview, with Haggart, supra note 131. 
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 Furthermore: 
 Industry Canada’s mandated focus on innovation is biased towards 
dissemination, ensuring that copyright law does not hinder access to 
knowledge and information. Canadian Heritage’s goal, meanwhile, is 
to maximize protection for creators for cultural reasons, though in 
practice this means maximizing copyright protection for copyright 
owners; that is, record companies and movie studios, which are 
usually not Canadian.155 Interest groups tend to gravitate towards one 
department or another. Groups representing performers, writers, 
creators, and the content industry coalesce around Canadian Heritage, 
while Industry Canada is seen as the representative of ISPs, 
consumers, businesses, investors, and “user industries, such as the 
broadcasting sector.156 
 
These findings could perhaps be responsible for some of the delays in decision-making 
and copyright policy formulation, which ultimately delays copyright legislative reform. This may 
have also been partly responsible for the delayed implementation of the WITs. Such delays are to 
be expected when two Canadian government departments that are supposed to work together on 
copyright policy and reform hold opposing views on copyright. As I posited earlier, despite the 
criticisms against two government departments having mandate on copyright issues, there is the 
possibility that it may have some advantages in ensuring fairness and balance in the process.157 
 
155 Laura Murray, “Copyright Talk: Patterns and Pitfalls in Canadian Policy Discourses” in Michael Geist, ed, In the Public 
Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law” (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 16 note 2: “The Heritage Department has not 
been reticent to declare that it sees only to represent the rights-holder side of copyright: in the Canadian Heritage Performance 
Report for the period ending March 31, 2003, then-Minister Sheila Copps reported that “with Industry Canada, the Department is 
analyzing World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaty issues, and working with collective societies, industry 
associations and various creators’ organizations to develop concrete proposals for copyright reform,” Canadian Heritage 
Performance Report: For the period ending March 31, 2003 (Ottawa: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2003), .Similarly, on 
November 6, 2003, Minister Copps suggested to the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage that given cabinet’s reluctance to 
press forward with WIPO treaty ratification, “…the best course of action to achieve your objectives might be to hear from CRIA 
[the Canadian Recording Industry Association] to see what would be an acceptable wording,” Standing Committee on Canadian 
Heritage, 37th Parliament, 2nd Session, Evidence (6 November 2003). 
156Bruce Doern and Sharaput Markus, Canadian Intellectual Property: The Politics of Innovating Institutions and Interests, 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 131, 24; Doyle, Thievery, supra note 150 at 134, Doyle notes that the Canadian 
Heritage, despite its support for the content industry, its officials “expressed concerns about the DMCA-like protection for TPMs 
even though their main clients, the Canadian Recording Industry Association and Canadian Motion Picture Distributors 
Association were strongly in favour of them,” cited in “Haggart, Copyfight, supra 153 at 159-160.” 
157 The different departments represent different copyright stakeholder groups; therefore, it is expected the departments would 
oppose any copyright law reform or policy formulation that may potentially adversely affect the stakeholders they represent. 
However, it is expected that both departments should arrive at a compromise, where the law or policy does not unduly favour one 
stakeholder group over the other. This is what balancing the interests of stakeholders means, which is a core argument my 
research supports. There is merit if the making of laws and policies could avoid unnecessary delays; however, the hasty passage 
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Canada’s assignment of copyright policy formulation responsibility to two departments could be 
used to ensure that the interests of stakeholders that each department represents are duly 
considered in copyright reform. In addition to the bureaucratic delays,158 however, differences in 
their mandate create, by default, a recipe for disagreement not just between the departments, but 
also among the stakeholders. The bottlenecks of having two departments work on a copyright 
cannot be ignored and should possibly be reviewed. 
In my opinion, this unusual arrangement reflects Canada’s understanding of the purpose 
of copyright law (which is now evolving, arguably due to the Supreme Court’s elucidation on the 
issue, for example, the Theberge case). Canada’s copyright policy more than a decade ago, 
showed that it did not prioritize or have a well-articulated purpose of copyright law until the 
explanation by Justice Binnie in Theberge,159 which posits that the purpose of copyright law 
should give recognition to the dissemination of information and the encouragement of learning, 
while at the same time not undermining the expectation to earn a just reward from creative 
works. In fact, prior to Theberge, the understanding of the purpose of copyright law as stated in 
Bishop v Stevens160 was that the Copyright Act was passed for a single purpose – to benefit all 
kinds of authors. The articulation of the purpose of copyright law in Bishop v Stevens obviously 
did not include the public interest and access to content by the user community, which was an 
incomplete conceptualization of the purpose of copyright law in Canada. If there had been a 
well-defined purpose of copyright law, it may have to some extent provided guidance on the 
limits of the copyright mandate given to Industry Canada and Canadian Heritage. 
 
of some laws may be to serve interests other than those of the public and common good. The United States DMCA is a typical 
example of a law passed with a short time but does cater for the public interest. 
158 Austin, Interview with Haggart, supra note 154, “The vigour with which each bureaucracy defends its mandate often interferes 
with the timely pursuit of reform, even when the ministers are in agreement about what should be done.” 
159 Théberge v. Galerie d’art du Petit Champlain, 2002 SCC 34 at 355-6 at online: < http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-
csc/en/item/1973/index.do> accessed September 15, 2019. 
160 Bishop v. Stevens [1990] 2 S.C.R 2 467  
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A possible resolution of any inter-departmental impasse between Industry Canada and 
Canadian Heritage could possibly be settled politically when the Prime Minister’s Office 
(PMO)161 and Privy Council Office (PCO)162 intervene in the matter. Donald Savoie opines that 
“the role of the Prime Minister’s Office and his secretariat in Canadian policy-making should 
never be ignored, particularly at a time when political power has been centralized more than ever 
in the hands of the prime minister and his aides.”163 Where necessary, the PMO/PCO can 
intervene in copyright cases.164 However, when the PMO/PCO decides to intervene, it may still 
not be insulated from criticisms as political reasons and influential copyright stakeholders may 
shape its decision. 
The intervention of the PMO could be influenced by both national political interests and 
international diplomatic ties with other countries, for example, the United States’ influence in 
implementing the WIT; the PMO under the Stephen Harper administration advised that Canada 
should please the United States:165 
The PMO has specific, if vague, views on what should be done: 
“satisfy the United States.” Says Austin: “The Prime Minister’s 
Office’s position was: move quickly, satisfy the United States. And 
both of our positions were, politically speaking, ‘Listen, there have 
been mistakes made in the DMCA, there are a list of exceptions that 
have been created by the court, can we have a DMCA lite?’ And they 
said, ‘We don’t care what you do, as long as the U.S is satisfied.’” 
 
 
161 Wikipedia, “Office of the Prime Minister (Canada) at online: 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_the_Prime_Minister_(Canada)> accessed August 27, 2018.  
162 Government of Canada, “Privy Council Office” at online: < https://www.canada.ca/en/privy-council.html> accessed August 
27, 2018. 
163 Donald Savoie, Court Government and the Collapse of Accountability in Canada and the United Kingdom, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press,2008), cited in “Haggart, Copyfight, supra 153 at 160.” 
164 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 152 at 160, “In the Canadian political system, the PMO/PCO can and does arbitrate and 
facilitate and facilitate inter-departmental disputes. This role is particularly important in a case like that of copyright, where two 
departments share responsibility. In the 1997 debates over Bill C-32, the PMO of the Liberal prime minister Jean Chretien had to 
arbitrate between Industry Canada and Canadian Heritage, whose polarization reflected that of their main constituents. According 
to then-Chretien heritage minister Sheila Copps, the two departments were at such loggerheads that the Prime Minister Chretien 
had to set part of the balance in the bill, eventually deciding that, “because Canadian universities had recently received 
substantial funding, they could make do with limited copying exception.” 
165 Austin, Interview with Haggart, supra note 158, cited in “Haggart, Copyfight, Ibid. at 181.” 
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The compromise above may be attributable to the 2005-6 election where Stephen Harper 
promised to improve strained relations with the United States.166 
 
3.12 Evaluation of WIPO Internet Treaties’ Implementation Attempts by Canada 
One can hardly dispute Bannerman’s view that Canadian copyright law reform is one of 
the highly controversial subjects to have come before the Parliament of Canada.167 Canada’s 
implementation of the WITs was protracted and laborious, resulting in three failed bills (Bill C-
60, Bill C-61 and Bill C-32) until Bill C-11 was passed in 2012 (Copyright Modernization Act). 
Although these Bills attempt to make a number of amendments in the name of modernizing 
Canadian copyright law, the focus of the following discussion is the introduction of legal 
protection for anti-circumvention of TPMs.   
3.12.1 Bill C-60 
The first legislative attempt to implement the WITs was Bill C-60; it was introduced in 
the House of Commons as an Act to amend the Copyright Act by the erstwhile Canadian 
Heritage Minister, Liza Frulla, and it went through first reading on the June 20, 2005.168 Besides 
the need to implement the WITs, background explanations to the bill reveal that the reform was 
also influenced by judicial opinions, which indirectly flag the need for Parliament to review 
copyright legislation in Canada. The background narrative to Bill C-60 explained that169: 
The current law in Canada has been affected by a series of court 
decisions, the most important of which are the Federal Court decisions 
 
166 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 164 at 182, “Stephen Harper had distinguished his Conservatives from the Liberal party by 
promising to improve relations with the United States that had been strained by Canada’s refusal to join the United States in the 
Iraq war or to sign on to the US Ballistic Missile Defence program, and by the long-standing trade dispute over Canadian 
softwood-lumber exports to the United States.  
167 Bannerman, Copyright: Canadian Copyright, supra note 127 at 17. 
168 Parliament of Canada, “Bill C-60: An Act to Amend the Copyright Act” prepared by Sam N Banks & Andrew Kitching at 
online:                                                 
<https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/LegislativeSummaries/381LS512E > Accessed 
April 8, 2018.  
169 Ibid. 
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in BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe170 and the Supreme Court of 
Canada decisions in Society of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers171 
(Tariff 22) and CCH Canadian Limited v. Law Society of Upper 
Canada.172 […] In the case of BMG v. John Doe, music companies 
sought to force Internet service providers (ISPs) to divulge the names 
of customers who were making infringing material available on the 
Internet.  The Federal Court in BMG v. John Doe held that Canadian 
law allows the downloading of copyright-protected files for personal 
use, and the making of those files available to others on peer-to-peer 
networks.  The Federal Court of Appeal upheld the decision, although 
it cited privacy concerns and the weakness of the music companies’ 
evidence, rather than a right to personal use of downloaded files. 
In Tariff 22, the Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers 
of Canada (SOCAN) asked the Copyright Board to impose royalties, 
known as Tariff 22, on ISPs that facilitated the transfer of published 
works over the Internet.  The case ultimately reached the Supreme 
Court of Canada, which concluded that ISPs could not be held liable 
for illegal downloading on their networks, since section 2.4(1)(b) of 
the Act provided protection when a person or company merely 
provides the means of communicating copyrighted works to the 
public. In the case of CCH Canadian Limited v. Law Society of Upper 
Canada, the Law Society of Ontario was sued by legal publishers for 
providing a photocopy service and maintaining self-service 
photocopiers in its library for use by patrons.  The Supreme Court of 
Canada held that the “fair use” sections of the Act allowed libraries to 
have photocopiers available for people to make private copies of 
works held by libraries for research purposes. 
 
The text cited above confirms the assertion I advanced in chapter one: although copyright 
legislative reform falls within the purview of the legislative arm of government in Canada, the 
parliament’s legislative function may be influenced through a dialogue with the judicial arm of 
government. The interpretative role of the judiciary, especially in areas where the law is 
obsolete, nudges parliament to play its legislative role—ideally informed by the broad principles 
articulated in the jurisprudence. Bill C-60 is a good example. 
 
170 [2004] 3 FC 241, 2004 FC 488.  
171 [2004] 2 SCR 427. 
172 [2004] 1 SCR 339. 
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Despite the pressures for the United States on Canada to implement the WITs following 
its DMCA approach, Canada resisted the United States’ influence and adopted a more 
minimalistic approach in this Bill, especially concerning the implementation of the highly 
debated TPM provisions. Section 34.02(1) of Bill C-60 prohibited the circumvention of TPMs;173 
s.34.02(2) prohibits the offering of services to aid circumvention of TPMs.174 The two provisions 
are typical of what content industry stakeholders advocate for, but Bill C-60 went further in 
s.34.02(3) (a)-(d) to attempt to create a balance and safeguard users’ access to content, stating:175 
(3) If a technological measure protecting a material form of a work, a 
performer’s performance or a sound recording referred to in 
subsection (1) is removed or rendered ineffective in a manner that 
does not give rise to the remedies under that subsection, the owner of 
copyright or holder of moral rights nevertheless has those remedies 
against a person who knows or ought to know that the measure has 
been removed or rendered ineffective and, without the owner’s or 
holder’s consent, does any of the following acts with respect to the 
material form in question: 
                        (a) sells it or rents it out; 
(b) distributes it to such an extent as to prejudicially affect the owner 
of the copyright; 
(c) by way of trade, distributes it, exposes or offers it for sale or rental 
or exhibits it in public; or 
(d) imports it into Canada for the purpose of doing anything referred 
to in any of paragraphs (a) to (c). 
 
The plain interpretation of this provision is that it only prohibits circumvention for 
commercial purposes and/or infringement. This means that any circumvention that is not 
prejudicial to the market interest of the copyright holder is not liable for copyright infringement. 
Industry Canada and Canadian Heritage cooperated with each other and endorsed the balanced 
 
173 Parliament of Canada, “Bill C-60 2005: An Act to amend the Copyright Act” at online: < 
http://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/38-1/bill/C-60/first-reading/page-24 > accessed September 20, 2018.  
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid.  
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and minimalist approach adopted by Bill C-60 in a bid to implement the WITs.176 Haggart notes 
that “Canadian Heritage did not view the protection of TPMs and the outlaw of circumvention 
devices as the best solution to the problem, claiming that a maximalist approach was not 
smart.”177 The decision to allow circumvention for non-commercial purposes was, in my view a 
deliberate move not to follow the DMCA. As Haggart puts it, the US example served as a 
cautionary tale about what not to do – a form of reverse emulation.178 
 Jane Bailey argued that Bill C-60 had the potential to protect freedom of expression more 
than the United States’ DMCA.179 Stretching this point made by Bailey, freedom of expression 
here in my view does not simply means freedom of speech, but broadly speaking, it encompasses 
freedom as envisioned by the free culture philosophy – the freedom to access creative works, 
engage with the content, and in some cases, for creative minds, this engagement could foster 
further creativity. Bailey further advised that the Canadian government should stand firm and 
resist pressures from the United States to expand legal protections for TPMs and tailor the Bill to 
better protect the constitutional rights of users.180 Unfortunately, Bill C-60 was not passed into 
law. In fact, deliberations on Bill C-60 was short-lived as it only went through first reading in the 
legislative process due to dissolution of parliament on November 29, 2005.181 If Bill C-60 had 
progressed for further scrutiny, no doubt, it would have faced fierce opposition by stakeholders 
who were expecting a DMCA-styled approach. 
 
176 Doyle, Thievery, supra note 150 at 138, “cited in Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 166 at 129.” 
177 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 166 at 176. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Jane Bailey, “Deflating the Michelin Man: Protecting Users’ Rights in the Canadian Reform Process” in Michael Geist, ed, In 
the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law” (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 127-8. 
180 Ibid at 128. 
181 Wikipedia, “An Act to Amend the Copyright Act (38th Canadian Parliament, 1st Session)”, 2005 at online: < 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/An_Act_to_amend_the_Copyright_Act_(38th_Canadian_Parliament,_1st_Session) > accessed 
September 24, 2018. 
 207 
Despite the laudable and bold move by the parliament of Canada to implement the WITs 
independent of external pressure, and linked circumvention to infringement, Ian Kerr still faulted 
Bill C-60 on the grounds that it offered little or no protection for user privacy. He argued:  
It is my contention that statutory silence about the permissible scope 
of use of TPMs risks too much from a privacy perspective. In 
particular, I am of the view that any law protecting the surveillance 
technologies used to enforce copyright must also contain express 
provisions and penalties that protect citizens from organisations using 
those TPMs to engage in excessive monitoring or the piracy of 
personal information. The best solution from a privacy perspective is 
no legal protection for TPMs at all. However, if the copyright 
industries and government insist on claiming a legitimate need for 
new laws to prevent the circumvention of TPMs, then similar 
provisions are needed to protect citizens from organisations that use 
both TPMs and the law of contract as a kind of privacy circumvention 
device.182 
 
Privacy in the digital era is a broad subject, and it is not the focus of my research. 
However, it is pertinent to mention here that the privacy arguments articulated by Kerr raises 
serious concerns, which mostly impact on the user community. I agree with Kerr that, for the 
interest of balance and fairness, permitting the use of intrusive technologies for copyright 
enforcement should be checked by legal provisions that protect users, who are mostly unaware of 
the subtle ways in which these intrusive technologies work and how much of their data are 
collected. Laura Murray echoes the same privacy argument, stating that consumers may be 
unaware of these invasions of their privacy.183  
 
182 Ian Kerr, “If Left to Their Own Devices…How DRM and Anti-Circumvention Laws Can Be Used to Hack Privacy” in 
Michael Geist, ed, In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law” (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 170. 
183 Laura Murray, “Commentary: Bill C-60 and Copyright in Canada: Opportunities Lost and Found”, (2005) 30 CJC at online: < 
https://www.cjc-online.ca/index.php/journal/article/view/1663/1804 > accessed September 26, 2018.   
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Notwithstanding these shortcomings of the erstwhile BillC-60, it represented a step in the 
right direction in that it was attentive to the need to create balance among copyright stakeholders 
as envisioned by the Supreme Court of Canada per Justice Binnie in Theberge.184  
3.12.2 Bill C-61 
Three years after Bill C-60 was cut short, Bill C-61, the second attempt to implement the 
WITs was introduced (First Reading) on June 12, 2008. Bill C-61, which adopted less of a made-
in-Canada approach185 and, as has been argued, was largely modeled after the United States’ 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act186 in the sense that it expunged the non-infringing use 
exception to digital locks circumvention and prohibited trade in circumvention devices. Unlike in 
Bill C-60, where Industry Canada and Canadian Heritage reached a consensus, Bill C-61 
emerged in the midst of inter-departmental conflict between Industry Canada and Canadian 
Heritage.187 Haggart reports that: 
By May 2007, Bernier188and Industry Canada had prepared a 
presentation to the PCO to outline Industry Canada’s views on 
copyright – dealing mainly with TPMs, education, and private 
copying – and to receive permission to write a bill. Austin189 describes 
discussion with the PCO and PMO as “intense.” While Heritage’s 
initial reaction to the Industry package was less than positive, by July 
2007, Bernier and Oda190 reached an agreement, entitled “Moving 
Forward on Copyright Reform,” on all WIPO-related issues except 
TPMs, ISP liability and the treatment of publicly accessible material. 
However, these two bureaucracies were unable to come to an 
agreement on these issues.191 
   
 
184 Théberge, supra note 159. 
185 Bannerman, Copyright: Canadian Copyright, supra note 1467 at 34 
186 Cory Doctorow, “Canadian DMCA is worse than the American one” June 12, 2008, at online: < 
https://boingboing.net/2008/06/12/canadian-dmca-is-wor.html  > accessed September 26, 2018 “cited in Bannerman, Copyright: 
Canadian Copyright, supra note 167 at 34 footnote 77. 
187 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 177 at 181. 
188 Maxime Bernier was the then Industry Minister in Canada. 
189 Michele Austin was Maxime Bernier’s chief of staff 
190 Bev Oda was the then Heritage Minister 
191 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 187 at 181; Haggart’s interview with Michele Austin, supra note 165. 
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 Usually, when the departments are unable to reach a consensus, the PCO and PMO would 
intervene to resolve the matter,192 but in this case, it was different; the PMO and PCO were 
unwilling to intervene and overrule either department,193 but instead succumbed to international 
pressure from the United States. On this issue, Michele Austin, former chief of staff to the 
Industry Minister, reports that: “The PMO itself had specific, if vague, views on what should be 
done: ‘satisfy the United States”194 regardless of the approach to do so.195 
 
 This, unfortunately for Canada, is a demonstration of United States influence over its 
internal law-making process emanating from diplomatic and trade deals. Prior to assuming 
office, Stephen Harper had promised to improve relations with the United States.196 In order to 
score political points with the United States and maintain diplomatic relations, the Harper-led 
government had to make a judgment call on the copyright file between maintaining diplomatic 
relations with government and a made-in-Canada approach to WITs implementation and a 
political decision was made to favour the United States. Austin concludes by saying that the 
Prime Minister (Harper) considered the matter from only one perspective, and that is from a 
Canada-US relations point of view and not as an internal affair of Canada.197 The decision to 
please the United States creates a one-sided approach to the creation of Bill C-61, which 
eventually marred any attempt to follow a balanced approach to the bill. This also created a 
significant shift from the approach adopted in BillC-60 and the concept of balance as laid down 
by Justice Binnie in Theberge.  
 
192 Ibid. at 160. 
193 Ibid. at 181. 
194 Austin, Interview with Haggart, supra note 165. 
195 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 191.  
196 Ibid.   
197 Ibid.  
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The crucial issue or provision that created a paradigm shift is the fact that circumvention 
did not distinguish between circumvention for commercial purpose and circumvention for non-
commercial purpose. Bill C-61 in s.41.1 1(a) generally prohibited circumvention;198 s.41.1 1(b) 
prohibited the offering of circumvention services;199 s.41.1 1(c) prohibited the manufacture, 
import, renting and sale of technology devices that are designed primarily to be used for 
circumvention.200 Unlike Bill C-60, Bill C-61 did not create any exception to circumvention. 
Even copyright law creates exceptions to exclusive rights that it grants to copyright owners – as 
we have seen, this is to create balance in the copyright system in order not to punish users for 
non-infringing access to and use of works. The absence of an exception in Bill C-61 undermines 
the purpose of copyright law and the fundamental concept of access to creative content. While a 
blanket approach to circumvention and TPMs may be a welcome development for the content 
industry stakeholders, it runs contrary to the free culture perspective on promoting access to 
content to foster creativity. Jeremy de Beer sums up Bill C-61 as follows: “Bill C-61 basically 
says that technology trumps whatever rights consumers or competitors might have otherwise 
had. So, the law no longer matters. People only have whatever rights content owners choose for 
them.”201     
While Bill C-61 was in the pipelines, Industry Canada Minister, Bernier, was appointed 
to Foreign Affairs and was replaced by Jim Prentice.202 Prentice’s preparation to introduce Bill 
C-61 unsurprisingly generated a lot of criticisms, which gained momentum and led to a public 
 
198 Parliament of Canada, “An Act to amend the Copyright Act, Bill C-61” 2007-2008 at online: < 
http://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/39-2/bill/C-61/first-reading/page-57#11 >  accessed October 1, 2018 
199 Ibid. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Jeremy de Beer, “Jeremy de Beer on Canada’s Copyright Bill: Win-win or Spin-spin?” National Post, 13 June 2008, cited in 
“Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 195 at 188.”  
202 Haggart, Copyright, supra note 195 at 183. Haggart believes that Bernier reappointment to Foreign Affairs was partly due to 
his argument against following the United States’ DMCA approach to Bill C-61. 
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outcry against the Bill. The most prominent protest against Bill C-61 was the Facebook activism 
started by Geist on December 1, 2007.203 According to Geist, he started the “Fair Copyright in 
Canada” campaign by creating a Facebook page to get people to engage with the ongoing 
copyright reform at that time;204 but to Geist’s amazement, and fortunately, the concept went 
viral, gathering 10,000 members within a week205and becoming a movement with individuals 
creating their own “Fair Copyright For Canada” chapters across the country.206 The Copyright 
For Canada campaign created a social activism around copyright law in Canada, with tens of 
thousands members of the public leveraging on the power of digital technology and the internet 
to voice their opinion on copyright reform. These were just regular members of the public whose 
right to access content would be limited if Bill C-61 were passed into law. The public protests 
and outcry obviously got the attention of the government. Geist notes the Facebook group led to 
hundreds of letter and phone calls to Minister Prentice, Prime Minister Harper and other MPs.207 
The immediate impact of the protests against Bill C-61 was that it delayed the 
presentation of the Bill by six months.208 On June 12, 2008, Bill C-61 was presented for first 
reading.209 In an interview conducted by Haggart with Jean-Sébastien Rioux (who at the time 
was the chief of staff to former Industry Minister, Jim Prentice), Rioux notes that the bill tabled 
before Parliament was 90-95 per cent the same as the one in December 2007.210 This essentially 
meant that the controversial provisions of TPM and legal protection for circumvention remained 
 
203 Ibid. at 184. 
204 Michael Geist, “Copyright’s 10k” December 9, 2007 at online: < http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2007/12/copyrights-10k/ > 
accessed October 10, 2018. 
205 Ibid.  
206 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 202 at 185. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Parliament of Canada, Bill C-61, supra note 198. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Jean-Sébastien Rioux, interview with Haggart, February 26, 2009, cited in “Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 206 at 187.”   
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unchanged211 and critics of the bill argued that it was born in the USA by pointing to its 
treatment of TPMs.212 In response, the government’s justification for Bill C-61 was political; it 
stated that the policy rationale for the bill would settle the strained relationship with the United 
States,213 indicating that Canada was indeed trying to please the United States by drafting a bill 
modeled after the DMCA in its implementation of the WITs. This suggests to me that the 
national interest of Canada was relegated and not afforded due consideration (except to the 
extent that US approval is in Canada’s national self-interest). Haggart articulates that: 
Rather than the minimal changes of Bill C-60, Bill C-61 proposed a 
significant reorientation of Canadian copyright law towards the US-
desired position that the presence of digital locks should effectively 
trump user rights, adding a new layer to copyright that could 
potentially eliminate any user-owner balance in the law decidedly in 
favour of the owner.214 
 
 At first glance, it may seem that the impact of the Facebook activism against Bill C-61 
did not achieve the desired outcome since the TPM and anti-circumvention provisions remained 
unchanged. This may not be completely true, especially considering the fact that the bill never 
made it beyond first reading. The possibility that the online protests and other opposition may 
have led to a change in the TPM and anti-circumvention provisions can only be a matter of 
speculation since that opportunity did not arise. However, the significance of the online 
mobilization and protests against Bill C-61 is indicative of the fact that, with regards to 
copyright, the online platform provides a formidable opportunity to educate and mobilize the 
general public to promote the public interest and the purpose of copyright. 
 
211 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 206 at 188. 
212 Ibid. at 187. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ibid. at 188. 
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 Bill C-61 suffered the same fate as Bill C-60, becoming a victim of an election in three 
months (September 7, 2008) after it was tabled for first reading in the House of Commons and 
never progressed beyond that point due to political circumstances.215  
3.12.3 Bills C-32, C-11 and the Copyright Modernization Act, 2012 
After the ill-fated legislative journey of Bill C-61 was cut short, it was not until almost 
two years later that another attempt was made to implement the WITs. On June 2, 2010, Bill C-
32 was tabled for first reading before the House of Commons.216 Bill C-32 was referred to as the 
Copyright Modernization Act,217 but even if it advanced further in the legislative process than 
Bills C-60 and C-61, it did not go beyond the House committee stage.218Yet again, Bill C-32 
died on the order of the paper following the dissolution of the Parliament of Canada in March 
2011. Closely following Bill C-32 was Bill C-11, which was essentially identical to Bill C-32 but 
given a different number.219 Bill C-11 eventually broke the jinx, made it through the legislative 
process and was assented to on June 29, 2012;220 Bill C-11 became the Copyright Modernization 
Act (CMA), 2012.221 Finally, seven years and nine days after Bill C-60 was introduced,222 and 
fifteen years since Canada signed the WIPO treaties in 1997, they had been implemented and the 
government could heave a sigh of relief that the United States would no longer be breathing 
down their neck. But it is pertinent to ask if the CMA incorporated the concerns raised by the 
Geist-led protest against TPMs and anti-circumvention provisions. Since Bills C-61 and C-32 
 
215 Ibid. at 189. 
216  Parliament of Canada, “An Act to amend the Copyright Act, Bill C-32” June 2, 2010 at online < 
http://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/40-3/bill/C-32/first-reading > accessed October 17, 2018. 
217 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 211 at 190 
218 Ibid.  
219 Ibid.; Parliament of Canada, “An Act to amend the Copyright Act, Bill C-11” June 2, 2010 at online < 
http://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/41-1/bill/C-11/royal-assent/page-ToC > accessed October 17, 2018. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Copyright Modernization Act S.C. 2012, c. 20. 
222 Parliament of Canada, Bill C-60, supra note 168. 
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were largely the same as Bill C-11, which was eventually became the CMA, it suffices to review 
some of the key provisions in CMA. 
In my view, the provisions of the CMA attempt to balance the interests of users and 
creators. Some provisions favour the user community, while others favour copyright 
owners/content industry. Therefore, the question to be asked is whether, when taken as a whole, 
this Act successfully achieved the appropriate balance, or whether one set of stakeholders was 
ultimately favoured over the other. My review of the key provisions of the CMA and their 
implications will provide some insight on the possible answer to this question. 
The CMA attempts to safeguard the rights and interests of both users and copyright 
owners. However, the limitations or restrictions placed on the user rights, discussed further 
below, do not foster balance between copyright users and owners. Additionally, what could be 
regarded as the major benefits to copyright owners are the provision on TPMs and their legal 
protection, which I discuss extensively in chapter five. As we now know, TPMs are digital locks 
for creative works in digital form that effectively control or restrict access to works.223 
Additionally, these digital locks now also enjoy legal protection in the sense that the law 
prohibits breaking or circumventing these locks.224 These two provisions in the CMA favour 
copyright owners and bestow on them enormous rights to control access to and use of their 
digitized works. It has been argued that digital locks and anti-circumvention provisions nullify 
the relevance of the user right exceptions contained in the CMA. 
First, to show that the CMA favours the content industry more, it is necessary to look at 
the TPM and anti-circumvention provisions. The CMA defines TPMs and its functions thus: 
 
223 Copyright Modernization Act, supra note 221, s.41(a). 
224 Ibid. s.41(1). 
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technological protection measure” means any effective technology, 
device or component that, in the ordinary course of its operation, 
(a) controls access to a work, to a performer ’s performance fixed in a 
sound recording or to a sound recording and whose use is authorized 
by the copyright owner; or 
(b) restricts the doing … of any act referred to in section 3 [copyright 
and moral rights], 15 [performers’ rights] or 18 [rights of sound 
recording makers] and any act for which remuneration is payable 
under section 19.225 
 
 By this provision, the use of TPMs now enjoy legal support, which further strengthens 
the content industry’s control over content. The law also prevents circumventions of TPMs, and 
circumvention in the CMA is defined to mean: 
“circumvent” means, 
(a) in respect of a technological protection measure within the 
meaning of paragraph (a) of the definition “technological protection 
measure”, to descramble a scrambled work or decrypt an encrypted 
work or to otherwise avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate or impair the 
technological protection measure, unless it is done with the authority 
of the copyright owner; and 
(b) in respect of a technological protection measure within the 
meaning of paragraph (b) of the definition “technological protection 
measure”, to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate or impair the 
technological protection measure.226 
 
The CMA prohibits the circumvention of TPMs and the distribution of circumvention 
devices; s.41.1 states that: 
No person shall: 
(a) circumvent a technological protection measure within the meaning 
of paragraph (a) of the definition “technological protection measure” 
in section 41; 
(b) offer services to the public or provide services if 
(i) the services are offered or provided primarily for the purposes of 
circumventing a technological protection measure, 
(ii) the uses or purposes of those services are not commercially 
significant other than when they are offered or provided for the 
purposes of circumventing a technological protection measure, or 
 
225 Copyright Modernization Act, supra note 221, s.41. 
226 Ibid. 
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(iii) the person markets those services as being for the purposes of 
circumventing a technological protection measure or acts in concert 
with another person in order to market those services as being for 
those purposes; or 
(c) manufacture, import, distribute, offer for sale or rental or provide 
— including by selling or renting — any technology, device or 
component…227 
 
Unlike the Swiss and New Zealand flexible implementation approaches, Canada adopts 
stricter approach that does not allow circumvention for permitted or noninfringing purposes and 
this gives a near absolute control over content to copyright owners. However, the CMA tries to 
create balance by expanding the scope of fair dealing in favour of users.  The CMA in s.21228 
expands the scope of fair dealing in s.29 of the Copyright Act of 1985 to include research, 
private study, education, parody or satire; prior to this addition, the existing scope of fair dealing 
included news reporting, criticism or review.229 The expansion of fair dealing in Canada is, in my 
view, a positive development because it is an addition to user rights230 potentially allowing users 
to make further uses of works without fear of being liable for infringement.231  
However, a critical look at the entire provisions of the CMA reveals that the expansion of 
fair dealing may not be as beneficial as it purports to be, especially in the face of TPMs and anti-
circumvention provisions discussed above. Carys Craig, while acknowledging the expansion of 
the scope of fair dealing, at the same time points out that these expansions are undercut by the 
existence of TPMs.232 We will return to consider the relationship between fair dealing’s 
expansion in the face of TPMs and legal protection for digital locks in chapter five. For now, it 
 
227 Ibid. s.41.1. 
228 Ibid. at s.21; Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 217 at 191. 
229 Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42, s.29(1) & (2). 
230 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 228. 
231 Michael Geist, “What the New Copyright Law Means for You” November 13, 2012 at online: < 
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2012/11/c-11-impact/ > accessed October 24, 2018. 
232 Carys Craig, “Locking Out Lawful Users: Fair Dealing and Anti-Circumvention in Bill C-32” in Michael Geist, ed, From 
“Radical Extremism” to “Balanced Copyright”, Canadian Copyright and the Digital Agenda (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at 191-
2. 
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suffices to point to the enlargement of fair dealing as a perceived counterweight to the addition 
of industry-favouring TPM protections, creating the overall impression of a balanced legislative 
package. Further justification for the expansion of fair dealing is that the use of TPMs create an 
extra layer of protection for content owners in addition to the existing protection under copyright 
law, therefore it is justifiable to call for the expansion of fair dealing in the interest of balance.      
The CMA also provides a bundle of new exceptions, which consider the day-to-day 
actions of consumers in the digital space in relation to how they access and use digitized content. 
The intent here is to make these activities non-infringing when users interact with content. The 
CMA in s.29.23 creates a new exception called fixing signals and recording programs for later 
listening or viewing;233 this means that a user would not be liable for copyright infringement if he 
or she records a work or sound recording to watch or listen to it later.234 This is also called 
format and time-shifting right.235 This is a plus for the user community as it eliminates the worry 
over possible copyright infringement for individuals engaged in this kind of reproduction. 
However, it is expected that this kind of right would be curtailed by some restrictions to avoid 
abuse and to balance the interests of users and copyright owners. In order for the exception to 
apply, the work or sound recording must have been obtained legally,236 this means that if the 
sound recording or work was procured illegally, the exception does not apply, and the individual 
could be liable for copyright infringement. Other limitations include that the work or sound 
recording, must not have been obtained by circumventing a TPM,237 the recording must not be 
made more than once,238 it must not be kept longer than necessary,239 it must not be shared and 
 
233 Copyright Modernization Act, supra note 221 at s.29.23. 
234 Ibid. at 29.23(1). 
235 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 228. 
236 Copyright Modernization Act, supra note 221, s.29.23(1)(a). 
237 Ibid s.29.23(1)(b). 
238 Ibid s.29.23(1)(c). 
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must only be used for the individual’s private purposes,240 in other words, it cannot be used for 
commercial purposes. Additionally, the exception does not apply to works obtained through on-
demand services.241  
In my opinion, the restrictions placed on the permission to record for later listening or 
viewing seem reasonable to the extent that they seek to preserve a competitive market for 
products and services offered online without unduly curtailing the regular activities of 
consumers. The limitations to this exception discourage or deter some consumers from engaging 
in unauthorized commercial exploitation copyright owners’ content, which is a major concern for 
content owners.   
Also for the benefit of users, especially content creators who engage in video and music 
remixes, the CMA provides for an exception called non-commercial user-generated content 
(UGC - also known as the YouTube exception).242 Before the passage of the CMA, Daniel 
Gervais, in his analysis of UGC in the proposed Bill C-32 defines it as content that is created 
with the aid of tools specific to the online environment and disseminated using such tools.243 In 
other words, this exception is designed to apply to digital and internet-based content. Under this 
exception, it would not be an infringement of copyright if an individual uses an existing work 
made available to the public to create a new work and disseminate or permit it to be 
disseminated.244 In other words, it means an individual can create a derivative work based on an 
existing work publicly available even though that work has copyright. This exception fosters 
 
239 Ibid. s.29.23(1)(d). 
240 Ibid s.29.23(1)(e) & (f). 
241 Ibid s.29.23(2); In s.29.23(3), on-demand service means where a person can choose when to access a performer’s performance 
or sound recording.   
242 Ibid. s.29.21(1). 
243 Daniel Gervais, “User-Generated Content and Music File-Sharing: A Look at Some of the More Interesting Aspects of Bill C-
32” in Michael Geist, ed. From “Radical Extremism” to “Balanced Copyright”, Canadian Copyright and the Digital Agenda 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at 465.   
244 Ibid. 
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creativity by allowing access to existing works upon which a new work is created. The safeguard 
measures to ensure the proper balance of rights between copyright users and owners are that the 
dissemination of the new work should not be for commercial gain,245 if the name of the creator of 
the original work is known and where it is deemed reasonable, credit should be given to him or 
her,246 the original work should be non-infringing on another’s copyright,247 and the 
dissemination of the new work should not adversely affect the market or financial exploitation of 
the existing work.248 The UGC exception is a made-in-Canada provision and has formed the 
basis of Peter Yu’s proposal for its legal transplant to Hong Kong,249 which speaks to the fact 
that Canada got it right with the UGC. 
These exceptions discussed above represent a trade-off wherein the user is expected to 
abide by the limitations in return for access to and modification of creative works. On the part of 
the copyright owner, their commercial interests are protected in return for allowing access to and 
modification of their work. Arguably, these limitations or conditions attached to the non-
commercial user-generated exception appear to be fairly balanced and definitely a plus for users. 
It also fosters creativity and innovation in the digital space and significantly eliminates the fear 
of liability for copyright infringement. 
A further benefit to the user community is the CMA provision that caps the statutory 
damages for non-commercial copyright infringement at $5,000 (five thousand dollars).250 In my 
view, the intent of this provision is to reduce the likelihood of lawsuits against individuals for 
 
245 Copyright Modernization Act, supra note 204, s.29.21(1)(a). 
246 Ibid. s.29.21(1)(b). 
247 Ibid s.29.21(1)(c). 
248 Ibid. s.29.21(1)(d). 
249 Peter Yu, “Can the Canadian UGC Exception be Transplanted Abroad?” (2014) 26 IPJ 177-205 at online: < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2405821> accessed April 27, 2019. 
250 Supra note 245 s.38.1(1)(b), s.38.1 (1)(a) for copyright infringement bordering on commercial purposes, the court can award 
statutory damages in the sum of less than $500 and not more than $20,000; other mitigating provisions in the statutory provisions 
are if the defendant is unaware of the infringement – s.38.1(2), and in a special case – s.38.1(3).  
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non-commercial activities, including unauthorized downloading or mistaken reliance on fair 
dealing.251 This provision seeks to create fairness that benefits both the copyright owner and the 
user. This is because most copyright owners (especially large multinational corporations) may 
not bother to pursue a non-commercial infringement activity for a possible damage award that is 
infinitesimal and would perhaps not even cover attorney’s fees. For those cases that are 
unintentional infringement, they may be spared a copyright lawsuit. If a large corporation 
decides to institute legal action for non-commercial infringement, then it may be motivated by 
something else other than the meagre damage award of five thousand-dollars or less.   
Additionally, some non-commercial infringing activities could be mistakenly based on fair 
dealing, and so it helps curb the institution of unnecessary lawsuits against individual for 
activities that are non-commercial and not at a scale to pose potential threat to the copyright 
owner’s market exploitation of the creative work. However, there may be smaller corporations or 
individuals who may decide to initiate lawsuits against non-commercial infringers. Perhaps, the 
benefit in this for such corporations or individuals is that it could serve as deterrence against 
persons who wilfully engage in infringement albeit for non-commercial purposes.  
Generally, scholars agree that the provisions or exceptions in the CMA are welcome 
developments252 that benefit users and afford them the opportunity to access, use, modify and 
share content on the internet without fear of infringing copyright. In fact, these exceptions and 
 
251 Geist, The New Copyright Law, supra note 231. 
252 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 228 at 191; Geist, The New Copyright Law, supra note 231; and Craig, Locking Out Lawful 
Users, supra note 232 at 186-8. It pertinent to state that Craig’s work focused on the proposed Bill C-32 and not the CMA, 
however, her analysis is still relevant because the CMA contains the same provisions as Bill C-32. See also Samuel Trosow, “Bill 
C-32 and the Educational Sector: Overcoming Impediments to Fair Dealing” in Michael Geist, ed. From “Radical Extremism” to 
“Balanced Copyright”, Canadian Copyright and the Digital Agenda (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at 541-568; Gervais, User-
Generated Content, supra note 243. 
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user rights were not in the bills prior to Bill C-32 and so it could be regarded as the achievement 
of the Fair Copyright for Canada protest.253   
However, the presence of digital locks on a work effectively overrides many of these new 
user rights;254 for example, under fair dealing, the user must first access the work in order to 
create a parody, but if the work is TPM-protected, the user cannot access the work in the first 
place let alone create a parody out of it. The same is applicable to the non-commercial user-
generated content: access is needed in order to enjoy the right to modify the work. Craig also 
argues that these exceptions (user right exceptions) are undercut by technological capabilities;255 
she further states that users’ right to research, study, criticize, transform, even read and listen can 
be prevented by the use of technical controls.256 Craig concludes that TPMs prevent users from 
exercising their rights and this tips the balance away from users and the public interest257 in 
favour of copyright owners. 
 
3.13 Statutory Review of the Copyright Act 
Before Bill C-11 was passed into law, Geist observed that the bill, though flawed, was 
fixable.258 A further opportunity to fix the flaws in the Copyright Act may finally have arisen; at 
the time of writing this dissertation, the five-year mandated statutory review of the Copyright 
Act has been conducted and it is hoped that the restrictive digital locks and anti-circumvention 
provisions will be reconsidered and amended to mitigate the limitations that they impose on 
users in terms of access to work. In the course of the review, a plethora of submissions was made 
 
253 Michael Geist, “The Battle over C-11 Concludes: How Many Canadians Changed the Copyright Debate” June 18, 2012 at 
online: < http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2012/06/canadian-copyfight-success/ > accessed November 7, 2018. 
254 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 252. 
255 Craig, Locking Out Lawful Users, supra note 232 at 193. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Ibid. 
258 Geist, The Battle over C-11, supra note 253. 
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to the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology. In line with the focus of my 
research, it is pertinent to review, in particular, submissions from the Creative Commons 
organization, Canadian intellectual property law scholars and stakeholders in the content 
industry.  
Ryan Merkley, the CEO of Creative Commons made a written submission that 
unsurprisingly called for a freeze on copyright term extension, expansion of user right and he 
decried how TPMs limit users’ access to content in the digital age.259 Merkley’s submission 
urged the review committee not to consider any increase to Canada’s current copyright term 
(which is currently the life of the author plus first years) but this call was ultimately ignored in 
the conclusion of the CUSMA, which was signed (November 30, 2018) after Merkley’s 
submission (May 15, 2018). As mentioned earlier, though the CUSMA is yet to come into force, 
if and when it does, Canada is obliged to honour its international obligation under the agreement 
and increase the current copyright term by twenty years (making it life plus seventy years). 
Therefore, works that would otherwise have been available for the public to use without any 
restriction would be delayed by another twenty years.  
While advocating for the expansion of user rights, Merkley observed that TPMs — as 
well as private contracts — must not restrict users’ ability to exercise their legal rights to access 
and reuse works under limitations and exceptions to copyright.260 Merkley’s suggestion here is to 
review the TPM provisions. Similarly, on TPMs and in terms of expanding user rights, the 
submission by the Canadian intellectual property law scholars suggests the inclusion of remedies 
 
259 Ryan Merkley, Submission to Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology on Statutory Review of the 
Copyright Act, May 15, 2018 at online: < https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/INDU/Brief/BR9887146/br-
external/CreativeCommons-e.pdf> accessed April 27, 2019.  
260 Ibid.  
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for users who are improperly restrained by TPMs from making legitimate uses of content.261 
They submit thus: 
While the Act confers a broad range of remedies to copyright owners 
against infringement of copyright and moral rights, and the 
circumvention of TPMS, it provides no remedies for users who are 
improperly restrained in making legitimate uses of copyright works. 
Explicitly providing general common law and equitable remedies to 
users facing such limitations, coupled with an administrative 
procedure facilitating legitimate access to copyright works (e.g. to 
exercise fair dealing or for interoperability purposes on a work 
protected by TPMs) would be the natural next step toward solidifying 
copyright user rights. Similar administrative procedures mediating 
between copyright owners and users deprived of legitimate access to 
their works currently exist in, e.g., France and the UK.262  
 
 This is an interesting recommendation as it speaks to the heart of balance in copyright 
law. Incorporating this recommendation would to some extent mitigate the harshness of TPM 
and anti-circumvention provisions, and is an idea to which we will return in Chapter Five. 
 On the content industry side, the submission by Rogers Communications focused on 
incorporating provisions that would tackle the problem of streaming piracy, which it claims is 
now the new trend in unauthorized access to exclusive content. Rogers Communications state 
that as follows: 
For the last several years, Rogers has been actively involved in the 
fight against online content theft, as we have increasingly seen 
Canadians migrate away from downloading piracy – which was a 
material problem when the Copyright Modernization Act was 
considered – to streaming piracy which, in our experience, the current 
iteration of the Act is ineffective in preventing.263 
 
 
261 Myra Tawfik et al, Brief - Statutory Review of the Copyright Act submitted by Myra Tawfik on behalf of Canadian 
intellectual property law scholars, October 22, 2018 at online: 
<https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/INDU/Brief/BR10278308/br-external/BannermanSara02-e.pdf> accessed 
April 27, 2019. The other signatories include: Pascale Chapdelaine, Sara Bannerman, Olivier Charbonneau, Carys Craig, Lucie 
Guibault, Ariel Katz, Meera Nair, Graham Reynolds, Teresa Scassa, and Samuel E. Trosow. 
262 Ibid.  
263 Rogers Communications, Written Submissions of Rogers Communications on section 92 Copyright Act Review, December 
10, at online: < https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/INDU/Brief/BR10268870/br-
external/RogersCommunicationsInc-e.pdf> 2018, accessed April 27, 2019. 
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 As a major broadcasting and content services provider in Canada, Rogers 
Communications is concerned about unauthorized access to its exclusive content, which it claims 
is facilitated by the proliferation and widespread adoption of set-top boxes and unlicensed 
Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) services.264 Therefore, Rogers Communications 
recommends the inclusion of criminal prohibition against perpetrators who communicate 
exclusive content to the public on a commercial scale, introduce injunctive relief against ISPs. 
While I agree that unauthorized access is a genuine concern that should be tackled, it should be 
done in a manner that would not prejudice the right of the user or restrict his or her access to and 
legitimate use of content. 
 These submissions give us a taste of the kinds of changes that the various copyright 
stakeholders would like to see implemented. Parliament now has the opportunity to ensure that 
the outcome of the review reflects and advances balance within the Canadian copyright system. 
Since the enactment of the CMA in 2012, the judiciary (federal court of Canada) has also had the 
opportunity to interpret the TPM provisions, as will be discussed in detail in chapter five. 
Besides legal reforms, it is also possible to explore other means outside the law to achieve 
balance in the copyright system. In chapter two, I discussed how the dynamics of ICT has altered 
the status quo in the copyright system and continues to evolve to this day. It is clear, by now, that 
the law generally struggles to keep up with the pace of technological advancement, and this is at 
least equally true of copyright law in particular. Therefore, to adapt to a technology-driven 
copyright environment, the law must be complemented with innovative ways of ensuring that 
copyright stakeholders achieve their goals while still having due regard for the public interest. 
 
 
264 Ibid. IPTV service is the provision of TV content through the internet unlike the traditional means, which is done through 
satellite or cable.   
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3.14 Conclusion  
Copyright law reform in Canada has come a long way. After series of setbacks and 
delays, Canada eventually implemented the WITs through the enactment of the CMA. However, 
Canada chose to implement the TPM provisions following an approach that does not adequately 
balance the interests of copyright stakeholders; this imbalance does not advance the public 
interest and creates challenges in the exercise of users’ rights. The analysis in this chapter 
suggests that the legislative reforms still leave much to be desired in terms of achieving 
copyright balance in Canada. This points to the fact that the copyright system needs innovative 
and stakeholder-led regulatory initiatives to complement the effort of the law in regulating the 
activities of the copyright industry in the information age. This is the reason I suggest embracing 
a regulatory pluralism approach in chapter six.  
Having examined the law reforms, it is apposite to discuss how copyright stakeholders 
take action to achieve their goals through the existing copyright legal structure. The focus will 
remain on the free culture and the content industry stakeholders. Therefore, chapters four and 
five provide a detailed analysis comparing and contrasting the strategies of the free culture and 
content industry stakeholders by examining their strategic use of CCL and TPMs respectively.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE FREE CULTURE STAKEHOLDERS AND CREATIVE COMMONS LICENSING 
 
This chapter forms the first part of the case study analysis and examines the free culture narrative 
through the lenses of CCL. I discuss the origin and concept of CC organization as well as review 
CCL and the various categories. First, I examine the narrative on CCL through the views of 
scholars and their critical comments, and then I consider the CCL as a catalyst for the realization 
of free culture agenda in a copyright system where ICT plays a significant role. 
  
4.0 Background to the Establishment of Creative Commons 
The establishment of the CC organization is traceable to the buildup of critical comments 
on what is arguably a one-sided and content industry-controlled copyright system. It is pertinent 
to show how specific developments in copyright law (which the free culture advocates oppose) 
paved the way for the creation of CC. The crux of the seemingly unending free culture-content 
industry copyright face-off fundamentally stems from what has been described as copyright 
law’s perennial inability to determine where exclusive rights should end, and unrestrained public 
access should begin.1 Some scholars are critical of the copyright law reform trend and how it is 
modeled to favour the content industry. This conflict continues unabated especially in the wake 
of ICT, which heightens the ongoing controversy.  
 
1 Neil Netanel, “Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society” (1996) 106 Yale L.J. 283 at 285, cited in “Sheldon Halpern, “The 
Digital Threat to the Normative Role of Copyright Law” (2001) 62 Ohio State L.J. 569 at 573. 
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In 1994, John Barlow expressed the view that intellectual property law cannot be patched, 
retrofitted, or expanded to contain digitized expression.2 In 1996 Pamela Samuelson criticized 
the attempt by the then Clinton administration in the United States of America to turn the 
emerging information superhighway into a publisher-dominated toll road.3 She further stated: 
The administration wants to please the copyright industry, 
especially members of the Hollywood community, who are 
vital to the president’s re-election bid. And what this copyright 
industry wants in return is more legal control than ever before 
over the products they distribute.4  
  
Similarly, in 1996, Jessica Litman stated that the current copyright statute (the Copyright 
Act of 1976, which is currently in force as at the time of writing this dissertation) in the United 
States of America and those before it were composed by representatives of copyright-related 
industries to govern interactions among them.5 Litman further noted that most of the proposals 
for copyright amendment came from copyright holders or their defenders.6 Samuelson and 
Litman were responding to the Clinton Administration’s Information Infrastructure Task Force 
proposal to reform copyright law in a report titled “Intellectual Property and the National 
Information Infrastructure”.7  
Since the enactment of the DMCA, copyright scholars have continued to denounce its 
harmful impact on the copyright system in the digital era. For example, in 2001, Jane Ginsburg 
asserted that: 
 
2 John Barlow, “The Economy of Ideas” (1994) WIRED, at online: < https://www.wired.com/1994/03/economy-ideas/ > 
accessed July 17, 2017. 
3 Pamela Samuelson, “The Copyright Grab” (1996) online: < 
http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper.html?pg=1&topic=> at 1, accessed July, 17, 2017. 
4 ibid. The issue of the Clinton administration seeking to please the copyright industry has likely been a characteristic of most 
previous American administrations and is not unique to the Clinton administration. 
5 Jessica Litman, “Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age” (1996) 75 Or. L. Rev. 19 at 23. 
6 Ibid. at 24. 
7 Ibid. at 20. The report was the proposal that initiated the bid to implement WIPO Internet Treaties and despite critical comments 
against it, it was passed into law two years later; it is the current Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA).   
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The confluence of new technologies of access control and 
copy control, and the new legislation in the 1998 Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) preventing their 
circumvention, may in fact have enhanced the ability of 
copyright owners to wield electronic protective measures to 
control new kinds of exploitation of their works. In reaction to 
this, critics assert that the goal of copyright law has never, and 
should not now become, to grant “control” over works of 
authorship, but rather to accord certain limited rights over 
some kinds of exploitation.8 Economic incentives to create 
may be needed to achieve the constitutional goal of public 
instruction, but those incentives should be as modest as 
possible.9   
 
Lawrence Lessig articulates five ways through which copyright law increasingly gains 
controls over cultural works:10 the extension of copyright duration, copyright scope expansion, 
regulatory extension of copyright, technological regulation, and corporate monopoly. First, 
Lessig identifies that copyright duration has been extended eleven times by the United States 
Congress for existing works with the latest being the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension 
Act.11 Lessig argues that in practice (regardless of theory), there has been established a system of 
perpetual copyright by installment,12 which is reminiscent of the pre-177413 perpetual copyright 
system.14 In the second dimension, Lessig talks about the scope of copyright, stating that as at 
1790 copyright covered maps, chart and books. He noted that there were 174 publishers in the 
United States in 1790 and the law principally functioned to regulate publishers.15 This has 
 
8 Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books, 2001) at 81-86 cited in “Jane Ginsburg, “Copyright and 
Control over New Technologies of Dissemination” (2001) 101 Columbia L. Rev. 1613 at 1615.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Lawrence Lessig, “The Creative Commons” (2004) 65 Mont. L. Rev. 1 at 4-8. 
11 Ibid. at 5, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act increased copyright term in the United States from life of the author 
plus 50 years to life of the author plus 70 years; Susan Corbett, “Creative Commons Licenses, the Copyright Regime and the 
Online Community: Is there a Fatal Disconnect?”, (2011) 74 Modern Law Review 503 at 509 
12 ibid.  
13 As explained in chapter one, the case of Millar v. Taylor favoured perpetual copyright but the decision was reversed in 1774 in 
Donaldson v. Beckett. 
14 Supra note 10 at 4. 
15 Ibid. at 5; additionally, on the international level, the Berne Convention for Protection of literary and Artistic Works, adopted 
on September 9, 1886 (as amended in Paris, 1971) also expanded the scope of copyright, Article 2(1) states, “The expression 
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evolved over time and the scope of copyright not only covers maps, charts and books, but all 
works of authorship in tangible form.16 Third, is the expansion of copyright reach due to the 
advent of digital technology and the internet.17 Lessig explains that traditionally, some uses of 
copyright materials are unregulated by law, for example, reading a book, giving it to a friend to 
read or even selling it.18 However, the architectural features of the internet function in such a 
way that copies are made in the process of accessing digitized content.19 Lessig notes that 
controls are built into technology to regulate previously unregulated uses of content bringing it 
within the reach of copyright.20  The fourth dimension is, according to Lessig, a shift in the 
regulation of copyright from the courts to technology.21 Lessig stated that: 
But increasingly, it is no longer courts that are enforcing 
copyright law. Increasingly, it is technology. Increasingly, it is 
the software, or generically, “code” that controls how you get 
access to the copyrighted works that determine what your 
freedom is. Increasingly, that means your freedom is restricted 
by code. And not just code. As if code was not powerful 
enough, Congress is now passing laws that purport to protect 
the code that protects the copyrighted (and noncopyrighted) 
material. These protections often extend beyond the 
protections of copyright law itself.22 
 
 
“literary and artistic works” shall include every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the 
mode or form of its expression, such as books, pamphlets and other writings; lectures, addresses, sermons and other works of the 
same nature; dramatic or dramatico-musical works; choreographic works and entertainments in dumb show; musical 
compositions with or without words; cinematographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to 
cinematography; works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and lithography; photographic works to which are 
assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to photography; works of applied art; illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and 
three-dimensional works relative to geography, topography, architecture or science.” 
16 Ibid.; Susan Corbett, Creative Commons, supra note 11 at 509: “there are few exceptions – players of sports are not protected 
by performer’s rights and advertisement slogans and titles remain unprotected by copyright in most jurisdictions (although this 
appears to have changed in New Zealand; see S. Corbett, ‘Sunlec v. Electropar: Copyright in a Slogan” Literature for Market?’ 
(2009) 15 NZBLQ 227)” 
17 Ibid. at 6. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid. at 7. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid at 7-8. 
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The fifth dimension is the existence of corporate monopoly in the cultural industry 
notwithstanding that the copyright law initially vests copyright in authors.23 Lessig argues that 
this is a concentrated form of control producing a kind of homogenous culture, a culture, which 
is increasingly tailored to the vision of a certain mainstream market and, therefore, protects that 
market against different kinds of creativity.24 Lessig concludes: 
If you add all of these changes together – the changes in the 
duration, scope, reach, force, and concentration – then you 
reach a point that is important for us to see: Never in our 
history have fewer exercised more control over the 
development of our culture than now. Not when copyrights 
were perpetual, because even then the reach of the right was 
only narrowly about republishing a particular work. Never 
has the concentration been as significant as it is now. And so, 
just at the time when the technology enables extraordinary 
range of new creativity, the new creators, the new Walt 
Disneys, must fight this system of legal regulation to find a 
right to speak.25 
 
According to Lessig, in response to the imbalance in the copyright system described above, 
the copyright world could be governed by two extremes; the first is where all rights must be 
controlled and the second is where no rights should be controlled.26 He identifies yet another 
copyright world where three blocs exist – all rights reserved, no rights at all and some rights 
should be controlled but not all.27 The concept of some rights reserved alludes to the concept of 
CCL, which free culture advocates believe could potentially tilt the copyright scale to achieve 
balance.  
 
23 Ibid. at 9. In the United States, despite vesting copyright in the author, corporate monopoly exists because some of the works 
are usually what is called “work for hire”, meaning that corporate organizations hire authors to create the work but the copyright 
in the work is assigned to the corporation. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Lessig, Creative Commons, supra note 10 at 9 
26 ibid. at 10. 
27 ibid. 
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While Lessig’s views above are compelling, it is necessary to accommodate critical 
comments on his opinion; these counter views will be discussed in detail when I offer a critique 
of CC organization and the CCL. However, Jeffrey L. Harrison’s critique in 2003 is a good 
example to consider briefly at this point. Harrison notes that he agrees with some of Lessig’s 
conclusions and that there is an imbalance in the copyright system.28 The imbalance referred to 
by Harrison is the inequality that exists between users’ rights and those of copyright owners. 
However, in a counter argument, Harrison contends that some of the views expressed by Lessig 
are one-sided and are characterized by a lack of discernable and consistent reasons underlying 
the rationale for his views.29 Presumably, what Harrison refers to as Lessig’s one-sided view 
could be his advocacy for the liberty to share and access content in the digital world as opposed 
to restriction of access to content by copyright law. This of course, is necessary for the much-
needed balance that Harrison himself agrees with. However, perhaps Harrison’s concern is that 
the CCL disregards the interests of copyright owners who seek to exploit their content for 
financial reward. Despite the views of critics, Lessig and other supporters of the free culture 
decided to devise a means to make some rights reserved a reality, especially since the well-
resourced and multinational content industry stakeholders30 show no sign of changing their 
stance on copyright. In support of the CC cause, Michael Carroll argues that copyright law 
follows a one-size-fits-all approach and assumes that all authors seek maximum legal control 
over their respective works.31 The creation of CC can be regarded as self-help in the copyright 
system riding on the platform of ICT.  
 
28 Jeffrey L. Harrison, “Creativity or Commons: A Comment on Professor Lessig” (2003) 55 Fla. L. Rev. 795 at 795. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Blayne Haggart, Copyfight: The Global Politics of Digital Copyright Reform (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) at 
166. 
31 Michael Carroll, “Creative Commons as Conversational Copyright” in Peter K. Yu, ed, Intellectual Property and Information 
Wealth: Issues and Practices in the Digital Age (USA: Praeger Publishers, 2007) 445 at 447. 
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4.1 Creative Commons Organization: Establishment and Concept 
Following the background given above and to locate a midpoint between all rights 
reserved (complete control) and no rights at all (complete freedom), the CC was born. It 
developed as a response to a challenge presented by online creativity.32 As noted briefly in 
chapter two, Lessig was the brain behind the creation of CC, which was established in 2001 as a 
non-profit organisation;33 it received generous support from the Center for the Public Domain 
and is led by education experts, technologists, legal scholars, investors, entrepreneurs and 
philanthropists.34 Other founding members of the CC include James Boyle, Michael Carroll, Hal 
Abelson, Eric Saltzman and Eric Eldred.35 It is pertinent to mention here that references to 
“Creative Commons or CC” are to the non-profit organization while the usage of “Creative 
Commons licensing or CCL” connotes reference to the licensing scheme by which owners of 
content license their works.  
CC has employed the internet to advance the free culture agenda and promote the 
dissemination of knowledge. As noted in chapter two,36 Lessig explicitly states his support for 
Stallman’s GNU Project so it is unsurprising that CC was partly inspired by Stallman’s free 
software project37 with the goal of building flexibility into the copyright system amidst 
increasingly restrictive default rules.38 CC helps creators and authors to share their knowledge 
and creativity by providing free and easy-to-use copyright licences that authorize licensees to use 
 
32 Susan Corbett, Creative Commons Licenses, supra note 11 at 503. 
33 Wikipedia, Creative Commons” at online: < https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creative_Commons > accessed July 19, 2017. 
34 Creative Commons, “History”, at online: < https://creativecommons.org/about/history/> accessed July 19, 2017. 
35 Nick Scharf, “Creative Commons-ense? An analysis of tension between copyright law and the Creative Commons”, (2017)12 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 376 at 377. 
36 Chapter two of this dissertation. 
37 Bas Bloemsaat & Pieter Kleve, “Creative Commons: A business model for products nobody wants to buy” (2009) 23 Int. Rev. 
of Law, Computers & Technology 237 at 238; Susan Corbett, Creative Commons, supra note 11 at 505 
38 ibid. 
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these creative works under certain licence conditions.39 In other words, the CC organization 
conceived a scheme of licensing called Creative Commons licensing (CCL) through which 
creators and authors of cultural works can choose to provide their works in digitized formats for 
free, but users of such works must comply with certain licence conditions. Lessig envisions the 
proliferation of ICT as a phenomenon that facilitates the sharing of creative works for users and 
creators to use and be inspired to continue the line of innovation.40 He published three successive 
works,41 which could be said to herald the establishment of the CC and further strengthen the 
free culture agenda in the copyright system.   
4.1.1 Objective and Ideology of the Creative Commons Organization 
As I understand it, the CC initiative rests on three basic ideological foundations. Firstly, to 
promote the free culture agenda so that creative works are made accessible through the internet 
for future users/creators to build on. It was intended that this ideology would enrich the society 
and foster public interest in the use of creative works. Secondly, the CC ideology promotes the 
creation of a commons as a key to enhance creativity42.  In articulating the meaning of commons, 
Michael A. Heller describes it as “a legal regime, in which multiple owners are each endowed 
with the privilege to use a given resource, and no one has the right to exclude the other.43” The 
name “Creative Commons” derives from the commons concept where authors and creators freely 
share their works creating a knowledge-based source accessible to all for free and to be used 
under certain conditions. The third CC ideology is its recognition and assertion of copyright in a 
 
39 Creative Commons, “What we do” at online: < https://creativecommons.org/about/ > accessed July 20, 2017.  
40 Susan Corbett, Creative Commons, supra note 32 at 507. 
41 Lawrence Lessig, Code and other law of cyberspace, (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas, 
The Fate of The Commons in a Connected World, (Toronto; New York: Random House, 2001); Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: 
How Big Media uses Technology and the Law to lock down Culture and Control Creativity, (New York: The Penguin Press, 
2004).  
42 Niva Elkin-Koren, “What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons (2005) 74 
Fordham Law Review at 389.  
43 Michael A. Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets” (1998) 111 Harv. L. 
Rev. 621,623-4, cited in “Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do, supra note 42.”  
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manner that promotes its free culture agenda to help promote balance in the copyright system. 
Copyright as provided by the law is recognized by the CC organization but instead of exploiting 
proprietary right in creative works, the right is used to give liberty to access and use of creative 
works, while requiring licensees of such works to adhere to certain licence conditions. 
The CC was established to give authors and creators the opportunity to exercise their rights 
differently from the traditional copyright method through a licensing scheme that is free and easy 
to use. The promotion of free culture is the core ideology of CC – on the one hand, this gives 
authors and creators the liberty to share their works, and on the other hand, users are given the 
freedom to access these works and abide by some terms stipulated by the author or creator of the 
work. This ideology of the CC is realized through the introduction of the CCL, that promotes 
creators’ rights by giving them the opportunity to exercise their rights (exclusive rights under 
copyright law) in a way that makes it possible to provide their works for free to users and inspire 
transformative use, which in turn leads to follow-on creativity and innovation. The ideology of 
CC does not conflict with the existing copyright system or attempt to establish an alternative to 
copyright; on the contrary, copyright is the foundation on which it actualizes its objectives. But, 
this is somewhat misunderstood as I clarify subsequently.  
The fundamental objective that underpins the CC initiative is to respond to the obstacles to 
creativity, which copyright law ironically creates through the restriction of access to content. 
This objective is achieved through the creation of a flexible option within the copyright system 
to accommodate the preferences of authors and creators who choose to freely make their cultural 
works available for use by others who in turn agree to adhere to the licence conditions. By 
making their works accessible to the public, some users build on them through transformative 
use (only applicable to some licences) and inspire the continuation of innovation and creativity. 
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Consequently, CC seeks to transmit a vast number of creative works into the “commons.”44 Niva 
Elkin-Koren states that copyright law provides owners with a set of exclusive rights to their 
works and this imposes a correlative duty on non-owners to seek owners’ permission for every 
use (except fair use) of their works protected by copyright.45 In her reasoning, Elkin-Koren 
identifies two barriers to access: first is the legal right to restrict access and second is the 
information costs associated with obtaining a licence.46 CC accepts the first and focuses on the 
later.47 Elkin-Koren further explains that the information costs associated with obtaining 
permission to use copyrighted materials are prohibitively high;48 the expression “protected by 
copyright” is not readily evident and would require elaborate legal analysis.49 Additionally, the 
process of identifying the owners, determining the legal status of the work, and negotiating terms 
of use is often very expensive50 and in some cases, impossible. Similarly, Bloemsaat and Kleve 
observe that it is necessary for almost any use of a work to clear copyright,51 which consists of 
locating all the copyright holders that (still) have rights to a work and getting their permission.52 
This task of clearing copyright can pose a huge obstacle for a potential user or distributor of a 
work.53 
Overcoming the obstacles to creativity is precisely what Lessig and other free culture 
advocates wanted to achieve when the CC organization was established,54 and the intention was 
to achieve this without specifically altering the existing legal structure of the copyright system 
 
44 Severine Dusollier, “The Master’s Tools v. The Master’s House: Creative Commons v. Copyright” (2006) 29 Columbia JL & 
Arts 271 at 272. 
45 Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do, supra note 42 at 379.  
46 Ibid.  
47 ibid. Accepting the first means CC acknowledges copyright owners’ exclusive rights in their works; focusing on the second 
means CC seeks to eliminate the barrier associated with seeking owners’ permission to use their works.  
48 Ibid. at 379-80. 
49 ibid. at 380. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Meaning to obtain permission to use the work. 
52 Bloemsaat & Kleve, Creative Commons, supra note 37 at 238.  
53 Ibid.  
54 Wikipedia, Creative Commons, supra note 33; Scharf, Creative Commons-sense? note 35.  
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thereby creating a new way to share creative works and enable the dissemination of knowledge 
for the benefit of all. The ultimate purpose for CC is to create a balance in the system. As Lessig 
puts it: 
Take this world that is increasingly a world by default 
regulating and change it into a world where once again we can 
see the mix between all, none, and some, using the technology 
of the Creative Commons. This change is done through the 
voluntary action by individuals - creators, content owners. 
They take voluntary action by marking their content with a tag 
that expresses a kind of freedom. They use these tags then to 
build a kind of balance into the system to restore this 
reasonableness into the system by giving people a way to say, 
“I don’t believe in this extremism.55 
  
 According to Lessig,56 technology has become a means to regulate copyright. 
Interestingly, it is the same instrument of technology that CC creatively uses to create balance in 
the copyright system.57 The freedom created by CC has enabled a simple way of lawfully using 
creative content through a less cumbersome process. 
4.1.2 Creative Commons Organization and Copyright  
One of the misconceptions about CC is the lack of understanding on how its agenda fits 
within the copyright system. The lack of clarity on CC-copyright relationship may even be found 
among supporters of CC; perhaps, some extra-zealous CC supporters, conceive CC erroneously 
as the new copyright. This may have informed the critical statement of Severine Dusollier, a CC 
advocate, who, as a project leader for CC in Belgium, in 2006, writes that “it is not clear whether 
the Creative Commons initiative seeks only to eliminate the excesses in the copyright regime or 
if its ultimate objective is to dispose of copyright altogether. I will assume that the purpose of the 
 
55 Lessig, Creative Commons, supra note 10 at 11.  
56 Ibid. at 7,8. 
57 This also aligns with the narrative I develop in chapter five, that ICT can be used as an instrument by copyright stakeholders to 
achieve their respective goals without much ado. 
 237 
Creative Commons project is the former not the latter.”58 Dusollier, in my view is expressing her 
concern over people’s understanding of CC, its agenda, and its relationship with the copyright 
system. Her statement suggests that there are some CC advocates, who seem to miss the point 
about CC (or what it claims to be or has become), its ideology and objective in relation to the 
existing legal structure of copyright. It is therefore necessary to clarify the relationship between 
CC and copyright. 
The CC organization promotes the CCL scheme, which operates within the copyright 
system and it is not a separate copyright regime. CCL is not an alternative to copyright system; 
rather, it works alongside copyright so that authors can always easily modify the default 
copyright terms to best suit their needs.59 To say CCL is an alternative means for creators to 
exercise their rights differently within the copyright system is appropriate and captures its 
purpose; on the contrary, to say that CCL is an alternative to copyright is not a correct 
understanding of what CCL stands for. CCL is not a substitute to copyright but operates on the 
foundation of the copyright system. This means that the CCL scheme recognizes the author’s 
ownership of the work before and after she licenses it under any of the CCL. Therefore, it uses 
the traditional copyright system to achieve its aim. This point is crucial in the light of the concern 
raised by Dusollier.60 
Scharf’s articulation presents a clear understanding of the relationship between CC and 
copyright when he states that: 
Although CC has its own different rules, copyright and CC can 
operate jointly over music content and are therefore co-
existent; copyright provides the underlying protection from 
which use can be administered via the CC licence. The fact 
 
58 Dusollier, The Master’s Tools, supra note 44 at 273 footnote 5. 
59 Creative Commons, “About” at online: < http://creativecommons.org/about/ > accessed July 24, 2017. 
60 Dusollier, The Master’s Tools, supra note 58. 
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that CC operates with copyright law as its regulatory 
underpinning is perhaps its most workable aspect as it does not 
require any restructuring of copyright law itself and is unlikely 
to prejudice the commercial interests served by the existing 
regime.61 
 
Rather than calling for an outright displacement of copyright (which in itself is counter-intuitive 
because CC relies on copyright), it is in line with the goals of CC to aspire to neutralize control 
around digitized works and remove barriers to creativity. 
In my view, the free culture community realized that the writings and critical comments 
against the copyright system were not yielding the desired change. Therefore, a change of 
strategy was needed. In 2004, Lessig notes that, referring to his outspokenness against the 
repression of culture, “I have been in the middle of this debate now for five years. It has only 
gotten worse.”62 The CC strategy, as Scharf notes, does not seemingly upset the content industry 
stakeholders’ interest and also appears to offer the free culture stakeholders the freedom they 
seek. The CC idea to create a balance in the copyright system comes from within the copyright 
system and not without. It is quite an ingenious arrangement though not flawless, as I show later. 
 
4.2 Creative Commons Licensing 
Pursuant to its aim of creating liberty to easily share creative works and contribute to the 
progress of science, the CC organization created and deployed online, various licence categories. 
The CCL arrangement helps to make works available for both consumptive and transformative 
use such as reading a book or article, viewing a video and listening to musical works as well as 
building on these works to create something new. CCL leverages the internet as an enabler to 
 
61 Scharf, Creative Common-sense, supra note 35 at 378. 
62 Lessig, Creative Commons, supra note 10 at 12. 
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provide a wider reach for access and usability of copyright works; and this in turn promotes the 
free culture idea in the copyright system. In the copyright system, there are authors and owners 
who desire to exploit the copyright in their works for economic gain and there are those who do 
not; the latter, in particular, take advantage of the CCL scheme to make their works available for 
others to use under certain licence conditions. However, nothing precludes some financially 
motivated copyright owners to license their works under the CCL arrangement to create 
awareness on such works, which may hopefully generate financial reward in the long run. Before 
proceeding to discuss the various categories of the CCL scheme, it is necessary to clarify 
whether or not the CC licenses are contracts.  
4.2.1 Is the Creative Commons Licensing Scheme also a Contract? 
A good starting point in the analysis is to briefly explain what these concepts (licence and 
contract) mean. A licence is special permission to do something on, or with, somebody else’s 
property which, were it not for the licence, could be legally prevented.63 Similarly, The Law 
Dictionary states that a licence is a permission, accorded by a competent authority, conferring the 
right to do some act, which without such authorization would be illegal, or would be a trespass or 
a tort.64 From these definitions of a licence, it is important to emphasize that for a licence to 
exist, there must be an issuing authority, who unilaterally confers the privilege to do certain acts, 
which would otherwise be illegal. Using the term “privilege” means that the licensee does not 
offer the licensor anything (in monetary value or otherwise) in exchange for the privilege. In the 
copyright system therefore, a copyright owner is at liberty to grant a licensee the privilege or 
permission to access and use her content under certain terms, otherwise such would amount to 
 
63 Lloyd Duhaime, “Licence Definition” at online: < http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/L/License.aspx > accessed August 
8, 2019. 
64 The Law Dictionary, “What is a Licence?”, at online: < https://thelawdictionary.org/license/ > accessed August 8, 2019.  
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copyright infringement. In other words, if the terms of a licence are violated, the licensee can be 
sued for copyright infringement but not breach of contract where there was no contract as such.  
A contract on the other hand, is an exchange of promises by two or more persons backed 
up by consideration; consideration in the eyes of the law does not have to always be of monetary 
value, it could be the promise to do an act. In the formation of a valid contract, the essential 
elements necessary for the formation of a valid contract are offer, acceptance and consideration. 
For example, Mr. A says to Mr. B, if you mow my lawn during the summer months, I will pay 
you $100 monthly. In Canada, United States and common law jurisdictions, this is an offer from 
Mr. A to Mr. B, and Mr. B can choose whether or not to accept the offer. If he does accept the 
offer, a contract is formed, and the consideration is the $100. If any of the parties does not fulfil 
their obligation or promise, an action for breach of contract can be instituted against the 
defaulting party. 
There are differences between a licence and a contract. The fundamental differences are 
that licences are revocable at will, but contracts are not;65 licences can be created unilaterally,66 
while contracts require mutual consent; and licences create privileges, but contracts create 
duties.67 Furthermore, in the context of copyright, if the terms of a licence is not complied with, 
the licensor can sue the licensee for copyright infringement, but if the licence is embodied in a 
contract (i.e. it has an offer, acceptance and consideration), violation of the terms makes the 
licensee liable for copyright infringement and breach of contract. 
With the foregoing, we might ask whether the CCL scheme operates as a contract or, in 
other words, whether the licences are contractual. As far as my research reveals, the CC 
 
65 Christopher Newman, “A Licence is Not a Contract Not to Sue: Disentangling Property and Contract in the Law of Copyright 
Licences” (2013) 98, Iowa L. Rev. 1101 at 1127. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
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organization has consistently branded its permission scheme as a “licence” and the word 
“contract” is not used interchangeably with “licence.” In the formation of these licences, each 
licensor chooses a particular licence (discussed below) under which she desires to give consent 
for her work to be used. This could imply that the licence is effectively a unilateral creation, 
which is one of the characteristics of a licence. There is no meeting between the licensor and 
licensee to bargain over the terms of the licence. A prospective licensee can either accept the 
terms and abide by them or leave it. Regarded in this way, it may appear that a CC licence does 
not involve an offer, acceptance and consideration--it is simply the grant of a permission to use 
the licensor’s content.  
Arguably, these characteristics of the CC licences do not quite align with the traditional 
definition and formation elements of a contract as discussed above, and instead, fitting more 
readily with the description of a licence. However, contrary to the norm,68 the CC organization 
claims that licences issued under its scheme are not revocable69 and this oddity seems to mimic a 
contract. Nonetheless, there may be some justification for this oddity, at least from a practical 
point of view. A work licensed under CC has one licensor but may have thousands of licensees, 
so it may be practically impossible to communicate a revocation to all the licensees. The CC 
offers licensors what I call a pseudo revocability by allowing them stop the distribution of the 
work under the licence at any time;70 technically, this means revocation, but the drawback is that 
its effect may be minimal because anyone who already has access to the distributed work may 
still redistribute it under the same licence.71 Perhaps CC’s rationale for making the licences 
irrevocable is that revocation may prove ineffectual because it is impossible to completely retract 
 
68 Supra note 65. 
69 Creative Commons, “Frequently Asked Question” at online: < https://creativecommons.org/faq/#can-i-change-the-license-
terms-or-conditions > accessed August 9, 2019. 
70 Ibid.  
71 Ibid. 
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materials distributed online. Arguably, the irrevocability of the CCL stems from the exchange of 
promises in the licensing scheme where the licensor offers an irrevocable licence on the grounds 
that the licensee promises to use the CCL and adhere to the terms of whichever licence she 
chooses. Therefore, the use of the work or acceptance of the licence on those terms implies a 
promise from the licensee in return for a promise of irrevocability on the part of the licensor. 
Regarded in this way, the relationship (exchange of promises) arguably makes the CCL scheme 
more of a contractual relationship than merely a free licence. 
In sum, I would argue that, notwithstanding the irrevocability anomaly, CC’s permission 
scheme, though branded a licence, does have elements that could constitute a contractual 
relationship.  
4.2.2 Creative Commons Licence Categories 
The CC licences have been designed to, as much as possible, accommodate creator and 
user preferences. Therefore, in my opinion, these licence categories are not just for convenience, 
but tailored to suit both creators and users. The different categories of CCL are: 
i. Attribution Licence: This licence (CC-BY) authorizes the public to do whatever they like 
with the work such as copy, disseminate and even produce derivative works for financial reward. 
The only condition the licence requires is that credit must be given to the author for the original 
work. It is regarded as the most accommodating of all licences offered by CC.72  
ii. Attribution Share Alike Licence: This licence also permits modification of the licensor’s 
work and even for commercial purposes. The licence condition requires that credit must be given 
to the original author and whatever derivative works the user generates and wishes to license it, it 
 
72 Creative Commons, “About The Licences” at online: < http://creativecommons.org/licences/ > accessed July 25, 2017. 
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must be the same terms under which the original work was licensed.73 That is, a CC BY-SA 
licence. 
iii. Attribution Non-commercial Licence: This licence permits others to modify your work and 
even produce derivative works based on your work. The licence condition is that credit must be 
given to the original author and derivative works must be non-commercial. Licensing of 
derivative works does not have to be under similar terms as the original work.74 This licence is 
denoted as the CC BY-NC. 
iv. Attribution Non-commercial Share Alike Licence: This is the same as number (iii) above 
except that the derivative work has to be licensed under identical terms as the original work and 
it is represented as CC BY-NC-SA. 
v. Attribution Non-Derivative Licence: This licence authorizes copying and redistribution of 
the work both for commercial and non-commercial purposes, but credit must be given to the 
author and derivative works are not allowed.75 This is represented as CC BY-ND. 
vi. Attribution Non-commercial No Derivative Works Licence: This is the most restrictive 
licence compared to all the other categories;76 Here the work may only be used for non-
commercial purposes and you must give credit to the author and cannot modify the work; it is 
denoted as CC BY-NC-ND. 
The image below represents the licences explained above. 
 
73 Creative Commons, The Licences, supra note 59. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid.  
76 Ibid. 
 244 
 
Source: Pixabay https://pixabay.com/vectors/creative-commons-licenses-icons-by-783531/ 
 
 The CC also provides an “all rights granted” licence category, which gives licensors, who 
choose to, the opportunity to dedicate their work to the public domain and is represented as 
CC077 and I will discuss it subsequently. 
 
4.3 Three Layers of Creative Commons Licences 
It is common practice that licences are embodied in some form of legal documentation 
which stipulates what the licensee can and cannot do.  The same applies to CCL, except that the 
documentation comes in three layers – legal code, commons deed (not used in the sense of a 
legal instrument) and machine readable version of the licence.78 The legal code is the actual 
 
77 Creative Commons, The Licenses, supra note 59. 
78 Ibid.; Lessig, Creative Commons, supra note 10 at 11. 
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licence and it contains the rights and obligations of the parties;79 it ensures that the terms are 
enforceable in court.80 The commons deed, according to CC is a summary of the important terms 
and conditions for licensors and licensees;81 in other words, it does not contain legal 
technicalities that are difficult for non-lawyers to decipher. The simplified language of the 
commons deed essentially dispenses with the need to seek the professional legal services (which 
is mostly unaffordable for the ordinary user) to draft a contract to permit the use of content. 
Some users just want to access and use content “on-the-go” so the commons deed is fast and 
easy and eliminates barriers to creativity. It is by far one for the most valuable benefits of the 
CCL scheme; from the outset, users know the terms and conditions of use. The third layer of 
licence is not for human consumption but designed to convey the licence data to computer 
programs such as search engines.82 According to CC:  
“In order to make it easy for the Web to know when a work is 
available under a Creative Commons licence, we provide a 
“machine readable” version of the licence — a summary of the 
key freedoms and obligations written into a format that 
software systems, search engines, and other kinds of 
technology can understand. We developed a standardized way 
to describe licences that software can understand called CC 
Rights Expression Language (CC REL) to accomplish this.”83 
  
 For every work that a licensee uses under the CCL scheme, it has these three licence 
layers, according to Lessig, these three layers live together in a Creative Commons tag.84 So in a 
nutshell, the way CCL works is that if an author chooses to make her work available for use, she 
 
79 Dusollier, The Master’s Tools, supra note 44 at 276.  
80 Ibid.; Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do, supra note 42 at 391.  
81 Creative Commons, About The Licences, supra note 72.  
82 Bloemsaat & Kleve, Creative Commons: A business model, supra note 37 at 242. 
83 Supra note 81. 
84 Lessig, Creative Commons, supra note 78. 
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selects a CCL of her choice and attaches it to the work. Users who come across her work online 
are free to use it provided they agree to keep within the licence conditions. 
  
4.4 Creative Commons Licences and Litigation 
 There have been some cases of alleged violation of CCL terms by users, resulting in 
litigation. In 2016, in Äventyrsgruvani Tuna Hästberg v. Gunnarsson, a photographer licensed a 
photo in Sweden using CC-BY-NC-ND version 2.5,85 the defendant reused the photo, he 
attributed the company that published the photograph but not the original photographer.86The 
plaintiff’s photo attribution claim was dismissed by the Swedish court on the grounds that the 
plaintiff could not prove their copyright in the photograph.87 This case demonstrates one of the 
risks in using works licensed under the CCL and indeed other forms of intellectual property such 
as patents or trade-marks, you may not be entirely sure the licensor is the bona fide owner of the 
intellectual property. On a speculative note, if the plaintiff had been able to establish rights in the 
photograph, relief sought could be compelling the defendant to comply with the CC licence 
conditions, or such other acts/relief according to the applicable law in Sweden. In another case, 
Chang v. Virgin Mobile,88 a mobile phone company in Australia did a commercial in 2007 using 
the photograph (licensed under CC-BY 2.0) of a minor. The plaintiffs sued the company under 
various causes of action (invasion of privacy, copyright infringement and breach of contract).89 
The plaintiffs also brought suit against CC alleging it had negligently failed to sufficiently warn 
creators that CC licences only address copyright and not privacy and publicity rights. The case 
 
85 Creative Commons, “Case Law” at online: < https://wiki.creativecommons.org/wiki/Case_Law > accessed May 22, 2019.  
86 Ibid.  
87 Ibid.  
88 Creative Commons, Case Law, supra note 85, at < https://wiki.creativecommons.org/wiki/Chang_v._Virgin_Mobile > 
 Accessed May 22, 2019. The direct citation of the case is Chang v. Virgin Mobile USA, LLC, Civil Action No. 3:07-CV-1767-D 
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2009), at online:< https://casetext.com/case/chang-v-virgin-mobile-usa > Accessed May 22, 2019. 
89 Ibid. 
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was dismissed by the Texas District court for lack of personal jurisdiction.90 Apparently, the 
minor, whose picture was used resides in the United States. In this case, initially, the plaintiffs 
included CC in the suit for failing to warn creators that CCL only cover copyright and not 
privacy or rights of publicity but later dropped the claims against CC and removed it from the 
lawsuit. However, the plaintiffs proceeded against Virgin Mobile and lost. The court held:91 
Defendant's motion to dismiss presents questions concerning 
the court's constitutional power to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over an Australian defendant arising from its use 
in Australia of a photograph downloaded from a public photo-
sharing website. Concluding that plaintiffs have failed to make 
the required prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, the 
court grants defendant's motion and dismisses this action 
without prejudice. 
 
 In 2016, CC reports that in a German case (names of parties were redacted in the 
published decision), the court ordered the removal of hyperlink to a CC-licensed image that was 
used in violation of licence conditions.92 In that case, a website in Germany posted a hyperlink to 
an image on another website, and the image was licensed under a CC licence, but the website 
where the image was posted from had not complied with the CC licence terms and was therefore 
in violation of the copyright.93 The photographer who had taken the image filed a lawsuit 
requesting that the German website take down the link;94 the court ordered the German website 
to remove the link due to violation of the licence terms.95 
 The cases discussed above show that there might be instances where the purported owner 
of the copyrighted work licensed under CCL may be challenged as the Swedish case above 
 
90 Ibid. 
91 Chang v. Virgin Mobile USA, LLC, Dist. Court, ND Texas 2009 at online: < 
https://scholar.google.ca/scholar_case?case=9985369727006284376&q=Chang+v.+Virgin+Mobile&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&as_vis
=1 
 > accessed September 16, 2019. 
92 Supra note 80, at https://wiki.creativecommons.org/wiki/Spirit 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid.  
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shows. Furthermore, users of works under CCL can be sanctioned (in Canada, a licensor can sue 
for copyright infringement and also be entitled to statutory damages) if they violate the terms of 
their licence, but this may only happen if the copyright owner of the licensed work sues for 
copyright infringement.  The determination of whether there has been copyright violation or 
breach of terms would be treated in its own merit by the courts.  
The cases above show that, just as in the conventional all-rights-reserved copyright 
system that is fraught with challenges and litigation, the CCL initiative is not immune to similar 
controversies, disputes, and lawsuits. While the lawsuits may seem generally unpalatable, they 
do prove that the licences are enforceable and therefore establish a workable system with the 
backing of law. After all, the CC organization envisaged and designed the licenses, but did not 
promise that licensing practises would be perfect and problem-free, and some of the sources of 
controversy are clearly outside its immediate control. Admittedly, the CCL is not a flawless 
arrangement; nonetheless, it has had a huge impact on the copyright system, which I now 
examine.    
 
4.5 Impact of Creative Commons Licensing 
Since its inception in 2001, the Creative Commons licensing scheme has gradually 
received the buy-in of authors and creators who choose to freely license their works under the 
Creative Commons Licences. From the humble beginnings of launching its first set of licences in 
December 2002,96 CCL has grown into an expansive online free culture community. The 
popularity and continued expansion of CCL proves one thing – the founders of CC were right 
about some rights reserved theory and that there are creators who would prefer to exercise their 
 
96 Creative Commons, History, supra note 34. 
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copyright differently from the traditional model. What Carroll referred to as a work in progress 
and ongoing experiment97 has turned out to be an established concept that promotes access to 
creative works at very low cost while leveraging the immense capabilities of ICT. Despite sharp 
criticisms, CCL has survived; Harrison stopped short of calling it a dumb idea when he said in 
2003: 
[…] think about the creative commons for a second. They are 
not a pretty sight. They are not like the fragile and pristine 
commons one might envision. Indeed, the creative commons 
are littered with all manner of trash and debris-written versions 
of abandoned refrigerators or eight-track cassette player.98 
 
 It is doubtful if Harrison would still hold the same view today about the CCL. At the very 
beginning, CCL demonstrated the potential to create a unique impact in the copyright system. In 
2004, shortly after the launch of the first set of CCLs, Lessig reports that: 
…in four months, more than 400,000 pages have appeared on 
the internet linking back to these licences. Four hundred 
thousand have said, we believe in a kind of freedom associated 
with our content that is not extreme. Now we want this 
400,000 to turn into 10,000,000. Because if there are 
10,000,000 people out there who say we don’t believe in 
extremes, then this debate is no longer a debate between 
copyright owners and anarchists. Instead, it is increasingly a 
debate between extremists and those who believe in a tradition 
that expresses a freedom more fundamental. Beyond the 
permission of fair use, these licences give people ways to say 
go ahead, sample me, share me, copy me, liberate me, and 
together they restore something of balance in this debate. And 
this balance, we believe, will enable a different kind of 
creativity: creativity built upon a tradition of building upon the 
works of others, freely. A free culture, not the permission 
culture that our law has produced.99      
 
 
97 Carroll, Conversational Copyright, supra note 31 at 448. 
98 Harrison, Creativity or Commons, supra note 28 at 796. 
99 Lessig, Creative Commons, supra note 10 at 12. 
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The current copyright system is largely based on a permission culture, which reflects the 
instrumentalist approach to copyright. Such permissions are tied to the payment of a fee before 
access is granted. In other cases, it may involve a lawyer and the laborious negotiation of terms 
before access is granted. On the contrary, even though the CCL, by virtue of how it operates, is 
still permission-based, it is a lot better because users access content easily free of charge; and as I 
mentioned earlier, with the simple and clear language of the commons deed, you do not require 
the services of a lawyer. 
The aspirations of Lessig for the growth CCL and increase in the number of users of CC 
licensed-works came to pass; Zachary Katz notes that by August 2005, it was reported that more 
than 50 million web pages linked back to CCL.100 He further reports that Duke Law Journal, 
Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, and Michigan Law Review have published content 
under CC licences;101 and that Google and Yahoo enable users to search for CC-licensed 
works.102 The CC organization reports that works CC-licensed works increased from 1.2 billion 
in 2016 to 1.4 billion in 2017.103 This implies a positive impact in accessing, sharing and use of 
content to inspire creativity; it offers great and undeniable opportunities to promote the 
dissemination of knowledge and creativity in the copyright system. To access and use works 
online, creators and users are free to do so under the CCL scheme and they do not even need to 
know or contact the original author but simply adhere to the licence terms. Another impact is that 
the popularity of CC has gained the support of some content platforms who now act as 
intermediaries to enable the discovery, sharing and collaboration on creativity and knowledge.104 
 
100 Zachary Katz, “Pitfalls of Open Licensing: An Analysis of Creative Commons Licensing,” (2006) 46 IDEA391 at 392.  
101 Ibid.  
102 Ibid.  
103 Creative Commons, “State of the Commons”, at online: < https://stateof.creativecommons.org/ > accessed July 29, 2017. 
104 Ibid.  
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Such partnerships include Jamendo Music,105 Vimeo,106 Flickr,107 Free Music Archives,108 
Wikipedia109 etc.  
It can hardly be challenged that the CCL has yielded positive impact in the copyright 
system by creating an opportunity for the democratization of access to and use of cultural works. 
However, these claims are general in nature and there is no concrete evidence or data to 
specifically quantify this impact. CC is aware of this, and in articulating its research agenda for 
2012-2013, noted that Creative Commons needs to measure the impact of its licences to better 
make the case for the social and economic value of open licensing.110 As at the time of writing 
(six years after the research agenda was initiated), no updates on the project save the preparatory 
work for the research, which include identifying thirteen research questions111 and five research 
 
105 Jamendo Music, “About us” at online: < https://www.jamendo.com/about > accessed July 31, 2017. “In the rise of more 
permissive models and movements such as Open Source and the Free Culture Movement, new ideas on how to digitally share 
creative works came to life. Creative Commons brought an alternative to the automatic “all-rights reserved” copyright, eventually 
leading a small group of people in Luxembourg to found in 2004 the pioneering website Jamendo.com, the first platform to 
legally share music for free from any creator under Creative Commons licenses.” 
106 Vimeo, “About” at online: < https://vimeo.com/about > accessed July 31, 2017. “Vimeo was born in 2004, created by a group 
of filmmakers who wanted an easy and beautiful way to share videos with their friends. Word started to spread, and an insanely 
supportive community of creators began to blossom. Now Vimeo is home to more than 50,000,000 creators worldwide” 
107 FLICKR, “Explore/Creative Commons” at online: < https://www.flickr.com/creativecommons/> accessed May 10, 2018 
108 FMA, “Creative Commons” at online: < http://freemusicarchive.org/curator/Creative_Commons/> accessed May 10, 2018. 
109 WIKIPEDIA, “Creative Commons” at online: < https://wiki.creativecommons.org/wiki/Main_Page> accessed May 10, 2018. 
110 Creative Commons, “Research”, at online: < https://wiki.creativecommons.org/wiki/Research > accessed July 29, 2017.  
111 Ibid. 1. What is the number and growth rate of CC licensed materials worldwide? 
2. What is the use of CC licensed materials worldwide? 
3. We aspire to answer: what is the reuse of CC licensed materials worldwide? 
4. We aspire to identify: what is the ratio of 'best practice' attribution and 'best practice' reuse of CC licensed materials to total CC 
licensed materials? 
5. What is the ecosystem in which CC operates? 
6. We aspire to answer: in the absence of CC what would the open ecosystem look like? 
7. What is the broader public perception of CC? and 
8. What is the impact of CC activities? 
To achieve this before December 2012 is an aggressive but vital ambition and is a rare opportunity to show how the work of CC 
(4.0 is core to all CC operations) affects the commons. Other important performance metrics to be captured within the CC 
organization include: 
9. Large scale/high profile adopters of CC licenses; 
10. Translations of CC license deeds; 
11. Indications of a strengthening CC Affiliate network; and 
12. Diversification in the funding base of CC. 
Concurrent with the above metrics is an ongoing case study of CC impact. It seeks to highlight the performance of CC 
intervention in the open education field, specifically by answering: 
13. How does the active CC-led intervention for U.S. Dept. of Labor (US DOL) Trade Adjustment Assistance Community 
College Career Training (TAACCCT) grantees achieve the goals of the US DOL TAACCCT program? 
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projects112 that will help address the thirteen research questions. The measurement of the impact 
of CCL would further strengthen the free culture cause in the copyright system, but 
unfortunately, there is no new information to indicate what progress has been made. 
Nevertheless, specific cases of impact of CCL can be cited from a publication that 
showcases CC success stories113 that was mentioned in chapter two. For example, in the 
publication, June Cohen shares the impact of releasing TED Talk for free using CCL and that 
five years after publishing all TED Talks online under Creative Commons licences, more than 
200 million viewers have experienced the innovative thinking of TED speakers.114 June Cohen 
reports that the phenomenal growth is solely driven by free and open distribution, and that CC 
licensing has enabled sharing in ways well beyond what TED Talk could have achieved on its 
own.115 For Cohen, embracing CCL was challenging especially as precise predictions could not 
be made on the outcome. It turned out that the impact on their business was positive. She 
explained that: 
When we decided to open our library, we had one single goal: 
to spread ideas. Every decision we made was based on that 
goal. Creative Commons was the most efficient way to 
empower the growth of our product and free us from 
conversations about what could or couldn’t be done with our 
videos. Sharing online was a very controversial decision. 
People feared it would capsize our business, discourage people 
from paying for our conference, and be rejected by speakers. 
The first year after releasing videos of talks for free, we raised 
the cost of the conference by 50 percent and sold out in one 
week with a 1,000-person waiting list,” Cohen says. “Not only 
do speakers lobby for the talks to be posted as soon as possible 
 
112 1) CC Licensed Material Metrics, 2) CC Ecosystem, 3) Public Perception of CC, 4) Impact of CC Activities, and 5) Open 
Education Resources (OER) case study. 
113 The Power of Open, Bloomsbury Academic: Publishing Openly, at online < 
http://thepowerofopen.org/assets/pdfs/tpoo_eng.pdf > accessed July, 29, 2017. 
114 Ibid.  
115 Ibid.  
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but paying conference participants are anxious to share talks 
they just heard with family, friends and colleagues.116  
 Similarly, Nina Paley, a New York City filmmaker and cartoonist released her self-
produced animated movie “Sita Sings the Blues” under CCL BY-SA.117 The work is also 
available for purchase on DVD, and theatrically through other distributors. It has been viewed 
millions of times worldwide through archive.org, YouTube, and innumerable torrent sites.118 The 
impact of licensing her work under the CCL, according to Paley was positive and also brought 
her financial rewards and exposure. She states that she has seen artists who refused to create 
unless they got paid and that for her, it is the opposite.119 On financial rewards and exposure, she 
states “I’ve never had more money coming at me than when I started using Creative Commons 
BY-SA. I have a higher profile. I don’t spend anything on promotion. My fans are doing it for 
me and buying merchandise. Sharing put me on the map.”120  
To further demonstrate the far-reaching impact of CCL in promoting culture, remix and 
creativity, the example of Pratham Books, a small nonprofit publisher in India is instructive. 
Pratham started disseminating its books and illustrations under CC licences on Flickr and Scribd 
in 2008.121 Speaking on behalf of Pratham Books, Gautam John states:  
As a small publisher, we do not have the bandwidth to 
customize licences every time a concerned party wants to use 
our content in a certain manner. What the Creative Commons 
licences have allowed us to do is engage with multiple partners 
without the attendant overhead of legal negotiations and the 
 
116 Ibid.  
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid.  
119 Ibid.  
120 Ibid.  
121 Ibid. 
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time and money that it would take for such negotiations to run 
their course.122  
According to the report, Pratham Books simply sends users a link to the book download 
and licence page, which John says takes them “all of one minute to do.” Pratham Books has 
recorded favourable outcomes, which are attributable directly to their use of CCL. On the impact 
of CCL on the business of Pratham Books, John reports that: 
Using CC has resulted in a variety of reuses and increased 
community engagement. Our communities have created 
multiple derivative works ranging from iPad and iPhone 
applications, to porting our works to OLPC (One Laptop per 
Child) laptops, to creating entirely new books from existing 
illustrations. Organizations and individuals have converted our 
books to audio books, Braille and DAISY that has allowed the 
visually impaired access to our content – something that would 
not have been possible without the Creative Commons 
licences. To our mind, all the derivative works were outcomes 
specifically linked to our Creative Commons licence model. 
Without the Creative Commons licence, we would not have 
engaged with communities because of the internal overhead 
required to support these multiple efforts.123  
 The publication124 by CC contains several other accounts demonstrating the positive 
impact on culture and creativity from using CCL. In the absence empirical evidence to quantify 
the impact of CCL in fostering creativity, these real-life accounts demonstrate that at the very 
least, the concept works and has been embraced by a lot of people who believe in the ethos of 
sharing their content free of charge and have in turn benefitted from doing so. I wish to mention 
here that interpreting the success must be done cautiously; the success stories do not necessarily 
mean any creator who licenses her works using the CCL would experience similar benefits. 
Additionally, what I can glean from the success stories is that an author or creator could 
 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid.  
124 The Power of Open, supra note 88. 
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potentially gain financial benefits and popularity by sharing their works using CCL scheme. This 
may sound counter-intuitive because why would users purchase something when they can get it 
for free? While the analysis here may be unclear, perhaps its logic could be similar to a freemium 
model. For instance, an author who produces several works releases a piece of content for free 
and fortunately, the usage goes viral. There is the possibility that this could lead to an increase in 
demand and sales of other works from the same author. However, though the freemium business 
model is quite popular and effective, a lot still depends on market dynamics such as the nature of 
the content, existence of substitutes, demand for the content, etc.  
As reported above, there are over a billion CC-licensed works but certainly not all the 
licensors have remarkable or exceptional stories. The success stories could be misleading to 
other potential CC licensors that they achieve financial success through CCL. The appropriate 
mindset of potential CC licensors is to at least have the desire to make their content available for 
other to access to use. A spin-off from this broad ideal could maybe lead to fame and/or financial 
success but this is not guaranteed. Nonetheless, the success stories show that there are authors 
and creators who prefer to embrace the idea of some rights reserved with the possibility of 
gaining financial rewards as well. The simplicity of the CCL and ease of use dwarfs the arduous 
and expensive process of copyright licensing in the conventional copyright system. In some 
cases, some authors may simply decline requests for permission to use their works for fear that 
they may not be able to control how their works are used. In the face of such rigidity and 
restricted access to cultural works, the flexibility of the CCL brings in tremendous change. 
Culture and creativity, especially in the ICT age, flourish under the auspices of freedom to share, 
access, use, remix and disseminate creative works. It is this kind of atmosphere of creativity that 
CC promotes; the buy-in of authors and creators world-wide into the CCL concept is an 
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indication that the two extremes of all rights reserved and no rights at all impede creativity and 
result in imbalance in the copyright system. 
 Lastly, it is important to mention how CC activities have impacted education. In the area 
of open education,125 CC states that an initiative called the Open Education Resources (OER) 
provides access to teaching, learning and research materials in any medium that reside in the 
public domain or have been released under an open licence that permits no-cost access, use, 
adaptation and redistribution by others.126The CC reports that the “OER Commons” online 
repository has 120 content providers and about 30,000 content.127 This certainly makes 
significant contributions to education. The OER Commons website contain educational materials 
and courses at primary, secondary and post-secondary levels; this creates the opportunity to 
access knowledge for free, which is in the public’s interest. 
 The concept of CCL does not negate the ownership and exploitation of proprietary rights 
in copyright, in fact, it would be self-defeating to do so because the CCL idea relies on copyright 
(ownership and financial exploitation of content) to achieve it aim. This is because an author or 
creator must first have proprietary rights in a work before choosing to license it under CCL. On 
the overall, my view is that in furtherance of the free culture objective, CC has succeeded in 
establishing a “commons” that holds a rich repository of valuable content. Through its advocacy 
of promoting the culture of sharing, many content creators have come to support the idea of 
 
125 University of British Columbia Wiki, “Open Education' means different things to different people. But essentially it can be 
understood as a collection of practices that utilize online technology to freely share knowledge. It can mean sharing: scholarly 
research (open access), teaching and learning materials (open educational resources), tools or computer code (open source), 
research data in a machine-readable format (open data), how you work/learn (open practice), access to your classes (open 
courses), at online: < https://wiki.ubc.ca/Documentation:Open_Education> accessed May 23, 2019. 
126 Creative Commons, Education/OER at online: < https://creativecommons.org/about/program-areas/education-oer/ >accessed 
May 23, 2019. 
127 Ibid.; OER Commons at online: < https://www.oercommons.org/ >accessed May 23, 2019. 
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sharing their content so that others can use, benefit from it, and perhaps produce more works. 
Content owners share their works by choosing a license from a suite of licences designed by CC. 
In my view, the CCL has increased users’ access to content, which in turn provides public 
interests benefits and supports the pursuit of balance in the copyright system. Furthermore, CCL 
has benefitted licensors by making their works have a wider audience, which may lead to renown 
and make their works more visible in the creative digital space. The CC organization has made 
significant progress in achieving its aim through the CCL initiative. 
4.6 Misconceptions and Critique of Creative Commons Licensing 
Despite the numerous benefits that the CCL has introduced in the copyright system, its 
system of licensing and its entire concept have come under sharp criticisms from various 
analysts. CCL appears to have some advantages even though it is far from being perfect or 
completely solving the challenges in the content industry. While I endeavour to assess the views 
of critics objectively, I wish to observe that some criticisms may be premised on misconceptions 
about CC as an organization and what it promotes through its unique licensing scheme. 
Therefore, the intention here is to clarify some misconceptions as well as to critique the CCL 
scheme. I will assess these misconceptions before reviewing the comments of critics. 
As noted earlier, Dusollier has expressed concern that some CC supporters may in error 
think that the motive of CC organization is to displace the copyright system.128 While this may 
give the impression that CC may have the intention to oust the present copyright system and 
establish CCL as the norm, it is not correct. The CC organization has not stated that its motive is 
to ultimately unseat copyright. Presently, the CCL runs on the copyright system, therefore, it 
 
128 Dusollier, The Master’s Tools, supra note 58. 
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would be counter-intuitive to eliminate copyright, which in itself is unlikely. In analyzing the 
ideology of CC, Elkin-Koren echoes a similar view, suggesting that CC is seeking to establish an 
alternative copyright system: 
Creative Common is a form of political activism and is best 
understood as a social movement seeking to bring about a 
social change. It responds to proposals calling for political 
activism against the enclosure of Intellectual Property. Like its 
predecessor the Open Source Movement and Free Software, it 
seeks to change the social consequences of copyright law by 
instantiating an alternative. Unlike its predecessors, which 
focused on software and addressed a rather small and 
homogenous community of professionals, Creative Commons 
seeks to become a popular movement that addresses the public 
at large. A key to its success is its ability to convince as many 
people as possible that Creative Commons is the best method 
for using creative works.129  
I agree with Elkin-Koren in her assertion that CC’s ideology seeks to bring about social 
change in the copyright system just like Stallman did with free software (though as explained in 
chapter two, four of CC licences do not fully conform with free software ideology; she is also 
right to compare the ideology of Open Source Movement with CC because both advocate for 
free culture even though they differ in some aspects – for example, as she notes, CC addresses a 
broad range of creative works. Elkin-Koren is right to articulate that CC aims to convince as 
many people as possible to adopt the CCL – CC’s effort in this area has indeed yielded 
considerable amount of success considering that there exist over 1.2 billion CC-licensed works. 
But her conception of CC’s ideology becomes confusing when she brands CC as a political 
activist group and that it seeks to change the social consequences of copyright law by 
 
129 Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do, supra note 42 at 387-8. It is important to note here that while Elkin-Koren generally 
implies that free software and open source software as similar to CC, I explained their differences in chapter two.   
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instantiating an alternative. Further comments from Elkin-Koren suggest that she perceives 
CC’s motive is to eliminate copyright even if CC does not articulate what happens next: 
Creative Commons’ ideology, as expressed in its publications 
and practices, reflects a minimalist approach, seeking to 
enhance access to creative works. Copyright law is clearly 
identified as an obstacle for achieving this goal; however, its 
vision of what would happen when it is removed is less 
coherent130 
While CC may be involved in advocacy that pressures political authority to create balance 
in the copyright system, it may be misleading to brand CC as a political activist group. 
Admittedly, while the advocacy of the CC may seek to influence the political order with specific 
reference to copyright, the CC, in my view is not in the business of partisan politics as the term 
“political activist group” may suggest. While Elkin-Koren’s assertion that copyright law is an 
obstacle that needs to be removed may appear controversial, the interpretation in my view is that 
she was referring to the ‘barriers’ that copyright law creates, which inhibit free access to and use 
of cultural works. The CC organization’s desire to instantiate an alternative to copyright is 
another way of saying that each creator should be given the liberty to exercise his or her 
exclusive rights differently. Furthermore, the CC organization does not perceive copyright law to 
be the obstacle but challenges the way copyright law is used to restrict access, which is a 
paradox. The right understanding of CCL or the ideology that the CC organization promotes is 
one that incorporates copyright in the scheme; an understanding that dissociates CCL from 
copyright does not align with the vision of CC and how its licences operate.131 The basis for this 
reasoning is that CCL asserts copyright. A CC licensor must possess copyright ownership in the 
 
130 Ibid. at 388. 
131 It is pertinent to mention here that the cautionary remarks by Dusollier and Elkin-Koren were made in 2006 and 2005 
respectively and these were the early years of CC and probably its vision was still not very clear to some supporters. 
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work before any valid licensing can take place. A licensor under CC derives the authority to 
license from the ownership of the work in the first place. This is in line with the Latin maxim – 
nemo dat quod non habet – meaning you cannot give what you do not have. The core issue that 
CC identifies is not “what is wrong with copyright” but “that copyright is used in a manner that 
inhibits the free culture idea.” 
The second misconception about CC or misuse of the CCL arrangement is that some 
licensors use it as a business model for commercial gain but may not be specifically interested in 
the ethos of making creative content available and accessible by users per se. This may probably 
be due to unintended consequences of using CCL and realizing its potential to generate financial 
gain. Before I proceed to discuss this misconception or misuse of the CCL scheme, I deem it fit 
to refer to my explanations132 in chapter two on the different interpretations given to free culture 
by Stallman, the OSS community, and CC so that my analyses here are properly understood. The 
same way Stallman’s ideology of free culture was misunderstood and probably still is today to 
mean absence of price, perhaps the purpose of CCL is being turned around to function solely as 
money-making vehicle. Admittedly, apart from CCL categories marked NC (non-commercial), 
all other licences permit the licensee to use the content for commercial purpose. Also, CC does 
not preclude a licensor from benefitting financially by reason of sharing creative content under 
CCL. In other words, apart from NC restriction, the CC organization does not generally 
discourage licensors and licensees from benefitting financially through the CCL. 
 
132 Stallman’s idea of free software articulates a community where software developers share their source code as well as give 
unlimited liberty to users to use the software for any purpose they wish. In other words, the concept of free culture here focuses 
on the users’ right to access content without any limitation or restriction; this is summed up in the four freedoms: liberty to use 
the program for whatever purpose the user wishes, modify the program, make copies and share the program, and distribute/ 
publish modified versions of the program. Stallman’s free culture philosophy is user-focused. CCL scheme align with Stallman’s 
free culture idea only with regards to two of its licences (CC-BY and CC-BY-SA) because they ensure the four freedoms are 
present. The other four licenses do not align with free software either because they prevent modification of the work or preclude 
use for commercial purpose. OSS believe in the principle giving freely sharing content but do not subscribe to the four freedoms 
as stated by Stallman and they prioritize commercial gain over the interest of the user community.  
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However, my concern is that in reality, the creators or authors who license their works 
using CCL are much more multifaceted than it appears; some creators believe in the ideology of 
CC and share their works using CCL to promote creativity and may not be concerned with 
financial reward, some share their works to promote creativity and also expect financial reward. 
There may also be the category that share their works using CCL solely for financial gain – for 
this category, CCL becomes a business model and a means to an end, the means being CCL and 
the end being monetary gain. In this case, the business model operates as a freemium, which 
means giving users free access to their content or some part of their content with the hope of 
converting them to paying users later. Regardless of the motive of the CC licensor, the 
arrangement is still beneficial to the public or users in the sense that cultural works are made 
available and can be accessed easily. The CC organization may be partly responsible for this 
misconception or misuse of the CCL because of the amplification of financial success of its 
licensors in the success story report. The success story cases I discussed above are instructive 
here.133 It is axiomatic from these success story accounts that for some artists or creators, using 
CCL brings them popularity, exposure and financial success. Although the CC organization does 
not expressly brand the CCL as a business model, it may be implicit in their advocacy. 
Therefore, the over one billion licensed-works under the CC licensing scheme could be made up 
of licensors with motives other than promoting CC sharing culture.  
In my view, which I believe aligns with the objective of CC, the philosophy of sharing 
and promoting access to creative content is the primary purpose for launching the licensing 
scheme; other benefits such as fame, exposure and pecuniary rewards are secondary. But it 
appears the reverse may now be the case due to misinterpretation of the purpose of the licensing 
 
133 The Power of Open, supra note 113. 
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partly due to the way CC projects its achievements. This trend has the possibility to dilute the 
free culture philosophy. 
Since its inception, the CCL scheme has been the subject of critique notwithstanding its 
seemingly far-reaching benefits to the ordinary creators and users of creative works. The CCL 
arrangements have some limitations,134 which perhaps stem from various interpretations of the 
purpose of the CC organization (which is not to depose copyright law as some may think) and its 
licensing scheme. In addressing the idea that CC seeks to replace copyright, Dusollier articulates 
her critique using the metaphor “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house;”135 
which could be interpreted to mean that copyright is the master’s house and CCL is the master’s 
tools and that CCL is seeking to dismantle copyright, which is currently impracticable because 
CCL asserts copyright. Put differently, the master’s house is in disarray and the master’s tool is 
trying to restore normalcy to the house. However, Dusollier seems to recoil on this line of 
thought when she was comparing the attribute of CC and Stallman’s Free Software Movement 
when she states that: 
The main purpose of the Creative Commons parallels that of 
the free software movement which seeks to use copyright to 
authorize, rather than to inhibit, copying, distribution, 
modification, and re-use of software and other copyrighted 
works. Moreover, the Creative Commons and open source 
software projects such as the General Public Licence (GPL) 
initiative, share a common strategy: they do not want to 
abolish copyright, as some have argued, or require copyright 
owners to relinquish their rights and dedicate their works to 
the public domain…Instead, both Creative Commons licences 
and GPL licences assert copyright in the specific works or 
software at issue. Therefore, Creative Commons licensing 
 
134 Dusollier, The Master’s Tools, supra note 44 at 271. 
135 Ibid. at 272. 
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regime clearly rests upon the proprietary regime of copyright 
but seeks to exercise it differently.136  
  
Dusollier’s articulation above, I assume, is a general reference about free software 
movement, CC and OSS and how each of these contribute to the culture of sharing content and 
making them easily accessible for others to use. However, as explained earlier in chapter two, 
there are nuances in their specific approaches to the free culture ideology. It is necessary to 
clarify that the free software movement and the CC organization are similar to the extent that the 
CC’s CC-BY and CC-BY-SA licences conform to the four freedoms of the free software 
movement as Stallman articulates. Additionally, while the free software movement and OSS 
community both share the same principle of sharing content for others to use, the former 
prioritizes the interests of users, while the latter emphasizes the interests of the content creator, 
vendor and even corporate interests. However, I agree with Dusollier’s point that CCL uses 
copyright to achieve its aim. The CC’s approach of achieving its aim through the use of licences 
has attracted various opinions. The licences created by CC are structured by consent, which 
enable authors determine how they want their works to be used. The various licences have terms 
attached to them, which potential licensees have to give consent to before using the licensor’s 
work. In other words, the CC licences are not contracts. However, these licences have been 
incorrectly interpreted to mean a contract and that the reliance on contract could be the Achillies’ 
heels of the CC plan137 because the ownership and exploitation of copyright is structured at every 
turn by consent embodied in a contract.138 It is the same contract that copyright employs to 
 
136 Ibid. at 274. It is important to clarify here that the similarity that Dusollier talks about between the free software movement 
and Creative Commons is not absolute as there are differences as I explained previously. Creative Commons is similar to the free 
software movement with regards CC-BY and CC-BY-SA licences.   
137 Dusollier, The Master’s Tools, supra note 44 at 282. 
138 David Nimmer, Eliot Brown & Gary N. Frischling, “The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand” (1999)87 Cal. L. Rev. 17 
at 24. For further reading on contract and copyright see Niva Elkin-Koren, “Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of 
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advance its restriction on access to creative content. While agreeing with Elkin-Koren, 
Dusollier139 asserts: 
By using contract provisions to enforce the will of the author, 
Creative Commons is doing exactly what it denounces in 
copyright. I would join Niva Elkin-Koren in saying that it is 
doubtful that Creative Commons, despite its declared objective 
of eventually changing copyright, will ever be able to 
dismantle copyright by using the very tools that have created 
the monstrous creature that Creative Commons seeks to fight. 
 
According to Dusollier, Elkin-Koren is of the view that the use of licensing tool 
symbolically represents that reliance on contracts is a valid strategy in copyright that aids the 
cause of private ordering.140 She asserts that Elkin-Koren concludes that, “creating an alternative 
to copyright could only result from the legal reform of copyright and not from a doomed attempt 
to use the same tools that have transformed copyright into an unbalanced body of law.”141 
It is unclear whether by the expression “the use of licensing tool symbolically represents 
that reliance on contracts…,” Elkin-Koren as cited by Dusollier was arguing metaphorically that 
CC’s use of licences conjures the image of a contract or whether she regarded the various CC 
licences as contracts. I already examined the issue and my analysis shows that the CC licences 
are not contracts. If Elkin-Koren’s contention is that CC licences are contracts, then her 
arguments would not apply because they are not. On the other hand, her argument may simply 
mean that licences reflect a permission culture just as contracts do; this suggests that the use of 
licences by CC limits access to content through authorial control just like contracts. In the 
traditional copyright system, contract is used by the copyright owner to expand the power of 
 
Contract” (1997)12 Berkeley TLJ 93 at 105; J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, “Privately Legislated Intellectual Property 
Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information” (1999)147 PA. L. Rev. 875 at 899.   
139 Supra note 137 at 283. 
140 Ibid. 
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 265 
control through the terms articulated in the contract. The concept of “contract” as a barrier to 
access or limit the use of creative works functions in two ways – when the contract is obtained 
and when it is refused. First, when the contract is obtained, the contractual agreement expressly 
specifies what can and cannot do with the creative work. In the second case, which is where a 
contractual arrangement cannot be reached, it occurs either because the copyright owner refuses 
or the owner could not be identified. In the absence of express permission, any use of such 
content is “use without permission, which potentially becomes copyright infringement. So, my 
interpretation of Elkin-Koren’s arguments is that since contract is a means of asserting and 
enforcing ownership in copyright, the fear is that the CC may be promoting proprietary regime 
through its licensing arrangement, which mirrors a contractual relationship. I reiterate my earlier 
position that Elkin-Koren’s argument would apply if CC licences are also contracts, otherwise 
the argument does not apply.    
While acknowledging the above criticism against CC by Dusollier and Elkin-Koren, 
Shun-ling Chen agrees that CC could strengthen the proprietary regime of copyright but for a 
different reason. In her experience as inaugural project co-lead of CC in Taiwan between 2004 
and 2005, she observed that Creative Commons outreach could implicitly be a promotion rather 
than an effective critique of copyright law.142  At the event, she explained that while some 
persons may be surprised at how restrictive copyright law can be, others become more conscious 
about how they can become proprietors through the ways they can exploit their copyrighted 
works.143 These are serious criticisms not just because they question the CC as a means for 
advancing the free culture agenda, but because they are coming from people who actually are 
 
142 Shun-ling Chen, “To Surpass or to Conform – What are Public Licenses” (2009) JLT & Policy 107 at 122.  
143 Ibid. 
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involved in promoting the licensing scheme. Apart from Chen’s experience in Taiwan, 
Dusollier’s analysis of CC is based on her experience as project leader in Belgium as at 2006. 
 While these arguments are compelling, it seems that the fears expressed by the authors’ 
over ten years ago may have turned out to be less serious especially in the absence of proof of 
their claim. Furthermore, using these licences, CC-licensed works has surpassed one billion and 
counting. While I agree that the use of licences could reflect a permission culture akin to the 
content industry approach, CC may have succeeded in using it to achieve a different outcome – 
to promote access to works and encourage creativity. The fact that there are authors who identify 
with “some rights reserved” and make their works available for use is potentially a positive sign 
towards private ordering and authors’ ability to control how their works are used. CCL does not 
seek to take away authorial rights but provides an avenue to exercise authorial right in 
determining how their works are used. Dusollier, Elkin-Koren and Chen’s argument could still 
have some validity based on further scrutiny of the CCL and its consequences carried out by 
other writers. In fact, these analyses may suggest that the CC approach may be detrimental to its 
acclaimed goal of promoting free culture and to remove the barriers to creativity. 
It is good to articulate CCL statistics as a mark of progress in advancing the cause of 
balance in the copyright industry, but the licensing process may have some queries. In his 
comparison of CCL and Free Software Movement, Benjamin Mako Hill concludes that unlike 
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the Free Software Movement, CCL does not define or have a standard of freedom.144 Hill 
reiterates the four freedoms articulated by Stallman:145 
i. the freedom to run the program, for any purpose; 
ii. the freedom to study how the program works, and adapt it to your needs; 
iii. the freedom to redistribute copies either free or for a fee; 
iv. the freedom to improve the program, and release your improvements to the 
public, so that the whole community benefits; 
Hill argues that despite claiming to apply the principles of Free Software, the CC organization 
does not define a standard principle of freedom; he asserts that: 
For the CC founders and many of CC's advocates, FOSS's 
success is a source of inspiration. However, despite CC's stated 
desire to learn from and build upon the example of the free 
software movement, CC sets no defined limits and promises 
no freedoms, no rights, and no fixed qualities. Free software's 
success is built upon an ethical position. CC sets no such 
standard.146 
 
Hill clearly reiterates Stallman’s position on free culture, and that though the CC claims 
to support the free culture agenda, its licensing arrangements do not have some defined freedoms 
common to all of them. The CC licensing categories do not give users such liberty and this, to an 
extent prioritizes the interest of the creators and gives them the right to determine how their 
works should be used. To this extent, Hill makes a distinction between the philosophy of free in 
Free Software Movement and CC organization when he points out that: Creative Commons 
licences are designed to give artists choice. Lessig personally describes how Creative Commons, 
"gives creators the freedom to choose how their works are used." This is not freedom in the sense 
 
144 Benjamin M. Hill, “Towards a Standard of Freedom: Creative Commons and the Free Software Movement” (2005) at online: 
< https://mako.cc/writing/toward_a_standard_of_freedom.html  > accessed August 12, 2017. 
145 Ibid; Free Software Foundation, “Free Software, Free Society: Selected Essays of Richard M. Stallman” (2002) Joshua Gay, 
ed., p.20 at online: < https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/fsfs/rms-essays.pdf > accessed August 12, 2017. 
146 Ibid. 
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that the term is used in Free Software. With the current structure of the CC approach through the 
use of licences, the baseline or definition of “freedom” as Hill argues is not possible and it does 
reveal marked differences between Free Software Movement and CC organization. 
Consequently, the CC organization and its licensing scheme do are not in full conformity with 
the free software ideology. Nonetheless, some part of the work may still be free, for an author 
could allow her CC-licensed work to be used in every other way save for commercial purpose 
(NC) and no derivative (ND) work could be made out of it.  
In my view, a counter argument to this is that the CC organization even though inspired 
by Stallman’s ideology, is not bound to follow the precisely the same model. The CC 
organization advocates for the promotion of creativity through the mantra of “some rights 
reserved” and to give creators a choice to determine how they want their works to be used. The 
promotion of free culture according to CC organization simplifies the process for users to access 
works, which ordinarily would have been near impossible following the conventional copyright 
model. The creators offer their works for free by voluntarily subscribing to any of the various 
licences of CC and determine what part of their rights they want to reserve and what part they 
wish to let users exploit. 
 Another criticism could emerge from the existence of several variations of the CCL; 
Zachary argues that the proliferation of CCL may give rise to confusion whereby licensors 
struggle to decide on which licence is properly suited to their need and licensees fail to 
understand the precise limits and obligations attached the licensed work.147 For the licensor, she 
faces the difficulty of deciding which licence to choose and what conditions to attach because the 
 
147 Katz, Pitfalls of Open Licensing, supra note 100 at 393. 
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CCL is irrevocable,148 once a licence is attached to a work, it cannot be changed. This is a rigid 
condition under the CC licensing scheme; perhaps it is because it is a licence, which authorizes a 
licensee to do certain acts with the licensed content, you can choose to accept the licence terms 
and abide by them. But if you are not comfortable with the terms of the licence, you can choose 
to avoid the licence altogether. Additionally, it would be cumbersome to get CC licensors to 
revise their licences, some may be unreachable; besides, this would lead to the hardship that 
exists using the conventional method of searching for a copyright owner. However, in the 
conventional copyright contracts, terms can be revised, of course with the consent of both parties 
and usually in writing. 
So, a prospective licensor under the CCL scheme has the liberty to choose what 
condition(s) she wishes to attach to her work, and a prospective licensee agrees to abide by these 
terms. The CCL has four conditions (BY-Attribution, NC-Non-commercial, ND-Non-derivative 
and SA-Share Alike) and six combinations (CC-BY, CC-BY-SA, CC-BY-ND, CC-BY-NC, CC-
BY-SA and CC-BY-NC-ND). There is also the responsibility to read and comprehend the legal 
code and deed.149 The deed according to Bloemsaat and Kleve is a summary, it summarizes what 
the actual licence entails and does not go into detail and is aimed at people who want to use the 
work drafted in plain language.150 The legal code is the actual licence containing legal details and 
is aimed at professionals rather than ordinary users.151 The challenge with the deed is that detail 
is sacrificed on the altar of brevity and simplicity; if the licensor or licensee choose to read only 
the deed, she would definitely not get the vital details of the licence before agreeing to it. On the 
 
148 Creative Commons, “Considerations for licensors and licensees” at online: < 
https://wiki.creativecommons.org/wiki/Considerations_for_licensors_and_licensees > accessed August 12, 2107. The 
irrevocability notice states “Once you apply a CC license to your material, anyone who receives it may rely on that license for as 
long as the material is protected by copyright and similar rights, even if you later stop distributing it.”  
149 Ibid.  
150 Bloemsaat and Kleve, Creative Commons, supra note 37 at 242. 
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hand, if the licensor or licensee reads the legal code inundated with legalese, the chances are she 
may not fully comprehend all the details except if she hires a lawyer. Additionally, the licensor is 
expected to have copyright in the work she is sharing or have cleared such rights before licensing 
it under CC scheme; in the event that the licensor’s ownership is challenged, this raises 
infringement issues for both the licensor and licensee and CC organization will not provide or 
pay for legal services.152 The licensors and licensees under the CCL scheme have to deal with 
these challenges in order to license or access work as the case may be on the CC platform. The 
CC’s claim to administer a simplified licensing process does appear to have some complexities 
with the three layers of licensing involved. However, the rate of dissemination under the CCL 
scheme is enormous as a single work could be assessed by millions of people whereas this would 
be highly problematic under the traditional model. 
 Zachary further posits that the licence proliferation under CC scheme leads to 
incompatibility problems where conflicting licence provisions prevent the creation of new works 
contrary to the wishes of the creators of the original work.153 In his intricate analysis of the 
interrelationship between CCL, he identifies incompatibilities. For clarity, Zachary defines 
compatibility thus: “Works released under the compatible licences can be combined in or used as 
the joint basis for derivative works; work released under incompatible licences cannot.”154 
Zachary’s analysis focuses on derivative works and he observes that ND licences (prohibits 
licensees from making derivative works) cannot be combined with other works and are thus 
 
152 Creative Commons, License, at online: < https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/legalcode  > accessed August 12, 2017. 
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incompatible with other CC works.155 The second incompatibility issue identified by Zachary 
relates to the SA licences. In line with the SA licence, any derivative work that uses a SA-
licensed work as an input must itself be licensed under SA.156 Zachary identifies incompatibility 
issues “when a follow-on innovator seeks to create and distribute a derivative work based on 
multiple pre-existing works subject to different licences. As with all CC licences, in determining 
what restrictions apply to a derivative work, licences to input works with more restrictive terms 
trump licences to input works with less restrictive terms.”157 To further elucidate this 
observation, Zachary gives the following hypothetical scenario: 
Imagine a Beatles song released under a BY-SA and a digital 
musician who wishes to make and release a remix of the song. 
She can only do so if she releases the remix under a BY-SA 
licence…Now imagine that the artist wants to “mash” or mix 
together a Jay-Z song, released under BY, with the BY-SA 
Beatles song. The resulting mash-up must be released under 
BY-SA…Finally, imagine that the Jay-Z song is released 
under BY-NC-SA, and again the musician wants to mash it 
with the BY-SA Beatles song. The Beatles song requires the 
mash-up to be released under BY-SA, while the Jay-Z song 
requires it to be released under BY-NC-SA. BY-NC-SA 
requires imposing the NC restriction on all derivative works, 
but the BY-SA prohibits the imposition of any additional terms 
– such as – NC – on derivative works. The licences thus block 
the musician from distributing the mash-up…158  
From the intermingling of licences illustrated above, it shows that the CC licensing scheme 
appears to pose a challenge to creativity due to restriction terms of some licences. Though this 
may be unintended, it is the reality of using these licences and deeper examination of combining 
licences. The shortcomings of CCL revealed by Zachary show that CC licensing strategy may 
not support creative combination in all cases; but the indeterminacy of the degree of this 
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perceived limitation is another question. If the concerns raised by Zachary are on the outliers, the 
impact on creativity may not be significant; but if the degree is significant, then the impact on 
creativity could be far reaching. However, in the absence of evidence, Zachary’s argument 
cannot be absolute.  Furthermore, even if these two licences (CC-BY-NC-SA and CC-BY-SA) 
cannot be combined, existing separately, they still promote creativity, which is better that all 
rights reserved – a situation where they cannot be used at all or to clear copyright to use them 
may prove challenging. On the face of it, the licence combination limitations may appear to 
restrict creativity. However, the very existence of these licences, made available free of charge 
and without the arduous process of clearing copyright, immensely facilitates users’ easy access 
to content and creativity – this outweighs Zachary’s licence combinations limitations. 
An important question about the CC arrangement is to identify who stands to gain or gain 
more from the licensing scheme – the creator, user, the public or all? On the face of it, it appears 
the creator/author offers her works without any immediate benefit in return, except in some cases 
as I explained above where some licensors have benefitted financially and otherwise from 
licensing their works under CC licence. On the other hand, users who access works for free seem 
to be more favourably disposed to benefiting more from the CC free culture agenda. However, in 
the CCL initiative, the author has a central position, she retains her rights and determines how 
her work is used and gives them back their long-lost autonomy,159 which dates back the 
Stationers’ Company era and even after the Statute of Anne was enacted (discussed in chapter 
one) – where authors did not even have the right to publish their work or acquire copyright in it; 
and even when the Statute of Anne vested them with copyright in their works, they still were at 
 
159Dusollier, The Master’s Tools, supra note 137 at 286.  
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the mercy of the Stationers’ Company and its monopolistic power in the book publishing market 
as at that time.  
The aspect of CC organization objective that focuses on making content accessible to users 
has been criticized as giving more regard to users. Dusollier contends that the focus on users 
does not take into consideration that there are users who are not subsequent creators, but merely 
consumers.160 The CC vision is not only about helping creators and the industry to make 
derivative works, but also about not branding end-users or consumers as breaking the law when 
they access copyrighted works.161 Dusollier argues that this could be the reason the vision of CC 
is rooted in the aspirations of consumers.162 To further articulate Dusollier’s point, if the greater 
percentage of users is just consumers, the amount of follow-on creativity would be minimal, 
which is contrary to the stated ideal of the CC. I assume many authors would appreciate it more 
if their works were used, enjoyed and inspire further creativity than just merely good for 
consumer enjoyment.  
On the face it, one could argue that a work that is merely used and enjoyed serves mostly 
consumer interests and less the public interest; similarly, online readers or content consumers 
have been referred to as free-riding parasites who benefit from the work of others and 
contributing little.163 However, a different perspective is to consider the learning gained by 
consumers as contributing to the public interest albeit passive or remote. Furthermore, the 
knowledge and enlightenment consumers gain may not be used instantly for creativity, however, 
in future, such knowledge could prove valuable to the public when the consumer directly 
engages in creativity or shares such knowledge with someone who may be inspired by it to 
 
160 Ibid. at 290. 
161 Ibid.  
162 Ibid.  
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create. To further buttress my argument, Chitu Okoli et al in their literature on Wikipedia readers 
and readership are of the view that non-contributory readership is not a bane but valuable in 
itself.164 The value lies in the fact that consumption is a source of inspiration, motivation for 
creators to produce more work and eventually contributes positively to the public interest.  
The public interest and consumer interests, I would argue, are markedly different; public 
interest benefits the society at large as opposed to consumer interest, which is personal interest 
and benefits only the individual. For example, if the result of successful medical research is 
made available through CC, other medical practitioners could tap into that knowledge to help 
save lives – this serves the public interest. This is different from a case where a consumer just 
enjoys a piece of music made freely available – this is personal or consumer interest. However, 
the personal interest argument may not be absolute as there could be an overlap with public 
interest. For example, assuming the user above who enjoys a piece of music and is inspired by it 
to create a remix of the original and shares it with the public. Arguably, this is public interest.  
Dusollier argues that copyright should be about controlling the exploitation of works and 
not their reception or private enjoyment.165  She further states that: 
…Consumerism is as much a threat to copyright as the 
increasing commodification of copyright (not surprisingly, 
since consumerism is a by-product of increasing 
commodification in our modern society). Turning copyrighted 
works into commodities has recast the public as individual 
consumers and focusing on consumers makes explicit the 
recognition of a copyright regime that considers creative works 
solely as commodities to be exchanged in the market.166 
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Dusollier’s argument suggests that there is the possibility that the CC risks contributing to the 
commoditization of works through its emphasis on end-user/consumer benefits.  This bears a 
semblance to what content industries promote. CC would be doing disservice to its free culture 
philosophy if this were to be the case.  
On the contrary, Julie Cohen’s concept of a situated user portrays the user beyond the 
parochial view of labeling her as one who merely consumes creative works. She states:  
The situated user appropriates cultural goods found within her 
immediate environment for four primary purposes: 
consumption, communication, self-development and creative 
play. The cumulative result of this behavior by situated users, 
and of both planned and fortuitous interactions among them, 
produces what the copyright system names, and values, as 
“progress.167   
 
Julie Cohen’s analysis of who a user is and how she interacts with creative works reveals a 
multi-dimensional perspective of a user in the copyright system. The interpretation of her 
argument implies that a user’s consumption of content does produce value in the copyright 
system. Interestingly, it is possible that all four purposes of engaging with creative works 
identified by Cohen could be achieved in a simple but realistic scenario as this: two guitarists 
come together to play a song and take turns to play; they are consumers of a song, 
communicating with each other, developing their skills, and playing creatively. So, arguably, 
consumers’ engagement with content contributes to the public interest though in varying degrees. 
The consumer who actively engages with content to produce a derivative work from it may have 
a stronger public interest impact than a consumer who engages with content for satisfaction and 
enjoyment.  
 
167 Julie Cohen, “The Place of the User in Copyright Law” (2005)74 Fordham L. Rev. 348 at 370. 
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Besides the six licence combinations, CC organization purports to offer a special public 
domain licence that allows licensors to waive their rights in their work and dedicate it to the 
public domain – all rights granted.168 This raises some concern especially since the licensing 
model of CC organization relies on and asserts copyright. CC organization ideology is to find a 
midpoint between all rights reserved and no rights at all; this gives rise to some rights reserved 
mantra, which the CCL scheme represents. 
The public domain licence under the CCL scheme needs clarification on how it co-exists 
with the notions of public domain in copyright; moreover. The principle of some rights reserved, 
and the assertion of copyright is understandable with the six CC licences; but for the public 
domain licence, it is a contradiction to grant all rights and simultaneously assert copyright; all 
rights reserved (copyright) and all rights granted (CC public domain licence) cannot co-exist. It 
may appear that the CC seems to be operating double standards – the standard for some rights 
reserved asserts copyright and the standard for the public domain licences operates without 
copyright. Since the CC0 (public domain licence) cannot exist alongside copyright or rest on the 
foundation of copyright, it is arguably and practically impossible for it to exist. The existence of 
CC0 creates an absurdity where a licensor purports to relinquish her copyright in a work before 
the expiration of the copyright term and release the work into the public domain. According to 
CC, this absurdity or incongruence does not arise because the CC0 is not simply a licence like 
the others, but also a means for a licensor to waive her copyright or dedicate her work to the 
public. CC organization states that: 
 
168 Creative Commons, Creative Commons Licences, at online: < https://creativecommons.org/share-your-work/licensing-types-
examples/ > accessed October 11, 2019. 
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Creative Commons licences do not affect the status of a work 
that is in the public domain under applicable law, because our 
licences only apply to works that are protected by copyright.169 
 
Furthermore, CC explains that depending on the jurisdiction, the CC0 could be a dedication or a 
licence: 
…no legal instrument can ever eliminate all copyright interests 
in a work in every jurisdiction. CC0 doesn’t affect two very 
important categories of copyright and related rights. First, just 
like our licences, CC0 does not affect other persons’ rights in 
the work or in how it is used, such as publicity or privacy 
rights. Second, the laws of some jurisdictions don’t allow 
authors and copyright owners to waive all of their own rights, 
such as moral rights. When the waiver doesn’t work for any 
reason CC0 acts as a free public licence replicating much of 
intended effect of the waiver, although sometimes even 
licensing those rights isn’t effective. It varies jurisdiction by 
jurisdiction. While we can't be certain that all copyright and 
related rights will indeed be surrendered everywhere, we are 
confident that CC0 lets you sever the legal ties between you 
and your work to the greatest extent legally permissible.170 
 
This clarifies the issue of absurdity and clarifies that when a complete dedication is not 
possible, the CC0 acts a licence. It creates a shortcut to the public domain; but the question of 
justification of waiver of copyright term before it expires remains unanswered. Is it justifiable to 
opt out of copyright as CC organization suggests?171 In response, CC acknowledges the difficulty 
in achieving this or whether it is even impossible under various copyright laws in different 
jurisdiction and it is precisely why it initiated the CC0 as a means for authors and creators to 
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have the liberty to dedicate their works to the public domain.172 In the absence of CCL, nothing 
precludes creators from giving express permission to the public to have unconditional access to 
and use of their works, and so this may bear the semblance of a public domain work even if the 
copyright term in the work still subsists. While copyright in a work becomes active immediately 
the idea is expressed in a fixed medium, copyright law also generally does not preclude a creator 
from dedicating her creation to the public domain. 
Copyright scholars have expressed various views on CCL and the public domain under the 
copyright system. I identify two strands of views; first, views expressed about CCL in relation to 
the public domain under the copyright system. Second, the legal justification of the dedicating 
works to the CC’s public domain while its copyright term still subsists. In order to properly 
situate the discussion on the CCL and the public domain in the copyright system, it is fitting to 
briefly discuss the meaning and concept of the public domain.  
The public domain is a contested area and copyright scholars and other commentators hold 
different viewpoints on the subject. A good starting point in explaining the public domain is that 
prior to the emergence of the copyright system, everything that existed was in the public domain. 
This implies that the public domain was the default. The advent of copyright introduced the 
concept of exclusivity right and the right to exclude others. The name, public domain, easily 
conjures up the notion of a space in the incorporeal world that holds works whose copyright term 
have expired and are therefore accessible (without any restriction) to the public for creative 
inspiration. This view seeks to answer the questions: what is the public domain and where does it 
exist? These questions have provoked a variety of responses. Carys Craig’s argues that the public 
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domain, like almost everything in intellectual property is a metaphor;173 she further reasons that 
the public domain could be nowhere and everywhere, nowhere in the sense that it is conceived as 
a metaphor and not a metaphysical territory or a geographically separate preserve;174 and yet it is 
everywhere because it is anywhere where people create and communicate.175 Craig’s response, 
though may appear simple, has a deeper significance in the sense that it suggests the futility of 
attempting to concretely determine what the public domain means or where it is located. Craig 
finds that it is better to ask what we need the public domain to be, and she suggests that the 
public domain should encourage the processes of culture in the face of restrictive intellectual 
property regime.176 
In her analysis of the public domain, Pamela Samuelson identifies two debatable notions of 
the public domain - a virtual wasteland of undeserving detritus or the fount of all new creation.177 
Surprisingly, Samuelson concurs with these seemingly contradictory notions of the public 
domain admitting that some contents in the public domain are detritus and some are valuable and 
better utilized if propertized. Understandably, the notion of contents in the public domain as 
worthless seem to stem from the fact that after the exploitation of a particular work for the life of 
the author plus another 50 years (if in Canada) there might be nothing of value left to exploit. 
This point of view is relative and depends on the circumstance surrounding the use of content in 
the public domain. Some works in the public domain might actually be of little value if they no 
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longer fit into contemporary times; however, if a user or creator accesses public domain works 
and decides to engage in transformative use, then it may be of value. The function of works in 
the public domain is not just for consumptive use, but to motivate the creation of new and 
probably better works. 
Another reason to look down on the content in the public domain may be that it is 
perceived not to be part of the copyright system. This is an incorrect perception of the public 
domain; I argue that the public domain is an integral aspect of the copyright system and in fact, it 
existed before the copyright system. So, even before the copyright regime under the Stationers’ 
Company and the subsequent enactment of the Statute of Anne, the public domain was already in 
existence. Prior to the time when the Stationers’ Company enjoyed exclusive monopoly rights in 
book publishing with no term limits178 the public domain was the default. The copyright system 
contributes to and enriches the public domain in the sense that following the enactment of the 
Statute of Anne, which provided for term limit in copyright,179 works whose copyright term had 
expired went into the public domain. Notwithstanding the term limits in the Statute of Anne, the 
provision was highly contested until judicial pronouncement in Donaldson v Beckett 180 finally 
settled the matter. Though the term “public domain” may be regarded as relatively new in 
copyright discourse featuring in the late nineteenth century,181 on the contrary, it had been 
recognized as a common Latin term – publici juris meaning a thing or right (air, water, etc) that 
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is open to, or exercisable by all persons.182 It was also applicable to other forms of intellectual 
property, for instance, a trademark may not be approved if the term was regarded as publici juris. 
The point to emphasize here is that the concept of public domain is not new, and it is an active 
component of the copyright system, which is arguably and vicariously provided for by copyright 
law through copyright term limitation.  
The Supreme Court of Canada endorses the value in the public domain when it states 
through Justice Binnie: 
Excessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of 
intellectual property may unduly limit the ability of the public 
domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the 
long-term interests of society as a whole, or create practical 
obstacles to property utilization.183 
 The pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Canada buttresses the argument that the public 
domain is an active component of the copyright ecosystem and a wellspring of creativity. In very 
concise language, the public domain is a concept recognized by copyright law and part of the 
copyright system; it holds expired copyright works accessible to the public without any 
restrictions and serves to promote creativity as much as copyright itself. Also, Corbett notes that 
the public domain is generally considered to hold all works that have no copyright protection and 
can therefore be used freely by anyone.184  
With regards to CCL and the public domain, critics have complained that CCL confuse 
notions of public domain and the commons, and that, in so doing, they contribute to the decline 
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of the public domain.185 The confusion perhaps arises from the existence of the commons 
repository under the CCL scheme that holds resources for users to access. Corbett argues that the 
works licensed under CC are placed in a commons, which she says is similar to the public 
domain because it is a theoretically constructed place that serves public good.186 This may appear 
similar to the public domain, which is also a repository of resources that cannot be confined to a 
particular space whether in the corporeal or incorporeal world. Works licensed under CC are 
held in the information / knowledge resource for others to access and use. The criticism against 
CC here is that this creates confusion as to the notion of the public domain, which is already 
subject to various conceptions. Craig notes that with regards to CC, it is not clear whether, and to 
what extent, content under this scheme can be conceptually located within the public domain.187 
Samuelson explains that content licensed under CC is not public domain in the sense of being 
unencumbered by intellectual property rights.188 Samuelson’s argument rightly addresses any 
perceived confusion between CCL and the public domain. The core distinguishing feature 
between CCL and the public domain is that the former is encumbered by copyright and the latter 
is not. Additionally, works licensed under CCL plans are further encumbered by the various 
licence restrictions; but works that have officially (when the copyright term expires) passed on to 
the public domain are available to be exploited without any limitation. 
Corbett and Craig express some ideas that portray the connection between the CCL and the 
public domain in a positive light. Corbett thinks the “commons” under CC is similar to the public 
domain and that it serves public good;189 Craig reasons that CC content is at least deemed to be 
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functionally equivalent to public domain material because it furthers the goal of wide 
dissemination and use.190 This suggests that the free culture agenda of the CC organization aligns 
with the purpose the public domain serves; in other words, they are both achieving the same 
thing, albeit in similar but different ways. The functional equivalence argument by Craig in my 
view does not suggest that CCL and the public domain are the same, but that there is unity of 
purpose – which is to enable access to and use of creative works, encourage creativity and wide 
dissemination of cultural works. In my opinion, notwithstanding the perceived confusion or 
difference(s) between CCL and the public domain, the benefits of CCL to the public domain or 
to creativity, arguably outweighs any possible demerit. The conception of the public domain is a 
general source of controversy in copyright law besides adding the CC mix. The most important 
point to buttress is that the “commons” under the CC serves to add value to the copyright system 
by providing access to and use of content, then it is not causing a decline to the public domain. 
On the contrary, it is adding value to it. 
However, the CCL-public domain relationship is further complicated with the existence of 
a public domain licence under the CCL arrangements. It is difficult to comprehend how it can be 
applied in practical terms and recalls the question I asked above, whether it is legally justifiable 
or possible to voluntarily opt out of copyright?191 The CC organization, through its public 
domain licence (CC0) encourages copyright owners to dedicate their work(s) for which 
copyright still subsists to the public domain. To broach the issue becomes even more problematic 
in the absence of any express provision in copyright law in Canada or United States. According 
to Corbett, critics have warned that this is misleading and fails to acknowledge the complexities 
surrounding the legality of an author voluntarily choosing to relinquish copyright in her works 
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and dedicating same to the public domain.192 A counter argument could be made that the absence 
of any express provision may suggests that copyright law did not intend to bar such dedications. 
Typically, in scenarios like this where the law is silent, it is necessary to review the comments of 
scholars. Corbett engages with the analysis of this argument by identifying the opposing views of 
Phillip Johnson193 and Timothy Armstrong.194 I also consider the arguments by Emily Hudson 
and Robert Burrell.195 My examination attempts to summarize the arguments as the discourse is 
broad enough to be a distinct research of its own. 
In the absence of legal implications, there is hardly anything wrong with giving up 
something to a person or for public use and I believe that this applies to copyright. With regards 
to an author dedicating her work to the public, Johnson’s196 view is that without considering the 
legal effects, an author is free to dedicate her work to the public and should not be precluded 
from doing so. The legal implication under copyright law therefore changes the equation by 
preventing this altruistic gesture. For clarity, it is necessary to explain terms that have been used 
interchangeably to describe an author gifting her work completely for public use. These are 
“forfeiture,” “abandonment,” “surrender,” and “dedication to public domain.” Johnson clarifies 
these terms and how they impact on the legal effect of placing or attempting to place a work in 
the public domain. He makes a distinction between involuntarily forfeiting copyright in a work 
and voluntarily giving it up197 even though courts in the United States have historically equated 
forfeiture with dedication to the public domain.198 Forfeiture occurs when a work is published 
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without proper copyright notice or where statutory requirements so that copyright does not exist 
in the work199 ab initio. This was the position in the United Kingdom until July 1, 1912 when the 
Copyright Act of 1911200 came into force and abolished all statutory requirements.201Similarly, 
in the United States and according to Armstrong, the copyright law operated as an opt-in system 
– meaning that for copyright to attach, notice and registration of copyright and deposition of a 
copy of the work at the Library of Congress were mandatory formalities otherwise copyright in 
the work would be forfeited.202 By these formalities, the author expressed her intention to opt-in 
to copyright. This position ended in the United States on January 1, 1978, which was the 
effective date of the United States Copyright Act of 1976203and the Act caused copyright to 
attach automatically once the work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression;204 though some 
formalities were retained, noncompliance did not vitiate copyright in the work.205 The 
requirement of formalities was abolished on March 1, 1989, the effective date of the Berne 
Implementation Act (bringing the United States in compliance with the Berne Convention).206 
Based on the foregoing, I concur with the argument of Johnson that forfeiture (which happens 
involuntarily or through inaction) should not be equated with voluntarily dedicating a work to the 
public domain.207 
With regards to copyright, Johnson construes abandonment to mean that copyright in a 
work ceases to exist and falls into the public domain;208 he further states that with other forms of 
IP (patents and trademarks) in the United Kingdom, the proper terminology is “surrender” and 
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not abandonment.209 To avoid confusion, Johnson prefers to use the term “dedicating a work to 
the public domain.” While the academic discourse on these terminologies by Johnson and 
Armstrong is appreciated, the crucial point is that the work gets into the public domain and freely 
accessible by the public. The clarification on terminology narrows down the issue to examining 
the legal basis for voluntary dedication of a work to the public domain before the expiration of 
the copyright term. 
On the legal basis for dedicating an unexpired work in to the public domain, Armstrong is 
of the view that, from the United States perspective, the 1976 Copyright Act does not give any 
statutory provision that enables dedicating a work to the public domain during the lifetime of the 
author or seventy year after.210He argues that although United States case law, for over a century 
upheld that copyright owners could disclaim their copyright, the courts were entangled in 
terminology confusion and used terms like, “abandonment” and “dedication to the public 
domain” to mean noncompliance with formalities.211 My earlier explanation on formalities is 
relevant here to further buttress the point that these cases cannot be used as the authority for 
voluntarily dedicating copyright to the public domain because of ambiguity in the usage of terms 
and the legal requirement for formalities, which has now ceased. Armstrong opines, “Nothing in 
the Copyright Act contemplates a voluntary extinguishment of the rights vested by the creator of 
a work; and the courts have been highly reluctant to find copyright abandonment.”212 The 
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summary of Armstrong’s position therefore is that existing law does not contemplate the 
dedication of works voluntarily into the public domain. 
Examining the issue from the United Kingdom perspective, Johnson considers divesting a 
legal right under English213 and Scots law. Under English law, the courts have been averse to 
allow anyone divests rights;214in fact the House of Lords held in Clarke v. Hart215 that it is not 
possible to waive or abandon a right except by acts which are equivalent to an agreement or 
licence. 
Under Scots law and in contrast to English law, divesting of a legal right is possible, but it 
must pass to the Crown and cannot cease to exist.216 Johnson concludes that:  
There is no authority in English or Scots law that copyright 
can be dedicated to the public domain. The authorities relied 
on in favour of the proposition are ancient and sketchy at 
best (Miller,217 Rundel,218 and Platt219) or widely discredited 
(Catnic220). Combine this with the English court’s long 
reluctance to allow a person to give up a legal right and the 
Scots rule transferring rights to the Crown, and it is difficult 
to see how copyright can be dedicated to the public 
domain.221  
 
 Furthermore, under the United Kingdom Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, there 
is no express provision to dedicate copyright in a work to the public domain, which is similar to 
Armstrong’s articulation of the position under United States copyright law. However, Johnson 
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disagrees with Armstrong that United States’ law does not permit divesting of a legal right, he 
argues asserts that the abandonment of both tangible and intangible property (which includes 
copyright) is less controversial in the United States and that state222 and federal common law223 
support this. He also cites the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act of 1995 and maintains that any 
legal right can be given up under the United States law. Furthermore, it is important to note that 
though copyright law confers a legal right on the copyright holder to exclusively enjoy the rights 
in her work, there is no provision in the law that compels her to do so. There is no legal 
obligation to coerce her into exercising this right. In other words, there is no sanction if the 
copyright holder gifts her work to the public. Copyright law confers a legal right but does not 
impose a legal duty to exercise this right. Therefore, this strongly supports the arguments that 
one can dedicate her work to the public even while the copyright in it subsists. Similarly, Emily 
Hudson and Robert Burrell,224 while acknowledging counter reasoning,225 support the view that 
copyright can be abandoned. They argue that copyright scholars in the United States generally 
support the view that copyright could be abandoned:226 
the copyright system is an incentive system, not a coercive 
one. … [N]othing in the Constitution or the Copyright Act 
compels an author to accept the benefits of copyright; nothing 
compels him to distribute his work to the public. An author is 
free to destroy or withhold the work rather than to distribute 
the work. 
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  Hudson and Burrell further opine:227 
It is therefore submitted that the position adopted in the US 
provides a safer guide than the position adopted in Germany, 
where copyright cannot be fully alienated… The possibility of 
abandoning copyright is also important given the recent focus 
on developing new forms of copyright management that 
facilitate public access and re-use. While some of these 
mechanisms are predicated on the creator or rightsholder 
retaining his or her copyright (such as the prospective 
licensing used by Creative Commons and others), in other 
examples the owners seek to divest themselves of any rights 
by dedicating the work to the public domain. 
 
Though Corbett remarks that based on the opposing views of Johnson and Armstrong on 
voluntary dedication a work to the public domain demonstrates the unsettled nature of the 
concept,228 a practical approach may be seen in the opinion of Emily and Hudson, which cites 
public interest as one of the reasons for copyright abandonment through the CCL.229 The CC 
organization acknowledges the murkiness of this debate and issues a subtle caveat that: 
And while no tool, not even CC0, can guarantee a complete 
relinquishment of all copyright and database rights in every 
jurisdiction, we believe it provides the best and most complete 
alternative for contributing a work to the public domain given 
the many complex and diverse copyright and database systems 
around the world.230 
 
 Two other concerns over CCL are its prospects to generate revenue and Stallman’s 
disavowal of the CC scheme. My earlier discussion on the potential misconception of CCL as a 
business model lays the foundation to examine Scharf’s scrutiny on the subject. In sum, and to 
reiterate my discussion on CCL being used as a business model, I observed that although CC 
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organization or its licensing scheme were not setup as a business model, it is fast becoming so 
due to the opportunity it creates through the CCL and the publicity around success stories and 
financial success of licensors. Consequently, the CCL scheme attracts diverse copyright 
stakeholders regardless of whether they support free culture ethos or not; the main motivation for 
some stakeholders is to gain exposure and financial success. CCL therefore runs the risk of 
becoming a money-making tool – a means to an end. Scharf examines the use of CCL as a means 
to generate revenue and possible hindrances; he articulates that the philosophy of sharing 
suggests that the economic model for CCL is based on gratuity.231Examining this subject from 
the perspective of music, Scharf reports that very few artists using CCL can make a living solely 
from their music and therefore expresses doubt as to whether creators would have enough 
motivation to produce more works in a free culture system.232 Scharf rightly observes that 
although the author of a CC-licensed work (music) is not barred from commercially exploiting 
the work, he notes that the chances of doing so successfully are impossible.233 He supports this 
extreme view by arguing that record labels would be unwilling to promote musical content that is 
already available for free234 and that this is a clear distinction compared to the conventional 
mode of operation in the music industry that relies heavily on market success and their 
interest.235 Scharf acknowledges that this perceived difficulty for creators to make money from 
their works through the CCL platform is not intentional and that the real benefit that CC 
organization offers is to aid creators to exploit their works themselves without being exploited.236 
A counter view on Scharf’s position is that music artists who are not signed on by any record 
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label could gamble with CCL, and while the outcome of such gamble is unpredictable, some 
artists, motivated by success stories of other CCL licensors may stand a chance.  
 Scharf’s concern is that although the CCL scheme presents an opportunity for licensors to 
make money, the free culture principle may make this problematic; this reasoning contrasts with 
CC success stories, which presents evidence, albeit limited, of licensors who are able to gain 
both exposure and financial benefits through CCL. The CC organization or its licensing scheme 
is unsurprisingly vulnerable to analyses similar to Scharf’s because of the success stories 
publicity, which fuel the understanding or rather, misunderstanding that CCL is a business 
model. In my view, Scharf approached his examination from an instrumentalist point of view, 
which may provide some justification for his reasoning, otherwise broaching the CCL from an 
intrinsic angle, Scharf’s conclusions may not be relevant. From the intrinsic perspective, which is 
a more suitable framework for assessing CC organisational objectives or its licensing initiative, 
Scharf fails to consider that some creators are motivated to create for reasons other than financial 
gain; his analysis also does not acknowledge the value that CCL-works provide in the cultural 
industry by making creative works available and easily accessible. Scharf’s argument 
inappropriately compares CC with traditional copyright in terms of revenue generation. It is 
understandable and permissible to seek commercial gain through copyright because the law 
permits it, but CC itself relies on copyright, and even if it does (indirectly) provide a means for 
creators to make money, the money-making aspect is a spin-off from the main focus of the CC 
organization. 
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Some other related issues for considerations are questions raised by Andrew Rens:237 1) if 
something held in the commons can be a basis to generate revenue? 2) can a commons-based 
enterprise generate sufficient revenue to sustain itself? and 3) will generating revenue from the 
commons erode the values of the commons? Unlike Scharf, Rens raises these questions for 
clarification purposes.238 Rens first explicates the meaning of the commons by citing Yochai 
Benkler who puts it thus: 
The salient characteristic of commons, as opposed to property, 
is that no single person has exclusive control over the use and 
disposition of any particular resource in the commons. Instead, 
resources governed by commons may be used or disposed of 
by anyone among some (more or less well-defined) number of 
persons, under rules that may range from “anything goes” to 
quite crisply articulated formal rules that are effectively 
enforced.239 
 
Benkler’s articulation on the nature of the commons suggests that ownership is collective 
and each adherent to the commons is free to use or dispose (which could mean revenue 
generation) of the resources in the commons in accordance with formal or informal rules of the 
commons as the case may be. Rens hints of a number of businesses using the CC as a platform 
(already discussed in the success stories) and that the success stories show no indication that 
revenue generation from the commons will destroy the commons.240 Rens further argues that the 
network effect sustain the commons;241 Rens explains the network effect to mean that the more 
people belong to a network, the more connections are available in the network.242 Rens believes 
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that this principle applies to the commons so that the more people use it, the more value it has 
and useful it becomes.243 Rens considers the possibility that people who contribute to the 
commons do so for ideological or utilitarian motives but maintains that in some cases, an author 
may gain more benefit from a growing commons compared to creating or using a copyright-
protected work.244 Admittedly, from the CC success stories, there is reason to believe Rens’ view 
is correct, but amongst the teeming artists and creators, it is not ascertainable if 50 percent of the 
number can make a living off revenue from a commons enterprise. The conclusion therefore is 
that such claims are not absolute. 
The last concern is about the position of Stallman on CC, which according to him, he no 
longer endorses because the CC does not give everyone a minimum level of freedom and on this 
score, he agrees with the argument of Hill.245 Furthermore, Stallman explains that: 
I don't think that licences which deny that minimum freedom 
are legitimate at all. Since people tend to treat Creative 
Commons as a unit, disregarding the details like which one of 
their licences is being used, it is not feasible to support just 
part of Creative Commons--so I can't support it at all now. I 
asked the leaders of Creative Commons privately to change 
their policies, but they declined, so we had to part ways.246 
 
 Stallman’s disagreement is partly rooted in the fact that CCL adopts a concept of free 
culture that differs from his; Stallman encourages a crusade in support for free culture, 
specifically, free software. CC organization does the same thing but following a different 
approach. My concern is that the free culture community is not only trying to promote its agenda 
in the face of a content-industry controlled copyright system, it may also be dealing with 
 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid.  
245 Richard Stallman, “Fireworks in Montreal (2005-07-01 to 2005-07-05)” (2010) at online: < 
https://www.fsf.org/blogs/rms/entry-20050920.html > accessed September 21, 2017; Hill, Towards a Standard of Freedom, supra 
note 144. 
246 Stallman, Fireworks in Montreal, supra note 207. 
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differences in principles (that is, free software, OSS and CCL approaches to free culture) within 
the free culture community. For ease of understanding, I have tried to clarify each party’s 
approach to free culture but a common similarity among them is that they all promote the culture 
of sharing content, which benefit users, creators and the creative society though in varying 
degrees. The free culture community advocacy could be stronger if the disagreement did not 
exist.  
 
4.7 Creative Commons Licensing and the Free Culture Agenda 
 It is incontestable that the CC organization and its licensing scheme aim to promote and 
mainstream the free culture philosophy into the copyright system as a response to the perceived 
content industry-dominated copyright industry. The campaign by the CC organization and its 
proponents seeks to instil a particular consciousness on the purpose of copyright law – which, 
arguably, at least from the free culture perspective, primarily aims to promote innovative ideas 
and creativity before. This relates to the focus of my discussion in chapter one and is relevant to 
the free culture cause and the goals of the CC organization. Chapter one revealed that the present 
feud between the present-day free culture and content industry advocates is traceable to the early 
squabbles right from the era of the Stationers’ Company monopoly (royal privileges) to the 
enactment of the first copyright law. Additionally, the discourse in chapter one shows the less 
than harmonious relationship among the arms of government on copyright matters and how this 
has left most copyright stakeholders largely unsatisfied. The copyright debate has endured for 
more than three centuries with no possible easy solution, despite countless copyright law 
reforms. The purpose of enacting copyright law remains largely contestable; it is possible for 
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both the free culture and the content industry supporters to justify the fact that the purpose of 
copyright aligns with their interests.  
My conjecture is that the free culture advocates have observed that the Stationers’ 
Company-like control of the copyright system is still very visible today even after more than 
three centuries have passed. The knowledge of these historical facts has nudged the free culture 
proponents to believe that unless an out-of-the-box initiative is introduced, they run the risk of 
just merely existing in name in a copyright system dominated solely by the property approach to 
copyright. Consequently, this led to the emergence of the free culture ideology and subsequently, 
the CCL scheme.  
The rate of success recorded by the CC organization in pushing forward the free culture 
goals through the CCL is attributable to the phenomenal effects of ICT, which I examined in 
detail in chapter two. There I discussed the intricacies of the concept of free culture and how 
both the intrinsic and instrumentalist approach to copyright are embedded in it because of the 
differing motives of the free culture adherents. Nonetheless, for the purpose of advancing the 
free culture objectives, the CCL, under the auspices of ICT, seems to be making progress and is, 
perhaps, on track to achieve more. The proliferation of the internet and digital technology 
supports the growth and increased use of CCL, notwithstanding the inherent concerns about the 
CCL discussed above and the inability or lack of evidence to empirically show its positive 
impact on creativity.  Digital technology and the internet largely serve as a catalyst for the 
exponential growth of the CCL, which furthers the free culture agenda. In chapter two, I 
discussed ICT and examined the free culture perspectives on it. I reiterated the position that ICT 
fosters the free culture goals as it provides a platform that makes access to and sharing of cultural 
works fast and easy, which in turn, keeps the circle of creativity unending and dynamic. This is 
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what the free culture agenda stands for: freedom to access works, be inspired by them, and 
engage in transformative use and disseminate the results of one’s creative efforts for the interest 
of the creative community. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to give an in-depth analysis of the free culture interests 
and goals. More specifically, I examined the free culture ideology from the context of CCL to 
understand its impact in copyright in the digital setting. I discussed the arguments both for and 
against free culture and its overall impact on the copyright system. The free culture community 
posit that their activities as actors in the copyright system enhance the purpose of copyright and 
foster the creation of a balanced copyright system by safeguarding the public interest. While the 
free culture initiative is not perfect, its activities seem to be more aligned to the purpose of 
copyright law and foster balance in the copyright system in a manner consistent with the 
principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Theberge.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CONTENT INDUSTRY STAKEHOLDERS  
AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTION MEASURES 
 
Chapter five forms the second part of my case study analysis and focuses on TPMs, how 
they work and why they are used. My inquiry seeks to understand the motive behind the content 
industry’s support for the use of TPMs as a means to further protect content despite copyright 
law’s protection. As we will see, while free culture advocates for the liberty to share and access 
content in the digital era, the content industry stakeholders promote a permission culture – that 
is, access to content should be controlled. 
 
5.0 About Digital Rights Management (DRM) and TPMs 
In the digital space, copyright owners manage their rights using DRMs and TPMs and it 
is appropriate to explain what they mean and how they interact with each other. DRMs refer to 
any technology system that facilitates the trusted and dynamic management of rights in any kind 
of digital information, throughout its life cycle, irrespective of how and where the digital 
information is distributed.1 This definition means that DRMs are a form of intellectual property 
management system in the digital space; it also helps manage licensing of digital content; as Kerr 
explains:  
DRMs are designed to manage an entire array of related 
activities by using various automation and surveillance 
 
1 Nic Garnett, “Outline of Presentation of Nic Garnett, representing InterTrust Technologies” (paper presented to the ALAI 
Congress 2001, June 2001) [unpublished], www.alai-usa.org/2001_conference/pres_garnett.doc at 1, cited in “Ian Kerr, “Digital 
Locks and the Automation of Virtue” in Michael Geist, ed, From “Radical Extremism” to Balanced Copyright” Canadian 
Copyright and the Digital Agenda, (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at 272 footnote 87.” Kerr notes that, according to the author, this 
is a fairly broad definition of DRM, as the authors notes, “the term DRM has no come to be applied to a variety of different 
technologies, most of which relate to control of access to information or to its copying.” 
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technologies to identify digital property and those seeking to 
use it, in order to technologically enforce certain licensing 
conditions. In so doing, DRMs can be used to automate 
permission automatically.2 
 
 DRMs enforce in the digital sphere what contracts do in the physical world, the 
difference being that DRMs are more advanced and sophisticated and leverage technology to 
achieve their functions automatically without any necessary consent on the part of the user. 
DRMs are much more than a contract/licensing-like system, Kerr states that DRMs are 
comprised of two components: 
The first component is a set of technologies that could include 
encryption, authentication, access control, digital 
watermarking, tamper-resistant hardware and software, and 
risk management architectures. In the copyright context, such 
technologies are used to enforce corporate copyright policies 
and pricing schemes through a registration process that 
requires purchasers to hand over certain bits of personal 
information. The second component is a licensing 
arrangement. This set of legal permissions establishes the 
terms of use for the digital property by way of contract.3   
 
From Kerr’s articulation, it can be gleaned that DRMs may bear some similarities with TPMs, 
especially, the technology component that uses encryption technology; there is also a distinction 
in the sense that DRMs administer the legal terms of use attached to a digital content by the 
content owner. Kerr uses an analogy to aptly describe the difference by saying that if a TPM is a 
virtual fence, then a DRM is a virtual surveillance system.4However distinct they may be, there 
are obvious overlaps. 
 
2 Kerr, Digital Locks, ibid. at 272. 
3 Ibid. 273. In note 88, Kerr reports that Hugenholtz has defined a DRM similarly as a contract, typically a licensing agreement, 
coupled with technology, typically, a technological protection measure such as encryption. 
4 Ibid. 
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There are, of course, some concerns with the use of DRMs; some DRMs enable the 
collection of personal data, which include customer identities, consumer habit profiling, and 
tracking and recording of the various uses of works under copyright protection.5 Besides 
authenticating user access and administering terms of use for digital content, DRMs are 
potentially invasive and violate user privacy and this extends beyond copyright protection and 
enforcement to entirely new grounds.6 The foregoing explanation on DRMs set the foundation to 
discuss TPMs, which I analyze below. 
The use of some form of technique to encrypt messages existed long before the advent of 
TPMs in its current sophisticated form. According to Ian Kerr et al, Mitchell McInnes reports 
that Julius Caesar utilized encryption and decryption techniques to send messages to his 
governors to prevent his messengers from tampering with them.7 Admittedly, though Caesar’s 
cryptography method could be regarded as primitive compared to the contemporary techniques 
used today in the digital era, nonetheless, they are generally referred to as 
technology/technological protection measures (TPMs) insofar as they function to restrict access 
to content.  
There are various types of TPMs and they are designed to regulate how content is accessed 
and used. TPMs could be as simple as creating a password to restrict access or involve 
complicated and technical computer programming. Although I will briefly describe some 
technical aspects of TPMs, it is not intended to be exhaustive; an exhaustive analysis on TPMs 
 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Mitchell McInnes et al, Managing the Law: The Legal Aspects of Doing Business (Toronto: Pearson Education, 2003) at 382, 
cited by “Ian Kerr et al, “Technical Protection Measures: Tilting at Copyright’s Windmill” (2002) 34 Ottawa Law Review 7 at 
14.” “Encryption is the coding of plain text in to an unreadable form called ciphertext so that it cannot be understood by those 
who are not privy to the code. Caesar created a rather simple system in which each character in his messages was replaced by a 
character three positions ahead of it in the Roman alphabet. Authorized recipients of his messages were provided with the means 
of decrypting them. Decryption is the process of converting ciphertext back into its original form so that it can be understood and 
acted upon.” 
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requires delving into technicalities, which is not intended here. The description I give is only 
intended to provide foundational knowledge that serves as basis to scrutinize TPM policy 
considerations and why most content industry stakeholders favour them.       
TPMs are multifaceted so a perfect definition is futile since they are associated with 
encryption and a broad range of technologies.8 Authors tend to adopt a very broad and simplified 
definition that give a general insight into the meaning of TPMs. According to Haggart, TPM is a 
technological method aimed at encouraging authorized use of digital content.9 This definition 
suggests that TPMs help encourage authorized use of digitized works especially from the 
viewpoint of the content industry stakeholders. This could be contestable, especially if TPMs are 
defined as technological systems that prevent unapproved use of content in digitized form. TPMs 
are defined from a positive perspective (to encourage authorized access and use), and from a 
negative perspective (to prevent unapproved access and use); the fact remains that they are, 
according to Kerr et al, “virtual fences around digitized content.”10 
The use of TPMs in their current sophisticated forms have become allowable in the 
digitized copyright system following their incorporation into the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 
and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), usually referred to as WIPO Internet 
Treaties.11 The legal debates and background to the adoption of TPMs have been examined in 
detail in chapter three.  
 
8 Michael Geist, “Anti-circumvention legislation and Competition Policy: Defining a Canadian Way? in Michael Geist, ed, In the 
Public Interest, The Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 220. 
9 Blayne Haggart, Copyfight: The Global Politics of Digital Copyright Reform (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) at 
18; Kerr et al, Technology Protection Measures, supra note 7 at 13. 
10 Ibid. Kerr et al.   
11World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Copyright Treaty, December 20, 1996, at online: 
<http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=295157> Accessed October 6, 2015. The WCT entered into force on 
March 6, 2002. [WCT]; World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, December 20, 
1996 at online:  
<http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=295477> Accessed October 6, 2015. The WPPT entered into force on 
March 6, 2002. [WPPT] 
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5.1 How TPMs Work 
TPMs can function simply as creating a password to restrict access or prevent copying of 
content; its functionality could be more intricate, involving the use of encryption technology and 
software programming. However simple or advanced TPMs are, they can be classified into two 
categories: TPMs that regulate access to digital works and those that control copying of digital 
content. My explanation of access control and copy control TPM dichotomy is drawn largely 
from the work of Kerr et al12 on the subject.  
5.1.1 Access Control TPMs 
In order to make use of a piece of content in digital form, access is essential. Access 
control TPMs attempt to ensure that users comply with authorized means to gain access. In other 
words, they prevent unauthorized persons from accessing digital content.13 Passwords and 
cryptography are forms of access control.14 The use of password is common; it can be used to 
prevent access to cellphones, laptops, documents, online accounts etc. Passwords are used for 
both copyright-protected and non-copyright-protected material. It is generally used to safeguard 
material from public view or limited access to authorized persons only. Cryptography is much 
more advanced compared to passwords. My earlier discussion on Caesar’s means of 
safeguarding messages is an example of example of cryptography.15 Cryptography in its simplest 
form is to mask content so it appears unintelligible to third parties but can be deciphered by the 
person(s) to whom it is directed using decryption tools they have received from the sender. 
 
12 Kerr et al, Technology Protection Measures, supra note 10 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. at 14. 
15 McInnes et al, Managing the Law, supra note 7. 
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Cryptography technology has been developed to enable its use in various forms to protect 
copyright content in digital form. Kerr et al identify some of the forms – Access TPM Devices 
and Players, Content Scramble System, Asymmetric Application Segmentation (AAS) and 
Digital Tickets.16 Access TPM Devices and Players are designed to function such that a linkage 
is established between encrypted content and devices or players;17 the content can be accessed 
only by using devices that are technically linked to the content.18 The implication of this for 
users is that to access the content, they must possess not just any device but specific devices that 
are technologically linked to the content. Kerr et al list different methods using this technique.19 
Despite the classification of TPMs as access and copy control oriented, some TPMs (for 
example, the trust-enabled player) also control whether a legally obtained content can be copied, 
stored or printed.20 Additionally, it is unfair to users who legitimately purchase content only to 
be barred from use because their device is not compatible or a component in the user’s computer 
responsible for the link fails and is replaced.21  
 The Content Scramble System, for example is mostly applied to protect movies in DVDs, 
the DVD contents are encrypted and can only be assessed with DVD players manufactured in 
accordance with the CSS licence.22 The content of the DVD is scrambled and can only be 
accessed by the DVD players manufactured with the capability of reading the content of the 
DVD. This implies that possession of the encrypted DVD needs a DVD player designed to 
access or read the content on the DVD.  
 
16 Kerr et al, Technology Protection Measures, supra note 12, at 15, 17 and 19. 
17 Ibid. at 15. 
18 Ibid.  
19 According to Kerr et al, C. Risher identifies a number of Access TPM Devices and Players methods, which include: device 
binding, trusted player, trust-enabled player, trusted device (close environment), trusted device (detection), online access control, 
multiple-key high security; for more detailed description of these methods see Kerr et al, Technology Protection Measures, ibid. 
at 16.   
20 Ibid. at 17. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid.  
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 Kerr et al identify AAS as a form of access control TPM that prevents or reduces the 
chances of making software susceptible to copying.23 To put it simply, a piece of the software 
known as “executable code” is deliberately removed and placed on a server;24 when a user runs 
the application, it identifies that there is a missing code and seeks to locate it on the server; 
besides locating the missing code, the software also verifies that the user is authorized to run the 
system. The rationale behind this mechanism is to prevent unauthorized access to the software. 
Digital Tickets essentially function by means of a code incorporated in a computer, the code 
determines if a user has the right to access content in digitized form,25 and when a ticket is 
presented, it is electronically punched to indicate that a right was used.26 
5.1.2 Copy Control TPMs  
 Besides controlling access to digitized content, TPMs might also have the capacity to 
regulate how content is used, which includes copying, distribution, performance, and 
display.27The technology for copy control TPMs manifests in different forms. Kerr et al explains 
Macrovision, Serial Copy Management System (SCMS), and Digital Transmission Content 
Protection (DTCP)28 as forms of copy control TPMs. These forms of access and copy control 
TPMs summarily described here are actually more technical than I have presented.  
 While I have categorized TPMs into access and copy control TPMs, a more important 
categorization should be TPMs that distinguish between lawful and unlawful uses. But presently, 
TPMs have not reached the level of sophistication (and it is doubtful if this can be attained) 
 
23 Ibid. at 19. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid.  
26 ibid. 
27 Kerr, Digital Locks, supra note 2 at 267, note 70. 
28 Kerr et al, Technology Protection Measures, supra note 26 at 21-22. Macrovision is a copy protection method for analogue 
VHS videocassette recorders (VCRs). It is used to prevent copying of pre-recorded videotapes. SCMS uses watermarks to 
prevent the illegal production of multiple generations of digital copies from a copyright-protected original (see note 44). A 
watermark is information that is digitally encoded in a hidden manner into digital work (see note 45). DTCP prevents 
unauthorized distribution of audiovisual content received in the home in digital form once it has been decrypted (see note 50).    
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required to distinguish between infringing and non-infringing copying and authorized and 
unauthorized access.29 The expectation of the attainment of this sophistication may not be 
technologically realistic. 
 Unsurprisingly, content industry stakeholders have embraced the use of TPMs and in 
contrast, it is widely viewed as an unwelcome development (especially if they are implemented 
without exceptions) within the free culture community or even from the perspective of the 
balance of rights in the copyright system. A vital point to note about TPMs is that in spite of their 
sophistication, they can be defeated;30 this will be analyzed subsequently and how this flaw in 
TPMs have become a justification for the content industry stakeholders to clamour for legal 
protection against circumvention of TPMs. 
 
5.2 TPMs in a Digitized Copyright Industry   
According to Haggart: 
TPMs and digital rights management (DRM) systems predate 
the 1990s and the Internet treaties, although the Internet 
treaties brought them into the mainstream of political debate. 
Depending on how they are used and regulated, TPMs have 
the potential to shift the balance of power between copyright 
owners in subtle ways related to authorization and access, 
effectively overturning any legislated balance set in copyright 
laws. TPMs effectively transfer control over a work from the 
purchaser of the work to whoever put the lock on the work. In 
the absence of digital locks, a user can exercise her statutory 
rights without having to seek anyone’s authorization. If a work 
is locked, however, the purchaser effectively must seek the 
permission of the content owner (or whoever locked the 
content) in order to exercise her legal rights. As a result, TPMs 
 
29 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 9 at 19. 
30 Ibid. at 21; Michael Geist, “The Case for Flexibility in Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties: An Examination of the Anti-
Circumvention Requirements” in Michael Geist, ed, From “Radical Extremism” to “Balanced Copyright”, Canadian Copyright 
and the Digital Agenda (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at 208.  
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can allow owners to impose restrictions more onerous than are 
available to them in the non-digital world.31 
  
 The emergence of ICT and how it empowers users to share and access content in the 
digitized form created a paradigm shift in the balance of power to access works in favour of the 
user. Additionally, ICT created avenues to aid illegal downloading or illegal access to copyright-
protected works. This ultimately strengthened the argument for increased use of TPMs, and the 
content industry stakeholders were at the vanguard of this move. The capabilities ushered in by 
digital technology seemed to have given users unfettered access to content, which, seemingly 
compromised content owners’ legal rights to fully exploit their copyright in the digital context. 
In a bid to maintain control over how their content is used, the content industry stakeholders 
adopted technological means to curtail digitally empowered users’ unauthorized access to 
proprietary content. In other words, the strategy was to use technology to fight technology. It is 
fitting here to use the words in Charles Clark’s book title: “the answer to the machine is in the 
machine.”32  
So just as technology empowers users to access content in the digital age, the content 
industry community have also found a way to leverage technology (through TPMs and DRM 
systems) to control access to content for their benefit. Herein lies the irony of digital technology 
- the same ICT that presents opportunities for the user community to access digitized content 
also enables the content industry to devise multiple means to restrict access to digital content.  
 
5.3 The Content Industry’s Justification and Use of TPMs 
 
31 Supra note 29. 
32 Charles Clark, The Answer to the Machine is in the Machine: And Other Collected Writing, Jon Bing and Thomas Dreier eds. 
(Norway: Norwegian Center for Computers and Law, 2005). 
 306 
As noted above, Haggart33 examines how the use of TPMs in the copyright industry 
could potentially favour the content industry to the bane of users or the free culture community. 
It places the content industry in a position to reclaim the near absolute control it used to have in 
the copyright industry in the pre-ICT era. Content industry stakeholders have taken advantage of 
ICT to explore ICT-based business models since the traditional copyright business model (a 
model that thrives on physical control to create artificial scarcity in order to minimize 
unauthorized access and maximize revenue generation) has gradually lost the grip of control in a 
copyright era that thrives on the digitization of content. The content industry stakeholders now 
explore ICT-based business models by providing online access to generate income. This is 
indeed a welcome development: in the music industry, iTunes and Amazon are selling online 
music through downloads and paid streaming services, in the film industry, Netflix, Amazon 
Prime, Microsoft Xbox, HBO Go, Xfinity and Hulu Plus are providing online video services, and 
in book publishing, the advent of Apple’s iBooks, and Amazon’s Kindle34 are examples of 
business models that digital technology supports. 
In the digital space, the ease with which content is made accessible (both legally and 
illegally) is worrisome for the content industry stakeholders. These concerns to some degree are 
genuine, as Kerr et al acknowledge that digital technology poses challenges to the enforcement 
of intellectual property, such as copyright in digitized form;35 this therefore creates a 
justification, albeit contestable, for the use of TPMs, which is perceived to provide further and 
greater control over online content,36 as well as serving as a means to enforce and protect their 
 
33 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 29. 
34 Stephen A. Merrill & William J. Raduchel eds., Copyright in the Digital Era: Building Evidence for Policy at online: < 
http://www.nap.edu/download/14686>  (Washington DC: National Academies Press: 2013) at 23, 25 and  26 Accessed July 18, 
2016. 
35 Kerr et al, Technology Protection Measures, supra note 7 at 12. 
36 Geist, Anti-Circumvention Legislation, supra note 8 at 220. 
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rights.37 This justification has two implications: first, the content industry stakeholders conclude 
that the statutory protection in copyright law is insufficient; secondly, the use of TPMs amounts 
to self-help due to lack of confidence in the ability of the law to guarantee protection in the 
digital space. To fill in for the inadequacy of the law, the content industry stakeholders’ resort to 
private technologies to regain control over digitized content. 
Despite the desirability of TPMs and the reliance on them by the content industry 
community, the security protection they offer is susceptible to compromise. Consequently, Geist 
states, companies explore new ways of using TPMs that are less conspicuous, which enable them 
to manipulate markets to the detriment of consumers.38 A couple of examples are identified to 
buttress this point. DVDs with regional codes cannot be played in another region and the 
consumer is often unaware of the reginal code;39 so if such a DVD is purchased while on 
vacation, the purchaser is unable to play the DVD when he returns home.40 Similarly, in 2005, 
Geist reported that Hewlett –Packard began to install TPMs into printer cartridges to prevent the 
use of cartridges bought in another region;41 according to Geist, the rationale is to enable the 
company to maintain different prices for the same product in different markets around the 
world.42 In my view, this suggests that the argument can be made that the use of TPMs have been 
extended beyond what was originally intended by the WIPO Internet Treaties.  
An assessment of the justification and use of TPMs by content industry calls for a critical 
review. The threat of unauthorized access to digital content should not be underestimated and 
 
37 Kerr et al, Technology Protection Measures supra note 35. 
38 Geist, Anti-Circumvention Legislation, supra note 8. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. at 220-1. 
41 Ibid. at 221. This also forestalls refiling of empty cartridges from sources other them HP.  
42 Ibid.  
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scholars acknowledge that fact.43 This reason might offer extenuating circumstances for the use 
of TPMs if their use could be targeted at unauthorized access intended for commercial copying 
of digital content. TPMs however, are yet to reach that level of intelligence where it could 
distinguish between cases where it is legal or illegal to copy, access or use a work.44 
Consequently, Craig argues that the extensive protection of TPMs without any consideration for 
lawful uses of copyright content has the potential to effectively eviscerate fair dealing in the 
digital age.45 Further to inappropriate uses of TPMs by corporations to gain market advantage,46 
the situation is worsened by the fact that TPMs are not implemented to identify illegal access to 
content but apply generally to all users. This significantly impacts on the rights of users to access 
content for lawful uses.  
The content industry’s coveted use of TPMs does not absolutely put an end to 
unauthorized access because it is trite that TPMs do not offer perfect protection, and their 
protective integrity can be easily compromised. For instance, in 2000 the Secure Digital Music 
Initiative (SDMI) tested the integrity of its technology protection by inviting the public to 
attempt to break it.47 The protection was easily cracked by a team of security researchers, 
illustrating that TPMs are not foolproof.48 Therefore, the articulation by Clark49 that the answer 
 
43 Kerr et al, Technology Protection Measures, supra note 35; Sheldon Halpern, “The Digital Threat to the Normative Role of 
Copyright Law” (2001) 62 Ohio State L.J. 569. 
44 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 33.  
45 Carys Craig, “Locking Out Lawful Users: Fair Dealing and Anti-Circumvention in Bill C-32” in Michael Geist, ed, From 
“Radical Extremism” to “Balanced Copyright”, Canadian Copyright and the Digital Agenda (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at 179; 
see also Carys Craig, “Digital Locks and the Fate of Dealing in Canada: In Pursuit of “Prescriptive Parallelism” (2010) 13 J.W. 
Intell. Prop. at 503 at 508, at online: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-1796.2009.00394.x > accessed May 
25, 2019. 
  accessed  
46 Geist, Anti-Circumvention Legislation, supra note 38-42. 
47 Janelle Brown, “Crack SDMI? No thanks!” Salon (14 September 2000), 
www.salon.com/technology/log/2000/09/14/hack_sdmi/index.html cited in “Michael Geist, Implementing the WIPO Internet 
Treaties, supra note 30 at 208-9.” 
48 Scott A. Craver et al, “Reading Between the Lines: Lessons from the SDMI Challenge” (paper presented to the 10th USENIX 
Security Symposium, Washington, D.C, August 15 2000), www.usenix.org/events/seco1/craver.pdf cited in “Michael Geist, 
Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 30 at 209.”  
49 Clark, Answer to the Machine, supra note 32. 
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to the machine is in the machine is not complete without adding that there is always a new 
machine in answer to the last. Halpern notes, this (encryption and decryption) could easily turn 
into an endless circle of rivalry: 
This seemingly endless game of catch-up, as encryptors and 
decoders leapfrog one another, take place usually in a context 
in which there is a large class of consumer-infringers (as well 
as consumers who are not infringers) who either do not 
consider the copying involved to be an infringing act or do not 
believe that the law ought to inhibit or punish their conduct.50 
 
The vulnerability of TPMs in the hands of skillful hackers leaves the content industry dissatisfied 
and exploring new ways to protect their content. This culminates in seeking legal protection to 
prevent circumvention of TPMs.  
5.4 TPMs and Legal Protection Against Circumvention   
The content industry’s effort to maximize protection of digital content led to the use of 
TPMs in the digital space, then, dissatisfied with the efficacy of TPM, they sought legal 
protection for the technologies that protect copyright;51 these are known as anti-circumvention 
laws. The act prohibited by law is the circumvention or bypassing TPMs to and/or copy content. 
The ordinary meaning of the word circumvention is to evade or avoid or bypass something. In 
copyright parlance, circumvention is construed broadly to mean both directly breaking the TPM 
and/or bypassing it to access content under digital locks. This makes sense because the 
prohibition here is to prevent access to digital content under protection. At this juncture, it is 
important to mention that while in some cases “access” may not necessarily amount to 
 
50 Halpern, The Digital Threat, supra note 43 at 576; Kerr, Digital Locks, supra note 27 at 266.  
51 Ian Kerr, “If Left to Their Own Devices…How DRM and Anti-Circumvention Laws Can Be Used to Hack Privacy” in 
Michael Geist, ed. In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 167. Note, some 
of these technologies may also be protected by patents. Since majority of these technologies are software-driven, computer 
programs per se are not patentable. However, where a software is part of an invention, it is patentable. Copyright may be 
preferable since it can cover technologies that are entirely software-driven.  
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circumvention, it is not the case with copying.52 This implies that circumventing copy control 
TPMs amounts to infringement. While this (legal protection against circumvention) may be 
construed as excessive considering the existing protection for creative works, the position of 
copyright holders (including a number of large and powerful corporations) is that the existing 
laws do not provide adequate protection against massive illegal dissemination of digital works. 
Therefore, it is justifiable to call for legal protection of TPMs.53 Extra protection besides 
traditional copyright, itself could be regarded as copyright-plus, or according to Jeremy deBeer, 
“paracopyright.”54 The legal backing for the use of TPMs as well as legal protection for them has 
its foundation in the WCT and, (which largely a product of the United States White Paper55 as 
discussed in chapter 3).  
As we have seen, Article 11 of the WCT states that: 
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and 
effective remedies against the circumvention of effective 
technological measures that are used by authors in connection 
with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne 
Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, 
which are not authorized by the authors concerned or 
permitted by law.56 
 
 
52 Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20, in s.41.11 to 41.18 provides for exceptions where gaining access through 
circumvention does not amount to infringement if done for specific reasons (other than commercial copying) such as law 
enforcement investigation, interoperability of computers, encryption research, personal information protection, computer security 
assessment, to enable accessibility by persons with perpetual disability, broadcasting purposes, to gain access to 
telecommunications services through radio apparatus. 
53 Kerr et al, Technology Protection Measures, supra note 43 at 42. 
54 Jeremy deBeer, “Constitutional Jurisdiction Over Paracopyright Laws” in Michael Geist, ed. In the Public Interest: The Future 
of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 89. 
55 In chapter three of this dissertation, I discussed the US White Paper (Bruce Lehman, “Intellectual Property and the National 
Information Infrastructure – The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights” (1995) at online: < 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015040596903;view=1up;seq=10 >  accessed May 25, 2019) and the role it played 
in origin and development of the WIT. In chapter three also, I examined criticisms against the US White Paper by Pamela 
Sameulson and Jessica Litman. 
56 WIPO, WCT, supra note 11, Art. 11. 
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The WPPT contain a similar provision.57 These provisions have been discussed 
extensively in chapter three, and so it suffices here to reiterate here that they set the foundation 
for WIPO member countries to incorporate the use of TPM and their legal protection into their 
respective national copyright laws. The WCT and the WPPT provide a framework for the 
implementation of anti-circumvention laws by WIPO members; but this framework is directive 
and therefore gives member countries the discretion to determine how to incorporate anti-
circumvention provisions into national copyright laws. Arguably, it also affords the opportunity 
to ensure that the content industry stakeholders are not unduly favoured over users or free culture 
stakeholders. The fairness of anti-circumvention provisions is determined by the implementation 
approach adopted.  
Haggart identifies two approaches consistent with the treaties’ provisions – minimalist 
and maximalist:58 the minimalist approach would make it illegal to break TPMs only if it was 
intended to infringe copyright;59 the maximalist approach on the other hand makes it illegal to 
break a digital lock regardless of whether the use is infringing or not.60 Therefore, where the 
minimalist approach is adopted, in an alleged case of breaking digital lock, the copyright owner 
has the burden to prove that the intention was to commit copyright infringement; where a 
maximalist approach is adopted, breaking the digital lock is illegal and intent is immaterial 
except the alleged offender can show otherwise. 
 The content industry stakeholders cite inadequacy of the law to provide effective 
protection against unauthorized access in the digital landscape as a justification to use TPMs and 
its attendant legal protection. Content industry stakeholders claim that the use of TPMs and its 
 
57 WIPO, WPPT, supra note 11 Art. 18. 
58 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 44 at 21. 
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid. 
 312 
legal protection is to further reinforce copyright protection, but in actual fact, the nature of 
protection offered by anti-circumvention provisions primarily protects the technologies deployed 
to protect digital content rather than the content itself. On this score, Geist argues that: 
Although characterized as copyright protection, this layer of 
legal protection does not address the copying or use of 
copyrighted work. Instead, it focuses on the protection of the 
TPM itself, which in turn attempts to ensure that the 
underlying content is only accessed and used as controlled by 
the copyright owner.61 
 
 Traditional copyright legislation protects expression in the work and not the physical 
embodiments in which the work reposes; based on this fundamental principle of copyright, I 
agree with Geist, that anti-circumvention does not directly protect copyright as it seems. If at all 
there is the semblance of any such protection, it is too remote from that provided by traditional 
copyright. Legal protection for TPMs therefore establishes another layer of protection besides 
that afforded by traditional copyright law. Furthermore, it can be argued that legal protection for 
TPMs is specific in the kind of technology (TPMs) it targets, which gives preferential treatment 
to content industry to the detriment of users. In matters of technology, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has ruled that the approach is to adopt a technology neutral approach and not favour a 
particular technology over another.62  
 
61 Geist, Anti-Circumvention Legislation, supra note 46 at 222. 
62 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v. SODRAC 2003 Inc. [2015] 3 S.C.R. at 652 “In our view, there is no practical 
difference between buying a durable copy of the work in a store, receiving a copy in the mail, or downloading an identical copy 
using the Internet. The Internet is simply a technological taxi that delivers a durable copy of the same work to the end user”: 
ESA, at para.  5. Similarly, in the valuation of a right, technological neutrality requires that different technologies using 
reproductions of copyright-protected work that produce the same value to the users should be treated the same way;” Cary Craig, 
“Technology Neutrality: (Pre)Serving the Purposes of Copyright Law” in Michael Geist ed, in The Copyright Pentalogy: How 
the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto: University of Ottawa Press, 2012) at 
291-2. She further argues that “technology neutrality can be derived directly from the face of the Copyright Act, it is generally 
found in the wording of section 3(1) and the owner’s exclusive right to reproduce the work “in any material form whatsoever.” 
This provision undoubtedly demonstrates an ambition toward a technologically neutral copyright but, in itself, it demands 
nothing more than extending the reach of owners’ right to new media, thereby ensuring non-discrimination in the applicability of 
the law to different technologies, and, to a certain degree, “future-proofing” the law.” 
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In response to the heightened challenges of illegal access to proprietary content in the 
digital space, it is not out of place for content owners to respond by safeguarding their content in 
the hope of gaining some financial rewards. However, the degree and manner of response is an 
issue for consideration. In this case, does the additional layer of legal protection for, and use of 
TPMs amount to adequate response or is it far out of proportion? Currently, there are now 
several regimes of protection available to content industry stakeholders. 
  
5.5 Regimes of Protection available to Content Industry Stakeholders 
According to Kerr et al, three levels of protection exist for copyright owners: existing 
copyright law, contract law and TPM and DRM technologies.63 In chapter one, I gave a detailed 
analysis of the origins of the first copyright law64 in 1710, which granted authors copyright in 
their book for them to exclusively exploit rewards from it for a period of fourteen years.65 Since 
then, copyright subject matter and term have been expanded enormously. In Canada, even 
leaving aside the addition of neighbouring copyright for sound recordings, broadcast signals and 
performers’ performances, the categories of works in which copyright may subsist include 
literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works,66 and the term of protection for these works is life 
of the author plus fifty years67 (which is likely only to increase in the light of the CUSMA as 
discussed in Chapter Three). These protections also extend to works in digital form as long as 
they meet the criteria for protection, which in Canada are originality, expression of the idea, and 
that such expression be fixed or embodied in a medium of more or less permanent endurance. 
Furthermore, because literary works include software, whether in human-readable or object code, 
 
63 Kerr et al, Technology Protection Measures, supra note 53 at 43. 
64 The Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Anne, c.19. 
65 Ibid. s.1 
66 Copyright Act, 1985, R.S.C., c. C-42 s.5(1). 
67 Ibid. s.6. 
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even software-based TPMs may themselves be protected by copyright law68 as literary 
expression in their own right. As Dusollier writes: 
When the technical protection measure that prevents copying, 
accessing the work or ensures its authentication, is a computer 
program, hacking it could constitute an infringement of the 
copyright vested in the software. Tampering with the 
protective mechanism could arguably imply a reproduction, 
even if transient, of the software.69 
   
This issue raised by Kerr et al and Dusollier undeniably strengthens the use of TPMs and 
its legal protection. In fact, to protect digital content online, most of the protective mechanisms 
are likely to be based on protocols and software codes, which in themselves enjoy copyright 
protection. So, this now creates a multiplicity of protection to the advantage of copyright owners.  
 David Nimmer et al, observe that the ownership and exploitation of copyright is 
structured at every turn by contract.70 In the traditional copyright system, contract is used by the 
copyright owner to expand the power of control through licences which spell out the terms of the 
contract. Contracts have been a means of asserting proprietary rights and ownership in copyright. 
Contracts also exist in the online space where digital content is made available and owners of 
content endeavour to control how their content is accessed and utilized. This is done through 
online licences where users are made to accept terms and conditions (contracts) that stipulate 
how the content should be used. Such licences, according to Kerr are often incorporated into 
 
68 Kerr et al, Technology Protection Measures, supra note 63.  
69 Severine Dusollier, “Situating Legal Protections for Copyright-Related Technology Measures in the Broader Legal Landscape: 
Anti-Circumvention Protection Outside Copyright” (General Report Presented to the ALAI Congress, June 2001) [unpublished], 
at online: ALAI 2001 Congress http://www.law.columbia.edu/conference/2001/Reports/GenRep_ic_en.doc cited by “Kerr et al, 
Technology Protection Measures, supra note 68 at 43-4.” However, note that not all “access” violates circumvention if they fall 
within stipulated exceptions, and because not all circumventions are done for the purpose of copying.  
70 David Nimmer et al, “The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand” (1999)87 Cal. L. Rev. 17 at 24. For further reading on 
contract and copyright see Niva Elkin-Koren, “Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract” (1997)12 Berkeley TLJ 
93 at 105; J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, “Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of 
Contract with Public Good Uses of Information” (1999)147 PA. L. Rev. 875 at 899.   
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digital rights management (DRM),71 which leads to the third level of protection available to 
content industries – DRMs and TPMs (already discussed above). 
With the extant level of expansive protection available to the content industry 
stakeholders in the physical and digital space, it is indeed worth pondering, whether adding 
another layer of protection (anti-circumvention laws) is necessary.  
 
5.6 Critique of TPMs and their Legal Protection 
The above analysis of TPMs and their legal protections in the copyright system raise 
some concerns that anti-circumvention protections arguably tend to undermine the achievement 
of balance in copyright and impact unfavourably on other areas such as access, fair dealing, 
privacy, control, competition, and the simultaneous availability of multi-level protection. 
5.6.1 TPMs, Access and Fair Dealing 
Access, in copyright parlance is the opportunity users have to interact with creative works 
in ways that do not violate the copyright owner’s right, and the engagement/use could be 
reading, viewing, reproduction and transformative use of content. Fair dealing is the permissible 
use of works without prejudice to the rights and interests of the copyright owner.72 Users cannot 
exercise their right to fair dealing if they are unable to have access to the work in the first place, 
and once you access creative content, use of such content begins (which could be permissible or 
illegal). So, these two concepts, access and use (fair dealing), are intertwined though different. 
 
71 Kerr et al, Technology Protection Measures, supra note 68 at 44. 
72 In Canada, the permissible fair dealing use are research, private study, education, parody or satire. Copyright Act, 1985, s.29(1) 
& (2) states: 29.1 Fair dealing for the purpose of criticism or review does not infringe copyright if the following are 
mentioned:(a) the source; and(b) if given in the source, the name of the (i) author, in the case of a work, (ii) performer, in the case 
of a performer’s performance, (iii) maker, in the case of a sound recording, Or (iv) broadcaster, in the case of a communication 
signal; 29.2 Fair dealing for the purpose of news reporting does not infringe copyright if the following are mentioned: (a) the 
source; and (b) if given in the source, the name of the (i) author, in the case of a work, (ii) performer, in the case of a performer’s 
performance, (iii) maker, in the case of a sound recording, or (iv) broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal.  
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Access makes the content available to users, while fair dealing gives users the right to engage 
with the content. Without access, fair dealing cannot be exercised. Access and fair dealing 
(referred to as fair use in the United States) are two cardinal principles in copyright law that 
engender the fulfillment of the purpose of copyright. These principles seem to have been 
adversely affected by the use of TPMs and legal protection against circumvention. 
At this juncture, it is necessary to consider the nature of rights users have to access 
copyright-protected works and whether or not copyright owners are obliged to grant access. 
Generally, users of works under copyright protection have rights to those works through the 
following ways: legitimate purchase, licence or services contract, or through exceptions (fair 
dealing) provided by copyright law.73 Access to works through purchasing a legitimate copy or 
by licence or contract are hardly controversial, in fact, the Supreme Court of Canada in Theberge 
opines that once an authorized copy of a work is sold, the copyright owner cannot control how 
the purchaser uses the work;74 the main contention is to what extent do copyright exceptions 
apply to give users the right to access works other than through legal purchase, licence or 
contract? That is, can users access content for free and still enjoy copyright exceptions? The 
Berne Convention75 answers this question in the affirmative; it provides for certain free uses of 
works, which are still entitled to enjoy copyright exceptions. Article 10 provides for certain free 
uses of works as follows:76 
(1) It shall be permissible to make quotations from a work 
which has already been lawfully made available to the public, 
provided that their making is compatible with fair practice, and 
their extent does not exceed that justified by the purpose, 
 
73 Pascale Chapdelaine, “Copyright Use Rights and Remedies: An Access to Justice Perspective” (2018) 7 Laws, 1, at online: 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3204902 > accessed August 14, 2019. 
74 Théberge v. Galerie d’art du Petit Champlain, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336 at 355-6. 
75 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works as amended September 28, 1979. 
76 Ibid. Art. 10. 
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including quotations from newspaper articles and periodicals 
in the form of press summaries. 
 
(2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the 
Union, and for special agreements existing or to be concluded 
between them, to permit the utilization, to the extent justified 
by the purpose, of literary or artistic works by way of 
illustration in publications, broadcasts or sound or visual 
recordings for teaching, provided such utilization is 
compatible with fair practice. 
 
(3) Where use is made of works in accordance with the 
preceding paragraphs of this Article, mention shall be made of 
the source, and of the name of the author if it appears thereon. 
 
Additionally, Articles 10bis provides for further free uses of works thus:77 
(1) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the 
Union to permit the reproduction by the press, the 
broadcasting or the communication to the public by wire of 
articles published in newspapers or periodicals on current 
economic, political or religious topics, and of broadcast works 
of the same character, in cases in which the reproduction, 
broadcasting or such communication thereof is not expressly 
reserved. Nevertheless, the source must always be clearly 
indicated; the legal consequences of a breach of this obligation 
shall be determined by the legislation of the country where 
protection is claimed. 
 
(2) It shall also be a matter for legislation in the countries of 
the Union to determine the conditions under which, for the 
purpose of reporting current events by means of photography, 
cinematography, broadcasting or communication to the public 
by wire, literary or artistic works seen or heard in the course of 
the event may, to the extent justified by the informatory 
purpose, be reproduced and made available to the public. 
 
 From the provisions of the Berne Convention above, it is apparent that users can access 
content free and enjoy uses covered by copyright exception, provided such uses conform to fair 
practice (that it, come within the ambit of copyright exception). In my opinion, the fundamental 
objective here seems to align with the purpose of copyright – to promote the encouragement of 
 
77 Ibid. Art. 10bis. 
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learning and dissemination of intellectual works. These provisions do not give users unlimited 
access to content to the detriment of copyright owners. For the content to be accessed free of 
charge, it has to be made available legally, and in line with fair practice. Additionally, the free 
use of such content must also conform to fair practice (fair dealing). Albeit limited, these 
provisions give users access to and use of content. As an international treaty, for these provisions 
to take effect, they have to be incorporated into national copyright laws of members states that 
are signatories to the Berne Convention. Member states have a discretion regarding their 
implementation approach. Despite the existence of these provisions, it does not seem to have 
gained much traction in national copyright laws. Nonetheless, it does serve as an authority to 
show that even without paying for it, users can still access content legally and enjoy copyright 
exceptions.  
Access and fair dealing principles are arguably as old as the first copyright law – the 
Statute of Anne and were entrenched in the law; though the law (Statute of Anne) did not 
specifically mention access and fair dealing, nonetheless, they can be inferred from section 5,78 
which provided that nine copies of each book published shall be made available for the use of 
libraries, and the libraries mentioned were the royal library, libraries of the universities of Oxford 
and Cambridge, libraries of four universities in Scotland, Sion College library in London, and the 
library of the faculty of advocates at Edinburgh.79 Although the Statute of Anne did not explicitly 
state the rationale for depositing these copies in the libraries, the rationale can be inferred. These 
books were deposited mostly in universities – citadels of learning, presumably for the lofty ideal 
of public gain and that members of the public could easily access these books and deal fairly 
with them. Other possible reasons could be for social, cultural and record purposes. Depositing 
 
78 Statute of Anne, supra note 64 at s.5. 
79 Ibid. 
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these books in the libraries fostered easy access to them by members of the public for the 
purpose of fair dealing but it did not mean that they owned the books; in my opinion, and 
impliedly, it was meant to balance the rights of the authors and the public interest. In the 
historical context described above, access was provided to the general public even though of a 
limited nature because only those in close proximity to the location of the libraries, and those 
willing to travel to such locations could actually have access to the published book. Other 
alternatives to obtain copies of the published books would be through purchase or from someone 
who purchased a copy. 
In contemporary copyright law, there is no provision or obligation on content creators to 
deposit copies of their works in public places. Nonetheless, the existence of exceptions to 
copyright arguably pave the way for access and more recently the discourse on access to works 
under copyright protection has been raised in favour of the user.80 Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has interpreted fair dealing (copyright exceptions) to mean “user’s right.”81 
While this articulation by the Supreme Court reinforces the idea of advancing the balance of 
interests between users and copyright owners, it also calls for a critical analysis. I will examine 
the meaning of user’s right first by discussing who the Supreme was referring to by the term 
“user(s)” and secondly, determine the meaning and nature of the “rights” conferred on users. 
Although the Supreme Court does not specifically define the category of users it was referring 
to; however, Pascale Chapdelaine gives a hint82 and identifies the type of access to creative 
works that proves to be more controversial: 
 
80 Marcella Favale, “The Right of Access in Digital Copyright: Right of the Owner or Right of the User? (2012) 15 The Journal 
of World Intellectual Property Law Journal 1, at online: < https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1796.2011.00433.x > accessed August 
14, 2019. 
81 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004 SCC 13 at 364. At online: < https://scc-
csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/2125/1/document.do> accessed August 14, 2019. 
82 Chapdelaine, Copyright User Rights, supra note 73. 
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What is more controversial to some, or at best uncertain to 
others, is the scope of those user rights including what is 
traditionally referred to as exceptions to copyright 
infringement. This is due in great part to copyright law having 
been predominantly centered on the exclusive rights of authors 
and copyright holders.83  
 
It can be inferred from Chapdelaine’s articulation above that a user as contemplated by 
the Supreme Court is one who legally (by purchase or with the consent of the copyright owner) 
obtains content, or one who accesses content legally made available for free.84 This arguably 
gives such users the justification to enjoy the fair dealing exception. In other words, my point is 
that users of illegally obtained copies of content do not have the justification to enjoy fair dealing 
exception to copyright. This clarification on the category of users is necessary to properly 
contextualize the pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The second issue interrogates the scope and nature of rights referred to by the apex court 
of Canada, that is, equating copyright fair dealing to user’s rights advances the idea of balance in 
the copyright system. The nature of the right, how it should be exercised, whether it can be 
supported by copyright law and the obligation of the copyright owner seem unsettled. The 
concept of rights in legal theory is broad and an exhaustive analysis is not within the scope of 
this research, but a concise explanation is necessary. According to Roscoe Pound, as a noun, the 
word “right” is used in law books in five senses,85 but for the context of this discussion, Pound’s 
second articulation of the meaning of right seems apposite: 
…the term "right" is used to designate the chief means which 
the law adopts in order to secure interests, namely, a 
recognition in persons, or a conferring upon persons, of certain 
capacities of influencing the action of others. The courts give 
 
83 Ibid. 
84 Berne Convention, supra note 76 & 77.  
85 Roscoe Pound, “Legal Rights” (1915) 26 Intl Journal of Ethics at 92, see generally 92-101, at online: < 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2376739.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-
4341%2Ftest&refreqid=search%3A9ac5b19b0343c08975db2c991ffc1d0b > accessed August 15, 2019. 
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effect to these capacities of influence by protecting those in 
whom they are recognized or upon whom they are conferred in 
the exercise of them, or by enforcing them specifically against 
those whom the law holds subject to such influence, or by 
vindicating them by some form of redress when they are 
interfered with.86 
 
  In sum, Pound’s definition above connotes that a legal right confers certain benefits, 
which influences others or places an obligation on them to do certain acts or refrain from doing 
so; furthermore, that the beneficiary of legal rights can enforce their rights in court and seek 
redress (remedies) when these rights are interfered with. The availability of remedy to redress a 
wrong aligns with the Latin maxim ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a 
remedy). The current provisions of exceptions to copyright are not couched as legal rights to fit 
into Pound’s definition above; fair dealing is not couched as an enforceable right in the court of 
law against the copyright owner with the possibility of seeking remedies. Similarly, in her 
analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation, Chapdelaine opines: 
…a perplexing aspect of this jurisprudential development is 
that it is far from clear that users have rights per se under the 
Canadian Copyright Act, at least in the Hofeldian sense of 
jural correlatives: i.e., a right implies that someone has a duty 
towards it…At a minimum, under the current understanding of 
exceptions to copyright infringements, they would qualify as 
privilege in the Hofeldian sense of the term. An exception or 
defense to copyright infringement qualifies as a privilege to 
the extent that it allows a user to perform certain acts without 
authorization but does not require copyright holders to 
facilitate the exercise of these acts (e.g., when constrained by a 
technological protection measure (TPM)). By contrast, if users 
have the power to require copyright holders to facilitate the 
performance of acts that are allowed through exceptions to 
copyright infringement, the said exceptions would then be 
more properly characterized as right (in Hofeldian terms).87 
 
 
86 Ibid. at 93. 
87 Chapdelaine, Copyright User Rights, supra note 82 at 2. 
 322 
 Chapdelaine’s position supports the fact that exceptions to copyright law (interpreted to 
mean user right in CCH) do not confer rights in a legal sense and lacks the legal foundation to 
compel a copyright owner to facilitate the enjoyment of the purported right. Furthermore, she 
argues that the exceptions qualify as privileges (as different from rights). So, of what use then is 
this interpretation by Canada’s Supreme Court? Just as the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Théberge articulates the purpose of copyright law and opened up a new understanding on the 
subject, so also, I believe, the CCH interpretation carries undeniable rhetorical force and power88 
to orchestrate a dialogue on advancing the rights of users and generally move closer towards the 
attainment of balance in the copyright system.   
In Canada, this point (copyright balance) has been amplified by the Supreme Court in 
Théberge when Justice Binnie articulates that the real meaning of balance is the recognition of 
the copyright owner’s right as well as its limited nature.89 The rights that access and fair dealing 
confer on users ideally should be the same both in the physical world and the digital space, but it 
appears that these principles are being truncated in the digital space. This causes real concern and 
questions the continued justification of the use of TPMs and their legal protection. Traditionally, 
copyright holders could not practically restrict access to creative works;90 once a work is 
published or publicly disseminated, the author loses the right to control access to the work.91 At 
that time, creative content existed chiefly in physical embodiments in the possession of the 
purchaser. Therefore, once an author’s work is legitimately purchased, the author cannot control 
what the purchaser does with the physical copy of the work. The purchaser can decide to 
physically give the work to as many persons as she pleases or even sell it. The liberty of the 
 
88 Ibid. at 3. 
89 Théberge, supra note 74 at 355. 
90 Kerr et al, Technology Protection Measures, supra note 71 at 47.  
91 Ibid.  
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purchaser to share the work with others means giving them access to knowledge, which could 
possibly lead to follow-on creativity. But currently, with the digitization of content, and the use 
of DRMs and TPMs, copyright owners in some cases can control how the work is subsequently 
used or shared or limit how many times the work can be shared. On this score, Craig remarks 
that:92  
In the Théberge decision, the Supreme Court stated that “once 
an authorized copy of a work is sold to a member of the 
public, it is generally for the purchaser, not the author, to 
determine what happens to it” (paragraph 31)…In the analogue 
world, a person can re‐read a favourite novel until it is in 
tatters, listen obsessively to a favourite record, devotedly 
watch and re‐watch a favourite movie, and then sell or give 
away the novels, records and videos with which they finally 
grow bored. In the world of technical controls, reading, 
listening or viewing can be limited by the number of plays, the 
number (or even brand) of machines on which content can be 
played, the time during which the content is available and/or 
the identity of the would‐be listener or viewer. 
 
 Attaching digital locks to the content arguably in the long run threatens the public domain 
because the chances of removing the TPMs placed on works after their copyright term expires 
cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, to the undiscerning public, works which ought to freely 
available for their use and engagement may probably become inaccessible due to TPMs. TPMs, 
therefore have the potential to continue to erect a barrier around creative content even after their 
legal entrance into the public domain.93 These inhibitions were not there prior to the digital era, 
freedom to access and use content in the physical world should also apply in copyright in the 
digital landscape. With the use of TPMs and protection against circumvention incorporated into 
copyright law, the content industry stakeholders are now empowered by law to control access.  
 
92 Craig, Digital Locks, supra note 283 at 509. 
93 Ibid. 
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From the perspective of the content industry stakeholders, copyright system in the pre-
ICT era did not have the challenge of unauthorized access and the ease of replicating content. 
The copyright digital landscape posed the challenge of unauthorized access which copyright law 
did not envisage and neither did it allow users to access copies unlawfully.94 This arguably tilted 
the balance in the copyright system and necessitated the need for measures (beyond the 
provisions of the law) to curb unauthorized access to content. This culminated codifying the use 
of TPMs and protection against circumvention. While to the advocates of TPMs, it is the only 
effective means to counterbalance the scourge of digital piracy,95 it further disrupts the volatile 
and shaky balance in the copyright system. The legal recognition of TPMs creates a legal system 
that allows the combination of unlimited powers of access control with exclusive copyright in 
which the balance now tilts more in favour of copyright holders.96 The control of access to 
content raises fundamental concerns that adversely impact on not just the free culture 
philosophy, but more importantly on the purpose of copyright and the public interest. Kerr et al 
articulate some of these concerns: 
Access-control rights raise a number of difficulties, most 
importantly the question of how to achieve a balance between 
private rights and the public interest. Allowing copyright 
holders the ability to control how access is obtained and who is 
permitted to access poses a threat to the public interest. In 
particular, creating an access-control right that is not 
accompanied by a robust and very carefully tailored set of 
exceptions will impact the public’s ability to exercise their fair 
dealing defense and various statutory exceptions to copyright 
infringement and will have a broader impact on the bundle 
rights falling under the banner of free expression. The 
implementation of an access-control right could potentially 
allow corporations that collect cultural content to prevent the 
 
94 Pascale Chapdelaine, Copyright User Rights: Contracts and the Erosion of Property (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) at 
140. 
95 Ibid. at 141. 
96 Ibid. 
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legitimate use of a work. This type of prohibition could also 
have the stifling effect of denying access to works that are in 
the public domain or works which would otherwise be 
exempted by fair dealing provisions under the current 
copyright regime. Since the combination of TPMs and 
contracts can already be used to prevent access to works that 
even exceptions to copyright permit, such as fair dealing, a 
legal prohibition on circumvention of TPMs that control 
access to public works, depending on how it is drafted, could 
further prevent the public from exercising their rights.97     
 
These concerns above were expressed by Kerr et al in 2002, long before Canada implemented 
the WIPO treaties, and as discussed already in chapter three, they were not given due 
consideration.  
In developing her narrative on the concept of access as it relates to creative works, 
Litman follows a critical approach98 and notes that the United States constitution describes the 
purpose of copyright as “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”99 which should 
entitle the public to reasonably expect access to works inspired by copyright.100 Litman initially 
queries the need for public access as a catalyst for the progress of science and arts since scientists 
and artists can build on each other’s achievements.101 She conjures a hypothetical scenario that if 
works were optimally kept secret, then there would be no need for incentives in the exclusive 
rights as creators could maintain exclusive control through self-help. On the contrary, Litman 
presents the other part of her argument, which can be interpreted to mean that the concept of 
copyright as incentive-based is understandable if the rationale is to promote dissemination of 
works for the public to access them.102 In other words, Litman’s view is that, to justify creators’ 
 
97 Ibid. at 48. 
98Jessica Litman, “Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age” (1996) 75 Or. L. Rev. 19 at 32.  
99 United States Constitution, 1789, Art. 1, §8, cl.8. 
100 Supra note 98. 
101 Ibid.  
102 Ibid. at 33. 
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enjoyment of exclusive rights and incentive in the copyright system, the public ought to be given 
access to their works. According to Litman, the encouragement to disseminate works and public 
access to them serve the following: 
We want the public to be able to read them, view them and 
listen to them. We want members of the public to be able to 
learn from them: to extract facts and ideas from them, to 
make them their own, and to be able to build on them.103      
    
 In the end, Litman’s narrative justifies the need for access and its importance to creativity 
and learning, which aligns with the free culture ideology. The concept of access may seem 
counter intuitive as the juxtaposition of access and exclusive rights seem to conflict. In other 
words, how do we reconcile copyright owners’ exclusive right and the public’s right to access 
content? Copyright law attempts to answer this question by striking a balance with, amongst 
other things, the concept of fair dealing. Under the Canadian copyright law, and as already 
explained above, certain uses of copyright material are referred to as fair dealing and deemed not 
to infringe on copyright; such use include: research, private study, education, parody or satire,104 
criticism or review,105 and news reporting.106 The rationale for fair dealing ties into the purpose 
of copyright because the permissible use (research, private study, education, parody or satire) 
fosters users’ interaction with content in a manner that potentially engenders knowledge creation, 
dissemination and inspiration to create more works. Infringement of copyright would mean any 
action that violates the copyright owner’s exclusive rights – such exclusive rights or bundle of 
rights include: the right to reproduce, publicly perform, publish or create derivative works from a 
work subject to copyright. In reality, to draw a dividing line between fair dealing and exclusive 
 
103 Ibid.  
104 Copyright Act, supra note 267, s.29. 
105 Ibid. s.29(1). 
106 Ibid. s.29(2). 
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rights may be difficult in some cases. However, the fact remains that users have a right to access 
and use works in a manner that does not adversely affect the interest of the copyright owner with 
regards to the exploitation of her exclusive rights, i.e. infringe copyright.  
In the wake of the use of TPMs and legal protection against its circumvention, the noose 
around fair dealing is becoming tighter to the extent that, at least with digital copies, it may now 
only exist only in theory and not in practice. In fact, in 2004, in an effort to use its interpretative 
power to explain the importance fair dealing, the Supreme Court in Canada redefined fair dealing 
by articulating its meaning beyond just an exception to an actual right that users are legally 
entitled to; the apex court had this to say: 
[T]he fair dealing, like other exceptions in the Copyright 
Act, is a user’s right. In order to maintain the proper balance 
between the rights of a copyright owner and users’ interests, 
it must not be interpreted restrictively. As Professor Vaver 
has explained, “User rights are not just loopholes. Both 
owner rights and user rights should therefore be given the 
fair and balanced reading that befits remedial legislations.107 
 
Furthermore, as Abraham Drassinower argues, this means fair dealing should not be 
construed negatively as an ordinary exception but should be viewed positively as a user right 
integral to copyright law.108 Fair dealing as a right and not an exception aims to balance the 
rights and interest of copyright owners and users so that one party is not favoured more than the 
other. The concept of fair dealing as a right, places limitations on copyright to create the space 
for fair dealing. Carys Craig discusses this in detail, arguing that: 
…fair dealing and other exceptions are not encroachments 
upon the creator’s rights but rather prevent encroachment of 
creators’ right into the public domain. Exceptions remove 
 
107 CCH Canadian Ltd., supra note 81. 
108 Abraham Drassinower, “Taking User Right Seriously” in Michael Geist, ed. In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian 
Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 467. 
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copyright-created obstacles to the proper use of works… The 
adoption of the language of “user rights” is arguably the most 
striking manifestation of the inclusion of the public as a 
primary beneficiary of the copyright system whose interests 
therefore factor directly into the copyright “balance.” The 
broad reading of fair dealing that this entailed reflects the 
evolving role of users in Canadian copyright policy.109 
  
The concept of balance in the copyright system will remain elusive as long as the content 
industry stakeholders possess multidimensional instruments, which include legal, and 
technological, to continually strengthen their protection of creative content and control access. 
On this score, the justification for the use of TPMs and the introduction of anti-circumvention 
laws remain questionable, not just because it is inimical to access and fair dealing, but because it 
challenges the overarching purpose of copyright law. If TPMs were targeted at copyright-
infringing uses, it may be justifiable as merely a technical tool for copyright enforcement; but the 
blanket application casts a wide net to the detriment of the public interest.   
Another disturbing impact of the use of TPMs is their implication on privacy, thereby 
going beyond their original intended purpose, which is to protect creative content. Presumably, 
the invasive characteristics of TPMs are exacerbated by the anti-circumvention provisions. In 
order to detect circumvention of digital locks, there has to be some form of monitoring and 
surveillance, and most often, these surveillance activities are technical in nature and operate 
without the consent of the user. According to Haggart, the Sony Rootkit incident in 2005 
 
109 Cary Craig, “Globalizing User Rights-Talk: On Copyright Limits and Rhetorical Risks” (2017) 33 AM. U. Int’l. L. Rev. at 21-
2, 23 at online: < https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3667&context=scholarly_works > 
accessed May 20, 2019. For more discussion on the subject see generally David Vaver, “User Rights” (2013) 25 Intell. Prop. L. J. 
105; Myra Tawfik, “The Supreme Court of Canada and the “Fair Dealing Trilogy:” Elaborating a Doctrine of User Rights Under 
Canadian Copyright Law”, (2013) 51 ALTA. L. Rev. 191; Pascale Chapdelaine, “The Ambiguous Nature of Copyright Users’ 
Rights,” (2013) 26 Intell. Prop. J. 1.  
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presents an example of the invasive tendencies of the use of TPMs and the monitoring of 
suspected circumvention activities, albeit unknown to the unsuspecting users. He explains: 
In order to prevent people from copying CDs, Sony BMG 
shipped several titles with a copy-protection TPM that would 
install itself in a user’s computer (those with Windows 
operating system) and limit CD copying and completely 
prevent people from “ripping” CDs into MP3 format. 
However, this TPM was hidden by a “rootkit” – a program that 
allows basic access to a computer system – that also installed 
itself (by design and without requiring consent) on people’s 
computers. Unfortunately, Sony did not tell people that this 
program (which doubled as a “spyware,” secretly contacting 
Sony when the CD was being played), making things 
exponentially worse. It turned out that the rootkit could be 
exploited by hackers to gain control of unsuspecting user’s 
computers. What’s more, as security expert Bruce Schneier 
remarks, even “trying to get rid of it damages Windows.” This 
vulnerability was publicized on 31 October 2005 by security 
researcher Mark Russinovich. The outcry was so great that by 
14 November Sony had pulled their copy-protected CDs and 
were offering to replace customer’s infected CDs for free.110      
  
 The account given by Haggart above depicts, not just a corporation seeking to protect and 
enforce its copyright, but a clandestine means to secure market control without due regard to the 
value of balance, and in disregard of users’ rights. The consequences are far-reaching, and the 
users are at the suffering end. These scenarios arguably create significant imbalance and Haggart 
argues that “the great danger posed by TPMs is that they threaten to replace negotiated copyright 
law, which balances the interest of several groups, with rules set in the lock itself by whoever 
controls the lock.”111 Considering the extent to which TPMs, shielded by anti-circumvention 
provisions, have significantly altered the copyright law regime in the digital era, it is doubtful if 
their continued use can still be justified as a response to the threat of unlawful access, or simply a 
 
110 Haggart, Copyfight, supra note 58 at 20.  
111 Ibid.  
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desire to achieve total control in the copyright industry. Not only are unsuspecting users denied 
lawful access to content, their privacy is under threat as well. 
 Considering the controversial nature of TPMs and anti-circumvention laws, Geist notes 
that litigation experience from the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 1998112 raises 
concerns about its negative effect on research, innovation and competition113 and he cites a 
couple of examples to substantiate his point. In 2002, Edward Felten, a researcher in Princeton 
publicly disclosed plans to release his study on encryption, which included information that 
could be used to circumvent a TPM;114 he was served a warning notice that he could face legal 
liability as release of circumvention information could violate US law.115 This shows the impact 
of the DMCA (TPM and anti-circumvention provisions) on competition policy. Similarly, 
Dmitry Sklyarov, a Russian software programmer was arrested in Las Vegas on account of his 
presentation which focused on the strength and weaknesses of software used to protect electronic 
books;116 he was charged for violating criminal provisions of the US DMCA.117 According to 
Geist, although Sklyarov was later released, this had a chilling effect on science and research 
because researchers with connection to the US reportedly removed information from websites for 
fear of potential lawsuits.118  
 Research is recognized as one of the exceptions to copyright infringement, but TPMs and 
anti-circumvention provisions are limiting this exception. It is ironic that copyright law, which is 
supposed to foster and encourage research, learning and innovation, is now used to achieve the 
 
112 The United States implemented the WIPO Internet Treaties by the enactment of the DMCA. 
113Geist, Anti-Circumvention Legislation, supra note 61 at 228. 
114 ibid.  
115 Lisa Bowman “Researchers face legal threat over SDMI hack” CNET News.com (23 April 2001), 
http://news.com.com/Researchers+face+legal+threats+over+SDMI+hack/2100-1023_3-256277.html > “cited in Geist, Anti-
Circumvention Legislation, supra note 113 at 228.” 
116 Geist, Anti-Circumvention Legislation, ibid. at 228. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Electronic Frontier Foundation, “Unintended Consequences: Five Years Under The DMCA” v.3 (24 September 
2003),<www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/unintended_consequences.pdf > “cited in Geist, Anti-Circumvention Legislation, ibid.”  
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contrary. Research knowledge geared towards exposing security shortcomings of products and 
services of corporations ought to be made public to put the corporations in check and charge 
them to improve on their products and services. Admittedly, research information that details 
how to circumvent TPMs, if in wrong hands could be used to the detriment of copyright owners.  
Kerr et al, note that: 
While it may be true that some users entitled to access digital 
works will be capable of circumventing DRMs, the vast 
majority of users do not have the inclination to circumvent 
such TPMs, nor do they possess the technical savvy. The 
potential power that copyright holders could have is practically 
unprecedented.119       
 
 The rhetoric of threat to copyright due to circumvention activities and the response to 
curtail this perceived threat has been stretched expansively beyond the safeguards that are 
necessary. This continuous expansion, as stated earlier, has resulted in multi-layered 
protection120 for content owners, which seems to provide them with undue advantage in the 
copyright landscape. It is in matters like this that the interpretative role of the judiciary could be 
useful to shape the contours of the narrative to ensure the already fragile copyright balance is not 
distorted further. 
 
5.7 TPMs and Anti-Circumvention Litigation in Canada: The Nintendo Case  
As discussed in chapter three, after several failed attempts, Canada eventually 
implemented the WIT by passing Bill C-11 into law, which became known as the Copyright 
Modernization Act of 2012, this law contains TPM and anti-circumvention provisions; the 
 
119 Kerr et al, Technology Protection Measures, supra note 90 at 52. 
120 Ibid. at 43, Copyright law, contract law, TPM and DRM.  
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provisions are restated here.121 These provisions significantly impact on the already fragile 
copyright balance of rights and interests in Canada. As discussed in detail in chapter three, the 
inclusion of TPMs and anti-circumvention provisions mostly benefit the content industry who 
desire to control access to content. Since these provisions were incorporated into Canada’s 
copyright law in 2012, the courts did not have the opportunity to make pronouncements on the 
subject matter until 2017. On March 1, 2017, the Federal Court of Canada, in Nintendo of 
America Inc. v Jeramie Douglas King & Go Cyber Shopping,122 made the first major 
pronouncement on TPMs and anti-circumvention. In this case, the Applicant, Nintendo of 
America Inc. brought an action and sought a declaration that the individual (Jeramie Douglas 
King) and corporate respondents (Go Cyber Shopping) circumvented, offered services to 
circumvent, and trafficked in devices which circumvented the Applicant’s TPMs contrary to 
s.41.1(1)(a)-(c)123 of the Act, and that the Respondents infringed on the Applicant’s copyright in 
certain works contrary to s. 27(2)124 of the Act.125  
 
121 Copyright Modernization Act, supra note 52, s.41, s.41(1) “technological protection measure” means any effective technology, 
device or component that, in the ordinary course of its operation, 
(a) controls access to a work, to a performer ’s performance fixed in a sound recording or to a sound recording and whose use is 
authorized by the copyright owner; or 
(b) restricts the doing — with respect to a work, to a performer ’s performance fixed in a sound recording or to a sound 
recording…”; “circumvent” means, 
(a) in respect of a technological protection measure within the meaning of paragraph (a) of the definition “technological 
protection measure”, to descramble a scrambled work or decrypt an encrypted work or to otherwise avoid, bypass, remove, 
deactivate or impair the technological protection measure, unless it is done with the authority of the copyright owner; and 
(b) in respect of a technological protection measure within the meaning of paragraph (b) of the definition “technological 
protection measure”, to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate or impair the technological protection measure; “No person shall: 
(a) circumvent a technological protection measure within the meaning of paragraph (a) of the definition “technological protection 
measure” in section 41; 
(b) offer services to the public or provide services if 
(i) the services are offered or provided primarily for the purposes of circumventing a technological protection measure, 
(ii) the uses or purposes of those services are not commercially significant other than when they are offered or provided for the 
purposes of circumventing a technological protection measure, or 
(iii) the person markets those services as being for the purposes of circumventing a technological protection measure or acts in 
concert with another person in order to market those services as being for those purposes; or 
(c) manufacture, import, distribute, offer for sale or rental or provide — including by selling or renting — any technology, device 
or component…” 
122 [2017] FC 246 [Nintendo]. 
123 Copyright Modernization Act, supra note 121. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Nintendo, supra note 122 at 2. 
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Nintendo sells hundreds of video games for its consoles in Canada, which are sold as 
game cards (in the case of DS and 3DS games) and discs (in the case of Wii games).126 Users 
who purchase the Nintendo video games can play these games on the appropriate Nintendo 
console by inserting the game cards or discs into the corresponding console.127 Nintendo does 
not authorize downloading of its games onto devices that mimic its game cards or discs and 
which circumvent its TPMs.128 In order to prevent unauthorized access to its video games, as a 
content industry stakeholder in copyright and given the propensity for unauthorized access to its 
products, Nintendo implements TPMs to prevent users from playing unauthorized copies of 
video games and from installing unauthorized software, including counterfeit games and 
software on its consoles.129 
 Since 2013, the respondent had advertised and offered for sale, either through its websites 
or at its retail store, certain devices which the applicant contended were designed to circumvent 
TPMs employed on the Nintendo DS, 3DS, and Wii gaming consoles.130 The devices (Nintendo 
referred  to them as “Game Copiers”), including mod chips sold by the Go Cyber Shopping 
could be used to play unauthorized copies of Nintendo DS or 3DS video games.131 The court had 
to determine whether Go Cyber Shopping infringed on Nintendo’s copyright (to establish 
secondary infringement132) and contravened the anti-circumvention provisions under s.41.1(1) of 
the Act? The court ruled thus: 
 
126 Ibid. at 6. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. at 8. 
130 Nintendo, supra note 125 at 9. 
131 Ibid. at 10. 
132 Ibid. The Federal Court followed the Supreme Court’s three-part test to determine secondary infringement which states: “The 
Supreme Court in CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13 [CCH] at paragraph 81, [2004] 1 SCR 339, 
set out the following three-part test for establishing secondary infringement: (1) the copy must be the product of primary 
infringement; (2) the secondary infringer must have known or should have known that he or she is dealing with a product of 
infringement; and (3) the secondary dealing must be established within one of the enumerated acts in s. 27(2).” 
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The evidence clearly establishes that an unauthorized copy of 
the Nintendo Logo Data File is present on the devices sold by 
the Respondent for use on DS consoles […]. This satisfies the 
first element of the test for secondary infringement. The 
second element of the secondary infringement test may be 
inferred from the Respondent’s admission of infringement in 
respect of the DS Header Data. Given that the Respondent 
admits knowing that its Game Copiers contain unauthorized 
copies of the DS Header Data, it is reasonable to infer that it 
knows, or ought to know, that its Game Copiers similarly 
contain unauthorized copies of the Nintendo Logo Data File. 
As for the third element, there is no dispute that the 
Respondent sells Game Copiers. Accordingly, the Respondent 
also infringes copyright in the Nintendo Logo Data File.133 
 
 On the issue of the contravening anti-circumvention provisions, Go Cyber Shopping 
contended that “the Respondent submits that, in the context of being a ‘protection measure,’ an 
access control TPM must create a barrier to the work being copied. Thus, the Respondent argues, 
the shape of the Applicant’s game cartridges fails to meet the statutory requirement of a TPM 
because it does not establish a barrier to copying.”134 Go Cyber Shopping made this argument 
relying on the English case of Nintendo Co. Ltd et al v Playables Ltd et al135 where Floyd J 
expressed some doubt as to whether physical configuration can amount to effective technological 
measure.136 While Justice Campbell of the Federal Court of Canada acknowledges Go Cyber 
Shopping’s argument, he was convinced otherwise by Nintendo arguments that Floyd’s doubts 
where strictly obiter137 (opinion of a judge that do not form part of the court’s decision). 
 
133 Ibid. at15-16. 
134 Nintendo, supra note 133 at 27. 
135 [2010] EWHC 1932. 
136 Nintendo, supra note 134 at 27.  
137 Ibid.  
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  Furthermore, Justice Campbell distinguished the English case from the case at hand 
based on the UK provision on TPM,138 which he perceived adopted a narrow approach, 
compared to that of Canada, which had no such limitation. Justice Campbell articulates this 
position thus:  
It is evident from the wording and structure of the UK Act that 
it contemplates a narrower definition of “effective 
technological measure”, in that the “access control or 
protection process” is limited to encryption, scrambling or 
some “other transformation of the work”. Arguably, this 
implies that access control under the UK Act requires some 
barrier to copying. The Canadian Act has no such limitation. 
Under part (a) of the definition, a technological protection 
measure means “any effective technology, device or 
component that, in the ordinary course of its operation, (a) 
controls access to a work …” There is no suggestion that such 
effective technology requires transformation of the protected 
work.139 
 
 Justice Campbell explains further: 
Consistent with the foregoing, the definition of “circumvent” 
for an access control TPM extends beyond descrambling and 
decryption (or other similar transformation) to anything else 
that otherwise avoids, bypasses, removes, deactivates, or 
impairs the technological protection measure. It is apparent 
that Parliament intended access control TPMs to extend 
beyond TPMs that merely serve as barriers to copying. 
Moreover, since part (b) of the definition for technological 
protection measure covers “any effective technology, device or 
component that, in the ordinary course of its operation […] 
restricts the doing […] of any act referred to in section 3”, for 
example copying, it would be redundant and inconsistent with 
the structure of s. 41 to require access control TPMs to employ 
a “barrier to copying”. Thus, having regard to Parliament’s 
express intent to give copyright owners the power to control 
 
138 UK Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act, 1988 (as amended) , section 296ZF provides: (1) In sections 296ZA to 296ZE, 
“technological measures” are any technology, device or component which is designed, in the normal course of its operation, to 
protect a copyright work other than a computer program. (2) Such measures are “effective” if the use of the work is controlled by 
the copyright owner through— (a) an access control or protection process such as encryption, scrambling or other transformation 
of the work, or (b) a copy control mechanism, which achieves the intended protection. 
139 Supra note 136 at 28. 
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access to works, the principle of technological neutrality, the 
scheme of the Act, and the plain meaning of the definitions for 
TPM and “circumvent”, it is clear that access control TPMs do 
not need to employ any barrier to copying in order to be 
“effective.140 
 
 With the above reasoning, Justice Campbell perhaps unsurprisingly found that Go Cyber 
Shopping circumvented Nintendo’s TPMs.141 As a deterrence to circumvention and having found 
bad faith in the action of Go Cyber Shopping, the court awarded $20,000 per work in damages in 
favour of the Nintendo, the amount being the maximum award in damages. Delivering what may 
be perceived as a harsh judgment, Justice Campbell states: 
In respect of the specific need to deter the Respondent, there is 
evidence of recidivism by the Respondent’s director Mr. King, 
who has been involved in similar activities in the past 
(Applicant’s Record, pp. 1203-1205). The Respondent’s 
business also appears to be dedicated to circumvention 
activities. Further, the Respondent continues to promote 
illegitimate activities such as piracy of television programs and 
circumvention devices for other platforms […]. All of this 
demonstrates an acute need for deterrence. In view of the 
foregoing factors, an award of $20,000 per work is reasonable 
and justified. This Court has not previously hesitated to award 
maximum statutory damages where it was warranted. (Louis 
Vuitton Malletier SA v Singga Enterprises (Canada) Inc, 2011 
FC 776 at paras 156-158, [2013] 1 FCR 413; Microsoft 
Corporation v 9038-3746 Quebec Inc, 2006 FC 1509 at paras 
112-113, 305 FTR 69; Louis Vuitton Malletiers SA v Yang, 
2007 FC 1179 at paras 18-26, 62 CPR (4th) 362; Adobe, above 
at paras 5-8; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Hernandez (3 
December 2013), Toronto T-1618-13 (Fed. Ct.), 2013 
CarswellNat 6160 at p. 3 (FC) (WL Can)). This is such a case. 
Therefore, the Applicant is entitled to statutory damages of 
$11,700,000 for TPM circumvention in respect of its 585 
Nintendo Games, and of $60,000 for copyright infringement in 
respect of the three Header Data works…The Respondent’s 
conduct justifies an award of punitive damages. An award of 
 
140 Ibid. at 29. 
141 Ibid. at 32. 
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$1,000,000 is warranted in this case in view of the strong need 
to deter and denounce such activities.142 
 
 The significance of the 2017 Nintendo case in Canada is crucial to my analysis and 
critique of TPMs and anti-circumvention provisions. I will examine the decision and its 
implication from two perspectives. First, from the point of view of the parties in the case and the 
need to do justice; and second, its policy implication for copyright policy in Canada, being a 
novel case to interpret a legislation that emanated from and was fraught with controversies. 
 Examining the case from the point of view of the parties, the facts of the case undeniably 
reveals that Go Cyber Shopping was clearly in breach of copyright and did circumvent 
Nintendo’s TPMs by advertising, offering for sale and trading in devices that aided 
circumvention and had numerous websites and a physical location in Waterloo for carrying on 
these activities. Go Cyber Shopping was engaged in copyright infringement and circumvention 
activities on a commercial scale, and the Federal Court found that this was not just blatantly 
detrimental to Nintendo, it was clearly in violation of the provisions of copyright law in Canada. 
In my view, this epitomizes the threat to copyright businesses that the content industry 
stakeholders complain about, and indeed it is real. There may be other organizations whose 
business model is analogous to Go Cyber Shopping around the world, some of which may not 
even have a physical address. In my view, finding Go Cyber Shopping liable for copyright 
infringement and anti-circumvention activities flow from the facts of the case. Go Cyber 
Shopping tried to convince the court that it also had other legitimate businesses to show good 
faith but that could not stand as the court noted that there was no evidence to that effect.  
 
142 Nintendo, supra note 141 at 47, 48 and 50. 
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 Having found Go Cyber Shopping liable, the award of damages and punitive measures 
arose for consideration. It was not the first time the Federal Court had awarded maximum 
statutory damages. In fact, Justice Campbell felt it was reasonable and justified to do so and 
supported his position with previous cases. The Copyright Act provides143 for the award of 
damages for a maximum of $20,000 CAD per work infringed,144 therefore, Justice Campbell’s 
award of maximum damages was within the provisions of the law. His reasoning for the award 
of maximum statutory damages was the bad faith behaviour exhibited by Go Cyber Shopping 
through its audacious conduct and more importantly, according to Justice Campbell, to serve as 
deterrence to others who were engaged in such activities or were planning anything similar. Any 
argument attacking the maximum award of statutory damages cannot discredit it on legal 
grounds; at best, such arguments would be based on sentiments. For example, the sentiment 
could be expressed that a US multi-international gaming company worth hundreds of millions of 
dollars is unduly favoured in the court judgment over a small Canadian company. Given the facts 
of the case, and the need to do justice, a significantly different outcome may have been unlikely. 
 The Nintendo case has now become precedent for the endorsement of the use of TPMs 
and anti-circumvention provisions – two provisions that potentially limit access to works. This 
precedent seems unfortunate considering that the case was undefended – meaning that there was 
no opportunity to adduce evidence in response to Nintendo’s case. This is particularly important 
not because it would have led to a different decision outcome (which would be unlikely given the 
facts of the case), but it would have placed a responsibility on the court to make pronouncements 
on the Go Cyber Shopping’s counter-arguments to present a balanced ruling. For example, 
 
143 Copyright Modernization Act, supra note 123 s.38.1. 
144 According to the Federal Court, the Respondent circumvented 585 games; therefore $20,000 award in damages per game 
amounts to $11,700,000. 
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Cameroon Hutchinson notes that because the case was undefended, pronouncement were not 
made on some issues;145 such issues include whether digital locks protection cover locks 
preventing mere access to a work, unaccompanied by any act of copyright infringement and 
whether physical configurations, or other devices that play no direct role in bypassing a lock, are 
protected.146 Perhaps the court should have considered appointing an amicus curiae147 to argue 
Go Cyber Shopping’s case in the interest of justice. 
In my view, the policy implication of this judgment in the copyright industry in Canada 
and even beyond is that it could further worsen the precarious state of copyright balance. Given 
the facts of the case, Go Cyber Shopping clearly circumvented digital locks and Federal Court’s 
interpretation of the TPM and anti-circumvention provision, which culminated in its decision is 
justified. However, it did not adequately in my view, consider the impact of its decision on 
broader copyright policy issues such as balance, access and the public interest as the Supreme 
Court of Canada did in Theberge, where it seized the opportunity to articulate the purpose of 
copyright law in Canada. In view of the copyright sensitivity of the case, and to further ensure 
balance in the copyright system, the Federal Court, while maintaining its decision, should have 
further made pronouncements, albeit obiter dicta, that support balance and the public interest. 
While I understand that Justice Campbell had no legal obligation to do so, it is doubtful if doing 
so would have caused harm, and it could have avoided the potential harm to the copyright 
balance that this solitary precedent may do. 
 
145 Cameron Hutchinson, “Nintendo v. Go Cyber Shopping Glosses Over Important Issues in the New Digital Locks Regime”, 
Slaw, Canada’s Online Legal Magazine, at online: < http://www.slaw.ca/2017/04/27/nintendo-v-go-cyber-shopping-glosses-over-
important-issues-in-the-new-digital-locks-regime/ > accessed August 6, 2019. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Government of Canada, “Legal Representation of Children – Amicus Curiae” at online: < https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-
pr/other-autre/lrc-rje/p5.html > accessed August 6, 2019. “The traditional role of amicus curiae (also known as a “friend of the 
court”) is to assist the court with its decision-making by ensuring that all relevant evidence and arguments are properly presented 
to the court.” 
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 Nintendo went after Go Cyber Shopping, I assume, not necessarily for the money it 
hoped to rake in in statutory damages (Nintendo’s global income in 2017 was almost a billion 
dollars,148) but to establish its access control rights in the Canadian market in the light of this 
freshly minted legislation that empowers it to control access. My guess is that Nintendo did their 
research, bought the Go Cyber Shopping’s product and tested it to establish how it infringed in 
order to gather evidence. It is unfortunate that Go Cyber Shopping presented them with that 
opportunity, which has now become a point of reference in support of the use of TPMs and the 
enforcement of anti-circumvention legislation. Admittedly, multi-million dollar transnational 
corporations like Nintendo, possessing a plethora of intellectual property rights, are prime targets 
of illegal downloading and counterfeiting activities world-wide; such large corporates cannot go 
after every suspected unauthorized user, and so their choice of whom to go after is strategic and 
aimed at creating the most deterrence (for this reason, it would also been necessary for courts to 
at least, restate the Supreme Court’s position on purpose of copyright law and the limitation of 
copyright owner’s rights).  Commenting on the judgment, Geist argues that the case reinforces 
the fact that Canada has strict anti-piracy legislations with one of the most aggressive digital lock 
laws in the world and suggests that should/will fuel calls to re-examine the effectiveness of the 
anti-circumvention exceptions in the 2017 copyright review.149 
  Without undermining threats of unauthorized access faced by the content industry, the 
application and use of TPMs and the codification of anti-circumvention provisions in copyright 
law amounts, in my opinion, to an overkill to the detriment of the users.   
 
148 Statista, "Nintendo’s net income from fiscal 2008 to 2017” at online: < https://www.statista.com/statistics/216625/net-income-
of-nintendo-since-2008/> accessed May 12, 2018. 
149 Michael Geist, “Canada DMCA in Action: Court Awards Massive Damages in First Major Anti-circumvention Copyright 
Ruling” at online < http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2017/03/canadian-dmca-in-action-court-issues-massive-damage-award-in-first-
major-anti-circumvention-copyright-ruling/> accessed May 12, 2018. The 2017 copyright law review will be discussed in chapter 
four. 
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5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the content industry stakeholders and their justification for the 
use of TPMs in the copyright industry. Undoubtedly, the content industry stakeholders play a 
vital role in the creation and dissemination of cultural works on a massive scale using 
technological means. However, their support for and use of TPMs and their legal protections 
seem to place them more at an advantage to the detriment of the user community. While there are 
genuine concerns which may justify the use of TPMs, a review of how they are implemented to 
mitigate its blanket approach, which currently raises serious user right concerns. Additionally, 
the impact of TPMs and their legal protection on the copyright system can be put to constructive 
use if circumvention is allowed in exceptional cases (as discussed later in chapter six). 
The main controversy with TPMs is not their use as such, but how they are used, and the 
extent to which these uses enjoy the additional protection of copyright law. Any protected use of 
TPMs should be guided by the tenets of balance, the public interest and in conformity to the 
purposes of copyright law. As discussed in chapter three, Switzerland and New Zealand have 
implemented TPMs regimes that attempt to balance the interests of copyright owners and users; 
the same approach can and should be adopted in Canada.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE FREE CULTURE AND THE CONTENT INDUSTRY ANALYSIS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
In the first part of this chapter, I engage with the arguments canvassed in chapters four and five 
with regards to free culture (CCL) and the content industry (TPMs) respectively. I proceed to 
assess them in relation to ICT, the purpose of copyright law and the concept of balance in the 
copyright system and make some concluding remarks. In the second part, I make some 
recommendations that could potentially lead to an improved level of balance in the digitized 
copyright era in Canada. I start with a succinct recap of the challenges I have analyzed in the 
previous chapters. Furthermore, I acknowledge that these copyright challenges have become 
entrenched in the copyright system and cannot simply disappear. Therefore, the 
recommendations I propose are far from perfect and, even if wholeheartedly embraced, would 
not be expected to transform the copyright industry instantly. My recommendations will follow 
what I call “regulatory pluralism” and some necessary reforms to the Canada’s copyright law. 
First, I argue against the over-reliance on copyright law reforms as the only solution/resolution 
of copyright issues; however, I also emphasize the importance of the existence of copyright law 
as necessary foundation on which other extra-legal innovations around copyright regulation 
ought to stand. Second, I advocate embracing private arrangements (such as Creative Commons) 
and other creative ways that will enable industry best practices to serve as a means of regulation 
and organization in addition to formal copyright law. Third, ICT in the copyright system should 
serve as a regulatory catalyst to advance the overall purposes of the copyright system while at the 
same time create opportunities for stakeholders to pursue their interests. Finally, I propose a 
number of reforms to address the current imbalance in the copyright landscape in Canada.  
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PART I 
FOSTERING THE PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT LAW:  
FREE CULTURE VS CONTENT INDUSTRY 
 
6.0 The Free Culture and Content Industry Perspectives – A Continuous Dialogue 
One of the core aims of this research is to critically evaluate copyright in the digital 
landscape from the perspectives of free culture and content industry through the lenses of CCL 
and TPMs respectively. The CCL scheme has been examined in detail from the point of view of 
the free culture stakeholders and, for them, CCL offers the freedom they advocate for in the 
copyright system. The freedom (free culture), as opposed to permission culture, is the removal of 
obstacles to access and use of creative works to foster the encouragement of learning and 
dissemination of knowledge. As I have shown in the discussion, the copyright system creates 
barriers to free culture and despite the numerous law reforms, these barriers continue to increase, 
making it clear that the chances of removing these barriers through copyright law reforms are 
slim. In response to this, it can be argued that CCL is equivalent to a private ordering scheme 
that relies on the basic legal structure of copyright to achieve its purpose of removing inhibitions 
in accessing and using content in the digital world. 
On the other hand, the content industry has been analyzed through the frame of the use of 
TPMs and anti-circumventions protections. The position of the content industry supporters is that 
despite the existence of protection under copyright law, unauthorized access is still a major 
concern that impacts on the commercial exploitation of their content. Realizing the inadequacy 
of the law to deal with the issues, extra protection, besides that afforded by copyright law, 
becomes necessary in the form of TPMs. Furthermore, realizing that TPMs can be circumvented, 
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the content industry stakeholders lobby to outlaw such circumvention. Similar to free culture, the 
content industry’s use of TPMs is equivalent to a private ordering scheme, but the difference is 
that it is used to ensure authorized access to content.       
I have attempted to conduct the analysis of both approaches to copyright in the era of 
digitized content. I discussed both perspectives looking at the merits in their approaches to 
copyright as well as their weaknesses. The analysis of both perspectives elicits thought-
provoking notions of copyright, which are important in understanding the views of the 
stakeholders and how we might better accommodate their views and concerns. 
It is fitting at this juncture to judge the outcome of my analysis from the perspective of 
the purpose of copyright, as elucidated in chapter one. Judging whether a particular stakeholder’s 
viewpoint of copyright aligns with the purpose of copyright evokes notions of public interest and 
copyright balance. The determination of which copyright stakeholder category more closely 
fosters the purpose of copyright becomes more problematic as they both legitimize their 
perspectives on the ground that their approaches fulfill the purpose of copyright law, advance the 
public interest and ensure balance in the copyright system. Therefore, it is apposite to more 
closely examine these concepts. 
 
6.1 The Meaning of Public Interest and Balance in Copyright 
These two concepts, public interest and balance feature prominently in intellectual 
property narratives and arguments and are often used by intellectual property stakeholders to 
justify their claims and interests. Similarly, in the copyright sphere, both the free culture and 
content industry community claim that their copyright agenda upholds public interest and 
balance in the copyright system. These terms literally evoke notions of justice and fairness in the 
 345 
copyright system but at the same time are dodgy in the sense that they are amorphous and can be 
used to justify both free culture and content industry perspectives on copyright. While it is 
undeniable that free culture and content industry stakeholders of copyright do contribute some 
good to the public, the terms, public interest and balance have been frequently employed in 
copyright rhetoric to influence copyright policy and laws for personal and/or commercial 
interests. Therefore, it is important to understand what these terms mean and what purpose they 
serve. 
A definition of these terms is not straight forward due of some inherent challenges. One 
of the challenges associated with the concept of public interest has already been mentioned: the 
meaning ascribed to it can be rationalized to favour any particular interests. As Victoria Owen1 
notes, it is the furtherance of public interest that necessitates the need to create balance; the 
notion of balance conjures up a scenario where justice is meted out equally and fairness is 
achieved. In some cases, especially in practical science or concepts, balance may not be so hard 
to achieve, for example, a measure of 2 molecules of hydrogen and one molecule of oxygen 
creates the balance to achieve water (H2O). In legal concepts and theories, where things are more 
abstract than practical, the attainment of balance is highly debatable, therefore, it is situation-
specific. 
Nonetheless, the usage of these terms in relation to copyright should be put in perspective 
by attempting some definitions to give clarity and direction. My definition of public interest and 
balance is derived from the title of the first copyright law – Statute of Anne and the articulations 
of the Supreme Court of Canada. The title of the 1710 Statute of Anne was An Act for 
Encouragement of Learning by vesting the Copies of printed Books in the Author or Purchasers 
 
1 Victoria Owen, “Who Safeguards the Public Interest in Copyright in Canada” (2012) 59 Journal of Copyright Society of USA 
803 at 806. 
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of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned. This title encapsulates both public interest 
and balance; the term, Encouragement of Learning, according to Owen is indicative of the 
societal benefit of learning, which amounts to advancing the public interest.2 Furthermore, and 
still on the subject of the title of the Statute of Anne, Owen notes that:  
The purpose of the original legislation was stated to be the 
encouragement of learning; the creation of the monopoly 
legislated for was Parliament’s instrument for carrying out the 
purpose of encouraging learning. Logically, if learning is not 
encouraged by so “vesting the copies” then a modern 
Parliament should reconsider such a vesting. But Canada’s 
Supreme Court has articulated that the public interest should 
not only reflect “promoting the encouragement and 
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect” (i.e., learning) 
but should also be balanced with obtaining just reward for the 
creator.” It is this notion of the “public interest” which requires 
the balancing of the interests of the public in learning with the 
interests of the public in rewarding creators.3 
 
The explanation above shows how the title of the Statute of Anne embodies the concepts 
of public interest and balance; it further explains how it sought to advance public interest by 
encouraging learning and dissemination of same. Additionally, it postulates how the grant of 
limited monopoly (copyright) serves as a means to promote public interest. This is essentially a 
bargain, “a give and take” arrangement whereby to promote knowledge dissemination and public 
good, creators are granted copyright for a limited period. However, imbalance sets in if learning 
is not encouraged by so vesting the copies, then a modern Parliament should reconsider such a 
vesting. The import of this remark by Owen is that if the grant of copyright to creators does not 
 
2 Ibid.  
3 Owen, Who Safeguards the Public Interest, supra note 1. The concept of balance is controversial as it could also be argued that 
it should be considered form the perspective of authors, i.e. authors deserve to be rewarded notwithstanding public interest 
consideration. While this point is acknowledged, the emphasis is that public interest should take priority. 
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further the public interest of learning, then it behoves parliament to intervene – and this is where 
law reforms are necessary. 
Additionally, Owen further elucidates on the concepts of public interest and balance by 
examining the nuances articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada (as discussed in chapter one, 
but also important to reiterate them here again because of its relevance), which leads to the 
second basis for my view of what constitutes public interest and balance. While the Supreme 
Court in Theberge does not specifically define public interest and balance, it explains what 
constitutes public interest and balance in the copyright sector. The Supreme Court says that “the 
Copyright Act is usually presented as a balance between promoting the public interest in the 
encouragement and dissemination of works on the arts and intellect […].”4 Here, the Supreme 
Court equates the concept of public interest with encouragement of learning and dissemination of 
works of the intellect. In my view, two things are inherent in the Supreme Court’s conception of 
the public interest: first, encouragement of works of art and the intellect assumes that these 
works are accessible to the public, so it can be a source of inspiration for further creativity; 
second, dissemination of these works should be for more people to access them and build on 
them.  
Besides the public interest, the Supreme Court also recognizes the economic or personal 
interest of the creator when it states – “obtaining a just reward for the creator (or more 
accurately, to prevent someone other than the creator from appropriating whatever benefits may 
be generated).”5 In the copyright system, being concerned alone about the public interest would 
be inequitable; the interest of creators is also a second side of the coin. The Supreme Court 
captures this by recognizing that creators’ interests matter too and this, the Court expands, 
 
4 Théberge v. Galerie d’art du Petit Champlain, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336 at 355. 
5 Ibid. 
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includes two components. First, the creator is entitled to a just reward for the labour and industry 
he or she has invested in the creation of works of intellect; second, someone else other than the 
creator should be prevented from benefitting from the creator’s labour and industry. Not only 
does the Supreme Court elucidate on the concept of public interest and creator’s interest, it 
juxtaposes them to strike a balance between the two; it presents a new understanding of balance 
to mean not merely acknowledging the rights of the creator, but giving due weight to their 
limited nature.6 In other words, the inference that can be drawn from this is that the Supreme 
Court seems to give priority to the public interest over creator’s interest. As we have seen, the 
Supreme Court explained further that: 
In crassly economic terms it would be as inefficient to 
overcompensate artists and authors for the right of 
reproduction as it would be self-defeating to undercompensate 
them.  Once an authorized copy of a work is sold to a member 
of the public, it is generally for the purchaser, not the author, 
to determine what happens to it. Excessive control by holders 
of copyrights and other forms of intellectual property may 
unduly limit the ability of the public domain to incorporate and 
embellish creative innovation in the long-term interests of 
society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to proper 
utilization.  This is reflected in the exceptions to copyright 
infringement enumerated in ss. 29 to 32.2, which seek to 
protect the public domain in traditional ways such as fair 
dealing for the purpose of criticism or review and to add new 
protections to reflect new technology, such as limited 
computer program reproduction and “ephemeral recordings” in 
connection with live performances.7 
  Admittedly, it may appear that the Supreme Court expresses a preference for the public 
interest over creator’s interest, but it is an expression of its understanding of the purpose of 
copyright law and how this has been distorted leading to imbalance in the copyright system 
 
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid. at 355-6. 
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where the creator’s interest overshadows public interest. Furthermore, it reflects the Supreme 
Court’s fair dealing and the purpose of copyright, which is to encourage learning and the 
dissemination of creative works. The Supreme Court gives insight into what an ideal situation of 
recognizing the balance between the public interest and creator’s interest should be. However, 
the full attainment of the ideal and desired balance may be difficult to realize.    
In her analysis of the concept of balance in intellectual property, Kimberlee Weatherall 
holds critical viewpoints of its attainment;8 she argues that the claim of balance is meaningless 
because it assumes that there exists an objectively determinable perfect balance of rights.9 She 
further explains that it makes no sense to expect intellectual property laws to give equal rights to 
creators and users because intellectual property is built on exclusive rights.10 In her analysis, 
Weatherall was not referring to copyright specifically, but to intellectual property in general. I 
agree with her position on the indeterminate nature of balance but wish to add to her position that 
intellectual property is built on exclusive rights, at least from the copyright perspective. On the 
face of it, her statement could be controversial and with regards to copyright, it may incline 
towards the instrumentalist approach. However, my interpretation is that her opinion captures 
what is as against what ought to be. By what is, I mean that the content industry’s instrumentalist 
approach and ideas significantly dominate and control the copyright system; by what ought to be, 
I mean the aspiration of a copyright system not based on permission culture but free culture. This 
is currently beginning to gain ground, especially with schemes like CCL, but faces challenges 
from the content industry. 
 
8 Kimberlee Weatherall, “Intellectual Property in the TPP: Not ‘The New Trips’” (2016) 17 Melbourne J.I.L. at 21. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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 On the exclusive right of the copyright owner, the Supreme Court’s opinion on the 
limited nature of creator’s rights and amplifying public interests suggests the beginning of a 
paradigm shift in copyright thinking; copyright should not be conceived from the creator’s 
perspective only, but from a broader public interest viewpoint. In fact, from the Supreme Court’s 
position in Theberge, priority is given to the public interest. Further comments by Weatherall11 
seem to suggest that she considers the possibility of balance among intellectual property 
stakeholders: 
We can, however, treat ‘balance’ as a shorthand for the legitimate 
public policy goal of ensuring that IP law accommodates a range of 
concerns. IP law should promote the legitimate interests of creators, 
innovators, and distributors and commercialisers through the conferral 
of exclusive rights which enable exploitation of IP in the market. But 
IP law should also protect other stakeholders, such as members of the 
public, public institutions, and follow-on innovators. These broader 
interests are promoted by appropriately limiting exclusive rights, and 
allowing some use of copyright content without permission, or 
payment.  
 
Weatherall’s opinion above captures an ideal and balanced copyright system where due 
weight is given to the limited nature of creator’s rights and fair dealing is upheld. With the help 
of the Supreme Court of Canada and with insight drawn from the title of the Statute of Anne, a 
sense of what constitutes public interest and balance in the copyright system can be 
conceptualized even though a perfect definition may be elusive.  
The concepts of public interest and balance are pivotal in the assessment of the activities 
of the free culture and the content industry if we are to gauge which stakeholder’s activity aligns 
more with the purpose of copyright law as enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Theberge. The stakeholders relate to the concepts of public interest and balance, albeit through 
 
11 Ibid. at 21-2. 
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different interpretations, and each stakeholder category claims that its activities in the digital age 
foster the advancement of public interest and balance. This is enigmatic given that some of their 
interests and goals mostly do not align, therefore, it suggests that their approach to public interest 
and balance may be tailored to fit specific interests.  
The activities of free culture stakeholders were examined using CCL while the content 
industry stakeholder analysis focused on the use of TPMs. I will assess the extent to which the 
core values of free culture and content industry in a digitized copyright environment justify or 
legitimize their claim in relation to advancing the purpose of copyright law. 
 
6.2 The Legitimacy of Free Culture Claims 
The core values or benefits of the free culture community in the context of CCL can be 
summarized in four points as identified by Timothy Armstrong:12 1) it legalizes acts that 
ordinarily would have amounted to copyright infringement, 2) it creates universal access to 
works, 3) it reduces transaction cost to access works, and 4) it creates freedom and the 
establishment of a commons. These four benefits highlighted by Armstrong align with free 
culture ideology and the CCL arrangement. Authors and creators who subscribe to CCL freely 
make their works available for use by authorizing the users or licensees to engage with the works 
within the limits of the licence conditions. Ordinarily, some of these authorized actions, such as, 
making derivative works, commercial use, reproduction and /or performance would have 
amounted to infringement, but the CC licensing model makes it legal. The ubiquity of the 
internet makes CC licensed-works universally available and accessible to all, and the ease of 
accessibility comes with the very low or close to negligible transaction cost. With a CC-licensed 
 
12 Timothy Armstrong, “Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright Licenses and Transfers for the Benefit of the Public 
(2010) 47 Harvard Journal on Legislation at 365-6. 
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work there is no challenge of identifying the owner of the work, lengthy negotiations, complex 
contract drafting, attorney fees and the back and forth involved in the formal processes of 
seeking permission from the creator or owner. This therefore engenders the growth of a 
commons in the digital era where there is freedom to access, use, create and disseminate works. 
The claim by the free culture community that its philosophy is geared towards fulfilling 
the purpose of copyright law rests on its core values, which I have stated above. These benefits, 
when reviewed objectively, contribute to the encouragement of learning and dissemination of 
works of the intellect, thereby advancing the interest of the public and in a bid to create balance. 
CCL makes works of the intellect available for the public to use without fear of liability for 
copyright infringement. Furthermore, CCL leverages the advantages of digital technology and 
the internet to create the opportunity for the public to access creative works from anywhere in the 
world with little or no cost; users of CCL-licensed works do not actually have to formally meet 
the licensors before accessing and using their licensed works, and this makes accessibility 
straightforward. The CC licensing community has grown into a massive repository of 
knowledge, creating a commons for public good. The benefit in this that the CCL is an ingenious 
scheme devised to create a balanced copyright system where the acts of users are not branded as 
infringement. Armstrong supports the idea that making works available in the commons as a 
catalyst for further creativity when he states that: 
[…] making works available for use under open-content 
licences has a multiplier effect, permitting the creation of new 
works which may never have come into existence absent the 
raw materials that the licences place into the commons.13 
 
 
13 Ibid. at 368. 
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Furthermore, CCL scheme also respects the other side of balance by allowing authors to 
determine the categories upon which they will make their works available for the benefit of the 
public (and themselves). With this, it is apparent that the CCL embodies and exemplifies the 
copyright balance as articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Notwithstanding the critical comments and shortcomings of the CCL scheme, analyzed 
above in Chapter Four, the assessment of its goals and aspirations show that it supports the 
purpose of copyright law as envisaged by the Supreme Court of Canada in Theberge.  
 
6.3 The Legitimacy of Content Industry Claims 
From my analysis of the content industry stakeholders using the TPMs and anti-
circumvention legislation, the cardinal objectives for the use of TPMs and introducing anti-
circumvention provisions is to address the challenges associated with copyright and digital 
technology and the internet. In this case, my prima facie rationalization of the core value of the 
use of TPMs and anti-circumvention laws is to prevent unauthorized use or access to digitized 
content. This aligns with the opinion of the Supreme Court in Theberge when it admonishes that 
a creator is entitled to a just reward, or put differently, to prevent someone else other than the 
creator from appropriating the benefits due to the creator. The protection of the creator’s interest 
is part of the balance needed in the copyright system to reward the industry and creativity 
invested by creators to produce works of art and the intellect. The assumption is that since the 
sophistication of digital technology and the internet facilitates copyright infringements, which 
amounts to persons other than the creator benefiting from the creator’s work, it seemed necessary 
to introduce digital gatekeepers (digital locks) to content. The perceived benefit in this is that a 
creator is incentivized to produce more creative works if he is rewarded for past works, in other 
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words, there would be less motivation to create if the benefit due to a creator is misappropriated 
as a result of unauthorized access and copyright infringement. It is the belief or common 
assertion of the content industry stakeholders that rewarding a creator leads to more production 
of works of art and the intellect and therefore furthers the purpose of copyright, which is to 
encourage learning and the dissemination of creative works. The content industry copyright 
stakeholders create works and make them available (mostly for a fee; some may be for free, but 
the long-term goal is to convert free users to paying customers) in hard copy and soft copies on 
the internet for people to access and engage with them in the belief that creativity would be 
inspired.     
Undeniably, while it may be acknowledged that the content industry activities may 
appear to contribute to the cause of the purpose of copyright, such support could be merely 
superficial. In my view, some activities or ideas advocated by the content industry do more harm 
than good. I do not intend to rehearse these criticisms here as I have already done so in Chapter 
Five. The objective here is to show how the content industry’s use of TPMs ultimately undercuts 
the purpose of copyright law and negatively affects the public interest.  
The existence of several layers of protection14 for creative works evidences a maximalist 
approach to copyright, creates imbalance in the system and does not augur well for the public 
interest. The use of TPMs now regulates access to content, which significantly undercuts the 
user’s right to access; this is evident in Canada in the Nintendo case where the Justice Campbell 
said that “it is apparent that Parliament intended access control TPMs to extend beyond TPMs 
that merely serve as barriers to copying.”15 The implementation of a TPM that targeted 
commercial copying would have created a minimalist approach and would have been perhaps 
 
14 Ian Kerr et al, “Technical Protection Measures: Tilting at Copyright’s Windmill” (2002) 34 Ottawa Law Review 7 at 43. 
15 Nintendo of America Inc. v Jeramie Douglas King & Go Cyber Shopping, [2017] FC 246 at 29. 
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more tolerable. Additionally, the regulation of access to works contradicts the position of the 
Supreme Court in Theberge when it admonished that the proper balance means recognizing the 
limited nature of the creator’s rights16 as well as the importance of dissemination. On the 
contrary, the use of TPMs and anti-circumvention legislations expands the rights of the creator 
and further constricts those of the user – this does not foster public interest in copyright and 
therefore works against the encouragement of learning and dissemination of works of art and the 
intellect. In order to effectively carry out its purpose, TPMs use tracking/surveillance technology 
to monitor and identify users who gain unauthorized access to content; consequently, this causes 
serious privacy17 concerns and may constitute a violation of users’ liberty. Some of these 
privacy-breaching technologies are implemented under the guise of TPMs unknown to the users. 
The purpose of copyright as articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada aims to benefit the 
public interest, even if the author’s entitlement to reward is duly acknowledged; this certainly 
does not encourage intrusive technologies that invade users’ privacy. Furthermore, the content 
industry has used TPMs and anti-circumvention provisions to impede research, innovation and 
competition.18 The inhibition of research, innovation and competition contradicts the purpose of 
copyright law as stated by the Supreme Court of Canada. Therefore, the activities of the content 
industry in this regard are arguably primarily concerned with unlimited proprietary interest (i.e. 
exclusive and complete control) and this undercuts public interest and balance in the copyright 
 
16 Theberge, supra note 4. 
17 Blayne Haggart, Copyfight: The Global Politics of Digital Copyright Reform (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) at 
19.   
18 Michael Geist, “Anti-circumvention legislation and Competition Policy: Defining a Canadian Way? in Michael Geist, ed, In 
the Public Interest, The Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 228-9; Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
“Unintended Consequences: Five Years Under The DMCA” v.3 (24 September 
2003),<www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/unintended_consequences.pdf > “cited in Geist, Anti-Circumvention Legislation, supra note 18 at 
228. 
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system. This casts doubts on the legitimacy of the content industry’s claim that its approach to 
copyright fulfills the purposes of copyright, fosters public interest and balance.  
Debora Halbert argues that the copyright system favours commercial interests to the 
detriment of the public interest;19 she further states: 
When courts do make the decisions [on where to strike the fair 
use balance], they are required to be sympathetic to 
commercial interests by the standards themselves, which are 
skewed toward protection of the commercial function of a 
work […] the political and social interests of the public are not 
considered in the calculation.20 Finally, fair use is applied in a 
case-by-case manner so that no bright lines exist and continued 
confusion is the result.[…] The principle advocated by content 
owners and the trend toward more “tethered” technologies 
suggest that a new balance needs to be struck.21 To that end, it 
is not user-generated content that is the problem, but the fact 
that copyright law itself strikes a balance that favours 
commercial interests too much. The law has always been 
written to protect the interests of the entrenched against the 
interests of future technologies, as Jessica Litman argued in 
2001.22 As Litman notes, current copyright leaves the public 
interest unprotected,23 something that needs to change.24 
 
Halbert’s argument above is in the context of the United States copyright system, which 
has had significant influence in Canada as I showed in chapter three. Halbert decries maximalist 
approach and hegemonic copyright regime in the United States; her remarks above highlight 
three points. First, that commercial interest is given priority and that copyright law is written in 
their favour. The second point is that the public interest and balance are not given due 
 
19 Deborah Halbert, The State of Copyright: The Complex Relationships of Cultural Creation in a Globalized World (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2014) at 196.  
20 Halbert reports that Rebecca Tushnet reminds us that there are other mechanisms to support free speech and a freer public 
conversation in copyright law as well. 
21 Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of The Internet-And How To Stop It (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press 2009) 
“cited in Halbert, The State of Copyright, supra note 352.” 
22 Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2001) at 47 ““cited in Halbert, The State of Copyright, supra 
note 352.” 
23 Ibid.  
24 Halbert, The State of Copyright, supra note 19. 
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consideration, and this raises fundamental questions as to the credibility of a copyright system. 
The third point is that fair use (fair dealing in Canada) is applied narrowly, thereby shrinking its 
application to the detriment of users. This indirectly impacts on access because what good is it to 
access content if the user cannot be legitimately engaged with it in ways permissible under 
copyright law. These points raised by Halbert reveal the importance of the opinion of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Theberge on the purpose of copyright law and the proper 
understanding of safeguarding the public interest to strike a fair balance in the copyright system.  
Canada and the United States follow a maximalist approach in the implementation of 
WIPO Internet Treaties, which in summary has the underlying ideology of using different 
technical apparatuses to dominate the copyright market in the digital era. Unfortunately, this 
trend does not give legitimacy to the content industry’s claim that its activities support the 
purpose of copyright law and encourage the creation and dissemination of works of art and the 
intellect.  
 
6.4 A Continuous Dialogue 
Despite the clarification given by the Supreme Court of Canada, commercial interests 
continue in their desire to dominate the copyright space in a digital environment. In my view, 
this does not render the pronouncements of the Supreme of Canada inefficacious because it does 
serve to bring education and enlightenment on the subject of the purpose of copyright and 
balance, which was lacking for some time in the copyright narrative in Canada. This has brought 
some degree of progress in the Canadian copyright discourse; however, a lot still needs to 
happen to close the widening gap in achieving balance among the various copyright 
stakeholders, especially with the impact of digital technology and the internet. Granted, the 
 358 
concept of balance is elusive25 but at the minimum, a desirable level of balance is one where 
access is not regulated by copyright owners and TPMs are applied specifically to limit 
commercially infringing copying, but not to impede lawful use or to harm the public interest.  
Neither the free culture nor the content industry copyright stakeholders have all the 
answers to ensuring a better copyright system, however, the dialogue on how best to realize the 
goals and interests of stakeholders must continue. 
 
PART II 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
6.5 The Challenges of the Copyright System  
The recommendations I propose in this research are tailored towards addressing the 
problematic issues in the copyright industry as well as promoting the overarching goals of 
copyright, which is to encourage creativity, foster unhindered access to knowledge and serve the 
public interest. First, it is appropriate to succinctly recap the challenges I have discussed in the 
preceding chapters.  
In chapter one, I attempted to trace the contours of the origin and purpose of copyright, 
which culminated in the enactment of the first copyright law – the Statute of Anne of 1710. One 
of the contentious issues that copyright faces today is the approach to the right of exclusivity in 
the exploitation of proprietary interests in creative works; most copyright owners tend to 
inappropriately interpret this to mean the right to shut out the rest of the world from gaining 
access to content save for a fee. This, in my opinion is a monopolistic approach to copyright and 
reminiscent of how the Stationers’ Company operated the book publication trade before the 
 
25 Cameron Hutchison, Digital Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2016) at 2. 
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Statute of Anne. Prior to the Statute of Anne, Queen Mary, in 155626 granted a royal privilege in 
the form of a Charter to the Stationers’ Company; this privilege gave the Stationers’ Company 
exclusive right to book publication, and by necessary implication, the right to exploit proprietary 
interests from published books. The motivation for the grant of the royal privilege by the British 
Monarch was for religious and political reasons.27 The Stationers’ Company was chosen to 
implement this objective in return for exclusive right to book publication. In my view, this was 
the birth of monopoly in copyright that still exists to this day, albeit in more subtle forms. 
Another major challenge in the copyright system is that in the midst of divergent views on the 
purpose of copyright law, there is hardly a consensus. In my research, I examined the Statute of 
Anne and scholars’ views28 on the rationale for its enactment. This lack of consensus exposes the 
definition and purpose of copyright law to manipulation.  
In chapter two, I examined the advent and impact of ICT on the conventional copyright 
system. The already tensed copyright industry, due to different approaches to the purpose of 
copyright law, now faces a paradigm shift created by ICT, which disrupts the traditional 
copyright business model as well as presents new and easier modes of creativity. Admittedly, 
while digital technology and the internet have positively transformed and enhanced creativity, 
 
26 Daniel J. Gervais, “A Canadian Copyright Narrative” (2009)21 I.P.J. 269 at 274.; Salathiel Masterson, “Copyright: History and 
Development” (1940) 28 California L. Rev. 620 at 625; Peter Baldwin, The Copyright Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2014) 
at 55. 
27 Masterson, Copyright History, ibid. at 628 “…to prevent the propagation of the Protestant Reformation. After reciting that 
certain heretical books “both in rhymes and tracks” were daily printed, containing “great and detestable heresies against the 
Catholic doctrine of the Holy Mother Church,” it ordains that for the suppression of this evil ninety-seven named persons shall be 
incorporated as a society of the art of a stationer. No person is to practice the art of printing unless he be one of this society, and 
the master and warden are authorized to search for, seize and burn all prohibited books, and to imprison anyone that should 
exercise the art of printing contrary to their direction.” 
28 Oren Bracha “The Adventures of the Statute of Anne in the Land of Unlimited Possibilities: The life of a Legal Transplant” 
(2010)25 Berkeley T.L.J. 1427 at 1436, Bracha argues that the Statute of Anne was a compromise; See Victor Bonham-Carter, 1 
Authors by Profession 16 (1978) (that the Statute of Anne “established the author’s right to his own property, and thereby gave 
him the power to bargain for better terms”); Lyman Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville: Vanderbilt 
University Press, 1968) at 143, Patterson argues that the Statute of Anne was more of a trade regulation law; Mark Rose, “The 
Author in Court: Pope v. Curll (1741)” (1992) 21 Cultural Critique 197 at 99, Mark Rose agrees with Patterson that the Statute of 
Anne was more of trade regulation statute. 
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they have also spawned considerable challenges due to stakeholders’ perspectives on its impact 
on copyright. The most controversial impact of ICT on the copyright system is how it supports 
the introduction of new and easy ways to create, duplicate and disseminate content. 
Consequently, these new technologies have also orchestrated contentious copyright law reforms, 
most notable being the WITs, which triggered controversial copyright law reforms and debates 
across WIPO member states, including Canada. 
My focus in chapter three captured the background and buildup to the WITs and keen 
involvement of the United States as a significant player in the development of the WITs. I 
examined how TPMs and anti-circumvention provisions found their way into the WITs amidst 
misgivings expressed by several WIPO member states and their potential negative impact on 
access and user rights. Despite the arguments against the inclusion of TPMs and anti-
circumvention provisions, they nonetheless remained in the WITs, giving member states some 
level of discretion as to how they would be implemented in their national copyright laws. 
Furthermore, I analyzed Canada’s protracted failed attempts to implement the WITs and the 
arguments for and against the proposed inclusion of TPMs and anti-circumvention provisions in 
its copyright law. The analysis in chapter three raised a crucial question as to whether copyright 
law reform in the ICT age can adequately cope with the dynamics in the current system.    
Next, I delved into a detailed analysis of the free culture and content industry 
stakeholders using the CCL and TPMs as case studies respectively. Chapter four featured 
analysis the of free culture community, while chapter five captured the content industry 
stakeholders. Both stakeholders advance strong arguments and justification for their approach to 
copyright. Additionally, I engaged with other challenges, which included the attainment of 
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proper balance of stakeholders’ interests, national and international influence, and the over-
reliance on law reform. 
Now in this chapter, therefore, I attempt to make some suggestions on how to deal with 
some of the challenges highlighted in the preceding chapters. 
   
6.6 Proposed Recommendations: A Regulatory Pluralism Approach 
The recommendations I propose flow from the arguments in this research and are 
premised on one central idea – that of regulatory pluralism. At its core, what I mean for this to 
convey is that copyright law alone as a single regulatory instrument is becoming increasingly 
insufficient to regulate the activities of industry actors, consumers, users and other copyright 
stakeholders. The concept of regulatory pluralism does not mean simply allowing and embracing 
the arbitrary and ad hoc creation of different and conflicting mechanisms to regulate an industry, 
On the contrary, as Cary Coglianese29 puts it: 
By regulatory pluralism, I mean to refer to a rulemaking process that 
involves a subset of the broad public with a high level of interest in 
and knowledge about a particular rulemaking. In this sense, pluralism 
seeks more participation by members of the public than does insulated 
or secretive decision-making by a few unelected regulatory officials, 
but it demands less participation than does participatory democracy. 
The participation that counts in regulatory pluralism is participation 
by organized interests and experts from outside of government.  
 
Coglianese’s position on regulatory pluralism captures the idea that could potentially be 
implemented in the copyright system; that is, the recognition that copyright regulatory initiatives 
could also emanate from outside of government and formal copyright law to advance the 
 
29 Cary Coglianese, “Expanding Regulatory Pluralism: The Role for Information Technology in Rulemaking,” at 13, Paper, 
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, at online: < 
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/coglianese.pdf 
> accessed October 13, 2019. 
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interests of its members and the public more broadly. Furthermore, it is pertinent to add here that 
regulatory pluralism does mean the gathering of the public or empowering every single 
stakeholder in an industry or community – this would be chaotic and destined to failure. Rather, 
the notion is that these various interests—in our example the interests of the content industry and 
free culture community—would be articulated by their respective representatives. The 
participation that matters in regulatory pluralism is that from organized interests and experts 
from outside of government.30 Coglianese’s emphasis on non-governmental actors in regulatory 
pluralism must be understood with caution; while regulatory pluralism is an industry-led 
initiative, their proposed regulatory approach must not contravene existing laws that regulate the 
industry. The CCL is a prime example. Its idea represents a stakeholder-led initiative but still 
conforms to copyright law, while identifiable representatives have the capacity to lead initiatives 
and represent the interests of the stakeholders involved.  
Similarly, in their support for regulatory pluralism, Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair 
contend that employed a single instrument or single strategy approach to regulation has strengths 
as well as weaknesses.31 Therefore, they suggest that a better strategy is to harness the strengths 
of individual mechanisms leading to a mix of instruments to achieve specific goals.32 Applying 
this idea to copyright, formal copyright law has it strengths and weaknesses, while building on 
its strengths, stakeholder-led initiatives would complement for its weaknesses (in particular its 
slow pace in the face of rapid technological change) through innovative ideas. Generally, in 
various areas of a society’s economic life, the government, while providing ground rules and an 
 
30 Ibid.  
31 Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, “Regulatory Pluralism: Designing Policy Mixes for Environmental Protection,” (1999) 
21 Law & Policy at 50 at online: < http://www.greeneconomics.net/Gun-RegulPlural.pdf > accessed October 13, 2019. 
32 Ibid.  
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enabling environment, encourages private initiatives to complement its effort. The same broad 
strategy can be productively applied to the copyright system.    
The copyright system (not just in Canada, but globally) has become very dynamic 
especially in the context of digital technology, while policy-making and law reform has become 
increasingly controversial and cumbersome. Therefore, we should be receptive to new regulatory 
initiatives. I discuss the regulatory pluralism approach under three headings: 1) de-emphasizing 
over-reliance on copyright law reform, 2) encouraging stakeholder-led regulatory practices and 
3) embracing ICT as an instrument to achieve the purposes of copyright as well as serve as a 
platform for stakeholders to pursue their interests. I wish to emphasize here that my call for a 
pluralistic regulatory approach seeks to achieve, first of all, the purposes of copyright, and then 
cater for the needs and interests of copyright stakeholders to the extent possible within that 
principled framework.   
These three recommendations are interconnected in the sense that exploring options 
besides law reform alone creates opportunities for the emergence of private regulatory initiatives; 
such private regulatory schemes in an ICT-driven copyright industry may consider the possibility 
of using ICT as a means for copyright stakeholders to achieve their goals. While these three 
proposed recommendations have the potential to create positive impact, there is, of course, no 
guarantee that their impact will be progressively linear, considering the differences and dynamics 
of the copyright industry. The point, rather, is to reframe the policy quandaries into which we 
keep wading and to rethink our strategies for improving the copyright system in the future. 
 
6.6.1 De-emphasize Over-Reliance on Copyright Law Reform 
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Updating copyright law is widely recognized as a popular way of dealing with challenges 
in the copyright industry. In the pre-ICT era, copyright reform, though an arduous process, was 
relatively effective. The proposition here is that copyright law alone is increasingly becoming 
inadequate in keeping up with the pace of advancement in the copyright industry, especially with 
the impact of ICT. However, the impact of ICT in copyright has been used as a justification to 
make calls for copyright law reforms to combat unauthorized access to content, which arguably 
discourages creativity if not adequately and efficiently addressed through copyright law reforms 
and stricter measures. In fact, this represents the instrumentalist conception of copyright as stated 
by Glynn Lunney: 
…copyright is built on a simple premise: more copyright yields more 
money for copyright owners, and more money in turn means more 
and better creative work. In my dream, rent-seeking is part of 
copyright; to fulfill its purpose, copyright generates rents (or 
incentives, if you prefer) for copyright owners. But it does so only to 
the extent that those rents are necessary and inextricably tied to 
ensuring more and better creative works.33 
 
However, prior to his 2018 paper, Lunney had, in 2001, just as sales revenue started to 
decline in the music industry due to the emergence of Napster and the rise of music file sharing, 
challenged the instrumentalist notion stated above when he predicted that: 
 
While copyright simplistically assumes that more incentive means 
more productivity, this assumption is flawed. At some point, higher 
returns for a given author’s work will likely reduce that author’s 
creative output.34 
  
 
33 Glynn Lunney, “Copyright Lost,” (June 18, 2018), IDEA Vol. 59, Forthcoming), Texas A&M University School of Law, Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series, at 2, at online: < file:///Users/aliceogoroh/Downloads/SSRN-id3198147%20(1).pdf > accessed 
October 14, 2019.  
34 Glynn Lunney, “The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,” 
(2001) 87 VA. L. REV. 813 at 890. 
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Revisiting his brazen prediction in 2018 (seventeen years later), Lunney, armed with 
empirical data in the music industry confirms his prediction – that contrary to the instrumentalist 
premise, in the music industry in the United States over the last fifty years, increased revenue led 
to fewer and lower quality hit songs, and decreased revenue accounted for more and better 
quality songs.35 Lunney’s study shows that while file sharing does account for loss of revenue in 
the music sector, this does not account for less production of music; on the contrary, it leads to 
more production of music. Therefore, the call to reform copyright law to ensure better incentives 
for creators to motivate them to produce more is revealed to be flawed. 
However, this is not to say copyright law has no place at all. In fact, on the contrary, I 
must first argue in favour of the need for the continued existence of copyright law because it 
provides the fundamental legal framework for the copyright system to function, in addition to 
any other stakeholder-led non-legal regulatory initiative. Copyright law is necessary as a 
reference point for definitive provisions on the meaning of copyright, when copyright exists, for 
creating and allocating exclusive right to exploit copyright works, delineating exceptions to 
 
35 Glynn Lunney, Copyright’s Excess: Money and Music in the US Recording Industry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2018) “cited in Lunney, Copyright Lost, supra note 33 at 4, 6, 7, 12.” Lunney analyzes music data before and during music file 
sharing as follows: 1) sales of recorded music rose more or less steadily from 1961 through 1999. From under $4 billion ($2013) 
in 1961, sales rose to an initial peak in 1978 of just over $15 billion ($2013), and then fell back with second OPEC oil embargo 
and associated recessions until 1983. After 1983, sales resumed a steady upward trend until they reached record levels and 
peaked at just over $20.7 billion ($2013) in 1999; 2) a steady decline in shipments of recorded music since the advent of file 
sharing in 1999. From its peak of $20.7 billion ($2013) in 1999, revenue from sales of recorded music have fallen in the United 
States to a low of just under $7.0 billion ($2013) in 2014. That is a decline in annual sales of $13.7 billion ($2013), or 66.4 
percent. Acknowledging that file sharing led to a decline in record sales, Lunney was also interested in seeing the impact it had in 
music output, that is, more money should lead to more music output and less money should account for less music output. 
Lunney’s findings were that excess incentives ensure that our most popular artists are vastly overpaid. By providing these excess 
incentives, copyright encourages our superstar artists to work less. As a result, when revenues were high for the recording 
industry, as they were in the 1990s, our top artists produced fewer studio albums and fewer Hot 100 hits in the first ten years of 
their career. In contrast, when revenues were low, both in the 1960s before the sound recording copyright and in the post-file 
sharing 2000s, our top artists produced more studio albums and more Hot 100 hits. It is no coincidence that the most prolific 
artists in the study, the Beatles and Taylor Swift, had their first Hot 100 hits in the low revenue years of 1964 and 2006, 
respectively. 
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copyright control, etc. In his assertion on the meaning of free culture, it is worth recalling, 
Lawrence Lessig speaks to the need for the existence of copyright law: 
A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not a culture in 
which artists don’t get paid. A culture without property, or in which 
creators can’t get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not what I 
advance here. Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a 
balance between anarchy and control.36  
 
Lessig’s reference to property, and the support for ownership of property37 implies that 
there is need for copyright law because without copyright law there can be no proprietary rights 
in creative works in the first instance. Such a result is not only “anarchy,” but is inconsistent with 
my overarching argument that there must be a balance between rewarding authors and allowing 
the cultural content industries to flourish and ensuring the access of the public to the content 
itself, for the benefit of society. 
Furthermore, Jeffrey Harrison, while critiquing the relationship between creativity 
(copyright) and CCL, expresses an opinion that appears to be useful for our purposes here in 
terms of supporting the need for copyright law:  
More generally, in order to get the point of there being a creative 
commons, there must be creativity in the first place. The richer the 
creativity, the richer the potential commons. Thus, as far as the 
creative commons is concerned, copyright has a chicken-and-egg 
quality. Without copyright, it seems doubtful that much would exist to 
become part of the commons.38 
 
On the validity of Harrison’s argument, I concur, because CCL does not mean disregard for 
copyright law. On the contrary, as we have seen, CCL relies on copyright law to build its 
 
36 Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture, How big Media uses Technology and the Law to lock down Culture and Control Creativity 
(New York: The Penguin Press, 2004) at xvi. 
37 This refers to copyright as a form intellectual or intangible “property” created by copyright law.  
38 Jeffrey L. Harrison, “Creativity or Commons: A Comment on Professor Lessig” (2003) 55 Fla. L. Rev. 795 at 798. 
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initiative. Therefore, using Harrison’s opinion in a broader context, copyright law plays a 
significant role as the foundation that creates an ordered copyright system, which in turn ensures 
the conditions necessary for creative activities/enterprises to flourish. Other regulatory initiatives 
can build on the foundation of copyright law.  
My recommendation to reduce over-reliance on copyright law reform proposes that, 
while copyright law is important, it does not possess the required flexibility to adequately adapt 
to the ever-evolving needs and dynamics of copyright in a digital era with each new 
technological development. In this regard, the law has obvious limitations. With the advent of 
digital technology and the internet, it has become increasingly challenging for the law to 
effectively or comprehensively deal with various ways in which ICT has transformed creativity 
in the copyright world, and particularly to do so in a balanced and timely way. Therefore, in my 
view, it is prudent not rely on law reform as the only pathway to resolving these challenges. ICT 
evolves faster than the law could be reformed to catch up with it, therefore, it is unwise to 
attempt to reform copyright law each time technology changes; nor is it consistent with the 
principles of technology neutrality as articulated by Carys Craig.39 Copyright law reform is 
necessary, and the principal intent should be to strengthen and update copyright law as a legal 
structure to guarantee balance in the system. 
There are a few further reasons worth highlighting in order to explain why legal response 
to copyright reform may not always be the desired approach. First, with the fast-paced 
technological advancement, it is incredibly challenging to future-proof the law, which can 
 
39 Cary Craig, “Technology Neutrality: (Pre)Serving the Purposes of Copyright Law” in Michael Geist ed, in The Copyright 
Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto: University of 
Ottawa Press, 2012) at 291-2. She further argues that “technology neutrality can be derived directly from the face of the 
Copyright Act, it is generally found in the wording of section 3(1) and the owner’s exclusive right to reproduce the work “in any 
material form whatsoever.” This provision undoubtedly demonstrates an ambition toward a technologically neutral copyright but, 
in itself, it demands nothing more than extending the reach of owners’ right to new media, thereby ensuring non-discrimination in 
the applicability of the law to different technologies, and, to a certain degree, “future-proofing” the law.”   
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therefore easily be rendered obsolete. Secondly, the legislative process to create new law or 
reform existing laws is generally slow and arduous. It becomes more challenging if the law 
reform is on a matter as controversial as copyright law. As we have seen, Canada’s attempt to 
implement the WITs took more than a decade to come to fruition, following several failed 
attempts; it was caught up in the midst of the politics and elections that are important and 
inevitable features within the structures of democratic government. Third, the outcome of the 
legislative process may not be free and fair due to influence of copyright stakeholders. In fact, 
copyright law reform is a battle between copyright stakeholders. Usually, these copyright 
stakeholders are not equally matched in terms of bargaining power and resourcefulness, and the 
class of stakeholders with the most financial and political resourcefulness tend to gain the upper 
hand. The incorporation of TPMs and anti-circumvention provisions into Canadian copyright law 
is a demonstration of how the process can be influenced to achieve a desired outcome by the 
content industry stakeholders. It must be noted that, influencing the outcome of the legislation 
can also come from the free culture stakeholders as was manifested in the Fair Copyright for 
Canada campaign, which arguably delayed the legislative process. There is therefore sound basis 
on which to question any assumption that law reform initiatives are necessarily freer from bias or 
immune to stakeholder self-interest than are stakeholder-led regulatory initiatives. Fourth, there 
is the possibility (indeed, clear likelihood) that there could be international influence which may 
prevail over domestic copyright policy goals. This can be by means of an international treaty that 
a member state is obliged to incorporate into its national copyright law. For example, in the case 
of the WITs, we saw that Canada and other members states were ultimately obligated to 
implement treaty provisions into their national law. The international influence could also be in 
form of diplomatic pressure, such as the influence the United States brought to bear on Canada’s 
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domestic implementation of the WITs, or through broader trade negotiations as seen in the 
culmination of the CUSMA.   
The foregoing captures some serious drawbacks inherent in the legislative process in 
copyright law reform. In view of this, I am of the opinion that creative ways are needed to 
maintain and advance copyright’s purposes in the face of changing circumstances—ways that do 
not seek to dismantle the copyright legal structure but rather to build on it to create systems and 
regulatory initiatives whereby stakeholders can achieve their goals in furtherance of copyright’s 
purposes and with less friction. This could include coordinated arrangements that attract 
stakeholders who are drawn to get involved in such initiatives. A perfect example of this, as I 
have argued, is CCL. 
6.6.2 Endorse Private Arrangements  
CCL, which I have discussed extensively in this research, is an example of a unique 
regulatory initiative that creates a platform for both creators and users to achieve their goals. Of 
course, this is a platform that stakeholders voluntarily sign up for if they are interested and 
believe in its objective; there is no coercion involved, and nor does it undermine the interests of 
third parties or the public in the copyright system. Since I have already examined the CCL 
scheme, as well as its pros and cons, the intention here is not to repeat those arguments but to 
offer some further justification and support for its existence as a stakeholder-led private 
arrangement. 
One obvious justification for the endorsement of CCL is that the content industry 
stakeholders are already using private arrangements to their advantage to create additional layers 
of protection for creative works besides the legal framework of copyright law. According to Ian 
Kerr et al, besides copyright law, other layers of protection for copyright works include contract 
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law, TPMs and digital rights management (DRM) technologies.40 Additionally, besides the 
industry-wide deployment of TPMs and DRM, the content industry’s use of copyright 
collectives41 is also a manifestation of a private scheme that benefits the content industry 
stakeholders (and ideally, also, users and the public). The use of TPMs and private arrangement 
schemes by the content industry can similarly be regarded as self-help schemes. Therefore, 
through the CCL, creators who have chosen to make their works freely available to the public are 
given an effective and accessible means by which to do so. This has become a vital initiative in 
helping to better structuring copyright law in furtherance of the interests of free culture 
stakeholders, including creators, users and the public at large.   
It is important to point out that, although I am using CCL as my principal example here, 
my support for such ground-up, stakeholder-led arrangements is actually for the copyright 
industry as a whole, which means, any group of stakeholders with shared interests can similarly 
work out how to achieve their goals by building upon copyright’s foundations. With this being 
the case, it is important to emphasize that that any such initiative should not adversely affect or 
actively undercut the purpose of copyright and the public interest. Of course, this creates its own 
challenges in practice because, as discussed earlier, both the content industry and free culture 
stakeholders typically lay claim to the legitimacy of their actions within the copyright scheme 
and insist, directly or indirectly, that satisfying their interests ultimately benefits the interest of 
the public. Nonetheless, recognizing this principled framework within which private 
arrangements and regulatory initiatives should flourish is a key feature of my regulatory 
 
40 Kerr et al, Technical Protection Measures, supra note 14. 
41 A copyright collective is simply a body or agency that centrally manages and collects copyright royalties on behalf of its 
members. 
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pluralism proposal (which, as I will demonstrate further below) leaves open the door for legal 
reform to act as a corrective measure where necessary.    
Furthermore, a final reason why industry-led schemes should be recognized as critical to 
copyright’s ongoing development is that, in the aftermath of most copyright reforms, not all 
stakeholders are happy with the outcome. The law is not a perfect solution to the challenges of 
copyright therefore, nor a perfect tool with which to achieve delicate balances in particular 
contexts. Private schemes are therefore necessary (and inevitable) in order to fill in the gap, 
especially for stakeholders who may be disadvantaged by the outcome of the copyright law 
reform or amendment (or its absence or delay).  
6.6.3 ICT as an Instrument to achieve the Purposes of Copyright as well as Reward 
Stakeholders   
The impact of ICT in the copyright industry is so phenomenal that copyright stakeholders 
and scholars now acknowledge that this has created a new epoch, a paradigm shift, which now 
makes it important to conceptualize copyright through the lenses of ICT. Digital technology and 
the internet have created a new age for copyright such that we now talk of copyright in the 
digital era or copyright in the internet age, and so on. It is for these reasons that ICT could 
potentially play a quasi-regulatory role in the copyright system. In chapter two, I examined the 
impact of ICT in the copyright system and how it is perceived by the free culture and the content 
industry stakeholders. It is apparent from my examination of free culture and content industry 
stakeholders’ approach to copyright in a digitized context, ICT serves as a means that can be 
used to achieve their goals in more than a purely architectural way. For example, the technical 
ease and availability of CCL has demonstrated that there are authors who support the idea of 
granting users free access to their works under certain conditions of their choice. The over one 
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billion works licensed under CCL schemes provide proof that the system works and is acceptable 
to those who choose to embrace it. 
In the same way, though the internet and digital technology creates a disruption in the 
traditional business model operated by the content industry stakeholders, it also provides new 
market opportunities to reach more audiences with their content for commercial gain. For 
example, as mentioned previously, for book publication, Amazon Kindle provides e-books for 
sale; for movies and TV shows, Netflix provides subscription-based movies/TV show streaming 
services; for music, Spotify provides subscription-based music streaming services. Amazon, 
Netflix, Spotify and other organizations with similar business models provide platforms on 
which creators agree to provide their content for users to access for a fee. Based on an agreed 
sharing formula, the fee paid by the user is split between the platform owner and the content 
creator. Millions of users across the world subscribe to these platforms, and this business model 
generates huge revenue.  
With the illustration above, it can hardly be disputed that ICT can be used by both the 
free culture and the content industry stakeholders to achieve their goals with less friction. This is 
laudable because ICT could be leveraged to achieve much nobler ideals in the copyright system.   
Therefore, it is fair to argue that ICT should not be conceived as either good or bad or as 
a threat to the copyright industry. So far, ICT has proven to be useful to both free culture and 
content industry stakeholders. I do not discount that digital technologies come with challenges. 
For both the free culture and the content industry stakeholders, the new opportunities that digital 
technology and the internet present come with risks. Resisting a one-sided vision that emphasizes 
the threats of ICT to incumbent stakeholders threatens to obstruct the pursuit of copyright’s 
objectives made possible by the capacities of ICT. My argument is not to focus on those risks 
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and on ICT as a threat, but to suggest that copyright policy makers and stakeholders focus on 
paving the way to leveraging ICT as a regulatory instrument to advance the overarching purposes 
of copyright law. If given the opportunity and embraced as a means of regulation in the 
copyright system, the internet and digital technology can facilitate the ultimate goal of 
encouraging creative learning and the unhindered transmission of knowledge, in addition to 
creating a platform to reward the creative effort of stakeholders. 
   
6.7 Challenges and Opportunities of the Regulatory Pluralism Approach 
Ideally, if all things were equal, then my regulatory pluralism recommendations would 
run smoothly and advance the interests of all stakeholders including the public at large. 
Unfortunately, truth be told, this is unlikely to be the case. In order to be realistic with my 
recommendations, it is important to envisage possible challenges and obstacles. 
Currently, ICT is being used as means for stakeholders (free culture and content industry) 
to achieve their own goals – that is, to provide access to and the dissemination of creative works 
for free culture, and for the content industry, the ability to monetize their content. Unfortunately, 
there are still unresolved issues, controversies and disagreements, and ways in which these 
efforts undermine copyright policy goals and the public interest.   
In my view and based on the arguments examined in this research, the plausible 
explanation for the unending controversies in the copyright system is the desire for some 
stakeholders to monopolize, control and dominate the copyright industry. At the risk of 
appearing biased towards free culture community, the desire for control in the copyright sector is 
mostly attributable to the content industry stakeholders and dates back to the monopoly and 
control the Stationers’ Company had over the book trade, which I examined extensively in 
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chapter one. Unfortunately, even after 3 centuries, the successors of the Stationers’ Company 
carry on this monopolistic approach to copyright. My point is not to lay blame, for the quest for 
profit necessarily entails this approach. It is, however, important to appreciate that the tendency 
of the content industry stakeholders to control, dominate and monopolize the copyright sector is 
one of the intractable challenges of copyright policy-making today—and it is surely one of the 
setbacks to my proposed recommendations.  
These challenges notwithstanding, I believe that following my recommendation and 
embracing the realities and potential of regulatory pluralism in the copyright sector could still 
create significant impact, especially in the area of ICT as technologies continue to evolve. For 
example, as artificial intelligence pushes new boundaries, it holds limitless possibilities and 
could be harnessed to foster creativity and balance in the copyright system just like CCL but in 
ways that we cannot yet imagine. Efforts to regulate AI through legal reform seem more likely, 
on the other hand, to stall, exacerbate existing conflicts or potentially backfire in a way that 
undermines copyrights goals and the public interest.   
Even in the midst of the copyright hegemony by powerful corporations in the content 
industry, the CCL model has managed to create an identity, while advancing unhindered access 
to knowledge and creativity. The CCL scheme is but one example; it proves that, if relying on 
and building initiatives within the current legal structure of copyright law, private arrangements 
riding on the bedrock of ICT can make a significant difference in promoting access to content 
and the encouragement of learning. 
 
6.8 Necessary Copyright Reforms in Canada 
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A balanced copyright system is one in which the rights given to stakeholders (in this case, 
copyright owners and users) are not absolute—a trade-off is necessary to maintain balance and to 
avoid giving undue advantage to one stakeholder over the other. Canada currently operates a 
strong TPM regime, which concentrates almost absolute rights and powers in the hands of 
copyright owners. The rationale for my recommended reforms is aimed at addressing the current 
imbalance. Pascale Chapdelaine aptly summarizes the imbalance thus:42 
The biggest flaw with strong TPM regimes is that they give almost 
carte blanche as to how copyright holders may protect their copyright 
works. Without carefully mapping TPMs with the purpose, function, 
scope of copyright, its limitations and exceptions, technological 
measures protected by such strong TPM regimes effectively allow 
copyright holders to ‘write their own intellectual property statute in 
computer code…There is generally no requirement that to receive 
legal protection, technological measures need to embed a mechanism 
that facilitates the exercise of fair dealing, fair use, or other exceptions 
to copyright infringement. Without such a requirement, the view that 
TPMs properly balance the competing interests of right holders, users, 
and the public domain is not convincing at best.  
 
The use of TPMs is understandable, and represents the kind of private ordering amongst 
copyright stakeholders that I have endorsed as a potential route towards advancing copyright’s 
purposes; but their unfettered use, it has been clear, undercuts the copyright balance and 
negatively impacts on the copyright system. Chapdelaine’s argument above suggests that the 
implementation of TPMs ought to align with the broader picture of the purpose of copyright and 
permissible use of protected content. Consequently, the recommendations below are apposite and 
demonstrate the ongoing role of law reform in the pluralistic regulatory environment that I have 
described.  
6.8.1 Rights Instead of Privileges 
 
42 Pascale Chapdelaine, Copyright User Rights: Contracts and the Erosion of Property (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) at 
140. 
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In Chapter Four, I examined the copyright exception through the lenses of rights versus 
privileges. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court of Canada’s erudition in CCH that copyright 
exceptions are rights, legal theory43 analysis of the meaning of rights show that copyright 
exceptions provisions do not meet the strict description of rights but, at best, are realized as 
privileges. However, in my opinion, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudential reasoning is 
nonetheless incredibly significant because it has initiated a dialogue, which I regard as a judicial 
nudge to the legislature to do what is needed – that is, to elevate copyright exceptions, in effect, 
from privileges to rights. This is an effective way to balance the interests of copyright owners 
with that of users. As long as copyright owners have rights and users have privileges, rights 
would always trump privileges and the imbalance continues. Judicial interpretation44 alone is 
inadequate to ensure balance in the copyright. The grant of rights to copyright owners and 
privileges to users bear the characteristics of imbalance ab initio; arguably between users and 
creators, no one is more important than the other in the copyright ecosystem. Copyright owners 
need users as much as users need copyright owners. On the one hand, while creators rely on 
users to consume, purchase, remix, distribute, and critique their works, on the other hand, users 
depend on creators to produce content necessary for not just entertainment and pleasure, but 
more importantly, to inspire further creativity. The interdependence of stakeholders among one 
another in the copyright system enriches creativity and advances the public interest. Therefore, 
 
43 Roscoe Pound, “Legal Rights” (1915) 26 Intl Journal of Ethics at 92, see generally 92-101, at online: < 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2376739.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-
4341%2Ftest&refreqid=search%3A9ac5b19b0343c08975db2c991ffc1d0b > accessed August 15, 2019. 
44 Chapdelaine, Copyright User Rights, supra note 42 at 136, note 62, Chapdelaine observes that in Chamberlain Group, Inc v 
Skylink Techs, Inc, 381 F (3d) 1178 (Fed Cir 2004) [Chamberlain] established a test linking the application of the TPM 
provisions to copyright infringement; see also Storage Technology Corp v Custom Hardware Engineering and Consulting Inc, 
431 F (3d) 1374 (Fed Cir 2005); see however MDY Industries v Blizzard Entertainment and Vivendi Games et al (n 54) did not 
link TPM provisions to copyright infringement as was done in Chamberlain. 
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this justifies the proposal that copyright exceptions should be properly expressed—and 
protected—in copyright law as rights and not privileges. 
Just as copyright owners’ exclusive rights are limited, it would be appropriate to impose 
some limitations to how users exercise their proposed right. This leads to the next 
recommendation. 
6.8.2 Permitted Uses and Petition for Access  
The proposed user’s right I recommend should of course be exercised only in respect to 
permitted uses as enshrined in the copyright law. In cases where TPMs are implemented and 
users are unable to exercise their right to permitted uses under copyright exceptions, I 
recommend that the Copyright Act of Canada be amended to include the establishment of an 
administrative process for the users to petition for access. This recommendation follows New 
Zealand’s implementation of WIT (discussed in chapter three) that establishes an administrative 
process for user to petition for access.45 The New Zealand implementation approach appears to 
strike a balance between the interests of copyright owners and users. To protect the interests of 
copyright owners, it recognizes TPMs, allows its use and accords rights to copyright owners who 
use TPMs46 and prohibits the distribution of circumvention devices.47 However, the New 
 
45 New Zealand, Copyright (New Technologies) Amendment Act, 2008 (this Act amended the Copyright Act, 1994), at s.226E 
states that: (1) Nothing in this Act prevents any person from using a TPM circumvention device to exercise a permitted act 
under Part 3. 
“(2) The user of a TPM work who wishes to exercise a permitted act under Part 3 but cannot practically do so because of a 
TPM may do either or both of the following: 
(a) apply to the copyright owner or the exclusive licensee for assistance enabling the user to exercise the permitted act: 
(b) engage a qualified person (see section 226D (3)) to exercise the permitted act on the user’s behalf using a TPM 
circumvention device, but only if the copyright owner or the exclusive licensee has refused the user’s request for assistance or 
has failed to respond to it within a reasonable time. 
46 New Zealand, Copyright Amendment Act, ibid. at s.226: “TPM or technological protection measure— 
(a)means any process, treatment, mechanism, device, or system that in the normal course of its operation prevents or inhibits 
the infringement of copyright in a TPM work; but 
(b)for the avoidance of doubt, does not include a process, treatment, mechanism, device, or system to the extent that, in the 
normal course of operation, it only controls any access to a work for non-infringing purposes (for example, it does not include 
a process, treatment, mechanism, device, or system to the extent that it controls geographic market segmentation by 
preventing the playback in New Zealand of a non-infringing copy of a work) 
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Zealand Copyright Amendment Act curtails the rights of copyright owners by providing 
exceptions where the rights of the owner of a TPM-protected work do not apply,48 as well as 
providing exceptions (permitted acts) to circumvention.49 The permitted acts are contained in 
Part 3 of the New Zealand Copyright Act, 1994.50 Note that, while the New Zealand law entitles 
the user to circumvent TPM in respect of permitted acts, this right cannot be exercised 
arbitrarily. The user can contact the copyright owner requesting access; but if this fails or the 
copyright owner does not respond within a reasonable time, the user can seek the assistance of a 
qualified person51 to perform the permitted acts using a TPM circumvention device. The New 
 
S.226B 
(1) This section applies if a TPM work is issued to the public by, or under licence from, the copyright owner. 
(2) The issuer of the TPM work has the same rights against a person who contravenes section 226A as a copyright owner has 
in respect of an infringement of copyright. 
(3) The issuer of the TPM work has the same rights under section 122 (order for delivery up in civil proceedings) or 132 
(order for delivery up in criminal proceedings) in relation to a TPM circumvention device as a copyright owner has in relation 
to an infringing copy. 
(4) Sections 126 to 129 (which relate to certain presumptions) apply in relation to proceedings under this section. 
(5) Section 134 (order as to disposal of infringing copy or other object) applies, with all necessary modifications, in relation to 
the disposal of anything that is delivered up under subsection (3). 
47 Ibid. s.226A “(1)A person (A) must not make, import, sell, distribute, let for hire, offer or expose for sale or hire, or 
advertise for sale or hire, a TPM circumvention device that applies to a technological protection measure if A knows or has 
reason to believe that it will, or is likely to, be used to infringe copyright in a TPM work. 
“(2)A person (A) must not provide a service to another person (B) if— 
(a)A intends the service to enable or assist B to circumvent a technological protection measure; and 
(b)A knows or has reason to believe that the service will, or is likely to, be used to infringe copyright in a TPM 
work. 
“(3)A person (A) must not publish information enabling or assisting another person to circumvent a technological protection 
measure if A intends that the information will be used to infringe copyright in a TPM work. 
48 Ibid. “226D When rights of issuer of TPM work do not apply –  
(1) The rights that the issuer of a TPM work has under section 226B do not prevent or restrict the exercise of a permitted act. 
(2) The rights that the issuer of a TPM work has under section 226B do not prevent or restrict the making, importation, sale, 
or letting for hire of a TPM circumvention device to enable— 
(a) a qualified person to exercise a permitted act under Part 3 using a TPM circumvention device on behalf of the user of a 
TPM work; or 
(b) a person referred to in section 226E (3) to undertake encryption research. 
(3) In this section and in section 226E, qualified person means— 
(a) the librarian of a prescribed library; or 
(b) the archivist of an archive; or 
(c) an educational establishment; or 
(d) any other person specified by the Governor-General by Order in Council on the recommendation of the Minister. 
(4) A qualified person must not be supplied with a TPM circumvention device on behalf of a user unless the qualified person 
has first made a declaration to the supplier in the prescribed form. 
49 New Zealand, Copyright Amendment Act, supra note 45.  
50 New Zealand Copyright Act, 1994, s.40-93, the permitted acts cover various areas under these headings – education, libraries 
and archives, public administration, literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works, computer programs, sound recordings and films, 
communication works, internet service provider liability.   
51 Ibid. s.226D. 
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Zealand Copyright Amendment Act does not directly vest users with the right to circumvent 
TPM, instead, this right is exercised through qualified persons listed in s.226D, which prevents 
abuse of this right by users.  
In fact, it is fitting at this time (as we anticipate an appropriate response to the Statutory 
Review of Canada’s Copyright Act) to amend Canada’s copyright law to incorporate these 
provisions, which would go a long way to safeguarding balance in the copyright system by 
moderating the strict application of TPMs and anti-circumvention roles in Canada. Indeed, as we 
shall see below, this amendment is actually envisaged and arguably endorsed by the Copyright 
Act Review process because of the observations one of the resulting recommendations in the 
Report52 of the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, which reflects the 
need to effect this change.  
 
6.9 Statutory Review of the Copyright Act: Fixing the Flaws 
The statutory review of Canada’s Copyright Act began in December 2017 and the House 
of Commons designated the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology to 
conduct the review.53 Since then, the Standing Committee has held 52 meetings, heard 263 
witnesses, received 192 briefs and received 6,000 emails and other correspondence.54 This in 
itself demonstrates how complex, resource-draining, and time-consuming law reform (copyright 
law reform in particular) can be given the need to consult widely with all stakeholders. My 
examination of the current statutory review and the Standing Committee’s report show two 
things: 1) it supports my earlier position that over-reliance on law reforms alone is inadequate to 
 
52 Statutory Review of the Copyright Act, Report of the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, June 2019, at 
online: < https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/INDU/Reports/RP10537003/indurp16/indurp16-e.pdf > accessed 
October 14, 2019. 
53 Ibid. at 1. 
54 Ibid.  
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address the challenges of a fast-paced ICT-driven copyright system; and 2) most of my 
recommendations align with recommendations in the Standing Committee’s report.   
In chapter three, I examined a few submissions55 (from the content industry and free 
culture stakeholders) to get a sense of what their concerns are and their recommendations for the 
Standing Committee. In summary, and as expected, while the free culture stakeholders expressed 
concern over copyright term extension and the limits placed by TPMs on user access to digital 
content, the content industry expressed worry over unauthorized access to content through 
streaming and called for measures to tackle the issue and better protect copyright owner control. 
  The Standing Committee has consulted widely and submitted a 182-page report56 to the 
House of Commons—and it has taken nearly two years to accomplish this. The House of 
Commons will in turn review the report and decide how to proceed forward with the 
recommendations – this will also take time given the legislative processes involved, and given 
that a change in Canada’s government seems immanent. The process can hardly be expedited 
any more than this without running the risk of being accused of not following due process. As I 
noted earlier in my discussion on over-reliance on copyright law reform, these are the challenges 
inherent in law reform processes – they are complex, time-consuming, expensive and susceptible 
to lobbyist influence. Furthermore, the frequent changes in government entailed by any 
democratic system (and as likely to occur in Canada due to the October 2019 Federal elections) 
 
55 Ryan Merkley, Submission to Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology on Statutory Review of the Copyright 
Act, May 15, 2018 at online: < https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/INDU/Brief/BR9887146/br-
external/CreativeCommons-e.pdf> accessed April 27, 2019; Myra Tawfik et al, Brief - Statutory Review of the Copyright Act 
submitted by Myra Tawfik on behalf of Canadian intellectual property law scholars, October 22, 2018 at online: 
<https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/INDU/Brief/BR10278308/br-external/BannermanSara02-e.pdf> accessed 
April 27, 2019. The other signatories include: Pascale Chapdelaine, Sara Bannerman, Olivier Charbonneau, Carys Craig, Lucie 
Guibault, Ariel Katz, Meera Nair, Graham Reynolds, Teresa Scassa, and Samuel E. Trosow; Rogers Communications, Written 
Submissions of Rogers Communications on section 92 Copyright Act Review, December 10, at online: < 
https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/INDU/Brief/BR10268870/br-external/RogersCommunicationsInc-e.pdf> 
2018, accessed April 27, 2019. 
56 Report of the Standing Committee, supra note 52. 
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could affect the direction of the review process and obstruct the timely implementation of legal 
reforms. 
6.9.2. Review of Five-Year Statutory Review Approach 
 The Standing Committee also received recommendations on statutory review process and 
the need to reconsider the approach. Various views57 were expressed on the matter, some 
suggested that a five-year interval was too short to implement new provisions and could make 
Parliament react prematurely to technological changes; others suggested58 that deciding when to 
review the Act should be at Parliament’s prerogative and not to be dictated by statute. Further 
suggestions59 were to keep the five-year review and even make the interval shorter to ensure 
quick legislative response to technological changes. 
 I am of the view that there is no “quick legislative response” to technological changes 
given how lengthy the process takes. A review process is necessary, but I consider a five-year 
interval too short. I suggest two options to the review approach. First, if Parliament is keen on 
retaining a statutory review, the interval should not be less than a decade. Second, Parliament can 
stop the statutory review, and call for a review when the need arises. 
 
57 Ibid. at 21-2, Noting that some of the 2012 amendments are still under litigation, Jeremy de Beer, Professor of Law at the 
University of Ottawa, argued that five-year intervals do not leave enough time to implement new provisions and interpret them in 
light of existing principles. Mr. de Beer added that frequent parliamentary reviews are resource-intensive and time-consuming, 
encourage short-sighted legislation, and hinder progress by postponing the resolution of difficult issues to the next review. 
Howard P. Knopf, Counsel at Maceral & Jarzyna, argued that short-interval, periodic reviews increase the risk that Parliament 
could react prematurely to technological change and before the market develops solutions of its own. 
58 Ibid. While he believed the current review to be timely, Casey Chisick, Partner at Cassels Brock & Blackwell, maintained that 
deciding when to review the Act should remain Parliament’s prerogative rather than being dictated by statute. Given the lack of 
publicly available data on the effects of copyright reform, the Intellectual Property Institute of Canada (IPIC) suggested that the 
Government refrain from making significant amendments to the Act and instead lay down the groundwork for its next mandated 
review, scheduled in 2022. According to Michael Geist, Professor of Law at the University of Ottawa, the 2016 and 2018 
amendments show that Parliament can change the Act whenever appropriate, outside of the review process. 
59 Ibid. at 22-3, Other witnesses argued that Parliament should retain the five-year review process to keep up with technological 
change, address outstanding issues, and ensure the Act works properly. Barry Sookman, Partner at McCarthy Tétrault, suggested 
to keep reviewing the Act on a regular basis, but to increase the interval of the reviews in order to allow more time to implement 
amendments and thoroughly observe their effects. The Screen Composers Guild of Canada (SCGC) suggested reviewing the Act 
at much shorter intervals than every five years to ensure quick legislative responses to technological changes. 
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6.9.3 Statutory Review: Standing Committee’s Recommendations  
The Standing Committee, in its report made various significant recommendations; but for 
our purposes here, most relevant is the Standing Committee’s thoughtful articulation of the need 
to revisit Canada’s implementation of the TPM anti-circumvention provisions, and possibly to 
allow circumvention of TPMs for non-infringing purposes. The Standing Committee reports 
thus: 
The Committee recognizes that the effective use of TPMs remains 
important in at least some creative industries and that Canada has 
international obligations in the matter. However, it agrees that the 
circumvention of TPMs should be allowed for non-infringing 
purposes, especially given the fact that the Nintendo case provided 
such a broad interpretation of TPMs. In other words, while anti-
circumvention rules should support the use of TPMs to enable the 
remuneration of rights-holders and prevent copyright infringement, 
they should generally not prevent someone from committing an act 
otherwise authorized under the Act. The Committee therefore 
recommends: Recommendation 19 That the Government of Canada 
examine measures to modernize copyright policy with digital 
technologies affecting Canadians and Canadian institutions, including 
the relevance of technological protection measures within copyright 
law, notably to facilitate the maintenance, repair or adaptation of a 
lawfully-acquired device for non-infringing purposes.60 
 
This recommendation and the accompanying observations support my suggestion above 
regarding the need to amend the Copyright Act to allow for exceptions to anti-circumvention 
provisions. If this is eventually incorporated into Canada’s Copyright Act, it would not only 
neutralize the strict application of TPMs and anti-circumvention provisions but foster more user 
access to content thereby supporting balance in the copyright system. 
Furthermore, some text of the Standing Committee’s report on recommendations 
concerning copyright and indigenous matters support my suggestion on advocating for private 
 
60 Ibid. at 72. 
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arrangement/stakeholder-led regulatory initiatives. Though focused on indigenous affairs, which 
are vitally important in unique ways that stand alone in the Canadian law reform agenda, it is 
worth pausing to appreciate what this might also and appropriately signal to other categories of 
copyright stakeholders. Addressing the concerns of the indigenous people and copyright, the 
Standing Committee recommends: 
The Committee recognizes that, in many cases, the Act fails to meet 
the expectations of Indigenous peoples with respect to the protection, 
preservation, and dissemination of their cultural expressions. The 
Committee also recognizes the need to effectively protect traditional 
arts and cultural expressions in a manner that empowers Indigenous 
communities, and to ensure that individual Indigenous creators have 
the same opportunities to fully participate in the Canadian economy as 
non-Indigenous creators. Achieving these objectives will require that 
policymakers approach the matter in creative ways. They could, for 
example, draw inspiration outside of copyright and intellectual 
property law and carefully consider how different legal traditions, 
including Indigenous legal traditions, interact with each other. Such 
work requires a more focused and extensive consultation process than 
this statutory review.61 
 
  From the quote above, I wish to emphasize two points. First, the failure of the Act to 
meet the expectations of the Indigenous people as a particular community with shared interests in 
the copyright system; and second, the recognized need to find creative solutions outside 
copyright and intellectual property law. These two points are at the core of stakeholder-led 
initiatives. The inability of copyright law to satisfactorily address the needs and interests of all 
stakeholders necessitates the need for different stakeholder blocs to resort to self-help initiatives 
and to explore outside-the-box solutions. The implementation of a stakeholder-led initiatives 
requires creative approaches beyond (but not contrary to) copyright law. Once stakeholders, in 
conformity with existing copyright law can fashion out a way (as CC did with CCL) to serve 
their interests, it can reduce the need to frequently engage in copyright law reforms while 
 
61 Ibid. at 30. 
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advancing the overarching objectives of the copyright system. However, private arrangements 
will thrive more, and with more positive results, if copyright law provides an initial level-playing 
ground and equal recognition for all stakeholders in the copyright system. 
 
6.9 Conclusion         
Premised on the preceding analyses, my position is that ICT can be regarded as 
essentially a regulatory and problem-solving instrument that can be harnessed by copyright 
stakeholders to advance their own purposes and also—equally—the purposes that animate 
copyright law. Indeed, my research shows that, in spite of ongoing conflicts and controversies, 
ICT has already been performing this role in the Canadian copyright system, as exemplified by 
uses of TPMs and CCL by content industry and free culture stakeholders respectively. 
Embracing the regulatory pluralism of the modern copyright system in practice is the most 
promising route toward ensuring the system’s ongoing balance and continued relevance into the 
future. Though this research has focused on copyright from a Canadian context, to some extent it 
mirrors the reality of copyright in other jurisdictions (particularly common law and 
commonwealth jurisdictions) and as such, the arguments and recommendations made here may 
be usefully applied internationally.  
In order to properly situate and understand the current copyright challenges in Canada, 
chapter one of this research traced the contours of the origin of the Statute of Anne of 1710 – the 
first copyright law. Additionally, the historical analysis of the Statute of Anne would be 
incomplete without beaming the search light of my examination on the Stationers’ Company, 
who prior to the Statute of Anne, had exclusive (monopoly) right to book publication.  
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My research drew two major conclusions from chapter one. The first is that copyright is 
trapped in a vicious circle; and second, that this challenge continues to linger to this day. I make 
this claim for several reasons. First, in the debates and arguments leading up to the enactment of 
the Statute of Anne, the meaning and purpose of copyright law was subject to manipulation and 
misleading arguments, which undoubtedly happens today. Secondly, the characters in this 
“copyfight,” as Blayne Haggart calls it, remain largely the same. On the one hand, the large 
multinational corporations and individuals with significant market and lobbying power (whom I 
refer to in this research as the content industry stakeholders) bear the marks of the Stationers’ 
Company of old; on the other hand, the present day copyright scholars and all those who believe 
in the free culture ideology play much the same role as John Milton and Daniel Defoe who called 
for an end to the exclusive monopoly power granted to the Stationers' Company. Additionally, 
the legislature (unsurprisingly) continues to be a copyright battle ground, just as it was in the 
period before the enactment of the Statute of Anne, which was characterised by intense lobbying. 
The judiciary, just as it played a role in post-Statute of Anne cases in limiting the claim by the 
Stationers’ Company that their common law rights were forever, continues to play the same 
dialogic role today in defining the purpose of copyright law and articulating the meaning of 
balance. My submission is that largely the same circle of challenges has been on autopilot from 
the first copyright law until now, with the content industry maintaining significant control of the 
copyright industry—and the copyright system more generally. A sudden disruption of the 
established pattern emerged, however, with the steady rise of digital technology in the 20th 
century. 
The impact of the internet and digital innovation in the 20th century has been amazing, 
and it has revolutionized activities almost in every facet of human life. The content industry 
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stakeholders had significant control in the activities of the copyright industry, at least from the 
perspective of monetization of creative works. The control was possible because creative works 
existed mainly in physical form. This enabled them to more readily control access to copies and 
so enjoy the artificial scarcity manufactured by the copyright system. Access could be restricted 
to authorized and typically fee-paying users. This business model was relied upon as a source of 
revenue generation for the content industry stakeholders for centuries. 
In chapter two, I traced the transition and development of early forms of copying 
technologies to its present digital sophistication, which has tremendously altered the copyright 
industry. The creation and reproduction of works have become much easier, faster and higher 
quality with the use of ICT; distribution of content no longer requires the traditional and 
expensive structures and networks that can only be afforded by large corporations with 
significant physical and financial resources. The sophistication of ICT enables the broad 
dissemination works as well as easy access to the works. The easy use and manipulability of 
digital content in this new era also gives more voice to the user and weakens the traditional 
business model. My evaluations in chapter two address some salient points to explore the reality 
of the ICT-driven copyright system – the impact of weakening the traditional business, resistance 
to ICT, the embrace of ICT, and lastly, the recognition that ICT possesses the potential to ensure 
peaceful co-existence among stakeholders. Following the new wave of empowerment of users 
and individual creators to create, distribute and access content, there was resistance to ICT from 
content industry stakeholders claiming that digital technology and the internet would 
significantly reduce their revenue and discourage further creativity. While this claim may have 
been born of some genuine and reasonable concerns, it turns out to have been exaggerated. In 
fact, the opposite turns out to have been the case. The content industry stakeholders saw the 
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potential in ICT and increasingly, rather than fighting the development of ICT, they use it to 
explore and create new business models for digitized content.  
The point to emphasize in the examination of the impact of ICT in the copyright industry 
is that, despite the controversies and arguments it has generated, it has proven to be a useful 
means for both the content industry and free culture stakeholders to achieve their goals. 
Therefore, ICT undoubtedly has a significant role to play in the future of copyright, especially as 
an instrument for stakeholders to realize their goals and co-exist. 
The emergence of the information age triggered many urgent calls for copyright law 
reforms. As such, my research then turned to consider the promises and perils of seeking 
copyright law reform to address perceived ICT challenges. In particular, I explored efforts at the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to create, towards the turn of the twentieth 
century, a legal framework to address the challenges and opportunities of copyright in a 
networked world.  As an example of the difficulties inherent in this approach, Chapter Three 
captured Canada’s struggle and fraught attempts to implement the WITs. Prior to the details on 
Canada’s copyright law reform in the digital age, and to properly contextualize Canada’s 
copyright law reform agenda, I examined the triggers behind Canada’s copyright law reform in 
the ICT age – the WITs. In the first part of chapter three, I analyzed how the origin, 
development, debates/meeting sessions, controversies and politics culminated in the adoption of 
the WITs, which included the controversial TPMs and anti-circumvention provisions. The 
second part of chapter three then focused on Canada’s implementation of the WITs. 
My analysis unearthed three crucial points, which serve to reinforce my position that 
ICT, if well utilized, has the potential to engender the peaceful and productive co-existence of 
the free culture and the content industry stakeholders. First, although the main theme in the WITs 
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was to provide a framework to make copyright law adapt to the new changes brought by digital 
technology, it turned out to be that the main idea was to limit users’ access to digital works by 
using technology – TPMs – and supporting them through additional legal protections. The 
United States was a major proponent of this idea and played a pivotal role in the development of 
the WITs. Consequently, in Canada’s implementation of the WITs, the United States intensely 
lobbied Canada to include the TPMs and anti-circumvention provisions in its copyright law. In 
summary, through the incorporation of TPMs and anti-circumvention provisions in Canada’s 
copyright law, extra layers of protection for creative works were created to the advantage of the 
content industry stakeholders. This demonstrates that the instrumentalist approach to copyright 
apparently has a better chance of influencing the copyright narrative and law reform to their gain 
and to the potential detriment of the purpose of copyright and the public interest.   
Second, the analysis of the development of the WITs and Canada’s copyright law reform 
provided a typical example of how law reform alone is unable to solve the challenges in the 
copyright system. After a protracted process of copyright law reform in Canada to implement the 
WITs, the outcome still leaves many stakeholders unsatisfied.  In fact, the introduction of anti-
circumvention provisions may have done more harm than good, particularly as implemented in 
the CMA. The introduction of anti-circumvention following the model adopted by Canada and 
the United States articulates an incomplete narrative about the influence of ICT in copyright – 
reflecting the notion that it is a threat that needs to be under surveillance and subject to private 
control in order to contain the damage it may do to content industries and the copyright system. 
Third, it took Canada about sixteen years to implement the WITs after a long and 
exhausting process, which arguably obstructed progress towards the much-needed balance. On 
the other hand, CCL, though far from perfect, in its almost eighteen years of existence has 
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created a platform where over 1 billion works have been licensed. Here the value is not just in 
the number, but in the intangible benefits that flow from granting so many people free access to 
so many works, which in turn fuels their creativity and innovation and furthers the public interest 
In my view, the development and uptake of the CCL is a significant move towards achieving 
balance in the copyright system. The CCL initiative leverages the power of ICT to enable 
creators and users achieve their goals in the copyright system without intense lobbying, debating, 
controversies and arguments. I strongly believe that the realization of some degree of reasonable 
balance in the copyright system will depend largely on a stakeholder-driven regulation of this 
nature while leveraging the capacities of ICT. CCL is, in other words, an example, which should 
inspire other such initiatives. 
The inability of copyright law to adequately regulate the activities in the copyright 
industry both in Canada and globally creates a situation where stakeholders try to adapt and act 
pragmatically in order to achieve their goals. This may result in the manipulation of the system 
by stakeholders to suit their interest at the expense of the purpose of copyright and the public 
interest.  
Chapters Four and Five studied how the free culture and the content industry stakeholders 
have explored the opportunities created by ICT to adapt and achieve their goals in a technology-
driven copyright system. The analyses carried out in these chapters reveal how copyright 
stakeholders could potentially use ICT as a means to achieve their goals through ground-up 
initiatives and private ordering. Using the CCL and TPM, I examine the free culture and the 
content industry stakeholders respectively to reveal how they utilized ICT in the pursuit of their 
goals. 
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The free culture community, in a bid to promote access to creative works, encourage the 
dissemination of content, promote learning and creativity, and give creators and users a new way 
of creative interaction, created the CCL initiative. The Creative Commons Organization, through 
its licensing idea, leveraged the immense benefits of the ubiquity and accessibility of the internet 
to achieve its objective as an organization. On the other hand, using a different private-ordering 
approach—that is, the use of TPMs and anti-circumvention provisions—the content industry 
stakeholders also claimed to promote the public interest, support creativity and incentivise 
creators in the copyright system by ensuring a functioning digital content industry. 
The central message that emerges out of the arguments and discussions I articulate in 
chapters four and five is that ICT in the copyright system can be a double-edged sword. 
Depending on the intention of who is wielding the sword of ICT, it could be used to promote the 
public interest and work towards balancing the interest of copyright stakeholders, or it could be 
used by a particular stakeholder(s) to dominate and control the system to the detriment of the 
public interest, thereby creating imbalance. While the CCL scheme may be flawed in some of its 
approaches, and far from perfect, in my view, it significantly advances the public interest, 
promotes access to, and dissemination of content, fosters creativity, promotes balance in the 
copyright system, enables creators choose how their works are used and encourages 
transformative use of content. The content industry also plays a significant role in the copyright 
system, however, through investment in content creation, job creation, generating huge revenues 
both nationally and internationally through new business models, inspiring creativity, advocating 
for incentives for creators, etc. All these undoubtedly promote the purposes of the copyright 
system, save for the intention to control and monopolize the industry. 
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The incorporation of TPMs and anti-circumvention provisions in Canada’s copyright law 
following an approach that highly restricts users’ access to content is a significant setback and 
demonstrates the continued existence of copyright hegemony. This approach to ICT in the 
copyright system stifles creativity and is incongruous with the achievement of the purposes of 
copyright. By unduly limiting access it forecloses certain benefits to users and the public that 
technology might otherwise afford, and that copyright has traditionally permitted. 
I strongly believe that the copyright system is ripe and primed for regulatory pluralism. 
The internet and digital technology could potentially play a significant role in enabling the 
pursuit of stakeholder interests while promoting the core purposes of copyright law. This will 
require recognizing and supporting a variety of regulatory or quasi-regulatory initiatives 
undertaken in concert by copyright stakeholders with shared values and common objectives. Law 
reform processes can and must continue to respond to technological developments, however, 
maintaining the appropriate balance between owner and user rights, protection and access. The 
current Statutory Review of the Copyright Act presents an opportunity to fix the flaws in 
Canada’s Copyright Act by effecting the necessary amendments to foster balance among 
copyright stakeholders—beginning with limiting the harmful effects of TPMs and their over-
protection. In my view, embracing this kind of regulatory pluralism is the best hope for ensuring 
that copyright can continue to advance its purposes and the public interest as technologies evolve 
and stakeholders strategize.   
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